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Title: Academica
Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
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THE
ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED
BY
JAMES S. REID,
M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
LONDON:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1874
[All Rights reserved.]
TO
THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
THE ACADEMICA,
THIS EDITION
IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
BY
THE EDITOR.
PREFACE.
Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has
edited the
Academica. In Germany the last edition with explanatory
notes is that of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and
untrustworthiness of Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong
evidence; while the work of Davies, though in every way far superior to
that of Goerenz, is very deficient when judged by the criticism of the
present time.
This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures
given by me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work
in its present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the
Universities, and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where
the philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those
where an attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient
Philosophy as will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now
required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford
and Cambridge. My notes have been written throughout with a practical
reference to the needs of junior students. During the last three or four
years I have read the
Academica with a large number of intelligent
pupils, and there is scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested
by some difficulty or want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody
in an Introduction such information concerning Cicero's philosophical
views and the literary history of the
Academica as could not be
readily got from existing books; next, to provide a good text; then to
aid the student in obtaining a higher knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity,
and lastly, to put it in his power to learn thoroughly the philosophy
with which Cicero deals.
My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in
the edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second
edition of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that
editor. I have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass
without carefully weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also
studied all original criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain
access. The result is a text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than
that of Halm. My obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently
acknowledged in my notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled
Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos, published in 1825
at Copenhagen, but never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in
the edition of Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few
passages I have introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the
conjecttires of other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the
MSS. If any apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the
notes, questions of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from
a conviction that the very excellence of the texts now in use is
depriving a Classical training of a great deal of its old educational
value. The judgment was better cultivated when the student had to fight
his way through bad texts to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the
Latin tongue. The acceptance of results without a knowledge of the
processes by which they are obtained is worthless for the purposes of
education, which is thus made to rest on memory alone. I have therefore
done my best to place before the reader the arguments for and against
different readings in the most important places where the text is
doubtful.
My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the
students for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller
acquaintance than they ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties
of language which the best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide
them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding
editor of Cicero must build. His edition of the
De Finibus
contains more valuable material for illustrating, not merely the
language, but also the subject-matter of the
Academica, than all
the professed editions of the latter work in existence. Yet, even after
Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be done in pointing out what
is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have therefore added very many
references from my own reading, and from other sources. Wherever a
quotation would not have been given but for its appearance in some other
work, I have pointed out the authority from whom it was taken. I need
hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to look out all the
references given. It was necessary to provide material by means of which
the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if it were new to
him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that occurred. Want of
space has compelled me often to substitute a mere reference for an actual
quotation.
As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
touched upon somewhere in the
Academica, it is evidently
impossible for an editor to give information which would be complete for
a reader who is studying that subject for the first time. I have
therefore tried to enable readers to find easily for themselves the
information they require, and have only dwelt in my own language upon
such philosophical difficulties as were in some special way bound up with
the
Academica. The two books chiefly referred to in my notes are
the English translation of Zeller's
Stoics, Epicureans and
Sceptics (whenever Zeller is quoted without any further description
this book is meant), and the
Historia Philosophiae of Ritter and
Preller. The
pages, not the
sections, of the fourth edition
of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's
De Finibus,
all teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as
bringing together much scattered information illustrative of the
Academica, which was before difficult of access. The present work
will, I hope, prepare the way for an exhaustive edition either from my
own or some more competent hand. It must be regarded as an experiment,
for no English scholar of recent times has treated any portion of
Cicero's philosophical works with quite the purpose which I have kept in
view and have explained above. Should this attempt meet with favour, I
propose to edit after the same plan some others of the less known and
less edited portions of Cicero's writings.
In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited
I cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that
intellectual disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this
University, and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of
English scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
JAMES S. REID.
CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
December, 1873.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. =
De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat.
= Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum;
Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr.,
Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium;
In Cat. = In Catilinam.
Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia
Socratis; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto.
Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. =
Pyrrhoneфn Hypotyposeфn Syntagmata.
Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et
Platonis.
Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos;
De Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad
Helvidium.
Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv.
= Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc.
= Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzьge der Griechischen Etymologie.
Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd.
= Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits,
or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
subjunctive.
R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium
locis contexta.
THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
[i]
INTRODUCTION.
I. Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
Letters: 90—45 B.C.
It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and
spent the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived that strong
love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout
his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to
feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for
the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of
Athens, whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he
had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at
once to the tenets of the [ii] master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life
a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable
disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps,
the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any
literary power.[4]
Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
Epicurean school.[5]
At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important
to the orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the
monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days
with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems never to have been much
attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between
the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion
set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became
an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil
heir to a not inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
accomplished [iii] men of his time, and Cicero's feelings
towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war.
Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic
philosopher, he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice
of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for
Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly,
as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been
brought into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of
each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his
egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student.
In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to
philosophy.[11] It
would be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection [iv] which
subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks;
but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then
Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning
the ethical part of Greek philosophy.
During the years 88—81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly
with the study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many
ambitious works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him
at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the
Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular
course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one
philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he
was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern
Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla
through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of
Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which
rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even
when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other
cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by
his passionate style of oratory[13].
The whole two years 79—77 B.C. were spent in the society of
Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at
Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the
exception [v] of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent
rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city[14]. By the advice of
Philo himself[15],
Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as
Diogenes calls him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the
Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to
his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in
spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to
find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of
Carneades whom he had known[18]. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along
with Atticus who loved him beyond all other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much
time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the
two pupils[20].
Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere
explicitly stated. Cicero must at this time have attained an almost
complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.
There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school
then at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose
lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed
Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three
notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of
Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is probable,
however, from a mention of [vi] him in the De Oratore, that Cicero knew
himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named
by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
unknown to him.
The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at
this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a
Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to
treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised
over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point
which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still
continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however,
make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the
learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught after
Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers
of the time, both for talent and acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
pointed style[25];
in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the philosophers of the
age[26]. A
considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was
strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso,
Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of
Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted
with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the Academica[28] he is mentioned in
such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
[vii]
The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had
been to learn philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he
devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the guidance
of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was
his old friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian
school[29]. Cicero, however, formed while at Rhodes one
friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy,
that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius,
the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero
makes reference in his works oftener than to any other
instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom
Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put
himself to much trouble[31]; as a minute inquirer[32]. He
is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of
affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works
more than those of any other author[33]. Posidonius
was at a later time resident at Rome, and stayed in
Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of
Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time.
Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius,
belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was
well acquainted with the works of the former, he does
not seem to have known either personally.
From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters
begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political
affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed
much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; [viii] and we
know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style
by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers.
During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we
may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many
Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the
Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of
the Optimates; to this he added such reading as his leisure would allow.
The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus,
which range over the years 68—62 B.C., afford many proofs of the
abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier
part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a
library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the
strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for
books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the midst of
his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest for
the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
his intellect, but never his heart.
The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to
indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his
speeches, which were [ix] crowded, he says, with the maxims of
philosophy[35]; the
history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he
sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the
poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two
later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and
keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of
leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at
this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]." At this period
of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum,
Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these
facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere
dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of
Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of
literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department
considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with
the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38] will give a fair
picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political
writings of [x] the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
Dicaearchus[39]. He
also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of Theopompus[40].
The years from 59—57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private
cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return
from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring
literature" with a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla,
the son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us,
his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which
Atticus had, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of
office. Towards the end of the year, he was busily engaged on the De
Oratore, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with
Greek philosophy[43]. In the following year (54) he writes
that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns
unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the
student[44]. During
this year he was again for the most part at those of his country villas
where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the
De Republica, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his
old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop[45]. Aristotle is
especially mentioned as one of the authors [xi] read at this time[46]. In the year 52
B.C. came the De Legibus, written amid many distracting
occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
philosophers of the Socratic schools.
In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens,
much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the
house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His
acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the
affectionate mention in the Brutus[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of
Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens.
It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil
of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in
which Epicurus had lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat
disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the
only man of merit then resident there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his
province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at
Athens as head of the Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at
Mitylene, where Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
thoughts till the end of 50. [xii] Yet he yearned for Athens and
philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful
city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build
a προπυλον at the
Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It seems the
Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues
to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
the books De Republica[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still
kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke
of conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes,
with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who
accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56]. From thence they
went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his
friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of
Atticus[58].
On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The
letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times
contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn
in the De Republica[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's
description of the tyrant is present to [xiii] his mind[60]; when, he
deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recals
the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of
the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious to find Cicero, in the
very midst of civil war, poring over the book of Demetrius the Magnesian
concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in arguing with
himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny[63]. Nothing could
more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but
accident a politician. In these evil days, however, nothing was long to
his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant[64].
As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46
he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a
letter written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my
books." These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear
richer fruit than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also
to Sulpicius[67].
The Partitiones Oratoriae, the Paradoxa, the Orator,
and the Laudatio Catonis, to which Caesar replied by his
Anticato, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the
year the Hortensius and the De Finibus had probably both
been planned and commenced. [xiv] Early in the following year the
Academica, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was
written.
I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero
as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion
of his life which preceded the writing of the Academica. Even the
evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect
indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual
philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at
no time had he been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge
made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
period—the Hortensius—that he was a mere tiro in
philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more
occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic
life[69]. Did the
scope of this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in
showing from a minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with
ancient authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as
accurate as it was extensive. So far as the Academica is
concerned, I have had in my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's
substantial accuracy; of the success of the defence I must leave the
reader to judge. During the progress of this work I shall have to expose
the groundlessness of many feelings and judgments now current which have
contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's philosophical
attainments, but there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no
better opportunity of mentioning [xv] than the present. It is this. Cicero, the
philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the
politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness,
vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in
philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into
their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance the
illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the De Legibus as "an oasis in
the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political
partizanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in
hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the
Academica.
II. The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero.
In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student
of philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed
historical examination of the later Greek schools—the Stoic,
Peripatetic, Epicurean and new Academic. These it would be necessary to
know, not merely as they came from the hands of their founders, but as
they existed in Cicero's age; Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as
Posidonius and the other pupils of Panaetius propounded it; not merely
the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and
Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new
Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and Carneades; the
medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put forward by
Antiochus in the name of the Old [xvi] Academy. A systematic
attempt to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine
held by these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements
concerning any particular school are generally tested by comparing them
with the assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier
representatives of the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at
once concluded that Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all
probability, he is uttering opinions which would have been recognised as
genuine by those who were at the head of the school in his day. The
criticism of Madvig even is not free from this error, as will be seen
from my notes on several passages of the Academica[70]. As my space
forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I have indicated as desirable,
I can but describe in rough outline the relation in which Cicero stands
to the chief schools.
The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
standard[71]. We
have in the Academica Cicero's view of the first problem: that the
attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To go more into
detail here would be to anticipate the text of the Lucullus as
well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school,
and in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine
that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against
which all the other schools [xvii] were combined[72]. In that which was most distinctively
New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero.
Nothing was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he
was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on
both sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition
with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth.
One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
arrogance[73].
Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most opposite
opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all
doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart from
his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, and
repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In positiveness
of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and disgraceful,
unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a touch of feeling
thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar to some put
forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to Mill, to show
that the free conflict of opinion is necessary [xviii] to the progress
of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to maturity
in Greece[77].
Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, says Cicero, there
philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a warning example, and the
baneful effects of authority are often depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires
us to find out what can be said for every view. It is a positive duty to
discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old
Academy and Aristotle[80]. Those who demand a dogmatic statement
of belief are mere busybodies[81]. The Academics glory in their freedom
of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they
will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does
Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the Tusculan
Disputations, he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole
of the fourth book of the De Finibus, and when the discrepancy is
pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the score
that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius
videtur[84]." The
Academic sips the best of every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of
philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from
Chrysippus[86]. The
Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he
makes it his sole [xix] aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and
others of the mists of error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus
the Antiochean[88].
While professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero
indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek
for the truth, has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and Epicureans cared
nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those
with which the common sense of the world could have most sympathy[92]. The Academy also
was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Compared with its
system, all other philosophies were plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the
Socratic tradition was most estimable, ceteris paribus, and that
man was Carneades[94].
In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard,
we must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of [xx] conduct (ars
vivendi). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely
estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be
reared. This is equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the
dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were
mere outworks or ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school
was carried on. These were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy;
in time of peace ethics held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a
key to unlock many difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may
instance one passage in the beginning of the Academica
Posteriora[95],
which has given much trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro
with having deserted the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge.
How is this to be reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he
never recanted the doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus.
Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo had been too busy with their polemic
against Zeno and his followers, maintained on logical grounds, to deal
much with ethics. On the other hand, in the works which Cicero had
written and published before the Academica, wherever he had
touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The works
themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical [xxi] difference,
would naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus
Academia," so long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought
dialectic to the front, and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would
naturally regard him as a deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This
view is confirmed by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote,
the Academic dialectic had found no eminent expositor. So much was this
the case, that when Cicero wrote the Academica he was charged with
constituting himself the champion of an exploded and discredited school[96].
Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the
sphere of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in
the De Legibus when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he
begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects,
to be silent[97].
Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, is in the
De Legibus spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks with
something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of
Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
should be the only true philosophers [xxii] after all[100]. There was a
kind of magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited
to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions, therefore, we
often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism than even his
teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the philosophers of
the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The Stoics
maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero agrees
with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a life
enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be happy,
but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic
schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) and to allow
that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he
were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he admits the
purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104]. These
opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble
craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's
general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he
caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever
stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
[xxiii] regarded chiefly the dialectic. It
is just in this that the difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To
the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter
treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of
doubt[106]. On the
whole Cicero was more in accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in
all points, however: for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the
Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded
that they were Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the
Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in
his joys and sorrows, refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some
points Cicero was inconsistent. In the De Finibus he argued that
the difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of
terms; in the Tusculan Disputations he held it to be real. The
most Stoic in tone of all his works are the Tusculan Disputations
and the De Officiis.
With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a
comparatively small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this
branch of philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient
theology was, as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical
science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very
strongly to sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal
operation of divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were
impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine [xxiv] government of the
universe were denied[109]. It went to Cicero's heart that
Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic
theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim
was to arouse men to the investigation of the truth[110]. At the same
time, while really following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often believed
himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose from the actual
adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, which they
gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious and the
genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111]. Still, Cicero
contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic physics by a
study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of his notions
about physics, the Timaeus of Plato, which he knew well and
translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
aware of the fact.
Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's
estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not
very powerfully represented during his lifetime. The philosophical
descendants of the author of the Organon were notorious for their
ignorance of logic[112], and in ethics had approximated
considerably to the Stoic teaching. While not much influenced by the
school, Cicero generally [xxv] treats it tenderly for the sake of its
great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. With
the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood absolutely
alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they discarded
mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing but
loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
III. The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works.
It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a
philosopher, and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is
true, but still absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of
Cicero's purpose in writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek
speculation. The conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite
unwarranted. If the later philosophy of the Greeks is of any value,
Cicero's works are of equal value, for it is only from them that we get
any full or clear view of it. Any one who attempts to reconcile the
contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch
and other authorities, will perhaps feel little inclination to cry out
against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. Such outcry, now so common, is
due largely to the want, which I have already noticed, of any clear
exposition of the [xxvi] variations in doctrine which the late
Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before the
Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
(if we except the third book of the De Officiis), which he does
not freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the
time when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault
rather than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no
one had propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had
been simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing
tenets. It would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two
centuries are therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not
the substance of the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which
ultimately exercised no unimportant influence on society and on the
Christian religion itself.
When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have
been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed
study to those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the
best Greek speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the
education of his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at
the same time to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism
throughout Italy. The doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin
in a shape suited to catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a
very large Epicurean literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty
traces is now lost. C. Amafinius, mentioned in [xxvii] the
Academica[113], was the first to write, and his
books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large number of imitators,
who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in Cicero's strong
language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115]. Rabirius and
Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of Horace, were two
of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various reasons for
their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the
fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the
voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It
is exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean
literature dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics
than with the ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the
fact that the Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for
morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and did not
much feel the need of any speculative system; while the general decay
among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied
as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, prepared the
way for the acceptance of a purely mechanical explanation of the
universe. But of this subject, interesting and important as it is in
itself, and neglected though it has been, I can treat no farther.
These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached [xxviii] by
Cicero for their uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not
read them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious
question arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero
had for omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman
Epicureans. The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible
to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being
unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of
Epicurus, preferred to keep silence, which nothing compelled him to
break, since Lucretius was an obscure man and only slowly won his way to
favour with the public.
In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero
had a patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the
reproach that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He
often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had
left its mark on the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that
philosophy was best left to the Greek language, he replies with
indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a
glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled
to resort to Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the
Greek is a richer tongue than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the
Roman intellect to deal with philosophical [xxix] enquiries, he will
not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has
been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made.
The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an
impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the
wane in Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of
oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he
claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so
many of the most prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and
in those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125]. Philosophy
took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and politics[126]. It is strange
to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies as he does for devoting
himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to
egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such studies were
merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them
seemed well enough for Greeks, [xxx] but for Romans unmanly, unpractical and
unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others,
like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy
was good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that Cicero
should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging the
pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were
roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed.
The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the
books, and many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as
to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were
accustomed to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy
could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been
mastered[132].
This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest
works which we possess, the Academica and the De Finibus,
required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero
never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy [xxxi]
to the Romans. He never pretended to present new views of philosophy, or
even original criticisms on its history. The only thing he proclaims to
be his own is his style. Looked at in this, the true light, his work
cannot be judged a failure. Those who contrive to pronounce this judgment
must either insist upon trying the work by a standard to which it does
not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek philosophy it copies, or
perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed worthlessness of the
philosophy of his age.
In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his
oratorical and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
Hortensius, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only two
works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
the Academica, were the De Consolatione, founded on
Crantor's book, περι
πενθους, and the
Hortensius, which was introductory to philosophy, or, as it was
then called, protreptic.
For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of
their composition, the student must be referred to the Dict. of
Biography, Art. Cicero.
IV. History of the Academica.
On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45
B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which
was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and [xxxii]
Circeii[134]. Here
he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
De Consolatione was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
together[135]. At
other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near
his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall[136]. Often exertion
failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he
would return to the forum and the senate. A grief, which books and
solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt,
in the busy city[137].
It was amid such surroundings that the Academica was written.
The first trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a
letter of Cicero to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks
of his bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus
very much for historical and biographical details, and in the letter in
question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed
in writing the Academica. The words with which he introduces his
request imply that he had determined on some new work to which our
Academica would correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome
the embassy which Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader
of the Epicurean school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι
at Athens. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in
the De Oratore[140], [xxxiii] where Cicero
speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name.
It may be with reference to the progress of the Academica that in
a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder of
his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention
in his letters to Atticus of the Academica[142]. He declares that however much his
detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not read
the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the same
space of time that he has taken to write them[143].
In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
Antium[144], where
he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same
place he wrote to Atticus of his intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome
by way of Lanuvium about the middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately
following Tullia's death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she
died. This he felt now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either
abandon Tusculum altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even
ten years would make the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero
[xxxiv] wrote to Atticus that he had
finished while at Astura duo magna συνταγματα,
words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars, including Madvig,
have understood that the first edition of the Academica, along
with the De Finibus, is intended. Against this view the reasons
adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the letters to
Atticus that the De Finibus was being worked out book by book long
after the first edition of the Academica had been placed in the
hands of Atticus. The De Finibus was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it was
still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
Academica[151]. The final arrangement of the
characters in the De Finibus is announced later still[152]; and even at a
later date Cicero complains that Balbus had managed to obtain
surreptitiously a copy of the fifth book before it was properly
corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia having copied the whole five books
while in that state[153]. A passage in the De
Divinatione[154] affords almost direct evidence that
the Academica was published before the De Finibus. On all
these grounds I hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero
describes as having been finished simultaneously at Astura.
Another view of the συνταγματα
in question is that they are simply the two books, entitled
Catulus and Lucullus, of the Priora Academica. In my
opinion [xxxv] the word συνταγμα, the use
of which to denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains
its natural meaning. Cicero uses the word συνταξις of the
whole work[156],
while συνταγμα[157], and συγγραμμα[158], designate
definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content,
then, to refer the words of Cicero to the Catulus and
Lucullus. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides that
this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the
Hortensius (or de Philosophia) and the Priora
Academica are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is
correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the
Hortensius which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are
quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before
the Academica. This would be clear from the mention in the
Academica Posteriora alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the De
Finibus[160]
place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the Hortensius
had been published a sufficiently long time before the De Finibus,
to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in
the Tusculan Disputations and the De Divinatione[161] the
Hortensius and the Academica are mentioned together in such
a way as to show that the former was finished and given to the world
before the latter. Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's
conjecture, except the doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word
συνταγμα, which
equally affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
[xxxvi]
Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
Hortensius and the Academica must have been more closely
connected, in style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting
perhaps the Academica and the De Finibus. The interlocutors
in the Hortensius were exactly the same as in the Academica
Priora, for the introduction of Balbus into some editions of the
fragments of the Hortensius is an error[162]. The discussion in the Academica
Priora is carried on at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the
Hortensius at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather
surprising that under these circumstances there should be but one direct
reference to the Hortensius in the Lucullus[163].
While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45,
Cicero sent Atticus the Torquatus, as he calls the first book of
the De Finibus[164]. He had already sent the first
edition of the Academica to Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia
had been added to the Catulus and Lucullus, in which the
public characters from whom the books took their names were extolled. In
all probability the extant prooemium of the Lucullus is the one
which was then affixed. Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, had
doubtless pointed out the incongruity between the known attainments of
Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they were made to take in difficult
philosophical discussions. It is not uncharacteristic of Cicero that his
first plan for healing the incongruity should be a [xxxvii]
deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of statements
concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans which he
knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I may
note, as of some interest in connection with the Academica, the
fact that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was
one from Varro[166].
On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says,
to arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing
attentions of Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it
had been his intention to go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still
unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the Academica,
for the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of
Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on
the receipt of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work
should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the Academica, the De
Finibus[170].
Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems
to have been chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times
anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years before he had
pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of
the works on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to
comply with the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full
two years before the Academica was [xxxviii] written, to
dedicate to Cicero his great work De Lingua Latino. In answer to
the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much
dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is
evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of that work.
His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making
any progress[173],
shows that there could have been little of anything like friendship
between the two. Apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought
the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since the De Finibus was
already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer to Varro the
Academica, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble
birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they possess
that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been
made in the first edition of the Academica to maintain[176]. For them
another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
Academica would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus,
and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It happened
that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at
Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
Academica, which he now divided into four books instead of two,
making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position
occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite an [xxxix] inferior one, but
he was so pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often
in the future such minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta
should also be introduced was found impracticable[180].
Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his
plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the
work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over
again before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for
these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was
obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he could not
disclose in a letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did
appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of
Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is
δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.
So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles,
it may be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than
his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue
[183]." Cicero, then,
feared Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical
fastidiousness. Before these explanations Atticus
[xl] had concluded that
Cicero was afraid of the effect the work might produce on the public.
This notion Cicero assured him to be wrong; the only cause for his
vacillation was his doubt as to how Varro would receive the dedication
[184]. Atticus would
seem to have repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured
Cicero that there was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a
general assurance, and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the
reasons from which it proceeded
[185]. In order to stimulate his friend,
Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown
more favour
[186].
We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed
ignorant of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of
being actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently
while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the
De
Finibus, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the
dedication
[187].
Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the
Academica is often given in the letters. He tells us that it
extended, on the whole, to greater length than the first, though much had
been omitted;
[xli] he adds, "Unless human self love
deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves
have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them....
This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better
than the last
[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
possess
[189]."
Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what success, but with a
care which nothing could surpass
[190]." The binding and adornment of the
presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter
accompanying it was carefully elaborated
[191]. Yet after everything had been done
and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy as
to the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus:
"I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own
risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who is also a
follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou wert ever wont,
flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part "shuddered" at the
idea of taking the responsibility
[192]. After the work had passed into his
hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from
getting into circulation until they could meet one another in Rome
[193]. This warning
was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had just managed to get
access to the
De Finibus[194]. In a letter, dated apparently a day
or two later, Cicero declared his intention
[xlii] to meet Atticus at
Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable to do so,
after a consultation
[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
approve any course that might be taken
[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as
Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then,"
says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal step; oh
dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter
stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear
how the matter stands
[197]." Again, a little later: "You have
been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment
upon them, but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books
in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work
on the
Tusculan Disputations[198]. A copy of the first edition had
already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which
Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of
the
Academica, at a time when the fate of the second edition was
still undecided
[199]. From this fact we may conclude that
Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. If he
consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies of the first edition,
it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of course assumes that
Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, wishes to have the
"Splendidiora, breviora,
[xliii] meliora." Still, on every occasion
which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition
the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after
the
Academica Posteriora was completed
[200], and often subsequently, when he most
markedly mentioned the number of the books as four
[201]. That he wished
the work to bear the title
Academica is clear
[202]. The
expressions
Academica quaestio,
Ακαδημικη
συνταξις, and
Academia, are merely descriptive
[203]; so also is the frequent appellation
Academici libri[204]. The title
Academicae
Quaestiones, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the
Tusculanae Quaestiones, which was supported by the false notion,
found as early as Pliny
[205], that Cicero had a villa called
Academia, at which the book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his
Tusculan villa, which he called his Academia, but we are certain from the
letters to Atticus that the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium,
and Arpinum.
Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well
[206], but the second
edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books are
expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
title
Academica. Augustine speaks of them only as
Academici
libri, and his references show that he knew the second edition only.
Lactantius also uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks
of
[xliv] the
Academica. Plutarch shows
only a knowledge of the first edition
[207].
I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of
the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus.
That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding
theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the
two editions. A fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of
Goerenz. I now proceed to examine into the constitution and arrangement
of the two editions.
a. The lost dialogue "Catulus."
The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the Lucullus
are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party
whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue
was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the
political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely
inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the
time, and the nature of their connection with Cicero.
Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
Lucullus[208] that he did little more than put
forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would,
doubtless, have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for
himself, but in that case, as in the De Oratore, the author would
have been [xlv] compelled to exclude himself from the
conversation[209].
The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as
Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render
literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard[210]. For the
arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their ατριψια with respect to
philosophy[211].
This ατριψια did not amount
to απαιδευσια,
or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of
philosophy in the Hortensius[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the
father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of
Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where
the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning
of the son[213].
But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be
considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.
During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of
the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence
are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one of
the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be
classed with the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law,
and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic
power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one
[xlvi] voice "On you[217]." He alone was bold enough to rebuke
the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no
storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire
either fear or hope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence,
though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not
only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death[221].
Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there
were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the viri
consulares who had given their unreserved approval to the measures
taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the
first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title
"Father of his country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose
himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for
the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden
times[223]." The
statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never
been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except
when Cinna held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast
between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague
Antonius[224].
Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house
of the two Catuli[225].
[xlvii]
We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
edition of the Academica from circulation, he affixed a prooemium
to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second.
From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit
in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a
portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the Catulus. The
achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as
those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made
to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once
more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received
from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in
the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere.
Some allusion most likely was made to the connection of Archias with the
Catuli, and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honour. Then the
occasion of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the place where it was
held, were indicated. The place was the Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned
date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63,
the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the
Lucullus[227]. It is well known that in the
arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
anachronisms.
The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly
made to the Hortensius, in which the same speakers had been
engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of [xlviii] which would fall to Cicero's
share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the
dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views,
at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before
we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications
offered by the Lucullus, it is necessary to speak of the character
and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to
mention his sapientia, which implies a certain knowledge of
philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the
wisest, the holiest of men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of
surpassing worth, a second Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the De
Oratore, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view
of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is
treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made
to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and
philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance
with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the
Greeks from the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the
Latin historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek
rhetorical teaching, while he bestows [xlix] high commendation
on the early sophists[234]. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle
and Theophrastus is most to his mind[235]. An account is given by him of the
history of Greek speculation in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin
style made him seem to many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written
a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had
imitated[238], and
was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
Academica that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In
the De Oratore, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does not
declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his
long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded
that he was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools.
Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator
spring, and the whole tone of the De Oratore shows that Catulus
could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The
probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of
Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his
information [l] from books and especially from the writings
of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of
the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he
does in the case of Antonius[243], and Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any
direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place,
although one passage in the Lucullus seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo
had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one
at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well
acquainted with his opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and
Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the
latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were
probably not known to Catulus[248].
I now proceed to draw out from the references in the Lucullus
the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably
introduced by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the
speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon
the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated
with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of
the older Academics[250]. The most important part of the
speech, however, must have consisted of a defence of Carneades and
Arcesilas against [li] the dogmatic schools[251]. Catulus
evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with
that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly probable that he
touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he
developed fully that positive teaching about the πιθανον which was so
distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which
concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly
aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day
before[252]. On
the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the
constructive part of Academicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to
whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and
ακαταληπτα
would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by
Lucullus on the way in which the probabile had been handled
appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would
naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the
party—Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of
establishing an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of
Catulus, and the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the
innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only
object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for επιστημη, was
already attained by the Carneadean theory of the πιθανον; whereupon
Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that [lii] such a basis
was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had
wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the
discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the
Lucullus clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply
such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative
Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean πιθανον. One important
opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would
opine[255] (τον
σοφον
δοξασειν), seems
another indication of the generally constructive character of his
exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
extremely probable that he gave a rйsumй of the history of philosophy,
corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the Academica
Posteriora. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty
of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the
speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the Academica
Posteriora it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second
as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second
edition of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate only in
the mouth of one [liii] who was answering a speech already
made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the
fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the
lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy
altogether[258],
and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
historical rйsumй as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within
the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put
forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant
for stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We are thus
relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
commoveris[261], from which Krische infers that the
dialogue, entitled Hortensius, had ended in a conversion to
philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion
we have nowhere else any allusion.
The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character
and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to
have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it
was possible for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech
of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral
teaching of Antiochus.
The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of
the preceding speech is correct, [liv] it follows that
Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer
to Varro, part of which is preserved in the Academica Posteriora[262]. He justified
the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old,
and also with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus,
therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great
and ancient names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according
to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides,
Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a
historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη
φαντασια and εννοιαι (which though
really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary
to "manufacture" (fabricari) Latin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably
also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave
their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by
Lucullus[266].
That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be
seen by the fact that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms καταληψις
(i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual καταληπτικη
φαντασια), εναργεια,
‛ορμη,
αποδειξις,
δογμα,
οικειον,
αδηλα,
εποχη, nearly all important terms in
the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which
Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the
more clearly does it appear that the main purpose [lv] of Cicero in this
speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the
New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience,
which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he
expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him
in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely
introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these
arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech,
although foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary
classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of
the elaborate speech of Cicero in the Lucullus proves that no
general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the
dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before.
Cicero's argument in the Catulus was allowed by Lucullus to have
considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus,
Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out
for the discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there
was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the
Lucullus.
One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the
attack of Catulus? Krische believes [lvi] that the argument of
Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur.
Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary
doctrines[273].
The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching
had been dismissed by all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his
letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo
(partes mihi sumpsi Philonis[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to
those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly
supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief
sources for Cicero's speech in the Catulus were, doubtless, Philo
himself and Clitomachus.
In that intermediate form of the Academica, where Cato and
Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no
doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato.
Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of
Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem
strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to
represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from
Zeno. The rфle given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any
cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to
sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been
reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in
the Academica Priora. He would naturally occupy the [lvii] place
given to Varro in the second edition[276]. If this be true, Brutus would not
speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough
connected with the Academica to render it necessary to treat of
him farther.
b. The "Lucullus."
The day after the discussion narrated in the Catulus, during
which Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the
Cuman villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of
Hortensius at Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind
favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his
at Pompeii[278].
Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round
which so many legends lingered[279]. The scenery in view was
magnificent[280].
As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines
of statues, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the
horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour
under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and
Puteoli, thirty stadia distant[281].
Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and [lviii] to keep
it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still
living, although when the words were written he had been dead for many
years[282]. The
surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private
troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept
carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of
thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at
Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last
section of the book, while in the last but one the De Finibus, the
De Natura Deorum and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another
passage the design of the Tusculan Disputations, which was carried
out immediately after the publication of the Academica and De
Finibus, is clearly to be seen[285].
Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly all
that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to
have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private
citizen, was directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train
when he went to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his
residence in [lix] the East he sought to attach learned men
to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus,
Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of
philosophic tastes[288]. He is several times mentioned by
Pliny in the Natural History as the patron of Greek artists. Yet,
as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus
that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus,
by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly
stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus
engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to
that of Cicero in the Catulus. Any closer examination of its
contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
same may be said of Cicero's answer.
In the intermediate form of the Academica, the speech of
Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a
slight connection with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much
more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close
relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have
had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife
of Lucullus[289].
Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
during the war between Pompey [lx] and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
c. The Second Edition.
When Cicero dedicated the Academica to Varro, very slight
alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the
piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost
within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene
was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date of
the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many allusions
are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian
party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
Hortensius[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death
and the writing of the Academica, it can be shown that Varro,
Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore
for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This
impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his
wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
philosophical [lxi] opinions, are alone needed here. The
first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself
sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like
friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the
trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had
eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to
send Varro the eulogy to read, adding "Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut
nosti, ελικτα και
ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the
letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to
write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf,
during his exile[298]. Several passages show that Cicero
refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's
return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state.
About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged
his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of
the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little
closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the
Academica was published, testify to this approximation[300]. Still they are
all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero
addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius,
Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to
the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast
learning which is by [lxii] no means natural to Cicero. The
negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of
the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable
accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro
De Philosophia[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of
Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school
from, among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, by an
elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious
in Augustine. My notes on the Academica Posteriora will show that
there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's
philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to Mьller, who,
from Stoic phrases in the De Lingua Latina, concluded that Varro
had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was
Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical
exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by
Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, [lxiii] which Cicero had given in the first
edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of
Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by
Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the
negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had formed part of
the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in
reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. 1. Book
IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. Atticus must
have been almost a κωφον
προσωπον.
I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
editions the Lucullus is marked throughout as Academicorum
liber IV. This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of
Nonius' quotations, which are always from the second edition, and
can tell us nothing about the constitution of the first. One other
thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the
Academica Priora before the Posteriora. This seems to me an
unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the Varro is
certainly prior, logically, to that of the Lucullus.
M. TULLII CICERONIS
ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM
LIBER PRIMUS.
I.
1. In Cumano nuper cum
mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone, venisse eum
Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos
venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam
putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et vetustate
amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque
cum
ab eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: atque
ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam
villam reduximus.
2. Hic pauca
primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus:
Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus,
quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. Silent enim diutius
Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae
scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: intemperantis enim arbitror
esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo opus magnum in manibus,
idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum—me autem dicebat—quaedam
institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius.
3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam,
Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e
Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium—nihil enim eius modi celare
possumus—non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de
manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in
mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas,
quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam
a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum
multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo
excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus
antecedat.
II.
4. Tum ille: Rem a me
saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans
respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re
multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam viderem
diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de nostris
eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.
5. Vides autem—eadem enim ipse
didicisti—non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui
nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone
disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione
concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant.
Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque
vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque
novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti
ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur
labor.
6. Iam vero physica, si
Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium
sustuleris, de corpusculorum—ita enim appellat
atomos—concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae
cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format
effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam
enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere?
Quid,
haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi
enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud nostros
autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut
quis intelligat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab
honestate seiungi: quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine
voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari
quidem. Si vero
Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit
illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra
Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem
ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem
animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis
datum munus homini.
8. Sed meos
amicos, in quibus est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire
iubeo, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae
autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea,
quantum potui—nihil enim magno opere meorum miror—feci ut
essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii
nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris,
quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus,
multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice †quae
quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum
invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis
†philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
III.
9. Tum, ego. Sunt,
inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque
tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando
qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones
temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam
disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque
rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, plurimumque poetis
nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque
ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque
multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum.
10. Causam autem probabilem tu
quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne
haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo
vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent
sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi
legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius,
Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt
poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum,
Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
sint aut Demosthenem imitati.
11. Ego autem—dicam enim, ut res est—dum
me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum
tenebat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum
licebat, legendo. Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et
administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia
peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic
aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus,
hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil
utilius aut, si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus.
12. Brutus quidem noster,
excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu,
cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
litterarum.
IV.
13. Tum, ille. Istuc
quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit,
quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te veterem illam, inquit,
tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho id magis licuerit,
nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam nobis in novam e
vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime.
Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat
in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse
erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, ut dicis: sed
ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra
ea Philonis Antiochus
scripserit.
14. Immo vero et
ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi
molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, inquam, si videtur. Sane istud
quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed videamus idemne Attico
placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi vero, ille: quid est enim
quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari? et simul videre
satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum essent dicta, in
conspectu consedimus [omnes].
15. Tum Varro ita exorsus
est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus
occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi
occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse,
ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret,
caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si
maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
valere.
16. Hic in omnibus fere
sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie
et
copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil
se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae
nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque
rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec
esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum
diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen
in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis
consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi
potest.
17. Platonis autem
auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et
sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique
Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam
composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam
dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita
consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates
probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio
disciplinae.
18. Quae quidem
erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos
et illam veterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni
praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat
utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi
non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum
Atticus: Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque
nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid
me, inquam, putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro
exhibiturum? Pergamus igitur, inquit, quoniam placet.
19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a
Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de
natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid
falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid
repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura
petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in
natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur,
constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum
adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. Corporis autem
alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: valetudinem, viris
pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam
aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus,
claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem:
20. animi autem, quae essent ad
comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et
mores dividebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant:
quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant
studia esse et quasi consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis
adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa.
In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem
appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae
omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec
animorum.
21. Vitae
autem—id enim erat tertium—adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad
virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et
in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt.
Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis
humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac
de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad
id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam,
ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.
VI.
22. Atque haec illa
sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem
non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud imprudenter, si alios
esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur.
Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci
quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut
maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute
versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute
esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et
corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad virtutis usum idonea.
23. Ex hac descriptione agendi
quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat
in conservatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur
fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque
susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum,
quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia
exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis
vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio
et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.
24. De natura
autem—id enim sequebatur—ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant,
in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen
utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi
contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non
alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi
qualitatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus
inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur,
utamur verbis interdum inauditis.
VII.
25. Nos vero, inquit
Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum voles, si te Latina forte
deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce
modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam
appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis.
Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas
ποιοτητας
Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed
philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt
publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut
enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.
Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur,
quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare
conamur?
26. Tu vero, inquam,
Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo
copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus ergo,
inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
Itaque aлr—utimur enim pro Latino—et ignis et aqua et terra
prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae
gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa
dicuntur: e quibus aлr et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi,
reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram.
Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor,
quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.
27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus
sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate—faciamus enim
tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius—materiam quandam, ex qua
omnia expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit
omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in
nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum
sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem
moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi
possint.
28. Et cum ita
moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem
nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia,
quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta
insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo
intereat:
29. quam vim animum
esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem
deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam
quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae
pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia
nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et
immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
VIII.
30. Tertia deinde
philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur
ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium
veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam
censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper
esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
ιδεαν
appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
dicere.
31. Sensus autem
omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res
eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut
sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil
umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur
et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant.
32. Scientiam autem nusquam
esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa
definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,
adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa
quaeque essent ita nominata, quam
ετυμολογιαν
appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad
probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque
tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione
conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur,
explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
33. Haec erat illis disciplina a
Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos
vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.
IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur
Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus
species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat
amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem,
vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et
ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem
veteris disciplinae: spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque
reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.
34. Nam Strato, eius auditor,
quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est:
qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in
virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae
contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et
Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et
post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati,
diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem
audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque
subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est
disciplinam. Eam quoque, si videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut
solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, inquam, videtur, quod vides idem
significare Pomponium.
X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos
virtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam
pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis,
idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum
bonum.
36. Cetera autem etsi
nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia
naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis
relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.
37. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex
iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita
appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam
vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium
et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in bonis
actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem servata
praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi.
38. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione
esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis
in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi,
seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat
nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse
praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur.
Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et
condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent,
sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi
morbis voluit carere sapientem.
39. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse
dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia
rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes
voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium
perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam
intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum
illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici
rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae
quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod
nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset
corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse
dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse
esse non corpus.
40. Plurima
autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam
quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille
φαντασιαν,
nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim
utendum in reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi
accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis
positam et voluntariam.
41.
Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis hoc? Nos vero,
inquit. Quonam enim modo
καταληπτον
diceres?—Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem
appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam
nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset,
plurimisque idem novis verbis—nova enim dicebat—usus est.
Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita
erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter,
inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset
imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis.
42. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam
comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis
neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo
sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta
sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia, quae
essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset
relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui
dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus
non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae
reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem
et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et
constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his
fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.
XII.
43. Quae cum
dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, inquam, a te,
Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse [autem]
arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem veteris
Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc Varro:
Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea,
quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio.
44. Tum ego: Cum Zenone, inquam,
ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut
studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate,
quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante
Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis paene veteres: qui
nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos
sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut Democritus, in
profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri,
nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse
dixerunt.
45. Itaque
Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum,
quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto:
neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis
nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione
approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem,
quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur,
neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni
adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat
consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
sustineretur.
46. Hanc
Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex
illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque
partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur: sed
tamen illa, quam exposui
sti, vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae
usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem
Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis
ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicureo
Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros
mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.
EX LIBRO I.
1. Nonius p. 65 Merc.
Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis.
Cicero Academicorum lib. I.: quid autem stomachatur Menesarchus? quid
Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
2. Nonius s.v.
concinnare p. 43. Idem in Academicis lib. I.: qui cum
similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
EX LIBRO II.
3. Nonius p. 65. Aequor ab
aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. vocabulum accepisse
confirmat: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor
illud poetae vocant.
4. Nonius p. 69. Adamare
Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: qui enim serius honores adamaverunt vix
admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.
5. Nonius p. 104. Exponere
pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II.: frangere
avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum
iuventuti.
6. Nonius p. 121. Hebes
positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid?
lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et
senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur cornua.
7. Nonius p. 162.
Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid? mare nonne
caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
8. Nonius p. 162.
Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: atqui si id
crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.
9. Nonius p. 394. Siccum
dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, non madidum
... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: alius (color) adultis, alius
adulescentibus, alius aegris, alius sanis, alius siccis, alius
vinulentis ...
10. Nonius p. 474.
Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.: si quando enim nos
demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
cernimus.
11. Nonius p. 545.
Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: quibus etiam alabaster
plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
EX LIBRO III.
Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. De gloria librum ad te misi: at in
eo prooemium id est, quod in Academico tertio.
12. Nonius p. 65.
Digladiari ... idem tertio: digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum
facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum
dixerit?
13. Nonius p. 65.
Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: et ut
nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus ...
14. Nonius p. 123.
Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: in
tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur
cognitionis et scientiae.
15. Nonius p. 419.
Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum lib. III.:
aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
16. Lactantius Inst. div.
VI. 24. Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico tertio verba sunt: quod
si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, sic vitam deviam secutis
corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.
17. Diomedes p. 373, ed.
Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. Varro ad Ciceronem tertio fixum et
Cicero Academicorum tertio (= Lucullus §27): †malcho in opera adfixa.
18. Nonius p. 139.
Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. Academicorum
lib. III.: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse
dicemus. = Lucullus §51.
19. Nonius p. 117.
Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae gallina
peperisset dicere solebant. = Lucullus §57.
EX LIBRO IIII.
20. Nonius p. 69, Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in
Academicis lib. IIII.: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = Lucullus
§67.
21. Nonius p. 65.
Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia.
Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: item ille cum aestuaret, veterum ut
Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = Lucullus §70.
22. Nonius p. 99. Dolitum, quod dolatum usu
dicitur, quod est percaesum vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum
Academicorum lib. IIII.: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
dolatus. = Lucullus §100.
23. Nonius p. 164. Ravum
fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: quia nobismet ipsis tum
caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet.... =
Lucullus §105.
24. Nonius p. 107. Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi
quendam laborem exanclatum. = Lucullus §108.
25. Nonius p. 163. Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = Lucullus
§109.
26. Nonius p. 122. Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.:
at hoc Anaximandro infinitatem. = Lucullus §118.
27. Nonius p. 65. Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. =
Lucullus §120.
28. Nonius p. 189.
Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ut ille qui
asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. =
Lucullus §121.
29. Martianus Capella V.
§517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. Cicero ... in Academicis: latent ista
omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. = Lucullus
§122.
30. Nonius p. 102. E
regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ego
non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae
qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. = Lucullus §123.
31. Nonius p. 80.
Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione
trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: plane, ut supra dictus,
Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = Lucullus §135.
Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
32. Lactantius Inst. div.
III. 14. Haec tua verba sunt (sc. Cicero!): mihi autem non
modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte
cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
33. August. contra
Academicos II. §26.: id probabile vel veri
simile Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent
invitare. ... Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi videntur omnia
quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine
vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid
dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum
opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [Proximis post
hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat Augustinus haec ipsius esse
Ciceronis verba.]
34. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
§15. Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam....
Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
35. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
§43. Ait enim Cicero illis (i.e.
Academicis) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam,
nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei
VI. 2. Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. Varroni) tale
testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi versatur
disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone, homine, inquit,
omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM
LIBER II.
I.
1. Magnum ingenium Luci
Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna
homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro
maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adolescens
cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna
cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos
annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus
aedilis, continuo praetor—licebat enim celerius legis
praemio—, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium,
quae de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum.
2. Idque eo fuit mirabilius,
quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui adolescentiam
in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto
gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum
iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis,
partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum
esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam
memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis
gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam
fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem
ferunt: qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum
primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle
discere, credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat.
Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat.
3. Tantus ergo imperator in omni
genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis totiusque
belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a
se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur.
In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque
civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis
servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate
rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni
peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a
Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam
debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem
currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in
maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito
testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.
II.
4. Sed quae populari
gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris
celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora
cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni
litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant
arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore
aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse
occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii
relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse
potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus
audiebat.
5. Ac vereor interdum ne
talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim
multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam,
reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem
principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas
litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani
historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit,
Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec
philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro.
6. Restat ut iis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi
nolint personas tam gravis illigari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut
tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum
colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis
philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo
quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos
populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de
opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo
non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut
plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam
augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has
etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus.
7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis,
qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus
disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam
mortuis invidere.
III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non
probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam
philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem,
quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii
a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est,
qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus, idque summa cura
studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa
difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis
nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire
se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos
studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes
quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et
tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime
accedat.
8. Neque inter nos
et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non
dubitant quin ea vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus,
quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et
solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut
omnia, quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate
ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset
optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut
obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione
capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam
quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt.
9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se
credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes
et indocti iudicare potuissent—statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel
maxime videtur esse sapientis—, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus
rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem
re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio
quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt,
pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur
exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata
sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et
Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus.
Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, quod erat constitutum, si ventus
esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur
pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.
IV.
10. Hic Catulus:
Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene explicatum est, ut tota
fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus
es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, inquit Hortensius,
feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit.
Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu erant, dicta
sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: Non sane, inquit,
Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis, qui placere
volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea, quae dico,
probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus,
si non fuerint,
non vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut
quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi
tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota
enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio,
eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam
quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos
ereximus.
11. At ille: Cum
Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat
iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et
Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista
philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum
quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem
isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant
adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo
natura lenissimus—nihil enim poterat fieri illo
mitius—stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante
videram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo
viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico
audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id
quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et
C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab
eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse.
12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum
igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et
item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut
causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito
doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea
Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat,
multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae
contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est
adversarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino
dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam
Carneademque veniamus.
V.
13. Quae cum
dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini—me autem
nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint,
cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem
agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis
tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q.
Pompeium: illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum
solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P.
Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut
videmus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C.
Marium. Et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum
atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt.
14. Similiter vos, cum
perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam
constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem,
Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus,
ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum
illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia.
Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant
quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere
videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil
omnino quale sit posse reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes
isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire
quam sciant.
15. Quod si
illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est
ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas
qui constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate
delitisceret, qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e
numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit
perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus
differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam
sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in
disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud
agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione,
quam Graeci
ειρωνειαν
vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea
vitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
VI.
16. Sed fuerint illa
veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est igitur actum, quod
investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans
nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum
huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus
tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam
floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime
a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat,
Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu
tenuit: nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum
floruerunt: e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho
fuit—declarat multitudo librorum—ingeni non minus in
[Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene
autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur.
17. Iam Clitomacho Philo
vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium
Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra
Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres
faciendum omnino non putabant: nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum
iis, qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo
fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset
cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam
καταληψιν
illi vocant, eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod
comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod
nihil esset clarius
εναργειαι,
ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi—me appellabat
iocans—hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant
illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent,
definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam
priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere
putabant, ne qui fallerentur.
18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam
evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et
homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova
quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum
pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre
Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum
enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset—id enim
volumus esse
ακαταληπτον—,
si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum—iam enim hoc pro
φαντασιαι
verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus—visum igitur impressum
effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse,
quod est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque
Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam
definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi
nihil posse concedimus.
VII.
19. Ordiamur igitur
a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae
nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris
incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid
quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo
aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur
tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa. Meo
autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac
valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen
mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et intervalla
aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus
ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in
sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium
requirat acrius.
20.
Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures
cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa
vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam
multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui
primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, quum id nos
ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in
quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et
eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis?
in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
sentiatur:—potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat,
et inter eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet
non apertissime insaniat?
21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum
illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa,
non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series
deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus
nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest.
22. Quod si essent falsae
notitiae—
εννοιας enim notitias
appellare tu videbare—, si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi
visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem
his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset,
quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo
philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet,
nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum?
aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero
quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi
perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab
inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo
atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
tractabit, multa perceperit?
VIII.
23. Maxime vero
virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus
solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo
rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque
sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem
constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut
quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum
perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat
aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit, cum quam ob
rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti,
constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet
aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium
recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint.
24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se
ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen
sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter
audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit
extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit
esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse
initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur, idque initium
esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter appetitio—eam enim volumus
esse
‛ορμην—, qua ad
agendum impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest.
25. Illud autem, quod
movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id,
quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri
animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur
accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit
non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam
impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est,
necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, videri.
26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet
ur. Itaque
argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece
αποδειξις,
ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non
percipiebatur, adducit.'
IX.
27. Quod si omnia
visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent,
neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse
aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides?
Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit
exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare
debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
δογματα, quorum nullum
sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique
proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum
nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum
possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile,
fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem
neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa visa, e quibus
omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse.
28. Ex hoc illud est natum,
quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente
diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum
diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, consentaneum esse unum
tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius
resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut
maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod
perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem,
quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
29. Antiochus ad istum locum
pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici
decretum,—sentitis enim iam hoc me
δογμα dicere—, nihil posse
percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis
a accipi
oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique
iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in
philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse,
qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut
unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere
dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a
sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut
hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de
inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse
potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
X.
30. Sequitur
disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior—habet enim
aliquantum a physicis—, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari
poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum
animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad
modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa
sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim
ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim
habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit,
ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur.
Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae
rerum, quas Graeci tum
εννοιας, tum
προληψεις
vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit.
31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam
vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime
cognitionem, et istam
καταληψιν,
quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum
ipsam per se amat—nihil est enim ei veritatis luce
dulcius—tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et
artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam
corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo
ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.
32. Nec vero satis
constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum
enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, quae disputentur,
vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos?
num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait
Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam
queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit
inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque
distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim—et hoc quidem vel
maxime vos animadvertebam moveri—probabile aliquid esse et quasi
veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac
disserendo.
XI.
33. Quae ista regula
est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non
possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut
inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si nihil interest,
nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique communis,
ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt
hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo
falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter.
Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis
quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non ademisse.
Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria
veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu probabilem
visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat,
sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo agimus,
tibi erit revertendum.
34.
In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia
proprium in communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil
erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi videatur verum, ut
non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio
veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur
ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo
atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim
modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id,
quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua
dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne
moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec
sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur.
35. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid
dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed
qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant
neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque adseverare sine aliqua eius
rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est
igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo
quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo levius?
36. Sin ex circumspectione
aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod visum sit, id se dicent sequi,
tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis visis, inter quae nihil
interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse
accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit,
exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero,
ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam
proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis
esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum
sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum
ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re
id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut
nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae
dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se
ipsa defendet.
XII.
37. His satis
cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione,
quam Graeci
συγκαταθεσιν
vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta
sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul
illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine
adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime
intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari
quidem potest quale sit—, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae
est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio.
38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos
neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo
non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam
appareat—Graeci id
οικειον
appellant—, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare.
Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de
adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed
haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec
notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in
nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.
39. Ubi igitur virtus, si
nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum
esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in
virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus
constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri
aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua
re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e
vita.
XIII.
40. Nunc ea
videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius
eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem
quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt,
in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis
quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc
quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint
nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non
percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum
est, id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est,
ut eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius
modi, ut in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi
possint, alia non possint.
41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.'
Quae autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa
sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit,
ex iis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non
possint:' reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item
duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum:
'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit
esse.'
42. Haec duo
proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima
dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta
esse falsa, quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse
comprehendi.
XIV.
43. Hanc ego
subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum causa,
qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et
horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et
earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma
et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa
esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos
quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si
posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit?
si
n negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio
transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id
percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
partibus.
44. Si enim
dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla
communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem
negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius
progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum
non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut
falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et
perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi,
quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque ipsa natura
accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam quod non
appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea,
quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam
falsa visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem,
inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
45. Sed progrediamur
longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur, quaeque ab
iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus.
Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim, ut
ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut
maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel
arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi
praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire
erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
XV.
46. Quam ob rem cum
duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem
sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt
animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea
circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et
captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas
dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae
pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam
diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum
captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui.
47. Exponam igitur generatim
argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum
conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum
animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis,
quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea,
quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis
declarentur—haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
disputant—, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus
efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant,
efficere non possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
nihil sit omnino?
48.
Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant, quae
cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis
videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non
modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis nihil
intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
visis distinctio appareat.
XVI.
49. Ad has omnis
visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una
re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa
capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod captiosissimo
genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari
solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc
vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. Vitiosum sane et
captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum obiectum est a deo
dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur
deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc
si perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin
ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum.
50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut
ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid cui
simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi
canibus similes
sunt, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis
similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime
artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse?
Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud
genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium
generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in
alieno.
51. Quod fieri qui
potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa
cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:
'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'
Idemque in Epicharmo:
'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'
Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita
habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.
XVII.
52. At enim dum
videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum
que, quae vigilantes
videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non
eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente
nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt
qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:
'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
adspectu' ...
53. At enim ipse sapiens
sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem
saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte gravitas aut tarditas
aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate
excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere
adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut
semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter
vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter
adfecti, tum nihil interesse.
54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta,
quod nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae
αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita
habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano,
cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non
mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum
anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum
similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si
satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo
non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius
contenditis, quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit
tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla
communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid
pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis
esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non
similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest.
55. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in
Academia irridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais
Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter
sese non solum similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut
inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque
homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut
inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque
nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil
intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus
gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus
innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in
hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?
XVIII.
56. Primum quidem
me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id,
quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis singularum rerum singulas
proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt,
tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non
cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus
hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos
consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti ne minimum quidem
similes viderentur?
57.
Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum
sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant, quas
non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso
adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et
ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis possit distinguere,
et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater geminos
internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si adsueveris.
Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc
accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id
gallina peperisset dicere solebant.
58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis est ova
illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc illud
esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam, ut
talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas
impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum.
Quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata
veri et falsi nota.
59.
Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla
impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his
illa necessario nata est
εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio,
in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non
nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est,
tollendus adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare
non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse
eo delabi interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse
sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi
possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil
opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae.
60. Restat illud, quod dicunt,
veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo
igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt
tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam
vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate
ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant,
nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi
quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et
perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam
maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?
XIX.
61. Haec Antiochus
fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam adseverantius,
in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata
causa te, hominem amicissimum—me autem appellabat—et aliquot
annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris,
eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos
iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis
quidem, quibus adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat
sive eius loci, quem incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis
uti lumine licebat, isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris
ne scintillam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si
sequamur, iis vinculis simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus.
62. Sublata enim adsensione
omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo
recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas
aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse,
quod mihi quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem
ullam quae cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam
atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur
auctoritas. Quae cum dixisset ille, finem fecit.
63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius,
me quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens—non enim satis
intellegebam—, coepit hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi
Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter,
accurate, copiose, taceo neque te quo minus, si tibi ita videatur,
sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud vero non censuerim, ut eius
auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo monuit, inquit adridens, ut
caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum vides quanta copia
semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione quaereret qui tibi
constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te
comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De causa autem ipsa
malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno opere mirabor.
Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac
visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes
intueri.
XX.
64. Tum ego non
minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius modi quadam oratione
sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit, ut docti
hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, quae pro illa
causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem.
Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem
tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
65. Ego enim si aut
ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum
philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et
naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia
reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu consilioque
totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum
etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione
id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum solet,
iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et
ea sentire, quae dicerem.
66. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum
gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse
iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec
tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam adsentiar,
qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus
quidem sum opinator—non enim sum sapiens—et meas cogitationes
sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,
'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'
ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,
'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'
sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non
de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter
mentem sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec
percipio tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens;
itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet
Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne
fallatur videre. Nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de
gravitate sapientis, errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur
loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque,
Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur—ut praepostere tecum
agam, mox referam me ad ordinem—haec primum conclusio quam habeat
vim considera.
XXI.
67. Si ulli rei
sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur: numquam autem
opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas
probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam
secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari,
quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed illud primum, sapientem,
si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et
eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non
possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere.
68. Nobis autem primum, etiam
si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse
videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri
quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio,
ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa
veris, eaque, quae percipi non possunt,
iis quae possunt—si
modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus—, ut tam in praecipitem
locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod
percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem
nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnes cohibiturum,
ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem.
Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse percipi: etenim de
eo omnis est controversia.
XXII.
69. Sed prius
pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me defenduntur, et didicit apud
Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de
his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusavit in senectute quam
antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen
inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero,
qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse negitavisset, veri et
falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Poenituit illa
sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim
erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? quid?
Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone
discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere.
70. Unde autem subito vetus
Academia revocata est? Nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa
descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere
dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii, qui se sequerentur, Antiochii
vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum
omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla
communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam reliquorum
philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub Novis solem
non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum, sic
Academicorum umbram secutus est.
71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, cum ei
placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes
utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis oportere,
illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset,
honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset,
honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum: qui ex illius
commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a
vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit
ut quod
argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.
XXIII.
72. Et primum
quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a nobis de antiquis
philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros, sed tamen
popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res
non bonas tractent,
similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri, quae
vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?—sic enim
appellabantur ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa
philosophabantur—: maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingeni gloria.
73. Quid loquar de Democrito?
Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam
animi? qui ita sit ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil
excipit de quo non profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa?
quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis
inferioris aetatis? qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur.
Atque is non hoc dicit, quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus,
percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse: sensus quidem non
obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc
maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus initio libri, qui est de natura:
'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id
ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an
nihil sit.'
74. Furere tibi
Empedocles videtur: at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur,
sonum fundere. Num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum
magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt,
iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus, sed
tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum
sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum
Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum
iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari
non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum,
'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? qui
certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset, nisi probavisset.
Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio
persequi.
XXIV.
75. Videorne tibi,
non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari numquam
nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minutos,
Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam
σοφισματα;
sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum
habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa
ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine
probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit
sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, quae nos fallerent probabilitate
magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile posse.
76. Quid Cyrenaici
tibi
videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod
percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu intimo
sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid colore aut quo
sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.
Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem
post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis
tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te
ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone
pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur.
77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum
non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari,
nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum
vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone
fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec
opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset,
quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur
visum? tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum
et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset
visum verum, quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse
visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem
modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad
definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si
esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut
doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso
possit esse.
78. Haec est
una contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum
esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim
nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum:
equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab
eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe
opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio,
ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum
esse.
XXV.
79. Quid ergo est
quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle,
communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere posses, idcirco heri non
necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas
infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo
sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores
nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?—Manent illa
omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.—Igitur
semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim
rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli
umquam esse credendum.
80.
Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et importune insistere!
Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas
ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse mendacium, non
oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed hic quidem
maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia
falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi nobis
ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et integris
sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?—Utinam
quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem,
non videmus.
81. At ille
nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et octingenta stadia
quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. Responderem igitur
audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me
acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et
nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt. Ergo ut
illis aqua, sic nobis aлr crassus offunditur. At amplius non desideramus.
Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo, quod
parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis
videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur
ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non
tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere
ostenderis.
XXVI.
82. Quid ego de
nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest
esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus
confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi quidem
quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam
videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta
incitatione fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem
possit, tamen nobis stare videatur.
83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso,
quam in parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse
quod nosci, percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E
quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id
percipi, tertium, inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut
eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum
verum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo
nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum
secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos,
quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est.
84. Qui igitur P. Servilium
Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi
visum, quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a
falso: qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum
Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non
posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino,
sed cum adversario facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet
igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit.
Sublato enim iudicio illo, quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem
videris, qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis
oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa.
85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus
videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non
sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis
esse, nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum
credibile 'nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius,
nullum granum.' Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod
agitur, nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an
internosci non possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo
tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere,
eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros
eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres?
86. Quid? si in eius
dem
modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?
XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae
nos non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur.
Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad
quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura!
87. Cur non extimescam
opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam
vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo
utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita?
quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur etiam
eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis
mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo ante
dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam, res
iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:—de quo queri solent Stoici, dum
studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque
omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem
inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.—
88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et
furiosorum visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum,
sanorum. Quo modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se
vidisse Homerum, sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:
'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'
Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit,
eum somnia re
ri et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea
vera, quae essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum
videbantur, quo modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non
putamus ita totum illud audivisse,
si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit
illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:
nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde
enim illa:
'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur
minorem habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?
XXVIII.
89. Quid loquar
de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam
sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur?
Quid ille, qui:
'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'
nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid?
apud Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat
sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde
movebatur falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat
'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:
'unde haec flamma oritur?'
et illa deinceps:
'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, adsunt, me expetunt:'
Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:
'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
cum ardentibus taedis.'
Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:
'Intendit crinitus Apollo
arcum auratum, luna innixus:
Diana facem iacit a laeva.'
90. Qui magis haec
crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur? Apparet enim iam
'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, ut illud
efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et falsa ad
animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa falsa
vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non enim
id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti sint,
aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium
aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.
91. Quid est quod
ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, veri et falsi
quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi? et in qua re? In
geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in
litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur. Sol
quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat
iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet?
Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem
pollicebatur. Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in
philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis.
92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne
contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit elementa
loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis
additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu
modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.
XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura
nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus
quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla
omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit,
multa pauca, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito
aut dempto certum respondeamus [non] habemus.—
93. At vitiosi sunt
soritae.—Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt
enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum
gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto
prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur,
‛ησυχαζειν.
Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid
proficit? Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo
interroget. Quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero,
multane erunt? Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim
fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere
posse. Cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit
accedere.
94. Nihil me
laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem
veniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi,
praeceps erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose
interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus
es: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed
negas te usque ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si
id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te
captare volt, utrum tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad
novem, verbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo
insistis: etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me
in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista
adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut
postremum docet.
95. Quid?
quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum
superiora. Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum
dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant
αξιωμα, quod est quasi
effatum—, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an
falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris
an
verum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius
quam illa, quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.
XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec
eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa
sint, ubi est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum
sit'? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias
improbandas, quae sint in genere contrario.
96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
dicis
nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere
et verum dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime
conclusum dicitis. Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum
traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars
ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis
te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque
dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris
eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem
dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet
autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum
concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa
conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris
igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare.
97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si
ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in
utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec
inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem
numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et
contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita
effabimur, 'aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic
statuant, omne, quod ita diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non
modo verum esse, sed etiam necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti
tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse,
necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est
in natura rerum talis necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id
est, Antiochus et Stoici: totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e
contrariis diiunctio—contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat,
alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est.
98. Mecum vero quid habent
litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat,
sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose,
minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec
autem merces erat dialecticorum. Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab
Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob
eam causam, quod ita didici, omne, quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum
esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut
igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.
XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis
sententia Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam,
ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad
senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde
studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis
adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo.
99. Duo placet esse Carneadi
genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi
possint, alia quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse
probabilia; alia non probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque
perspicuitatem dicantur, ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra
posteriorem nihil dici oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum
esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra
naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam
tu, Luculle, commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa
sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non
etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit
specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi
contrarium, utetur eo sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur.
Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur
probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa, sed similia
veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur.
100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num
comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui
potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta,
probo navigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur
se illuc venturum esse salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et
agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam
erat Anaxagoras, qui id non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret
aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri
quidem.
101. Et
quaecumque res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla
re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
dolatus, habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut
ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam
percipiendi notam: eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem
modi exsistere falsum aliquod, cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra
sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque
aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur,
praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis
tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio
tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est,
nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid
sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non
concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus
est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus,
tibi adsentior.
102.
Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem
maxime, cui erant ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec
quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse,
certe levior reprehensio est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia,
non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere,
quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis?
nihil tibi est perspicuum?' Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo
modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a
Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poлtam, cum
scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, eum, qui consul cum M.
Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis—sunt enim mihi nota,
propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima institutio et
quasi disciplina illo libro continetur—, sed scriptum est ita:
103. 'Academicis placere
esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles videantur,
aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia
non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi
perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait vehementer errare eos, qui
dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem
aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in
his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam.
104. Quae cum exposuisset,
adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc
intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri: altero, cum se a
respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget
aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam
adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec
aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere possit.
†Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa,
quibus ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque
partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit,
dum sine adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea,
quae nulla re impedirentur.
105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane,
invidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos
percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri
dicimus.
XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem
expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle,
iacere iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens,
de quo loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur,
isdem sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare
illud, quod nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro
videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum
videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et
vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis
rationem reddere cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod
videbatur oculis, defendere.
106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim
quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid?
Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro
adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae
sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut
vobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque
rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque
percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron
Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed
tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi
remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si comprehensio
perceptioque nulla sit.
107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne, quae ipsae
fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae tantum id,
quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera et falsa
diiudicent?
Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum
enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio
Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici
certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum [
responsa], auspicia,
oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is
potest facere vel de iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas
habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est
aliquid, quod positum vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non
possit? an tu in soritis poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus
non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione
ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam sequi?
108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim
videri oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos
adsensus esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli
autem omnia, si visa tollantur.
XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa,
sed brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
sequitur, nulla re impediente?
109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod statuet, ne
id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque impediet in
navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis
plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.
Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater,
sed, ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret
consentaneum esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum
saltem dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et
sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil
comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo
potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum
esse possit nisi comprehensum, perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum
decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse
perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat et sine
decretis vitam agere possit!
110. Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic
hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam,
eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus.
Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non
enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit, stellarum numerus par an
impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de rebus, in quibus
versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis enim nihil
probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid
faciat nec quid respondeat.
111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle,
reprehensionem Antiochi—nec mirum: in primis enim est
nobilis—, qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum.
Cum enim sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea
differre a veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse
concessum, quod videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli
altero, quo neget visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id
ita esset, si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam
falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum
habemus.
XXXV.
112. Ac mihi
videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim campus in quo
exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum
dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id
percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque
etiam, si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille
sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem
huic loco valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum?
113. Quaero enim quid sit
quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus,
ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito
nimirum adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus
Academia concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet,
vel quod amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum
et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero
quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam
alia, haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae
aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale,
quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo.
Horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque
verum puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.
XXXVI.
114. Illud
ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes idque turpissimum
esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges, ut exponas
disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, finis
bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar
definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et
artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens
nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me
deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est.
115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque
rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem
esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse,
sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se
amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? qui mecum
vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? qui ista
Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola, si
vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet
ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec
quaestio est.
116. In tres igitur
partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est.
Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, videamus: at
illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire
persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura pendent, quae
disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi
necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non persuadere,
sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non quaero ex
his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum progredi non
possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat: extremitatem et
quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: liniamentum sine
ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius
iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes
omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem
esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem deum
censet esse, contempserit.
117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget
et disciplinam? Etsi
quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e
physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor
quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia
constant, videamus quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa
dissensio.
XXXVII.
118. Princeps
Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse primas ferunt, ex
aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo,
non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia
gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aлra, sed ea, quae ex
eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his
omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis inter
se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et
fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a
deo sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis
proficisci volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem,
credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo
condemnatique discedent.
119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic
animo comprehensam habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit
nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem,
habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur,
moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis,
terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea
permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore
deflagret.
XXXVIII. Sint ista vera—vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse
veri—, comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste
Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis
aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum
esse umquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari
operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat
motus mutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum
exsistere, ut hic ornatus umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare,
illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit,
cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur.
120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium,
quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est?
Cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis—,
tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa
ac perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite
tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius
quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque
perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum
opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur.
121. Negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e
transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem
muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius
habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum.
Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec, ut ille, qui
asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse
dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis,
sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut
sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et
motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim
potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum
numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cui non
accidit?—extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen
adsentior, nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.
XXXIX.
122. Latent
ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla
acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare
possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium, quam vim
quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea
nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora
esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid
nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus, ut
videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
media pendeat?
123.
Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram multarum urbium et
montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui dixit, iurare
posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e
regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent
contra nostra vestigia, quos
αντιποδας
vocatis: cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis,
qui, cum audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait
Theophrastus, caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare
censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum
axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae,
si stante terra caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo
dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure?
loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos
ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali
irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat
posse.
124. Sed redeo ad
animum et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura
sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an,
ut Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis
habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex
unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut
Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore—quod intellegi quale sit vix
potest—et, quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in
partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur,
nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in
plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.
XL.
125. Sin agis
verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar, sed
quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem potissimum?
quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui.
Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse,
cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur corporum
cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos ullas,
e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua
mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic
tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post,
alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc simus
ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem
esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire.
126. Non ergo id agitur, ut
aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne
probabilia quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam
esse arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud
scio an ita sit.
XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio?
an Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et
reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua
omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem—ipse enim hic radiatus me
intueri videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui—vos ergo
huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior?
127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones physicorum
exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam
quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, elatiores
fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia
haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum
maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid
occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
voluptate.
128. Quaeret
igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur,
credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi
secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.
Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum
est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde adfirmant,
earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, amittere.
Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix
cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis adfirmabunt
signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non
possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo
illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui
ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non
percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse
percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera
percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis
minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio
comprehendendi.
XLII.
129. Sed quod
coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? nempe fines
constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur: qua de
re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? Omitto illa, quae
relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum
bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo
dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod
esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A
Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne
bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli
similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius.
130. Hos si contemnimus et
iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui
cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse
bonum nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in
mediis ea momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum
bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae
αδιαφορια
ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae
απαθεια nominatur. Has
igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu
multumque defensa sunt.
131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum
princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post
Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de
ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse
Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate
Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,
quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut
indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles
eiusque amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam
Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse
frui rebus iis, quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere,
quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum,
qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.
XLIII.
132. Iam illud
perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis
esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: modo ne quis illud tam
ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem.' Nihil
potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne—omitto
per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem—per
ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca
mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine. Nam
aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non
potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione
contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de
qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur
uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si
Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens—nam vos quidem
nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum—: sin vera sunt Zenonis,
eadem in veteres Academicos
et Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur
neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior?
133. Quid? cum ipse
Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia
peccata esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat
tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue
aliquando quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in
utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim
dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito
assentiar: quod mihi tecum est dogma commune.
134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno in una
virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis
et fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat,
si sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur,
et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
discrepant.
XLIV.
135. Quid? illa,
in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum
numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia
sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non
timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni
necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi vero,
Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem
multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et
venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint
ab Academia vetere
decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant
esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu.
Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit,
ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura
dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa,
misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis
quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus.
136. Atrocitas quidem ista
tua quo modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non
possum, non quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia
Stoicorum, quae
παραδοξα
nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? hos enim
quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges,
solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse?
neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum
quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?
insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta
Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis
quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium?
137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si
es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:
mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.
XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad
senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M.
Marcello coss. praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit,
doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem
dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia
sapiens non sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico
non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat,
non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas
incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca
balbutiens.
138. Vos
autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et
comprobem incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur
saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de
finibus bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem
esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id
esse, si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere,
sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum
honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima
naturae commoda adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat
probabiliter posse defendi.
139. Sit sane ita—quamquam a Polemonis et
Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam
habeo adhuc probabilius—, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas
sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut
Aristippo. Revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos
motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam
Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno,
quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem
sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut
eam probare etiam videretur. Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se
intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim
sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu,
cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate
tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?
XLVI.
140. Unum igitur
par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo
fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa
ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas, amicitia,
iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit
gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur,
ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra
illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte,
quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: fontem omnium
bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem
esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur
habiturum.
141. Nihil
igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam
moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum
interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas,
verum illud certum, comprehensum, perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse
vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil
eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso,
quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia
ista dialecticae nulla sint.
142. Venio enim iam ad
tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium Protagorae est, qui putet id
cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter
permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii: aliud Epicuri, qui omne
iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit.
Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab
opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit.
143. Num quid horum probat
noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut
Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum
probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil
politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.
XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut
cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in
elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne
sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta
contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet.
Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet!
quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus,
opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt?
144. Quid me igitur,
Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut
seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud,
cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui
si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam
primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules,
servos, insanos esse dicatis: deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad
multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos
Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim
defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere.
145. At scire negatis
quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat.
Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat,
'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius
modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem
illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non
fuerat,
καταληψιν
imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte
vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem
nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi
quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu,
Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse.
146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen
nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi
posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile
esset, satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem
sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut
Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos
docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci:
ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod
nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem
maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi
sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,'
quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret,
ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati
iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'
pronuntiarentur.
XLVIII.
147. Verum,
quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat
navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est
mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de
dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae
deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto
opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse
sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum
mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici
texuerunt.
148. Tum
Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim
congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur,
requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum
Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille
Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem
non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita, ut
intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi
possit: qua re
εποχην illam omnium rerum non
probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,
vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum
aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:
Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia.
Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras
descendimus.
NOTES.
BOOK I.
§§1—14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae
(1). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the
promised dedication of the De Lingua Latina is too long delayed,
turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves
this subject untouched (2, 3).
Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and
points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4—6). He greatly believes in
philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he
devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion,
but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless.
Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and
orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and
instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy
(9—12). Varro putting
the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for
the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement
that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to
Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on
the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus
and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of
Antiochus (13, 14).
§1.
Noster:
our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus than of
Cic., see Introd. p.
37.
Nuntiatum: the
spelling
nunciatum is a mistake, cf. Corssen,
Ausspr. I. p. 51.
A M. Varrone:
from M. Varro's
house news came.
Audissemus: Cic. uses the contracted forms of
such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms
like
audiissemus.
Confestim: note how artfully Cic. uses
the dramatic form of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for
Varro.
Ab eius villa: the prep is absent from the MSS., but
Wesenberg (
Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum, p. 62) shows that it must be
inserted. Cic. writes
abesse Roma (
Ad Fam. V. 15, 4),
patria (
T.D. V. 106) etc., but not
abesse officio (
De
Off. I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the
like.
Satis eum longo intervallo: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after
Davies, reads
se visentum for
satis eum, quoting
Ad
Att. I. 4, Madv.
tum for
eum
(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the
repetition of pronouns (
illum,
eum) is quite Ciceronian.
The emphatic
ille is often repeated by the unemphatic
is,
cf.
T.D. III. 71, and
M.D.F. V. 22. I may note that the separation of
satis
from
longo by the word
eum is quite in Cicero's style (see
my note on
25 quanta id magis). Some
editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking
intervallo of
distance in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly
press
satis, which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently."
The words
satis longo intervallo simply = "after a tolerably long
halt." For the clause
ut mos, etc., cf.
De Or. II. 13.
§2.
Hic pauca
primo: for the omission of
locuti, cf. the very similar
passages in
D.F. I. 14,
III. 8, also my note on
14.
Atque ea: Halm brackets
ea, quite needlessly, for its
insertion is like Cic.
Ecquid forte Roma novi:
Roma is the
ablative, and some verb like
attulisset is omitted. (So Turnebus.)
To take it as nom., understanding
faciat, is clearly wrong.
Percontari: the spelling
percunctari rests on false
derivation (Corss.
I. 36).
Ecquid ipse
novi: cf.
De Or. II. 13. The MSS.
have
et si quid, bad Latin altered by Manutius.
Istum: some
edd.
ipsum, but Cic. often makes a speaker use
iste of a
person who is present. Goer. qu.
Brut. 125,
De Or. II. 228.
Velit: Walker reads
velis with
St Jerome. For
quod velit =
quod quis velit, cf.
De
Or. I. 30.
In manibus: so often, cf.
Cat. Mai. 38.
Idque: MSS. have in the place of this
quod with variants
que,
quae,
qui,
quo. Dav. gave
quia, which was the vulgate reading down to
Halm, who reads
idque, after Christ.
Ad hunc enim ipsum:
MSS. have
eum for
enim (exc. Halm's G). Such a combination
of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for expressions like
me illum
ipsum (
Ad Att. II. 1, 11) are not in
point. Of course if
quia be read above,
eum must be ejected
altogether.
Quaedam institui: the
De Lingua Latina; see
Ad. Att XIII. 12.
§3.
E Libone:
the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cжsar
B. Civ. III. 5, 16, 24.
Nihil enim eius modi again all
MSS. except Halm's G. have
eum for
enim. Christ conj.
enim eum; so Baiter.
Illud ... requirere: i.e. the question
which follows; cf.
requiris in
4.
Tecum
simul: Halm's G om.
tecum; but cf.
De Or. III. 330.
Mandare monumentis—letteris
illustrare: common phrases in Cic., e.g.
D.F. I. 1,
T.D. I. 1,
De
Div. II. 4.
Monumentis: this, and not
monimentis (Halm) or
monementis, is probably the right
spelling; cf. Corss.
II. 314.
Ortam a:
Cic.
always writes the prep. after
ortus; cf.
M.D.F.
V. 69.
Genus: regularly used by Cic. as
opus by Quintilian to mean "department of literature."
Ea
res: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has
ars; on the
other hand Bentley (if the
amicus so often quoted in Davies' notes
be really he) reads
artibus for
rebus below. The slight
variation, however, from
res to
artibus is such as Cic.
loves.
Ceteris: the spelling
caeteris (Klotz) is absolutely
wrong, cf. Corss.
I. 325.
Antecedat: some
MSS. give
antecellat. a frequent variant, cf.
De Off. I. 105
§4.
Deliberatam—agitatam: Cic. as usual exaggerates the
knowledge possessed by the
personae of the dialogue; cf. Introd.
p.
38,
De Or. II. 1.
In promptu: so
II. 10.
Quod ista ipsa ...
cogitavi: Goer., who half a page back had made merry over the gloss
hunters, here himself scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo
expels the words. Yet they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf.
De Div.
II. 1,
Cat. Mai. 38), and moreover
nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and clauses in
slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense desire to
flatter Varro.
Si qui ... si essent: the first
si has
really no conditional force,
si qui like
ειτινες
merely means "all who," for a strong instance see
Ad Fam. I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe,
si accusandi sunt, si qui
pertimuerunt.
Ea nolui scribere, etc.: very similar
expressions occur in the prologue to
D.F. I., which should be compared with this prologue
throughout.
§5. Vides ...
didicisti: MSS. have
vides autem eadem ipse didicisti enim. My
reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has
vides autem ipse—didicisti enim eadem—non posse, etc.
Similis: Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write
i and
e indiscriminately in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write
i everywhere, we shall thus, I believe, be far nearer Cicero's
real writing. Though I do not presume to say that his usage did not vary,
he must in the vast majority of instances have written
i, see
Corss.
I. 738—744.
Amafinii aut
Rabirii: cf. Introd. p.
26.
Definiunt ...
partiuntur: n. on
32.
Interrogatione:
Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
Bentl.
argumentatione, Ernesti
ratione. But the word as it
stands has exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
Interrogatio is merely the
conclusio or syllogism put as a
series of questions. Cf.
Paradoxa 2, with
T.D. II. 42 which will show that
interrogatiuncula
and
conclusiuncula are almost convertible terms. See also
M.D.F. I. 39.
Nec dicendi nec
disserendi: Cic.'s constant mode of denoting the Greek
‛ρητορικη
and
διαλεκτικη;
note on
32.
Et oratorum etiam: Man., Lamb.
om.
etiam, needlessly. In
Ad Fam. IX. 25, 3, the two words even occur without any other
word to separate them. For
oratorum Pearce conj.
rhetorum.
Rhetor, however is not thus used in Cic.'s phil. works.
Utramque vim virtutem: strange that Baiter (esp. after Halm's
note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj.
unam for
virtutem. Any power or faculty (vis,
δυναμις) may be called
in Gk.
αρετη, in Lat
virtus. Two
passages,
D.F. III. 72,
De Or.
III. 65, will remove all suspicion from the
text.
Verbis quoque novis: MSS. have
quanquam which however
is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf.
M.D.F. V. 68).
Ne a nobis quidem: so all the MSS., but
Orelli (after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "
arrogantius dictum"
places
quidem after
accipient. The text is quite right,
ne quidem, as Halm remarks, implies no more than the Germ.
auch
nicht, cf. also Gk.
ουδε.
Suscipiatur labor: MSS. om.
the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.
§6. Epicurum, id
est si Democritum: for the charge see
D.F. I. 17,
IV. 13,
N.D.
I. 73.
Id est often introduces in Cic. a
clause which intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause,
exx. in
M.D.F. I. 33.
Cum causas rerum
efficientium sustuleris: cf.
D.F. I.
18, the same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists,
Met. A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read
efficientis, which would then govern
rerum (cf.
D.F.
V. 81,
De Fato, 33, also Gk.
ποιητικος).
But the genitive is merely one of definition, the
causae are the
res efficientes, for which cf.
24 and
Topica, 58,
proximus locus est rerum efficientium, quae causae
appellantur. So Faber, though less fully.
Appellat: i.e.
Amafinius, who first so translated
ατομος.
Quae cum
contineantur: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must
be kept, and
adhibenda etiam begins the
apodosis. Madvig
(
Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos, Hauniae, 1825, p.
108) tacitly reads
continentur without
cum, so Orelli and
Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without
cum.
Quam quibusnam: Durand's em. for
quoniam quibusnam of the
MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (
Em. p. 108) made a
forced defence of
quoniam, as marking a rapid transition from one
subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like the Gk.
επει, only one
parallel instance, however, was adduced (
T.D. III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.
Adducere?: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole
sentence, so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true
system of physics. If
quoniam is read and no break made at
adducere, all after
quoniam will refer to ethics, in that
case there will be a strange change of subject in passing from
quisquam to
haec ipsa, both which expressions will be
nominatives to
poterit, further, there will be the almost
impossible ellipse of
ars,
scientia, or something of the
kind after
haec ipsa. On every ground the reading of Madv. is
insupportable.
Quid, haec ipsa: I have added
quid to fill
up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to have fallen out.
[The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be
elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on
II. 123]
Illi enim
simpliciter: "frankly," cf.
Ad Fam. VIII. 6, 1
Pecudis et hominis: note on
II. 139.
§7. Sive sequare
... magnum est: for the constr. cf.
II. 140.
Magnum est: cf.
quid est magnum,
6.
Verum et simplex bonum: cf.
35.
Quod bonum ... ne suspicari quidem an
opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
T.D. III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with
the Greek preserved by Diog. Laert.
X. 6 (qu.
Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus,
VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353).
Ne suspicari
quidem: for this MSS. give
nec suspicari, but Madv.
(
D.F., Excursus
III.) has conclusively
shown that
nec for
ne ... quidem is post Augustan Latin.
Christ supposes some thing like
sentire to have fallen out before
nec suspicari; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in
D.F. II. 20, 30,
T.D. III. 46,
N.D. I. 111,
where the same opinion of Epicurus is dealt with, we have either
ne
suspicari quidem or
ne intellegere quidem (cf. also
In
Pisonem 69). Further,
ne ... quidem is esp frequent with
suspicari (
D.F. II. 20), and verbs
of the kind (
cogitari II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end
of sentences eg
Verr. II. 1, 155. Notice
negat ... ne suspicari quidem without
se, which however
Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous passages produced from Cic. by
Madv. (
Em. 111), in which not only
se, but
me,
nos, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
infinitive, after verbs like
negat. Cf. also the omission of
sibi in
Paradoxa 40.
Si vero: this, following
sive enim above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule which is to write
sive—sive or
si—sin, but not
si—sive or
sive—si. This and two or three other
similar passages in Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most
important and exhaustive excursus to his
D.F. (p. 785, ed. 2), and
are connected with other instances of broken sequence. There is no need
therefore to read
sive here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others.
Quam nos ... probamus: cf. Introd. p.
62.
Erit explicanda: for the separation of these words by other words
interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see
11,
17. I am surprised that Halm
and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical objection to the
phrase
explicare Academiam, and read
erunt against the
MSS., making
illa plural. If
erunt is read,
erit
must be supplied from it to go with
disserendum, which is harsh.
Quam argute, quam obscure: at first sight an oxymoron, but
argute need not only imply
clearness, it means merely
"acutely".
Quantum possum: some MSS. have
quantam, which is
scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only follows
nequeo,
volo,
malo,
possum, and such verbs when an
infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For
velle see a
good instance in
D.F. III. 68, where
consult Madv.
Constantiam: the notions of firmness, consistency,
and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, cf.
II. 53.
Apud Platonem:
Timaeus, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by Cic., cf.
De
Leg. I. 58,
Laelius 20, 47,
T.D. I. 64.
§8. Id est ...
jubeo: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. But Cicero
is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight variations
in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of slightly varied
phrases connected by
id est in
D.F. I. 72,
II. 6, 90. I therefore
hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words.
Ea a:
Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
e for
a, which Halm would also prefer.
De,
ab, and
ex follow
haurire indifferently in Cic.
Rivulos consectentur: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The
metaphor involved in
fontibus—rivulos is often applied by
Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus in
N.D. I. 120.
Nihil enim magno
opere:
magno opere should be written in two words, not as
magnopere, cf. the phrases
maximo opere,
nimio
opere, the same holds good of
tanto opere,
quanto
opere.
L. Aelii: MSS.
Laelii. The person meant is L.
Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the master of Varro, and the earliest
systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil.
Inst. Or. X. 1, 99, Gellius
X. 21,
Sueton.
Gramm. 3.
Occasum: an unusual metaphor.
Menippum: a Cynic satirist, see
Dict. Biogr. Considerable
fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and have often been
edited—most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
Imitati
non interpretati: Cic.
D.F. I. 7,
gives his opinion as to the right use to be made of Greek models.
†Quae quo: these words are evidently wrong. Halm after
Faber ejects
quae, and is followed by Baiter. Varro is thus made
to say that he stated many things dialectically,
in order that the
populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault lies in the word
quo, for which I should prefer to read
cum (=
quom,
which would be written
quō in the MSS.) The general sense
would then be "Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature
which the unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the
learned read."
Laudationibus:
λογοις
επιταφιοις,
cf.
Ad Att. XIII. 48 where Varro's are
mentioned.
†Philosophe scribere: the MSS. all give
philosophie. Klotz has
philosophiam, which is demonstrably
wrong,
physica,
musica etc.
scribere may be said,
but not
physicam,
musicam etc.
scribere. The one
passage formerly quoted to justify the phrase
philosophiam
scribere is now altered in the best texts (
T.D. V. 121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads
philosophiae scribere; his explanation is, as Orelli gently says,
"vix Latina." I can scarcely think Halm's
philosophe to be right,
the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. almost condemns it by his use of
the Greek
φιλοσοφως
(
Ad Att. XIII. 20). In older Greek the
adverb does not appear, nor is
φιλοσοφος
used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses
philosophus adjectivally
in
T.D. V. 121,
Cat. Mai. 22,
N.D. III. 23, just as he uses
tyrannus (
De Rep. III. 45), and
anapaestus (
T.D. III. 57) Might we
not read
philosophis, in the dative, which only requires the
alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would
then be "to write
for philosophers," which would agree with my
emendation
cum for
quo above.
Philosophice would be
a tempting alteration, but that the word
φιλοσοφικος
is not Greek, nor do
philosophicus,
philosophice occur till
very late Latin times.
Si modo id consecuti sumus: cf.
Brut. 316.
§9. Sunt ista:
=
εστι
ταυτα, so often, e.g.
Lael.
6. Some edd. have
sint, which is unlikely to be right.
Nos in
nostra: Augustine (
De Civ. Dei VI. 2)
quotes this with the reading
reduxerunt for
deduxerunt,
which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's
remark, "
deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus
humanitatis." The words, however, are almost convertible; see
Cat.
Mai. 63. In
Lael. 12,
Brut. 86, we have
reducere, where Durand's rule requires
deducere, on the
other hand cf.
Ad Herennium IV. 64,
hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae etc., August. (
De Civ.
Dei VI. 3) describes Varro's "
Libri
Antiquitatum" (referred to in
8), in which most
of the subjects here mentioned were treated of.
Descriptiones
temporum: lists of dates, so
χρονοι is technically used
for dates, Thuc.
V. 20, etc.
Tu
sacerdotum: after this Lamb. inserts
munera to keep the
balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of
formal accuracy.
Domesticam—bellicam: opposed like
domi
bellique, cf.
Brut. 49,
De Off. I. 74. Augustine's reading
publicam shows him
to have been quoting from memory.
Sedem: so the best MSS. of Aug.,
some edd. here give
sedium. The argument for
sedem is the
awkwardness of making the three genitives,
sedium,
regionum,
locorum, dependent on the accusatives,
nomina,
genera,
officia,
causas. Cic. is fond
of using
sedes,
locus,
regio together, see
Pro
Murena, 85,
Pro Cluentio, 171, quoted by Goer.
Omnium
divinarum humanarumque rerum: from the frequent references of Aug. it
appears that the "
Libri Antiquitatum" were divided into two parts,
one treating of
res humanae, the other of
res divinae
(
De Civ. Dei,
IV. 1, 27,
VI. 3).
Et litteris luminis: for
luminis, cf.
T.D. I. 5.
Et
verbis: Manut. reads
rebus from
26.
Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant.
Multis locis
incohasti: Varro's book "
De Philosophia" had apparently not
yet been written.
§10. Causa:
=
προφασις.
Probabilem: = specious.
Nesciunt: Halm with his one MS. G,
which is the work of a clever emendator, gives
nescient to suit
malent above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to
force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm
himself allows to be broken in two similar passages,
II. 20,
105.
Sed da mihi nunc, satisne probas?: So
all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj.
sed ea (eam) mihi non
sane probas. This last Baiter gives, while Halm after Durand reads
sed eam mihi non satis probas, which is too far from the MSS. to
please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though
da
mihi for
dic mihi is certainly poetic.
Da te mihi
(Manut., Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be
supported by
12,
Brut. 306,
Ad Fam.
II. 8, or such like passages.
Attius: the
old spelling
Accius is wrong.
Si qui ... imitati: note the
collocation, and cf.
17. Halm needlessly writes
sint for MSS.
sunt. For this section throughout cf. the
prologues to
D.F. I.,
T.D. I. and
II.
§11.
Procuratio: for the proper meaning of
procurator and
procuratio see Jordan on
Pro Caecina 55.
Implacatum et
constrictum: the conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual;
cf.
17 plenam ac refertam,
II. 127 exigua et
minima, so
και
in Greek.
Inclusa habebam: cf.
T.D. I. 1.
Obsolescerent, used of
individual
memory, is noteworthy.
Percussus volnere: many edd. give the
frequent variant
perculsus. The
volnus, which Goer. finds
so mysterious, is the death of Tullia, cf.
N.D. I. 9,
De Consolatione, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe,
and Introd. p.
32.
Aut ... aut ... aut ...
aut: This casting about for an excuse shows how low philosophy stood
in public estimation at Rome. See Introd. p.
29.
The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the exordium of
N.D. I.
§12. Brutus:
the same praise often recurs in
D.F. and the
Brutus Graecia
desideret so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has
Graeca. Halm
(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger,
Graeca
desideres. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's
Philologus
XXIV. 483, approves the reading on the curious
ground that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but
rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to have recourse to Greece for
philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for Greece with Cicero is the
supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if she is satisfied the
philosophic world is tranquil. Cf.
Ad Att. I. 20, 6,
D.F. I. 8,
Ad Qu. Fr. II. 16, 5. I just note the em.
of Turnebus,
a Graecia desideres, and that of Dav.
Graecia
desideretur.
Eandem sententiam: cf. Introd. p.
56.
Aristum: cf.
II.
11, and
M.D.F. V.
8.
§13. Sine
te: =
σου
διχα.
Relictam: Cic. very rarely
omits
esse, see note on
II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.
20.
Veterem illam: MSS. have
iam for
illam. The position of
iam would be strange, in the passage
which used to be compared,
Pro Cluentio 16, Classen and Baiter now
om. the word. Further,
vetus and
nova can scarcely be so
barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading
illam is from Madv. (
Em. 115), and is supported by
illam
veterem (
18),
illa antiqua (
22),
istius veteris (
D.F. V. 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and
Bait.) thinks
iam comprises the last two syllables of
Academiam, which he reads.
Correcta et emendata: a fine
sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often occur
together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of expression,
cf.
De Leg. III. 30,
D.F. IV. 21, also Tac.
Hist. I. 37.
Negat: MSS. have
negaret, but
Cic. never writes the subj. after
quamquam in
oratio recta,
as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the
sentence; see
M.D.F. III. 70. Nothing is
commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for the
pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and
vice versa.
In
libris: see
II. 11.
Duas Academias: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
refer to R. and P. 404.
Contra ea Philonis: MSS. have
contra
Philonis merely, exc. Halm's
V., which gives
Philonem, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added
ea.
Orelli quotes
Ad Att. XII. 23, 2,
ex
Apollodori. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and
libros may be
supplied from
libris above, so in
Ad Att. XIII. 32, 2,
Dicaearchi περι
ψυχης utrosque, the word
libros has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar
ellipse of
bona in
19,
22. Madvig's
Philonia is improbable from its
non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective
Antiochius
is frequent. Halm inserts
sententiam, a heroic remedy. To make
contra an adv. and construe
Philonis Antiochus together,
supplying
auditor, as is done by some unknown commentators who
probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified
by
D.F. V. 13.
§14. A qua absum
iam diu: MSS. have strangely
aqua absumtam diu, changed by
Manut.
Renovari: the vulg.
revocari is a curious instance
of oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note
he gave
renovari. Orelli—who speaks of Goerenz's
"
praestantissima recensio," and founds his own text upon it two
years after Madvig's crushing exposure in his
Em. often quoted by
me—not only reads
revocari, but quotes
renovari as an
em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no
independent value, took it.
Renovare in Cic. often means "to
refresh the memory," e.g.
11,
Brut. 315.
Nisi molestum est: like
nisi alienum putas, a variation on
the common
si placet, si videtur.
Adsidamus: some MSS. have
adsideamus, which would be wrong here.
Sane istud: Halm
istuc from G.
Inquit: for the late position of this word,
which is often caused by its affinity for
quoniam,
quidem,
etc., cf.
M.D.F. III. 20
Quae cum
essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes): most edd. since
Gulielmus print this without
essent as a hexameter, and suppose it
a quotation. But firstly, a verse so commonplace, if familiar, would
occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if not familiar, would not be given
without the name of its author. Secondly, most MSS. have
sint or
essent before
dicta. It is more probable therefore that
omnes was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
hexameter rhythm. Phrases like
quae cum essent dicta consedimus
often occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf.
De Div.
II. 150, and Augustine, the imitator of Cic.,
Contra Academicos,
I. 25, also
consedimus at the end of a clause in
Brut. 24, and
considitur in
De Or. III. 18.
Mihi vero: the omission of
inquit, which is strange to
Goer., is well illustrated in
M.D.F. I.
9. There is an odd ellipse of
laudasti in
D.F. V. 81.
§§15—42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy.
First part of Varro's Exposition, 15—18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics
supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets,
his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of
ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (16).
Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master, from him sprang
two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted
definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one
another—the Peripatetic and the Academic (17,
18).
§15. A rebus ...
involutis: physical phenomena are often spoken of in these words by
Cic., cf.
19,
Timaeus c. 1,
D.F.
I. 64,
IV. 18,
V. 10,
N.D. I. 49.
Ursinus rejected
ab here, but the insertion or omission of
ab after the passive verb depends on the degree to which
natura is personified, if
28 be compared
with
Tim. c. 1, this will be clear.
Involutis = veiled; cf.
involucrum. Cic. shows his feeling of the metaphor by adding
quasi in
II. 26,
and often.
Avocavisse philosophiam: this, the Xenophontic view of
Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's time, cf.
II. 123,
T.D. V. 10,
D.F. V. 87, 88,
also Varro in Aug.
De Civ. Dei,
VIII. 3.
Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were curiously answered
in
De Rep. I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug.
De Civ. Dei,
VIII. 4). The same view is
supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the passages quoted by R. and P.
141. To form an opinion on this difficult question the student should
read Schleiermacher's
Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a
Philosopher (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's
Socrates and the
Socratic Schools, Eng. Trans., pp. 112—116 [I dissent from his
view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's
Handbook, so far
as it relates to Socrates and Plato.
Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
valere:
valere is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm,
its use in
21 makes it more probable than
conferre, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius vainly tries to
justify the MSS. reading by such passages as
D.F. I. 39,
T.D. I. 70. The
strangest ellipse with
nihil ad elsewhere in Cic. is in
De
Leg. I. 6.
§16. Hic ...
illum: for this repetition of pronouns see
M.D.F. IV. 43.
Varie et copiose: MSS. omit
et,
but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two
adverbs stand
together without
et, though three may (cf.
II. 63), and though with pairs of
nouns and
adjectives, et often is left out, as in the passages quoted here
by Manut.
Ad Att. IV. 3, 3,
Ad
Fam. XIII. 24,
XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg,
reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works
(1861), on
T.D. III. 6.
Varie et
copiose is also in
De Or. II. 240.
Cf. the omission of
que in
23, also
II. 63.
Perscripti: Cic.
like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were
authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf.
II. 74.
Nihil adfirmet:
so
T.D. I. 99. "
Eoque praestare
ceteris" this is evidently from Plato
Apol. p. 21, as to the
proper understanding of which see note on
II. 74.
Ab Apolline, Plato
Apol. 21 A,
Omnium: Dav. conj.
hominum needlessly.
Dictum:
Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads
iudicatum, it is remarkable that
in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (
Cato Mai.
78,
Lael. 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb
iudicare.
Una
omnis: Lamb.
hominis, Baiter also.
Omnis eius oratio
tamen:
notwithstanding his negative dialectic he gave positive
teaching in morals.
Tamen: for MSS.
tam or
tum is
due to Gruter, Halm has
tantum.
Tam,
tum and
tamen are often confused in MSS., e.g.
In Veri (
Act
II.)
I. 3, 65,
II. 55, 112,
V. 78, where see
Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that
tum ... et,
tum
... que,
et ... tum, correspond in Cic. like
tum ...
cum,
tum ... tum. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled
by
Ac. II. 1,
43.
Ad virtutis studium cohortandis: this
broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's
Socrates 88,
with footnote.
§17. Varius et
multiplex, et copiosus: these characteristics are named to account
for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
multiplex "many sided," cf.
T.D. V. 11.
Una et consentiens: this is an opinion
of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
D.F.
IV. 5
De Leg. I.
38,
De Or. III. 67. Five ancient
philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious
Academico-Peripatetic school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus,
Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
D.F. IV. 2),
sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have been first
broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in Aug.
De
Civ. Dei XIX. 1, cf. also
34. Antiochus doubtless rested his theory almost
entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
D.F.
V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus,
this appears, as also in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as
though ethics were the whole of philosophy (cf. also
De Off. III. 20). Antiochus probably made light of such
dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
ιδεαι,
which had long ceased. Krische
Uber Cicero's Akademika p. 51, has
some good remarks.
Nominibus: the same as
vocabulis above.
Cic. does not observe Varro's distinction (
De L. L. IX. 1) which confines
nomen to proper nouns,
vocabulum to common nouns, though he would not use
vocabulum as Tac. does, for the name of a person (
Annals
XII. 66, etc.).
Quasi heredem ... duos
autem: the conj. of Ciaconus "
ex asse heredem, secundos autem"
is as acute as it is absurd.
Duos: it is difficult to decide
whether this or
duo is right in Cic., he can scarcely have been so
inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and Halm's ed.,
Ac. II. 11,
13 with
De Div. I.
6). The older inscr. in the
Corpus vol.
I. have
duo, but only in
duoviros, two
near the time of Cic. (
C.I. vol.
I. nos.
571 and 1007) give
duos, which Cic. probably wrote.
Duo is
in old Latin poets and Virgil.
Chalcedonium: not
Calchedonium as Klotz, cf. Gk.
Χαλκηδονιον.
Praestantissimos: Halm wrongly, cf.
Brut. 125.
Stagiritem: not
Stagiritam as Lamb., for Cic., exc. in a
few nouns like
Persa,
pirata, etc., which came down from
antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in
-ης into Latin nouns in
-a. See
M.D.F.
II. 94.
Coetus ... soliti: cf.
10.
Platonis ubertate: cf. Quintilian's
"
illa Livii lactea ubertas."
Plenum ac refertam: n. on
11.
Dubitationem: Halm with one MS., G, gives
dubitantem, Baiter
dubitanter, Why alter?
Ars quaedam
philosophiae: before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert
disserendi, probably from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and
ejects
philosophiae, while Lamb., Day read
philosophia in
the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy became entirely
dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics.
Ars =
τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so
Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the
certa dogmata of this old
school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy.
Descriptio: so Halm here, but often
discriptio. The
Corp. Inscr., vol.
I. nos. 198 and 200,
has thrice
discriptos or
discriptum, the other spelling
never.
§18. Ut mihi
quidem videtur: MSS. transpose
quidem and
videtur, as
in
44.
Quidem, however nearly always comes
closely after the pronoun, see
M.D.F. IV.
43, cf. also
I. 71,
III. 28,
Opusc. I.
406.
Expetendarum fugiendarumque:
‛αιρετων
και
φευκτων, about which
more in n. on
36. The Platonic and Aristotelian
ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the
two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did
away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system.
The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of
Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much
greater than it was.
Non sus Minervam: a Greek proverb, cf.
Theocr.
Id. V. 23,
De Or. II. 233,
Ad Fam. IX.
18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the
Academica, also
quotes Plutarch
Prжc. Polit. 7.
Inepte ... docet: elliptic
for
inepte docet, quisquis docet.
Nostra atque nostros: few
of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian,
and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the
words "
tui cives," meaning the Athenians, often occur.
Quid me
putas: i.e.
velle.
Exhibiturum: Halm inserts
me
before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist.
For the omission of
me, cf. note on
7.
§§19—23. Part II. of Varro's
Exposition: Antiochus' Ethics. Summary. The threefold division of
philosophy into ηθικη,
φυσικη,
διαλεκτικη.
Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural
advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The
bodily are described (19); then the mental, which
fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of
the acquired (20), then the external, which form
with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated,
in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing
happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the
possession of all three classes of advantages (22).
With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account
of action and duty (23).
§19. Ratio
triplex: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's
time, so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug.
De Civ. Dei
VIII. 4, and by Diog. Laert.
III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself
cannot be traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian
Peripatetics, to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp.
Adv. Math.
VII. 16. It was probably first brought into
strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more sharply and
decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. esp.
M.D.F. IV. 3.
Quid verum ... repugnans
iudicando: MSS. exc. G have
et before
quid falsum,
whence Klotz conj.
sit in order to obviate the awkwardness of
repugnet which MSS. have for
repugnans. Krische wishes to
read
consequens for
consentiens, comparing
Orator
115,
T.D. V. 68,
De Div. II. 150, to which add
T.D. V. 21 On the other hand cf.
II. 22,
91. Notice the double translations of the Greek
terms,
de vita et moribus for
ηθικη, etc. This is very
characteristic of Cic., as we shall see later.
Ac primum: many
MSS. and edd.
primam, cf.
23,
30.
A natura petebant: how Antiochus could have
found this in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so,
however, is indubitable; see
D.F. V.
24—27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro
in Aug.
XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is
the
ιδεα of
the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the
abstract
φυσις, that he scarcely appeals
even incidentally to
φυσις in his ethical works. The
abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly
apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into
those of Antiochus.
Adeptum esse omnia: put rather differently in
D.F. V. 24, 26, cf. also
D.F.
II. 33, 34,
Ac. II. 131.
Et animo et
corpore et vita: this is the
τριας or
τριλογια
των αγαθων,
which belongs in this form to late Peripateticism (cf.
M.D.F.
III. 43), the third division is a development
from the
βιος
τελειος of Aristotle.
The
τριας in this distinct shape is
foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus,
Ethica II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro
seems to merge the two last divisions into one in Aug.
De Civ. Dei
XIX 3. This agrees better with
D.F. V.
34—36, cf. also Aug.
VIII. 8. On the
Antiochean
finis see more in note on
22.
Corporis alia: for ellipse of
bona, see n. on
13.
Ponebant esse: n. on
36.
In toto in partibus: the same distinction
is in Stob.
Eth. II. 6, 7; cf. also
D.F. V. 35.
Pulchritudinem: Cic.
Orator 160, puts the spelling
pulcher beyond a doubt; it
often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only
pulcrai,
pulcrum, etc., occur in inscr., exc.
pulchre, which is found once (
Corp. Inscr. I. no 1019).
Sepulchrum, however, is frequent
at an early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see
Boscher in Curtius'
Studien II. 1, p.
145. In the case of
pulcher the false derivation from
πολυχροος
may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger
derived it from
πολυ χειρ
(Curtius'
Grundz ed. 3, p. 8) For
valetudinem viris
pulchritudinem, cf. the
‛υγιεια
ισχυς
καλλος of Stob.
Eth.
II. 6, 7, and
T.D. V. 22.
Sensus integros ευαισθησια
in Stob., cf. also
D.F. V. 36 (
in
sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus).
Celeritatem: so
ποδωκεια in
Stob.,
bene currere in Aug.
XIX. 3.
Claritatem in voce: cf.
De Off. I.
133.
Impressionem: al.
expressionem. For the former cf.
De Or. III. 185, which will show the
meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter
De
Or. III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's
remark "
imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit." See also
De
Off. I. 133. One old ed. has
pressionem, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls
presse
loqui, and
N.D. II. 149. Pliny,
Panegyric, c. 64, has
expressit explanavitque verba; he and
Quintilian often so use
exprimere.
§20.
Ingeniis: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf.
T.D. III. 2, and
animis below and in
N.D.
II. 58.
In naturam et mores: for
in ea
quae natura et moribus fiunt. A similar inaccuracy of expression is
found in
II. 42. The
division is practically Aristotle's, who severs
αρεται into
διανοητικαι
and
ηθικαι (
Nic. Eth.
I. c. 13,
Magna Mor. I. c. 5). In
D.F. V.
38 the
διανοητικαι
are called
non voluntariae, the
ηθικαι voluntariae.
Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam: cf. the
ευμαθεια,
μνημη of Arist. (who adds
αγχινοια
σοφια
φρονησις), and the
docilitas, memoria of
D.F. V. 36.
Quasi consuetudinem: the
quasi marks a translation from the
Greek, as frequently, here probably of
εθισμος (
Nic.
Eth. II. c. 1).
Partim ratione
formabant: the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in
Nic. Eth. VI. c. 2.
In quibus:
i.e.
in moribus. All the late schools held that ethics formed the
sole ultimate aim of philosophy.
Erat: note the change from
oratio obliqua to
recta, and cf. the opposite change in
II. 40.
Progressio: this, like the whole of the sentence in which it
stands, is intensely Stoic. For the Stoic
προκορη,
προκοπτειν
εις αρετην,
cf.
M.D.F. IV. 64, 66, R. and P. 392,
sq., Zeller,
Stoics 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be
Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus.
Perfectio
naturae: cf. esp.
De Leg. I. 25. More
Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the
reason, cf.
II. 26,
D.F. IV. 35,
V. 38, and Madvig's note on
D.F. II. 88. Faber quotes Galen
De Decr. Hipp. et
Plat. c. 5,
‛η αρετη
τελειοτης
εστι της
‛εκαστου
φυσεος.
Una res optima:
the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug.
XIX. 3, cf. also
D.F. V. 36, 38.
§21. Virtutis
usum: so the Stoics speak of their
αδιαφορα as the
practising ground for virtue (
D.F. III.
50), cf.
virtutis usum in Aug.
XIX. 1.
Nam virtus: most MSS. have
iam, which is out of place here.
Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam: MSS. omit
et between
cernitur and
in, exc. Halm's G which has
in before
animi and also before
corporis. These last
insertions are not necessary, as may be seen from
Topica 80,
causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur
aut in
omnibus aut in
plerisque, also
T.D. V. 22. In Stob.
II. 6, 8, the
τελος
of the Peripatetics is stated to be
το κατ'
αρετην ζην
εν τοις περι
σωμα και
τοις εξωθεν
αγαθοις, here
quibusdam quae etc., denote the
εξωθεν or
εκτος
αγαθα, the third class in
19.
Hominem ... societate: all this is strongly
Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob.
II. 6, 7 (
κοινη
φιλανθρωπια),
etc., doubtless the humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the
φυσει
ανθρωπος
πολιτικον
ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf.
D.F. III. 66,
De Leg. I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293—296. The
repetitions
hominem,
humani,
hominibus,
humana are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous
friend) proposed
mundana from
T.D. V. 108, Varro, however, has
humana societas in
Aug.
XIX. 3.
Cetera autem: what are these
cetera? They form portion of the
εκτος
αγαθα, and although not strictly
contained within the
summum bonum are necessary to enrich it and
preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob.
II. 6, 8, 13,
φιλια,
φιλοι would belong to the
quaedam of Cicero, while
πλουτος
αρχη
ευτυχια
ευγενεια
δυναστεια
would be included in
cetera. The same distinction is drawn in Aug.
VIII. 8.
Tuendum: most MSS.
tenendum, but
tuendum corresponds best with the division of
αγαθα into
ποιητικα and
φυλακτικα,
Stob.
II. 6, 13. For the word
pertinere
see
M.D.F. III. 54.
§22.
Plerique: Antiochus believes it also Academic.
Qui tum
appellarentur: MSS.
dum, the subj. is strange, and was felt to
be so by the writer of Halm's G, which has
appellantur.
Videbatur: Goer. and Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that
it has the strong meaning of the Gr.
εδοκει, "it was their dogma,"
so often.
Adipisci: cf.
adeptum esse,
19.
Quae essent prima natura: MSS. have
in
natura. For the various modes of denoting the
πρωτα
κατα φυσιν
in Latin see Madvig's
Fourth Excursus to the D.F., which the
student of Cic.'s philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase
prima
natura (abl.) could not stand alone, for
τα πρωτα τη
φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous
forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A
comparison of this statement of the ethical
finis with that in
19 and the passages quoted in my note there, will show
that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic
τα
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν and the Peripatetic
τριλογια. That
this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his
Excursus, but he
does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly
correctly reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug.
De
Civ. Dei XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in
every particular. Even the
inexplicabilis perversitas of which
Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen
from Augustine
XIX. 1, 3, included even
virtus among the
prima naturae. A little reflection will
show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical
identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the
finis. I regret
that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther.
For the Stoic
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν see Zeller, chap
XI. Ipsa per sese expetenda: Gk.
‛αιρετα, which is
applied to all things contained within the
summum bonum. As the
Stoic
finis was
αρετη only, that alone to them was
‛αιρετον, their
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν were not
‛αιρετα, (cf.
D.F. III. 21). Antiochus'
prima
naturae were
‛αιρετα to him, cf.
Aug.
XIX. 3,
prima illa naturae propter se
ipsa existimat expetenda so Stob.,
II. 6, 7,
demonstrates each branch of the
τριλογια to be
καθ'
‛αυτο
‛αιρετον.
Aut
omnia aut maxima: so frequently in Cic., e.g.
D.F. IV. 27, so Stob.
II. 6, 8,
τα
πλειστα και
κυριωτατα.
Ea sunt maxima: so Stob., Varro in Aug.
passim.
Sensit: much misunderstood by edd., here =
iudicavit not
animadvertit cf.
M.D.F. II. 6.
Reperiebatur: for change of constr. cf.
D.F. IV. 26
Nec tamen beatissimam: the question
whether
αρετη was
αυταρκες
προς
ευδαιμονιαν
was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to
Antiochus, consult
M.D.F. V. 67.
§23. Agendi
aliquid: Gk.
πραξεως, the usual
translation, cf.
II. 24,
37.
Officii ipsius initium:
του
καθηκοντος
αρχην, Stob.
II. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New
Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the
ground from action and duty, see
II. 24.
Recti honestique: these words are redolent
of the Stoa.
Earum rerum: Halm thinks something like
appetitio has fallen out,
susceptio however, above, is
quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in
D.F. III. 32.
Descriptione
naturae: Halm with one MS. (G) gives
praescriptione, which is
in
II. 140, cf. also
praescriberet above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf.
prima
constitutio naturae in
D.F. IV. 15.
Aequitas: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
επιεικεια.
Eaeque: so Halm for MSS.
haeque,
haecque. Of course
haecque, like
hicque,
sicque, would be
un-Ciceronian.
Voluptatibus: a side blow at the Epicureans.
Forma see n. on
33.
§§24—29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus'
Physics. Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which
are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate.
When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed
entity (ποιον τι or
quale)—(24). These formed entities are
either primary or secondary. Air, fire, water, earth are
primary, the two first having an active, the two last a passive function.
Aristotle added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed
entities is the formless matter, matter and space are infinitely
subdivisible (27). Force or form acts on the
formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside which no
matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This
Reason has various names—Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom,
Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing
(28, 29).
§24. Natura:
this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a translation both
of
φυσις and
ουσια. Here it is
ουσια
in the broadest sense, all that exists.
In res duas: the
distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in
the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however
probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this
read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of
Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler,
Handbook, pp
99—105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important
coincidence of Force with logical
genus (
ειδος), and of Matter
(
‛υλη) with
logical
differentia (
διαφορα). For the
duae res, cf.
D.F. I. 18.
Efficiens ... huic se praebens: an attempt to translate
το
ποιουν and
το
πασχον of the
Theaetetus,
το
οθεν and
το
δεχομενον of
the
Timaeus (50 D). Cic. in
Tim. has
efficere and
pati, Lucretius
I. 440
facere and
fungi.
Ea quae: so Gruter, Halm for MSS.
eaque. The
meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by an active generative
form results in an
aliquid, a
τοδε τι as Aristotle calls
it. Passive matter
‛υλη is only potentially
τοδε τι,
passing into actual
τοδε τι, when affected by the
form. (Cf.
τοδε,
τουτο, Plato
Tim. 49 E, 50 A,
also Arist.
Metaph H, 1, R. and P. 270—274). A figurative
description of the process is given in
Timaeus, 50 D.
In eo
quod efficeret ... materiam quandam: Cic. is hampered by the
patrii sermonis egestas, which compels him to render simple Greek
terms by laboured periphrases.
Id quod efficit is not distinct
from, but
equivalent to
vis,
id quod efficitur to
materia.
Materiam quandam: it is extraordinary how edd.
(esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over
quandam and
quasi
used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) simply mark the
unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, in the Greek
‛υλη the
strangeness had had time to wear off.
In utroque: for
in eo
quod ex utroque (sc.
vi et materia)
fit, the meaning is
clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot
actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed
entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.
Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur: the meaning of this
is clear, that nothing can
exist except in space
(alicubi),
it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless
est be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence
the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent
the belief of Aristotle and Plato. The
ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato
in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle
explicitly says this,
Phys. III. 4).
Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in space,
as in
Phys. IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289).
Cic. perhaps translates here from
Tim. 52 B,
φαμεν
αναγκαιον
ειναι που το
‛ον ‛απαν
εν τινι
τοπω. For ancient theories about space the
student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair summary
is given by Stob.
Phys. περι κενου
και τοπου
και χωρας, ch.
XVIII. 1.
Corpus et quasi qualitatem:
note that
corpus is
formed, as contrasted with
materia,
unformed matter.
Qualitas is here wrongly
used for
quale; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the
product of Force and Matter, cf.
28. The Greeks
themselves sometimes confuse
ποιοτης and
ποιον, the
confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the phrase
το
ποιον in Greek, which may either
denote the
τοδε
τι as
ποιον, or the Force which makes it
ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of
his categories
το
ποιον and
ποιοτης
indifferently For the Stoic view of
ποιοτης, see Zeller,
96—103, with footnotes.
§25. Bene
facis:
passim in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf.
D.F.
III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly
like this.
Rhetoricam: Hьlsemann conj.
ethicam, which
however is
not Latin. The words have no philosophical significance
here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised.
D.F. III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words
make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first
declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in
en.
Non est vulgi verbum: it first appears in
Theaet. 182 A, where it is called
αλλοκοτον
ονομα.
Nova ... facienda: =
imponenda in
D.F. III. 5.
Suis
utuntur: so
D.F. III. 4.
Transferenda:
transferre =
μεταφερειν,
which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor,
De Or. III. 153 sq., where
necessitas is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf.
also
De Or. III. 149.
Saecula: the
spelling
secula is wrong; Corss.
I. 325,
377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from
secare, and
sequi.
Quanto id magis: Cic. is exceedingly fond of
separating
tam quam ita tantus quantus, etc., from the words with
which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g.
Lael. 53
quam id recte,
Acad. II. 125
tam sit mirabilis,
II. 68
tam in praecipitem; also
D.F.
III. 5
quanto id nobis magis est concedendum
qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere.
§26. Non modo
rerum sed verborum: cf.
9.
Igitur picks
up the broken thread of the exposition; so
35, and
frequently.
Principes ... ex his ortae: the Greek terms are
‛απλα and
συνθετα, see Arist.
De Coelo,
I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The
distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both
Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly
Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be
found in R. and P. 297.
Quasi multiformes: evidently a trans. of
πολυειδεις,
which is opposed to
‛απλους in Plat.
Phaedr. 238 A, and often. Plato uses also
μονοειδης
for
unius modi; cf. Cic.
Tim. ch.
VII., a transl. of Plat.
Tim. 35 A.
Prima
sunt:
primae (sc.
qualitates) is the needless em. of
Walker, followed by Halm.
Formae =
genera,
ειδη. The word is applied to
the four elements themselves,
N.D. I. 19;
cf. also
quintum genus below, and
Topica, 11—13. A
good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be
gained from the section of Stob.
Phys., entitled
περι αρχων
και
στοιχειων
και του
παντος. It will be there seen
that Cic. is wrong in making
initia and
elementa here and
in
39 (
αρχαι and
στοιχεια)
convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements
στοιχεια but
not αρχαι, which term would be reserved
for the primary Matter and Force.
Aлr et ignis: this is Stoic but
not Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary
properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two
former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns
two
of these properties,
one active and
one passive, to each of
the four elements; each therefore is to him
both active and
passive. The Stoics assign only
one property to each element; heat
to fire, cold to air (cf.
N.D. II. 26),
moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at
once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.
Accipiendi ... patiendi:
δεχεσθαι often
comes in Plat.
Tim. Quintum genus: the note on this,
referred to in Introd. p.
16, is postponed to
39.
Dissimile ... quoddam: so MSS.; one would
expect
quiddam, which Orelli gives.
Rebatur: an old
poetical word revived by Cic.
De Or. III.
153; cf. Quintil.
Inst. Or. VIII. 3,
26.
§27. Subiectam
... materiam: the
‛υποκειμενη
‛υλη of Aristotle, from which our word
subject-matter is descended.
Sine ulla specie:
species here
=
forma above, the
ειδος or
μορφη of Arist.
Omnibus without
rebus is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes
avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in
21 in
quibusdam,
quae.
Expressa: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf.
expressa effigies
De Off.
III. 69);
efficta, moulded
as by a potter (see
II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS.
effecta. So Matter is called an
εκμαγειον
in Plat.
Tim. Quae tota omnia: these words have given rise
to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them.
Tota is
feminine sing.; cf.
materiam totam ipsam in
28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can
suffer all changes." For the word
omnia cf.
II. 118, and Plat.
Tim.
50 B (
δεχεται γαρ
ηι τα
παντα), 51 A (
ειδος
πανδεχες). The
word
πανδεχες is also
quoted from Okellus in Stob.
I. 20, 3. Binder is
certainly wrong in taking
tota and
omnia both as
neut.—"
alles und jedes." Cic. knew the
Tim. well and
imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the
passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
Plato's
‛υλη and that of Aristotle.
Eoque
interire: so MSS.; Halm after Dav.
eaque. Faber was right in
supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the
materia what he ought
to have said of the
qualia. Of course the
προτε
‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian,
is imperishable (cf.
Tim. 52 A.
φθοραν ου
προσδεχομενον).
Non in nihilum: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that
infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing
and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr.
I. 215—264, and elsewhere.
Infinite
secari: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the
infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox
one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf.
D.F. I. 20
ne illud quidem physici credere esse
minimum, Arist.
Physica,
I. 1
ουκ
εστιν
ελαχιστον
μεγεθος. The history of
ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close
enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn
Plato's opinions from
Tim. 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,
tripping over the old
αντιφασις
of the One and the Many, denied
παν μεγεθος
διαιρετον
ειναι και
μερος
εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus
followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378).
Intervallis
moveri: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr.
I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext.
Emp.
Adv. Math. VII. 214. Aristotle
denied the existence of void either within or without the universe,
Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence
without (Stob.
I. 18, 1), the Stoics did the
exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the
universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes).
Quae intervalla ...
possint: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter
atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed
Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and
especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the
Physica.
§28. Ultro
citroque: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness.
MSS. have
ultro introque, whence
ed. Rom. (1471) has
ultro in utroque. I think that
in utroque, simply, was the
reading, and that
ultro is a dittographia from
utro. The
meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound,"
utroque being as in
24 for
eo quod ex
utroque fit. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
motion and is ever thus on the move."
Ultro citroque is an odd
expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with
a
quasi. Indeed if it is kept I suggest
quasi for
cum
sic. The use of
versetur is also strange.
E quibus in omni
natura: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject
in. It is
perfectly sound if
natura be taken as
ουσια = existence
substance. The meaning is "out of which
qualia, themselves
existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf.
totam
commutari above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was
formed." For the
in cf.
N.D. II.
35,
in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid, also a similar use
ib. II. 80, and
Ac. II. 42. If
in utroque be
read above,
in omni natura will form an exact contrast, substance
as a whole being opposed to the individual
quale.
Cohaerente et
continuata: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than
any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in
N.D. II. 19, 84, 119,
De Div.
II. 33,
De Leg. fragm. 1. (at the end of
Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if
they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob.
I. 22, 3. The
partes mundi are spoken of in
most of the passages just quoted, also in
N.D. II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic
sources.
Effectum esse mundum: Halm adds
unum from his
favourite MS. (G).
Natura sentiente: a clumsy trans. of
αισθητη
ουσια = substance which can affect
the senses. The same expression is in
N.D. II. 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to
the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf.
N.D. II. 22, 47, 87.
Teneantur: for
contineantur; cf.
N.D. II. 29 with
II. 31
In qua ratio perfecta insit: this
is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are
interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145—150 By an
inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason
is the
Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being
in the Universe, as
here (cf. Diog. Laert.
VII. 138,
N.D.
II. 34) In a curious passage (
N.D. I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same
inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life,
extends through all extent".
Sempiterna: Aristotle held this: see
II. 119 and
N.D.
II. 118, Stob.
I. 21,
6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire
(Diog. Laert.
VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob.
I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an
absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out
of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert.
VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics
however denied the
εκπυρωσις.
Nihil enim valentius: this is an argument often urged, as in
N.D. II. 31 (
quid potest esse mundo
valentius?), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159.
A quo intereat:
interire here replaces the passive of
perdere cf.
αναστηναι,
εκπιπτειν
‛υπο
τινος.
§29. Quam vim
animum: there is no need to read
animam, as some edd. do. The
Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch.
VI. passim. Nearly all these names occur in
N.D. II. The whole of this section is
undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
Sapientiam: cf.
N.D. II. 36 with
III. 23, in which latter passage the Stoic
opinion is severely criticised.
Deum: Cic. in
N.D. I. 30 remarks that Plato in his
Timaeus had
already made the
mundus a God.
Quasi prudentium quandam:
the Greek
προνοια is translated
both by
prudentia and
providentia in the same passage,
N.D. II. 58, also in
N.D. II. 77—80.
Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad
homines: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see
Ac. II. 120,
N.D. I. 23,
II. 160 (where there
is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq.
Necessitatem:
αναγκην, which is
ειρμος
αιτιων,
causarum series
sempiterna (
De Fato 20, cf.
N.D. I. 55,
De Div. I. 125,
127, Diog.
VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This
is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of
cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is
expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence.
Τυχη therefore is
defined as
αιτια
αδηλος
ανθρωπινωι
λογισμωι (Stob.
I. 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed
to Anaxagoras—see also
Topica, 58—66). This
identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and
excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward
by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob.
I. 5, 15.
Nihil aliter possit: on
posse for
posse fieri see
M.D.F. IV. 48, also
Ac. II. 121. For the sense of
Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God),
ουδε τι
γιγνεται
εργον επι
χθονι σου
διχα
δαιμον.
Inter quasi
fatalem: a trans. of the Gk.
κατηναγκασμενον.
I see no reason for suspecting
inter, as Halm does.
Ignorationemque causarum: the same words in
De Div. II. 49; cf. also August.
Contra Academicos
I. 1. In addition to studying the reff. given
above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's
Physica
II. ch. 4—6, with M. Saint Hilaire's
explanation, for the views of Aristotle about
τυχη and
το
αυτοματον,
also ch. 8—9 for
αναγκη. Plato's doctrine of
αναγκη, which is
diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in
Timaeus p. 47, 48, Grote's
Plato,
III. 249—59.
§§30—32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus'
Ethics. Summary. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based
knowledge on the senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of
truth, but the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true
(30). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and
unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come
into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of
their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts
were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based only on sense was
therefore mere opinion (31). Real knowledge only
came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they defined
everything about which they argued, and also used verbal explanations,
from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their
dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (32).
§30. Quae
erat: the Platonic
ην,
= was, as we said.
In ratione et disserendo: an instance of
Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf.
D.F. I. 22
quaerendi ac disserendi.
Quamquam
oriretur: the sentence is inexact, it is
knowledge which takes
its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind
itself; cf. however
II. 30 and n.
Iudicium: the constant translation
of
κριτηριον,
a word foreign to the older philosophy.
Mentem volebant rerum esse
iudicem: Halm with his pet MS. writes
esse rerum, thus giving
an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that
there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that
no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring
contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose,
Orator 194 sq.,
De Or. III. 182
sq.
Solam censebant ... tale quale esset: probably from Plato's
Tim. 35 A thus translated by Cic.,
Tim. c. 7
ex ea
materia quae individua est et unius modi (
αει κατα
ταυτα
εχουσης cf. 28 A.
το
κατα ταυτα
εχον)
et sui simile, cf. also
T.D. I. 58
id solum esse quod semper
tale sit quale sit, quam ιδεαν appellat ille, nos
speciem, and
Ac. II. 129.
Illi ιδεαν, etc.: there is more than one
difficulty here. The words
iam a Platone ita nom seem to exclude
Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an
oversight, but to say first that the school (
illi, cf.
sic
tractabatur ab utrisque) which included Aristotle held the doctrine
of
ιδεαι, and next, in
33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears
very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
ιδεαι
and Aristotle's
τα
καθαλου would naturally
seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in
his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid
at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with
Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very
knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what
inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's
opinions with a much more cautious step.
§31. Sensus
omnis hebetes: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean
view as given in
II. 12—
64, cf. esp.
19 sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia
sunt, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato
by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the
certain from the uncertain.
Res eas ... quae essent aut ita: Halm
by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has
greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads
res ullas
... quod aut ita essent; thus making Antiochus assert that
no
true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in
the
Lucullus, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
reminiscences of the
Theaetetus and of Xenocrates; see below.
Nec percipere: for this see
Lucullus passim. Christ's conj.
percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum, which Halm seems
to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf.
II. 101 neget rem ullam
percipi posse sensibus, so
21,
119 (just like
ratione percipi 91), also
I. 41 sensu comprehensum.
Subiectae
sensibus: cf.
II. 74
and Sext. Emp.
Adv. Math. VIII. 9,
τα
‛υποπιπτοντα
τη
αισθησει.
Aut
ita mobiles, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the
Theaetetus, esp. 160 D sq. For
constans cf.
εστηκος, which so often
occurs there and in the
Sophistes.
Ne idem: Manut. for MSS.
eidem. In the
Theaetetus, Heraclitus' theory of flux is
carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even
the word
εμε is
stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas
the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore
ought to be
τους εμε.
Continenter:
ουνεχως; cf. Simplicius
quoted in Grote's Plato,
I. p. 37, about
Heraclitus,
εν μεταβολη
γαρ συνεχει
τα οντα.
Laberentur et
fluerent: cf. the phrases
‛ροη, παντα
‛ρει, ‛οιον
‛ρευματα
κινεισθαι
τα παντα, etc., which
are scattered thickly over the
Theaet. and the ancient texts about
Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in
Orator 10.
Opinabilem:
δοξαστην, so
opinabile =
δοξαστον in Cic.
Tim ch.
II. The term was largely used by
Xenocrates (R. and P. 243—247), Arist. too distinguishes between
the
δοξαστον and the
επιστητον,
e.g
Analyt. Post. I. 33 (qu. R. and P.
264).
§32. For this cf.
D.F. IV. 8—10.
Notionibus:
so one MS. for
motionibus which the rest have.
Notio is
Cicero's regular translation for
εννοια, which is Stoic. This
statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each
would put a separate meaning on the word
notio.
Επιστημη in Plato
is of the
ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it
is
τον
καθολου; cf.
Anal.
Post. I. 33 (R. and P. 264),
λεγω
νουν αρχην
επιστημης.
Definitiones rerum: these must be carefully distinguished fiom
definitiones nominum, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in
R. and P. 265, note b. The
definitio rei really involves the whole
of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with
moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the
Politicus and
Sophistes, to Aristotle from the passages
quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as
clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole
of Aristotle's philosophy.
Verborum explicatio: this is quite a
different thing from those
definitiones nominum just referred to;
it is
derivation, which does not necessitate definition.
ετυμολογιαν:
this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek
Prose, as are
ετυμος and all its
derivatives. (
Ετυμως means "etymologically"
in the
De Mundo, which however is not Aristotle's). The word
ετυμολογια
is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather
ονοματων
ορθοτης (Diog. Laert.
VII. 83), the title of their books on the
subject preserved by Diog. is generally "
περι των
ετυμολογικων"
The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when
it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had
given the first impulse (
N.D. III. 63).
Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in
N.D. II. and ridiculed in
N.D. III. (cf. esp. 62
in enodandis nominibus quod
miserandum sit laboratis).
Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis
ducibus: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something
about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
Topica
10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
veriloquium of
ετυμολογια
and adopts
notatio, the
rerum nota (Greek
συμβολον) being
the name so explained (
Top. 35). Varro translated
ετυμολογια
by
originatio (Quintil.
I. 6, 28).
Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of
etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be
said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer
examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em.
notationibus for
notas ducibus, the word
notatio is
used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular
derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g.
D.F. V. 74) describes
verba or
nomina as
rerum notae. Berkley's
nodis for
notis has no
support, (
enodatio nominum in
N.D. III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I
conclude this wearisome note. The
quasi marks
rerum nota as
an unfamiliar trans. of
συμβολον. Davies
therefore ought not to have placed it before
ducibus, which word,
strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance
in
T.D. I. 27.
Itaque tradebatur:
so Halm improves on Madvig's
ita for
in qua of the MSS.,
which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to
30
pars for an antecedent to
qua (
in ea parte in qua)
is violent, while Goerenz's resort to
partem rerum opinabilem is
simply silly. Manut. conj.
in quo, Cic. does often use the neut.
pronoun, as in
Orator 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes
thought that Cic. wrote
haec, inquam (cf.
huic below).
Dialecticae: as
λογικη had not been
Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote
λογικη, of
which
διαλεκτικη
is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus,
‛ρητορικη
which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69,
70.
Orationis ratione conclusae: speech drawn up in a syllogistic
form which becomes
oratio perpetua under the influence of
‛ρητορικη.
Quasi ex altera parte: a trans. of Aristotle's
αντιστροφος
in the beginning of the
Rhetoric.
Oratoria: Halm brackets
this word; cf. however a close parallel in
Brut. 261
oratorio
ornamenta dicendi. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s
favourite double genitive (
T.D. III. 39),
oratoria being put for
oratoris.
Ad persuadendum:
το
πιθανον is with Arist.
and all ancient authorities the one aim of
‛ρητορικη.
§§33—42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures
from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the
ιδεαι
of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus,
Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to
which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could
influence happiness, and would allow the name good to nothing else
(35). All other things he divided into three
classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with
nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive
value, and called them preferred to the second a negative value
and called them rejected, to the third no value
whatever—mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms
right action and sin belong only to virtue and vice, he
thought there was an appropriate action (officium) and an
inappropriate, which concerned things preferred and things
rejected (37). He made all virtue
reside in the reason, and considered not the practice but the mere
possession of virtue to be the important thing, although the
possession could not but lead to the practice (38).
All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded
the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while
he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two
parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in
passing which the will was entirely free (40).
Sensations (visa) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
sensation he called it Knowledge, if otherwise, Ignorance
(41). Perception, thus defined, he regarded
as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of
truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in
the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with
virtue and perfect wisdom (42).
§33. Haec erat
illis forma: so Madv.
Em. 118 for MSS.
prima, comparing
formulam in 17, also
D.F. IV. 19,
V. 9,
T.D. III.
38, to which add
Ac. I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
MSS. reading and supply
pars, as usual. His power of
supplying is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the
difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in
6,
15,
32 and here.
Immutationes: so Dav. for
disputationes, approved by Madv.
Em. 119 who remarks that the phrase
disputationes
philosophiae would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain
by
mutavit in
40,
commutatio in
42, and
De Leg. I. 38.
Halm's odd em.
dissupationes, so much admired by his reviewer in
Schneidewin's
Philologus, needs support, which it certainly does
not receive from the one passage Halm quotes,
De Or. III. 207.
Et recte: for the
et cf.
et
merito, which begins one of Propertius' elegies.
Auctoritas:
"system".
Inquit: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
omission of
igitur after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to
begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in
8
says
nihil enim meorum magno opere miror) would not eulogise
himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is
meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying.
Aristoteles: after
this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture,
inserts
igitur, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his
exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter
IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader
would not be much incommoded.
Labefactavit, that Antiochus still
continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic
school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical
resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro
in Aug.
XIX. 1
nulla est causa philosophandi
nisi finis boni.
Divinum: see R. and P. 210 for a full
examination of the relation in which Plato's
ιδεαι stand to his
notion of the deity.
Suavis: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu.
R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from
his style (cf.
loquendi nitor ille divinus, Quint.
X. 1, 83). For
suavis of style cf.
Orat.
161,
Brut. 120.
Negavit: for his various offences see
D.F. V. 12 sq.,
T.D. V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he
departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic
view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In
II. 134 Cic. speaks very
differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that
of Antiochus in
22 the difference is merely verbal.
Beate vivere: the only translation of
ευδαιμονιαν.
Cic.
N.D. I. 95 suggests
beatitas
and
beatitudo but does not elsewhere employ them.
§34. Strato:
see
II. 121. The
statement in the text is not quite true for Diog.
V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven
ethical works, while Stob.
II. 6, 4 quotes his
definition of the
αγαθον.
Diligenter ...
tuebantur: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,
cf. Diog. Laert.
IV. 18,
Ac. II. 131,
D.F. II. 34, and R. and P.
Congregati: "
all
in the Academic fold," cf.
Lael. 69,
in nostro, ut ita dicam,
grege. Of Crates and Crantor little is known.
Polemonem ... Zeno
et Arcesilas: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
teachers (Diog.
VII. 2, 3), while he is not
mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is
that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from
Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb.
Praep. Ev. XIV. 5,
συμφοιτωντες
παρα
Πολεμωνι
εφιλο
τιμηθησαν.
Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.
§35. Anteiret
aetate: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the
dates are uncertain.
Dissereret: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
missing the meaning conj.
definiret.
Peracute moveretur:
Bentl.
partiretur; this with
definiret above well
illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted
the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to
the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs
Ad
Fam. XV. 21, 4, see other close parallels in
n. on
II. 37.
Nervos
... inciderit: same metaphor in
Philipp. XII. 8, cf. also
T.D. II. 27
nervos virtutis elidere,
III. 83
stirpis aegritudinis elidere. (In both
these passages Madv.
Em. Liv. 135 reads
elegere for
elidere, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses
νευρα
εκτεμνειν
metaphorically. Notice
inciderit but
poneret. There is no
need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon
in Cic., e.g.
D.F. III. 33.
Omnia,
quae: MSS.
quaeque, which edd. used to take for
quaecunque. Cf. Goerenz's statement "
negari omnino nequit hac
vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri" with Madvig's utter refutation in
the sixth Excursus to his
D.F. Solum et unum bonum: for the
Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for
himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special
difficulties of the
Academica.
§36. Cetera:
Stoic
αδιαφορα, the
presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly
protested against their being called either
bona or
mala,
and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek
philosophy.
Secundum naturam ... contraria: Gr.
κατα
φυσιν, παρα
φυσιν.
His ipsis ...
numerabat: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words
quae minoris below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness
(with Halm). The word
media is the Gk.
μεσα, which word however is
not usually applied to
things, but to
actions.
Sumenda: Gk.
ληπτα.
Aestimatione:
αξια, positive
value.
Contraque contraria: Cic. here as in
D.F. III. 50 feels the need of a word to express
απαξια (negative value).
(Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word
inaestimatio.)
Ponebat esse: cf.
19,
M.D.F. V. 73.
§37. To cope
thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the
student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and
Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
appears at first sight to have made the
αποπροηγμενα
a subdivision of the
ληπτα (
sumenda), the two
being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (
D.F. III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the
text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads
media in the place of
sumenda, must be rejected. Nor can
anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in
order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe
that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best
known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the
αποπροηγμενα
formed a branch of the
ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is
strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in
36 had
explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the
αδιαφορα, nor is
there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory
any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the
intention to speak of the
sumenda only and then rapidly extended
his thought so as to embrace the whole class of
αδιαφορα, which
he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in
the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I
defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance
of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in
D.F. III. 52,
quae secundum locum
obtinent,
προηγμενα
id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et
remota. If this language be closely pressed, the
αποπροηγμενα
are made of a subdivision of the
προηγμενα,
though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention.
So if his words in
D.F. V. 90 be pressed,
the
sumenda are made to include both
producta and
reducta, in
D.F. III. 16
appeterent includes
fugerent,
ibid. II. 86 the opposite of
beata vita is abruptly
introduced. So
D.F. II. 88
frui
dolore must be construed together, and
ibid. II. 73
pudor modestia pudicitia are said
coerceri, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the
vices which are opposite to these virtues.
I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by
ex iis Cic. means
mediis, and not
sumendis, about
which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that
pluris aestimanda and
minoris aestimanda simply indicate
the
αξια and
απαξια of the Greek,
not different degrees of
αξια (positive value). That
minor
aestimatio should mean
απαξια need not surprise us
when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing
this
απαξια or negative value in
Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on
36;
(2) on the strong negative meaning which
minor bears in Latin,
e.g.
sin minus in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall
victims to the task of expressing
απαξια. Stobaeus, in a
passage closely resembling ours makes
ελαττων
αξια equivalent to
πολλη
απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext.
Emp. after rightly defining
αποπροηγμενα
as
τα
‛ικανην
απαξιαν
εχοντα (
Adv. Math.
XI. 62—64) again speaks of them as
τα
μη ‛ικανην
εχοντα
αξιαν (
Pyrrhon. Hypot. III. 191) words which usually have an opposite
meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words
minoris aestimanda bear
quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus,
τα
μη ‛ικανην
αξιαν
εχοντα. I therefore conclude
that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express
the Stoic doctrine that, of the
αδιαφορα, some
have
αξια
while others have
απαξια. He may fairly claim
to have applied to his words the rule "
re intellecta in verborum usu
faciles esse debemus" (
D.F. III. 52).
There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of
misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are
difficulties connected with the terms
‛ικανη
αξια and
‛ικανη
απαξια which are not
satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret
that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the
D.F. quoted in this note.
Non tam rebus quam vocabulis:
Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen
the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never
properly belonged to the Stoics at all.
Inter recte factum atque
peccatum: Stob. speaks
II. 6, 6 of
τα
μεταξυ
αρετης και
κακιας. (This does not
contradict his words a little earlier,
II. 6, 5,
αρετης δε
και κακιας
ουδεν
μεταξυ, which have regard to
divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however,
VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see
R. and P. 393.)
Recte factum =
κατορθωμα,
peccatum =
‛αμαρτημα,
officium =
καθηκον (cf. R. and P.
388—394, Zeller 238—248, 268—272).
Servata
praetermissaque: MSS. have
et before
servata, which all
edd. since Lamb. eject. Where
et and
que correspond in
Cic., the
que is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the
et. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this
oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate
clauses it is possible. Cf.
43 and
M.D.F. V. 64.
§38. Sed quasdam
virtutes: see
20. This passage requires careful
construing: after
quasdam virtutes not the whole phrase
in
ratione esse dicerent must be repeated but
dicerent merely,
since only the
virtutes natura perfectae, the
διανοητικαι
αρεται of Arist., could be
said to belong to the reason, while the
virtutes more perfectae
are Aristotle's
ηθικαι
αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of
certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be)
by habit."
Ea genera virtutum: both Plato and Arist. roughly
divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the
emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf.
T.D. II. 47, and Arist.
το
μεν ‛ως
λογον εχον,
το δε
επιπειθες
λογωι); Zeno however asserted the
nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason,
to which he gave the name
‛ηγεμονικον
(Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller
248,
D.F. III. passim). When the
‛ηγεμονικον
was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there
was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not
resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle,
but a civil war carried on in one and the same country.
Virtutis
usum: cf. the description of Aristotle's
finis in
D.F.
II. 19.
Ipsum habitum: the mere
possession. So Plato,
Theaetet. 197 B, uses the word
‛εξις, a
use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
Ethics of Arist. In this sense virtue is
not a
‛εξις,
according to the Stoics, but a
διαθεσις (Stob.
II. 6, 5, Diog.
VII.
89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a
‛εξις,
VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes).
Nec
virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur: cf. Stob.
II. 6, 6
δυο γενη των
ανθρωπων
ειναι το μεν
των
σπουδαιων,
το δε των
φαυλων, και
το μεν των
σπουδαιων
δια παντος
του βιου
χρησθαι
ταις
αρεταις, το
δε των
φαυλων ταις
κακιαις.
Perturbationem: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of
the
Acad. appears, should read the plural
perturbationes, a
conj. of Walker.
Perturbationem means emotion in the abstract;
perturbationes below, particular emotions. There is exactly the
same transition in
T.D. III. 23, 24,
IV. 59, 65,
V. 43,
while
perturbatio is used, in the same sense as here, in at least
five other passages of the
T.D., i.e.
IV.
8, 11, 24, 57, 82.
Quasi mortis: a trans. of Stoic
παθεσι, which
Cic. rejects in
D.F. III. 35.
Voluit
carere sapientem: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the
reason, and perfect reason being virtue (
20), it
follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All
emotions are reasonless;
‛ηδονη or
laetitia
for instance is
αλογος
επαρσις. (
T.D.
Books
III. and
IV.
treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg,
Em. to
the
T.D. III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses
efferri laetitia but
ferri libidine.
§39. Aliaque in
parte: so Plato,
Tim. 69 C,
Rep. 436, 441, Arist.
De
Anima II. 3, etc.; cf.
T.D. I. 20.
Voluntarias: the whole aim of the Stoic
theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the
will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
Stoic fatalism we are not told.
Opinionisque iudicio suscipi: all
emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external
object; cf. Diog.
VII. 111.
τα
παθη
κρισεις
ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller
233. For
iudicio cf.
D.F. III. 35,
T.D. III. 61,
IV. 14, 15, 18.
Intemperantiam: the same in
T.D. IV. 22, Gk.
ακολασια, see
Zeller 232.
Quintam naturam: the
πεμπτη
ουσια or
πεμπτον
σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its
existence in
De Coelo I. 2, in a curious
and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist.
derived
mind from this fifth element, though the finest and
highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in
T.D. I. 22, 41, 65,
D.F. IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important
note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from
Stob.
I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the
time were in the habit of deriving the mind from
αιθηρ, which is the
very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (
σωμα
αιθεριον in the
De Coelo), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The
error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred
influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen
into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of
these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time
succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed
νους
εν αιθερι (see
Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial
existence The notion that
νους or
ψυχη came from
αιθηρ was also
fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as
αεικινητος
in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his
mind One from the
Phaedrus 245 C is translated twice, in
Somnium Scipionis (
De Rep. VI.),
and
T.D. I. 53 sq. Now the only thing
with Aristotle which is
αεικινητος
in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion
is alone perfect and eternal), is the
αιθηρ or
πεμπτον
σωμα, that fiery external rim of the
universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve.
How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that
the
αεικινητος
ψυχη of Plato came from the
αεικινητος
αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had
guarded himself by saying that the soul as an
αρχη
κινησεως must be
ακινητος, but
Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob.
I.
41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to
the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just
where Arist. placed his
πεμπτον
σωμα Any one who will compare
T.D.
I. 43 with the
Somn. Scipionis will see
what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the
mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on
as divine (cf.
Somn. Scip. 15) These considerations will be enough
to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible
for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by
the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too
late.
Sensus: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction
drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being
αναλογον τω
των αστρων
στοιχειω (
De
Gen. An. II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299).
Ignem: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree,
between
αιθηρ and
πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190.
Ipsam
naturam:
πυρ is
κατ'
εξοχην
στοιχειον
(Stob.
I. 10, 16), and is the first thing
generated from the
αποιος
‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water,
from water earth (Diog. Laert.
VII. 136, 137)
The fire is
λογικον, from it comes
the
‛ηγεμονικον
of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.
These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics
(Zeller ch.
VIII. with notes) For his view of
sensation and thought see Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 127—129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics
probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's
Plato I. 34 sq.
Expers corporis:
for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a
connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed
from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (
ου γαρ
εγχωρειν τα
‛ετερα και
διαφεροντα
πασχειν ‛υπ'
αλληλων, qu. from Arist.
De Gen. et Corr. I. 7, by R. and P. 43),
the same is affirmed loosely of all the old
φυσικοι, (Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 116), and by Empedocles
in his lines
γαιαι μεν
γαιαν
οπωπαμεν, etc.
Plato in the
Timaeus fosters the same notion, though in a
different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of
thought.
Xenocrates: see
II. 124, n.
Superiores: merely the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school.
Posse esse non corpus: there is no
ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see
Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
§40.
Iunctos: how can anything be a
compound of one thing? The
notion that
iunctos could mean
aptos (R. and P. 366) is
untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his
D.F.) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say
iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum, but having to
explain
φαντασια was
obliged to break off and resume at
sed ad haec. The explanation of
a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in
De Off. I. 153. Schuppe,
De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis p.
9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf.
D.F. II. 44
e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus
Ernesti em.
cunctos, Dav.
punctos,
ingeniose ille
quidem says Halm,
pessime I should say.
Φαντασιαν:
a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by
Zeller, ch.
V., R. and P. 365 sq.
Nos
appellemus licet: the same turn of expression occurs
D.F.
III. 21,
IV. 74.
Hoc
verbum quidem hoc quidem probably ought to be read, see
18.
Adsensionem =
συγκαταθεσιν.
In nobis positam: the usual expression for freedom of the will,
cf.
II. 37,
De
Fato, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is
involuntary (
ακουσιον Sext.
Emp.
Adv. Math. VIII. 397).
Tironum
causa I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the
mind as
involuntary, while the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια
compels assent (see
II. 38). This is, however, only true of the healthy
reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
§41. Visis non
omnibus: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno
abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner
citadel of the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια.
Declarationem:
εναργειαν,
a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on
II. 17.
Earum rerum:
only this class of sensations gives correct information of the
things lying behind.
Ipsum per se: i.e. its whole truth
lies in its own
εναργεια, which
requires no corroboration from without.
Comprehendibile: this form
has better MSS. authority than the vulg
comprehensibile. Goerenz's
note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity
Nos
vero, inquit: Halm with Manut. writes
inquam. Why change?
Atticus answers as in
14,
25,
33.
Καταληπτον:
strictly the
thing which emits the
visum is said to be
καταληπτον,
but, as we shall see in the
Lucullus, the sensation and the thing
from which it proceeds are often confused.
Comprehensionem: this
word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the
individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use
καταληψις
for
καταληπτικη
φαντασια very
often.
Quae manu prehenderentur: see
II.
145.
Nova enim dicebat: an admission not
often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno
merely renamed old doctrines (cf.
43).
Sensum: so Stob.,
I. 41, 25 applies the
term
αισθησις to the
φαντασια.
Scientiam: the word
επιστημη is used
in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or
systematised perceptions (
καταληψεις
or
καταληπτικαι
φαντασιαι)
sometimes also called
τεχνη (cf. Sext.
Pyrrh. Hyp.
III. 188
τεχνην δε
ειναι
συστημα εκ
καταληψεων
συγγεγυμνασμενων);
(2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be
seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80.
Ut convelli ratione non
posset: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all
καταληπτικαι
φαντασιαι
were
ασφαλεις,
αμεταπτωτοι
‛υπο λογου.
Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to
logical tests; see Sext.
Adv. Math. VII.
253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every
καταληπτικη
φαντασια, instead
of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of
sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller
remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic
theory.
Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret: I know nothing like this
in the Stoic texts;
αμαθια is very seldom talked
of there.
Opinio:
δοξα, see Zeller and cf.
Ac. II. 52,
T.D. II. 52,
IV. 15, 26.
§42. Inter
scientiam: so Sextus
Adv. Math. VII.
151 speaks of
επιστημην
και δοξαν
και την εν
μεθοπιαι
τουτων
καταληψιν.
Soli: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives
solum ei.
Non quod omnia: the meaning is that the reason
must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can
know thoroughly any one
thing. This will appear if the whole
sentence be read
uno haustu; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same
view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek.
Quasi: this points out
normam as a trans. of some Gk. word,
κριτηριον
perhaps, or
γνωμων or
κανων.
Notiones
rerum: Stoic
εννοιαι; Zeller
81—84, R. and P. 367, 368.
Quodque natura: the omission of
eam is strange; Faber supplies it.
Imprimerentur: the terms
εναπεσφραγισμενη,
εναπομεμαγμενη,
εντετυπωμενη
occur constantly, but generally in relation to
φαντασιαι,
not to
εννοιαι.
Non
principia solum: there seems to be a ref. to those
αρχαι
της
αποδειξεως
of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the
bases of all proof. (See Grote's
Essay on the Origin of Knowledge,
first printed in Bain's
Mental and Moral Science, now re-published
in Grote's
Aristotle.) Zeno's
εννοιαι were all this
and more.
Reperiuntur: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from
oratio obliqua to
recta, which however has repeatedly taken
place during Varro's exposition, and for which see
M.D.F. I. 30,
III. 49; (2) the
phrase
reperire viam, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm
give
aperirentur. There is no MSS. variant.
Aliena: cf.
alienatos D.F. III. 18.
A
virtute sapientiaque removebat: cf.
sapiens numquam fallitur in
iudicando D.F. III. 59. The
firma
adsensia is opposed to
imbecilla 41. For
the
adsensio of the
sapiens see Zeller 87. More information
on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the
first part of the
Lucullus.
In his constitit: cf.
II. 134.
§§43—end. Cicero's
historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas'
philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the
obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of
knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of
Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).
§43.
Breviter: MSS.
et breviter; see
37.
Tunc: rare before a consonant; see Munro on
Lucr. I. 130.
Verum esse [autem] arbitror: in
deference to Halm I bracket
autem, but I still think the MSS.
reading defensible, if
verum be taken as the neut. adj. and not as
meaning
but. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it
is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that
esse
was needed to go with
putandam. This is a total mistake; cf.
ait ... putandam, without
esse II.
15,
aiebas removendum II. 74; a hundred other
passages might be quoted from Cic.
§44. Non
pertinacia aut studio vincendi: for these words see n. on
II. 14. The sincerity of
Arcesilas is defended also in
II. 76.
Obscuritate: a side-blow at
declaratio 41.
Confessionem
ignorationis: see
16. Socrates was far from
being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on
II. 74.
Et iam ante
Socratem: MSS.
veluti amantes Socratem; Democritus
(460—357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates
(468—399) who died nearly sixty years before him.
Omnis paene
veteres: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised
II. 14. None of these
were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on
II.
73, for Empedocles on
II. 74, for Anaxagoras on
II. 72.
Nihil
cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri: the verbs are all equivalent;
cf.
D.F. III. 15
equidem soleo etiam
quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere.
Angustos
sensus: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles
στεινοποι
μεν γαρ
παλαμαι
κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.
Brevia curricula
vitae: cf. Empedocles'
παυρον δε
ζωης αβιου
μερος. Is there an allusion in
curricula to Lucretius'
lampada vitai tradunt, etc.?
In
profundo: Dem.
εν
βυθω, cf.
II. 32. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would
suit better.
Institutis:
νομω of Democritus, see R. and P. 50.
Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.
Deinceps
omnia:
παντα
εφεξης there is no need to
read
denique for
deinceps as Bentl., Halm.
Circumfusa
tenebris: an allusion to the
σκοτιη
γνωσις of Democr., see
II. 73.
Dixerunt: Halm
brackets this because of
dixerunt above, parts of the verb
dicere are however often thus repeated by Cic.
§45. Ne illud
quidem: cf.
16.
Latere censebat Goer.
omitted
censebat though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as
usual. For the sense
II. 122.
Cohibereque: Gk.
επεχειν, which we shall
have to explain in the
Lucullus.
Temeritatem ... turpius:
for these expressions, see
II. 66, note.
Praecurrere: as was the case with
the dogmatists.
Paria momenta: this is undiluted scepticism, and
excludes even the possibility of the
probabile which Carneades put
forward. For the doctrine cf.
II. 124, for the expression Euseb.
Praep. Evan.
XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas,
ειναι γαρ
παντα
ακαταληπτα
και τους εις
εκατερα
λογους
ισοκρατεις
αλληλοις, Sextus
Adv. Math. IX. 207
ισοσθενεις
λογοι; in the latter writer the word
ισοσθενεια
very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g
Pyrrhon. Hyp. I. 8 (add
N.D. I. 10,
rationis momenta)
§46.
Platonem: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed,
Sextus
Pyrrhon. Hyp. I. 221
τον Πλατωνα
οιν ‛οι μεν
δογματικον
εφασαν
ειναι, ‛οι
δε απο
ητικον, ‛οι
δε κατα μεν
τι
απορητικον,
κατα δε τι
δογματικον.
Stobaeus
II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the
difficulty;
Πλατων
πολυφωνος
ων, ουχ ‛ως
τινες
οιονται
πολυδοξος.
Exposuisti: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm,
etc. for MSS.
exposui.
Zenone: see Introd. p.
5.
NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.
BOOK I.
1. Mnesarchus:
see II. 69, De Or.
I. 45, and Dict. Biogr. 'Antipater'; cf.
II. 143, De Off.
III. 50. Evidently this fragment belongs to that
historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cicero
to have concluded the first book.
2. The word
concinere occurs D.F. IV. 60,
N.D. I. 16, in both which places it is
used of the Stoics, who are said re concinere, verbis discrepare
with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had already
mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this
fragment. Krische remarks that Augustine, Cont. Acad. II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated that part of
Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic. must have
condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order to excuse
the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
BOOK II.
3. This fragm. clearly
forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments which Cic. in the
first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so
level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not
level.
4. On this I have
nothing to remark.
5. There is nothing
distinctive about this which might enable us to determine its connection
with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who serius adamavit
honores.
6. The changing aspects
of the same thing are pointed to here as invalidating the evidence of the
senses.
7. This passage has the
same aim as the last and closely resembles Lucullus 105.
8. The fact that the
eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy the senses are. A
similar argument occurs in Luc. 86.
Perpendiculum is a plumb line, norma a mason's square, the
word being probably a corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt.
Grundz p. 169, ed. 3), regula, a rule.
9. The different
colours which the same persons show in different conditions, when young
and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober and when drunken,
are brought forward to prove how little of permanence there is even in
the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
10. Urinari is
to dive; for the derivation see Curt. Grundz p. 326. A diver would
be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in Luc. 81, which are unable to see that which lies
immediately above them and so illustrate the narrow limits of the power
of vision.
11. Evidently an
attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy. Different people pass
different judgments on one and the same odour. The student will observe
that the above extracts formed part of an argument intended to show the
deceptive character of the senses. To these should probably be added
fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that
the impossibility of distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been
brought forward in the Catulus, was allowed to stand in the second
edition, other difficulties of the kind, such as those connected with the
bent oar, the pigeon's neck, the twins, the impressions of seals
(Luc. 19, 54), would
also appear in both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses
must have been summed up in the phrase cuncta dubitanda esse which
Augustine quotes from the Academica Posteriora (see fragm. 36).
BOOK III.
12. This forms part
of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in substance to Lucullus'
speech in the Academica Priora The drift of this extract was most
likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against
criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to
fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. See
another view in Krische, p. 62.
13. Krische believes
that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show that the senses were
trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with which the fishes
were seen leaping from the water was brought up as evidence. (In
Luc. 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an
argument hostile to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The
explanation seems to me very improbable. The words bear such a striking
resemblance to those in Luc. 125 (ut
nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic innumerabilis paribus
in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis) that I am inclined to think
that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and not Book III., and
that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the Lucrine lake, also
changed Puteolosque into pisciculosque exultantes for the
sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the
Lucrine.
14. The passion for
knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by Varro as an argument
in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be attainable. The same line
is taken in Luc. 31, D.F. III. 17, and elsewhere.
15. It is so much
easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than in that of
Lucullus in the Academica Priora that I think the reference in
Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than
a dogmatist (see Luc. 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of
the same). If my conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a different opinion, but very
hesitatingly, p. 63.
16. This may well
have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις,
temeritas being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics
as by the Academics cf. I. 42.
17. I conjecture
malleo (a hammer) for the corrupt malcho, and think that in
the second ed. some comparison from building operations to illustrate the
fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις
was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the Lucullus. I note in Vitruvius,
quoted by Forc. s.v. malleolus, a similar expression (naves
malleolis confixae) and in Pliny Nat. Hist. XXXIV. 14 navis fixa malleo. Adfixa
therefore in this passage must have agreed with some lost noun either in
the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
18. This and fragm.
19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
notes, the Stoic εναργεια had
evidently been translated earlier in the book by perspicuitas as
in Luc. 17.
19. See on
Luc. 57.
BOOK IV.
Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on
the parallel passages of the Lucullus.
21. Viam
evidently a mistake for the umbram of Luc. 70.
23. The best MS. of
Nonius points to flavum for ravum (Luc. 105). Most likely an alteration was made in the
second edition, as Krische supposes, p. 64.
28.
Corpusculis: Luc. 121 has
corporibus. Krische's opinion that this latter word was in the
second edition changed into the former may be supported from I. 6, which he does not notice.
The conj. is confirmed by Aug. Contr. Ac. III. 23.
29. Magnis
obscurata: in Luc. 122 it is
crassis occultata, so that we have another alteration, see
Krische, p. 64.
30. Only slight
differences appear in the MSS. of the Luc. 123, viz. contraria, for in c., ad
vestigia for contra v.
31. Luc. 137 has dixi for dictus. As Cic. does
not often leave out est with the passive verb, Nonius has probably
quoted wrongly. It will be noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the Luc.,
those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic.
therefore divided the Luc. into two portions at or about 63.
UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
32. I have already
said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary assault on the
senses made by Cic. in the second book.
33. In the Introd. p.
55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the probabile was
incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
that part this fragment must probably be referred.
34. This important
fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a
jocular application of the Carneadean probabile, as may be seen
from the words probabiliter posse confici.
35. Krische assigns
this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book. With this opinion I
find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the Lucullus (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition
this allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have
occurred either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no
reason whatever appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer
to regard it as belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of
Academic doctrine in the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the
Academic school must not be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see
Luc. 119, also 66
and N.D. I. 12. Also Aug. Contra.
Ac. II. 29.
36. It is difficult
to see where this passage could have been included if not in that
prooemium to the third book which is mentioned Ad. Att. XVI. 6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me
wrong in holding that the whole four books formed one discussion,
finished within the limits of a single day. Why interrupt the discussion
by the insertion of a prologue of so general a nature as to be taken from
a stock which Cic. kept on hand ready made? (Cf. Ad Att. as
above.)
Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications
of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled
Contra
Academicos, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
imitated throughout the second edition of the
Academica of Cic. No
writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
and opinions of Augustine as the
Academica and the lost
Hortensius. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications
of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's
works. In Aug.
Contr. Ac. II. 14, 15, we
have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book
I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not
be regarded as having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to
discuss that new doctrine of
καταληψις
advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of
ακαταληψια
though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct
shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather
enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under
the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife
between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.
must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his
opinion (
Contra. Ac. II. 1) that New
Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it
appeared. Indications of Book
II. in Aug. are
scarce, but to it I refer
Contra. Ac. I.
7
placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad
eius inventionem non valeat pervenire, also
ibid. III. 10
illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse
hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse.
These I refer to Cicero's development of the
probabile in Book
II., although I ought to say that Krische, p.
65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the
Ac.
Priora transferred to Book
IV. of the
Ac.
Posteriora. As this would leave very meagre material for Book
II., nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of
the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement;
mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first
edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book
II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally
well to the later attack in Book
IV. As to Books
III. and
IV., I do not
think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement
between them and the
Lucullus, which will find a better place in
my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from
other sources. These are the translation of
σοφισματα
by
cavillationes in
Luc. 75 (Seneca
Ep. III.), and the insertion in
118 of
essentia as a translation of
ουσια.
BOOK II.
ENTITLED LUCULLUS.
§§1—12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and
cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during
his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was
due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits
as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till
just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I
cannot now tell (3). He was not merely a general;
he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read
much for himself (4). Those enemies of Greek
culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be
referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these
dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach
beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy
which I follow—the Academic. This is natural, but they must know
that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (7). My
school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to
authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
Catulus (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to
defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to
do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day
before (10). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard
discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo,
and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday
came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book
against his old teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter
against Philo (12).
§1. Luculli:
see Introd. p.
58, and
Dict. Biog.
Digna homini nobili: a good deal of learning would have been
considered
unworthy of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p.
30.
Percepta: "gained," "won;" cf.
percipere fruges, "to reap,"
Cat. Mai. 24.
Caruit:
"was cut off from;"
carere comes from a root
skar meaning
to divide, see Corss.
I. 403. For the three
nouns with a singular verb see Madv.
Gram. 213 A, who confines the
usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common
reading
dissensit in
De Or. III.
68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
Admodum: "to a
degree."
Fratre: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro,
and was a man of distinction also; see
Dict. Biog. Magna cum
gloria: a ref. to
Dict. Biog. will show that the whole affair
was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have
gained greater glory by letting it drop.
Quaestor: to Sulla, who
employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia.
Continuo: without any interval.
Legis praemio: this seems
to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who
had restored the old
lex annalis in all its rigour, and yet
excepted his own officers from its operation.
Prooemio, which has
been proposed, would not be Latin, see
De Leg. II. 16.
Consulatum: he seems to have been
absent during the years 84—74, in the East.
Superiorum:
scarcely that of Sulla.
§2. Laus:
"merit," as often, so
praemium, Virg.
Aen. XII. 437, means a deed worthy of reward.
Non
admodum exspectabatur: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with
distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war.
In Asia
pace: three good MSS. have
Asiae; Baiter ejects
Asia;
Guilelmus read
in Asia in pace (which Davies conjectures, though
he prints
Asiae).
Consumere followed by an ablative without
in is excessively rare in Cic. Madv.
D.F. V. 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however,
to our passage, I note
hoc loco consumitur in
T.D. IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give
no variants.
Pace here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like
tranqullo.
Indocilem: this is simply passive, = "untaught,"
as in Prop.
I. 2, 12, Ov.
Fast. III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong
in making it active.
Factus: =
perfectus; cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 5, 33
homo factus ad
unguem, Cic.
De Or. III. 184,
In
Verr. IV. 126. So
effectus in silver
Latin.
Rebus gestis: military history, so often.
Divinam
quandam memoriam: the same phrase in
De Or. II. 360.
Rerum, verborum: same distinction in
De Or. II. 359.
Oblivisci se
malle: the same story is told
D.F. II. 104,
De Or. II.
299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person
denoted here by
cuidam) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis,
for whom see
De Or. II. 360.
Consignamus: cf.
consignatae in animis notiones in
T.D. I. 57.
litteris must be an
ablative of the instrument.
Mandare monum.: cf.
I. 3.
Insculptas: rare in
the metaphorical use, cf.
N.D. I. 45.
§3. Genere:
"department" cf.
I. 3.
Navalibus pugnis:
ναυμαχιαις.
Instrumento et adparatu:
κατασκευη
και
παρασκευη.
Rex: Mithridates.
Quos legisset: =
de quibus l.; cf.
the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g.
Trist. IV. 4, 14. I take of course
rex to be nom. to
legisset, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and
that
quos legisset =
quorum commentarios legisset I think
improbable.
Hodie: Drakenborch on Livy
V.
27 wants to read
hodieque, which however, is not Ciceronian. In
passages like
De Or. I. 103 and
Verr. V. 64, the
que connects
clauses and does not modify
hodie. On this subject see Madv.
Opuscula I. 390.
Etsi:
M.D.F. V. 68, shows that in Cic. a
parenthetic clause with
etsi always has a common verb with its
principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same
holds of
quamquam, see n. on
I. 5.
Calumnia: properly a fraudulent use of
litigation,
συκοφαντια.
The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him.
In
urbem: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city.
Profuisset: this ought properly to be
profuerit, but the
conditional
dicerem changes it.
Potius ... quam ...
communicem: n. on
23.
§4. Sunt ...
celebrata: cf.
I. 11,
17 for the collocation of the words.
Externa ...
interiora: cf.
De Div. II. 124
sed
haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus.
Pro
quaestore: for this Faber wrote
quaestor, arguing that as Luc.
was Sulla's
quaestor and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be
pro quaestor. But surely after the first year he would be
pro
quaestor. Dav. reads
quaestor here and
11, saying "
veterem lectionem iugulavit
Faber".
Ea memoria ... quam: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give
qua, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor.
Sat. I. 6, 15. A passage like ours is
D.F. I. 29,
ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis, where
one MS. has
qua. Read Madvig's lucid note there.
De quibus
audiebat: Madv.
Em. 121 makes this equivalent to
de eis
rebus de quibus, the necessity of which explanation, though approved
by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic.,
and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf.
e.g.
Cat. Mai. 83. I take
quibus as simply =
libris.
§5. Ac:
strong, as often, =
και μην.
Personarum:
public characters,
προσωπων
πολεως (
Ad. Fam. XV. 17, 2), so
personas 6.
Multi ... plures: cf. Introd. p.
30.
Reliqui: many MSS. insert
qui by
dittographia, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains
it. On the retention or omission of this
qui will depend the
choice of
putant or
putent below.
Earum rerum
disputationem: for
disp. followed by genitive see n. on
I. 33.
Non ita decoram:
for this feeling see Introd. p.
30. For
non
ita cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae".
Historiae
loquantur:
hist. means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than
"history," which is better expressed by
res gestae. Note that the
verb
loqui not
dicere is used, and cf. n. on
101.
Legatione: to the kings in Egypt and
the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the
embassy see
Dict. Biogr. art. 'Panactius'.
Auctorem: one
would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read
fautorem, Dav.
auditorem.
§6.
Illigari: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use
Forc. qu. Liv.
XXXIII. 21, Tac.
Ann.
XIII. 40.
Aut ludicros sermones: =
aut
clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat.
Rerum leviorum: a
similar argument in
D.F. I. 12.
Quodam
in libro: the
Hortensius.
Gradu: so the word "degree"
was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad.
De opera
publica detrahamus: the dative often follows this verb, as in
D.F. III. 7
nihil operae reipublicae
detrahens, a passage often wrongly taken.
Operae is the dat.
after the verb, not the gen. after
nihil,
reip. the gen.
after
operae, like
opera publica here, not the dat. after
detrahens.
Nisi forensem: the early oratorical works may
fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the
De
Republica or the
De Leg. both of which fall within the period
spoken of.
Ut plurimis prosimus: cf. Introd. p.
29.
Non modo non minui, sed: notice
non
modo ... sed thrice over in two sentences.
§7. Sunt ... qui
negent: and truly, see Introd. p.
38. In
Cat. Mai. §3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned
than he really was.
Mortuis: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about
57, Hortensius 50.
Contra omnis dicere quae videntur: MSS. mostly
insert
qui between
dicere and
quae, one of the best
however has
dicere quae aliis as a correction, while another has
the marginal reading
qui scire sibi videntur. The omission of
qui, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2)
referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense.
Verum invenire: cf.
60.
Contentione: =
φιλονεικια
as usual.
In ... rebus obscuritas: cf.
I.
44 rerum obscuritate.
Infirmitas: cf.
I. 44 imbecillos
animos.
Antiquissimi et doctissimi: on the other hand
recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime I. 13.
Diffisi: one of
the best MSS. has
diffissi, which reminds one of the spelling
divisssiones, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint.
Inst. Or.
I. 7, 20.
In utramque partem:
επ'
αμφοτερα, cf.
I. 45.
Exprimant:
"embody," cf. n. on
I. 19.
§8.
Probabilia:
πιθανα, for which see
33.
Sequi: "act upon," cf.
99-
101.
Liberiores et
solutiores: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and
illustrate his love for petty variations; see
105, also
T.D. V.
43,
De Div. I. 4,
De Rep. IV. 4,
N.D. I. 56,
Orat. 64.
Integra: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "
non
mihi integrum est"—"I have committed my self."
Et quasi:
MSS. have
et quibus et quasi.
Cogimur: for this Academic
freedom see Introd. p.
18.
Amico cuidam:
Orelli after Lamb.
cuipiam; for the difference see Madv.
Gram. 493
b,
c.
§9. Ut
potuerint, potuerunt: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was
simply
ut potuerunt, "granting that they had the ability, they
gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they
did
decide on a single hearing," etc.
Iudicaverunt autem: so Lamb. for
MSS.
aut. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "
arguta
hariolatio," read
an for
aut and put a note of
interrogation at
contulerunt. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's
Philologus VII. 466) introduces by conj.
a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's
remarks in
Em. 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed,
followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion
of
aut between
sed and
ut at the beginning; of this
Madv. says "
non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat."
For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
N.D. I. 10,
De Leg. I. 36.
Quam adamaverunt: "which they have learned to love;" the
ad
has the same force as
προ in
προμανθανειν,
which means "to learn
on and on, to learn by degrees" (cf.
προυμαθον
στεργειν
κακοις), not, as the lexica
absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly."
Constantissime: "most consistently".
Quae est ad Baulos:
cf. Introd. p.
57.
In spatio: this
xystus was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called
ξυστος from its polished
floor and pillars.
Consedimus: n. on
I.
14.
§10. Servatam
oportuit: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but
rarely, in Cic. and Livy.
In promptu ... reconditiora: cf.
in
promptu ... interiora in
De Div. II.
124, also
Ac. I. 4.
Quae dico: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and
wishes to read
dixero. But the substitution of the pres. for the
future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv.
IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note.
Si non
fuerint: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have
si
vera etc. In support of the text, see
I. 9 (
sunt ista) and note.
Labefactata: this
is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
Ed. Rom.
(1471); the others have
labefacta. Orelli's statement (note to his
separate text of the
Academica 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
perfect
labefeci and the part,
labefactus is quite wrong.
The former is indeed the vulg. reading in
Pro Sestio 101, the
latter in
De Haruspicum Responsis 60, but the last of these two
passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like
sustentatus, which occurs with
labefactatus in
Cat.
Mai. 20. For the perfect
labefactavit cf.
I. 33.
Agam igitur: Cic.
rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the
learning of Lucullus.
§11. Pro
quaestore: cf.
4.
Essem: MSS.
issem, whence Goer. conj.
Alexandriam issem.
Heraclitus
Tyrius: scarcely known except from this passage.
Clitomachum:
for this philosopher see Zeller 532.
Quae nunc prope dimissa
revocatur: sc.
a Cicerone. Philo's only notable pupils had
combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
Academica the New Academic dialectic had been without a
representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p.
21.
Libri duo: cf.
I. 13.
Heri for this indication of the contents of
the lost
Catulus, see Introd. p.
50.
Implorans: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to
with tears," see Corss.
I. 361.
Philonis:
sc.
esse.
Scriptum agnoscebat: i.e. it was an actual work
of Ph.
Tetrilius: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the
name
Tertinius is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
Tretilius, which may be a mistake for
Tertilius, a name
formed like
Pompilius,
Quintilius,
Sextilius. Qy,
should
Petrilius, a derivative from the word for four, be read?
Petrilius and
Pompilius would then agree like
Petronius and
Pomponius,
Petreius and
Pompeius. For the formation of these names see Corss.
I. 116.
Rogus: an ill omened and unknown name.
Rocus, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
denarii of the
gens Creperia.
De Philone ... ab eo ipso: note the change
of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy."
De and
ex
are common in Cic. after
audire, while
ab is rather rarer.
See
M.D.F. I. 39, and for
describere
ab aliquo cf.
a te in
Ad Att. XIII. 22, 3.
§12. Dicta
Philoni: for this see Introd. p.
50. It cannot
mean what Goer. makes it mean, "
coram Philone." I think it
probable that
Philoni is a marginal explanation foisted on the
text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by
18.
Academicos: i.e.
novos, who are
here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
title.
Aristo: see Introd. p.
11.
Aristone: Diog.
VII. 164 mentions an
Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
unknown.
Negat: see n. on
18.
Lenior: some MSS.
levior, as is usual with these two words.
In
11 one of the earliest editions has
leviter for
leniter.
§§13—18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted
like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as
supporters of scepticism (13), Those very
philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, seem to me, if anything,
too dogmatic (14). Even if they were often in
doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many
centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was
a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel
against a good government (15). Has nothing really
been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists
think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument
can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however do allow of discussion with
sceptics. Philo in his innovations was induced to state falsehoods, and
incurred all the evils he wished to avoid, his rejection of Zeno's
definition of the καταληπτικη
φαντασια really
led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then
must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (18).
§13. Rursus
exorsus est: cf.
exorsus in
10.
Popularis:
δημοτικους.
Ii a: so Dav. for MSS.
iam.
Tum ad hos: so MSS.,
Dav.
aut hos. The omission of the verb
venire is very
common in Cic.'s letters.
C. Flaminium: the general at lake
Trasimene.
Aliquot annis: one good MS. has
annos, cf.
T.D. I. 4, where all the best MSS. have
annos. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and
indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers
ever use any
accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to
express duration (cf. Prop.
I. 6, 7 and Madv.
Gram. 235, 2).
L. Cassium: this is L. Cassius Longinus
Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (
De Leg.
III. 35), he was the author of the
cui
bono principle and so severe a judge as to be called
scopulus
reorum. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty
with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C.
P. Africanum: i.e.
the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have
done nothing else for the democrats.
Fratres: Lamb.
viros,
but cf.
Brut. 98.
P. Scaevolam: the pontifex, consul in the
year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against
the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about
the legal effect the bills would have.
Ut videmus ... ut
suspicantur: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that
the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but
him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be
allowed the inconsistency.
§14.
Similiter: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have
simile.
Xenophanem: so Victorius for the MSS.
Xenoplatonem.
Ed. Rom. (1471) has
Cenonem, which
would point to
Zenonem, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea.
Saturninus: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer.
says
frustra quaeritur. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of
Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
Arcesilae calumnia: this was a common charge, cf.
Academicorum
calumnia in
N.D. II. 20 and
calumnia in
18 and
65 of this book. So August.
Contra Acad. II. 1 speaks of
Academicorum vel calumnia vel
pertinacia vel pericacia.
Democriti verecundia: Cic. always
has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on
D.F. I. 20 remarks, cf.
De Div. II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the
general
arrogantia of the
physici.
Empedocles quidem ...
videatur: cf.
74. The exordium of his poem is
meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text,
see R. and P. 108.
Quale sit: the emphasis is on
sit, the
sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence.
Quasi modo
nascentes: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however
T.D.
II. 5
ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... ,
philosophia nascatur.
§15.
haesitaverunt: Goer. cf.
De Or. I.
40.
Constitutam: so in
14.
Delitisceret: this is the right spelling, not
delitesceret,
which one good MS. has here, see Corssen
II.
285.
Negavissent: "had denied, as they said."
Tollendus
est: a statement which is criticised in
74.
Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt: genuine Antiochean
opinions, see the
Academica Posteriora 17,
43.
De se ipse: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
Madv.
Gram. 487
b).
Diceret: this is omitted by the
MSS., but one has
agnosceret on the margin; see n. on
88.
Fannius: in his "Annals." The same
statement is quoted in
De Or. II. 270,
Brutus 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius
(
Ad Att. XII. 5, 3).
§16.
Veteribus: Bentley's em. of MSS.
vetera: C.F. Hermann
(Schneid
Philol. VII. 457), thinking the
departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
vetera and changes
incognita into
incondita, comparing
De Or. I. 197,
III. 173. A glance,
however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely
"disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between
order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that
incognita is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS.
reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were
not
knowledge, but mere
opinion." The conj. of Kayser
veri nota for
vetera (cf.
76) and
investigatum below, is fanciful and improbable.
Quod
investigata sunt: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
disturbs the text which since Madv.
Em. 127 supported it (quoting
T.D. V. 15, Liv.
XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that
illa
in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects
nihilne est igitur actum as a dittographia (!) from
15 nihilne explicatum, and reads
quot
for
quod with Bentl. For the meaning cf.
T.D. III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as
there quoted.
Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans: see n. on
I. 34. These charges were
brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch
Adv. Colotem
p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge
is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was
often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug.
Contra Acad.
II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm.
2 and
35 of the
Academica
Posteriora.
Immutatione verborum: n. on
I. 33. This phrase has also
technical meanings; it translates the Greek
τροποι
(
Brut. 69) and
αλληγορια
in
De Or. II. 261, where an ex. is given.
Definitiones: n. on
18.
Tenebras
obducere: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is
mentioned, cf.
30 (
lucem eripere),
N.D. I. 6 (
noctem obfundere) Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 14 (
quasdam nebulas
obfundere), also the joke of Aug.
II. 29
tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse.
Non admodum
probata: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533.
Lacyde: the most important passages in ancient authorities
concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that
Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of
information about his teacher's doctrines.
Tenuit: cf. the use of
obtinere in
De Or. I. 45.
In
Aeschine: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher
see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have
hac nonne Christ conj.
Hagnone which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to
adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon
just mentioned in Quint.
II. 17, 15. There is
not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
at all, from these two passages only.
§17.
Patrocinium: for the word cf.
N.D. I. 6.
Non defuit: such patronage
was
wanting in the time of Arcesilas (
16).
Faciendum omnino non putabant: "Epictetus (Arrian,
Diss.
I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by
saying
ουκ αγω
σχολην προς
ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another
passage (Arrian,
I. 5) Epict. says it is no more
use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse.
Ullam rationem
disputare: the same constr. occurs in
74 and
Pro Caecina 15,
Verr. Act. I. 24.
Antipatrum: cf. fragm.
1 of Book
I. Verbum e verbo: so
31,
D.F. III. 15,
T.D. III. 7, not
verbum de verbo,
which Goer. asserts to be the usual form.
Comprehensio: cf.
I. 41.
Ut Graeci: for the
ellipse of the verb cf.
I. 44 ut Democritus.
Evidentiam: other
translations proposed by Cic. were
illustratio (Quint.
VI. 2, 32) and
perspicientia (
De Off.
I. 15).
Fabricemur: cf.
87,
119,
121.
Me appellabat: Cic. was the great
advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (
D.F. III. 15).
Sed tamen: this often resumes the
interrupted narrative, see Madv.
Gram. 480.
Ipsa evidentia:
note that the verb
evidere is not Latin.
§18.
Sustinere: cf.
70.
Pertinaciam: the
exact meaning of this may be seen from
D.F. II. 107,
III. 1. It denotes
the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to
see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term
to the Academics, cf. n. on
14,
66, also
I. 44 and
D.F. V. 94,
N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages
the Academy is called
procax.
Mentitur: cf.
12.
Ita negaret: this
ita corresponds
to
si below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf.
19.
Ακαταληπτον:
the conj. of Turnebus
καταληπτον
is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in
negaret.
Visum: cf.
I. 40.
Trivimus: cf.
I. 27.
Visum igitur: the Greek of this definition
will be found in Zeller 86. The words
impressum effictumque are
equivalent to
εναπεσφραγισμενη
και
εναπομεμαγμενη
in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to
be a real alteration (
‛ετεροιωσις)
of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external
thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf.
Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes.
Ex eo unde esset ... unde non
esset: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given
by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in
Adv. Math. VIII. 86
Pyrrh.
Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt),
and in Diog. Laert.
VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a
clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It
is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of
his
Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words
κατ'
αυτο το
‛υπαρχον. Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 249 considers them
essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra,
mistook her for an Erinys. The
φαντασια
therefore which he had although
απο
‛υπαρχοντος
(proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not
κατα το
‛υπαρχον, i.e.
did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug.
Cont. Acad.
II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses
it thus;
his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest
habere quod falsum est.
Iudicium:
κριτηριον,
a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known.
Eo, quo
minime volt: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a
reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of
knowledge on a ground quite different from the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια, which he
pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to
suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf.
11, Sextus
Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans
believed all things to be
ακαταληπτα,
Philo held them to be
καταληπτα,
and Numenius in Euseb.
Praep. Ev. XIV. 8,
p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is
evident from the
Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The
foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to
comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be
in their
own nature καταληπτα
(‛οσον δε
επι τη φυσει
των
πραγματων
αυτων
καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades
would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that
things
in themselves were incognisable,
but that human
faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore
Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such
a doctrine. The Stoics by their
καταληπτικη
φαντασια professed
to be able to get at
the thing in itself, in its real being, if
then Philo did away with the
καταλ.
φαντ. and substituted no other mode of
curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense,
he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius
treats his polemic against the
καταλ.
φαντ. as a mere feint intended to cover
his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in
112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be
expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually
does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to
be "
quod impressum esset e vero" (
φαντασια
απο
‛υπαρχοντος
εναπομεμαγμενη),
refusing to add "
quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (
‛οια ουκ αν
γενοιτο απο
μη
‛υπαρχοντος),
cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that
the cognisable was equivalent to the
δηλον or
πιθανον of Carneades,
hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the
wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on
phenomena. (See
78 of this book.) The scarcity of
references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact
view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or
nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
entitled
Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli).
With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie"
consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that
they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (
12). I
may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of
Stobaeus'
Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left
dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is,
that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new
Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
genuinely Academic.
Revolvitur: cf.
De Div. II. 13, also
148 of this book.
Eam definitionem: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that
all knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility
depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.
§§19—29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and
unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things.
Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must
see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be
removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated senses of painters and
musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally
clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of
sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we
arrive at definitions and ideas (21). If these
ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at
once rendered impossible (22). That true
perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the
things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing
certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can
proceed (24). Credence must be given to the thing
which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an
end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never
be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled,
should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are
rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a
sure basis (27). Hence the Academics have been
urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible, to be a
certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be
inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there
can be any true perception (28). Antiochus
declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they
had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
§19.
Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word
sensus
like
αισθησις means
two things, (1) one of the
five senses, (2) an individual act of
sensation.
Deus: for the supposed god cf.
T.D. II. 67.
Non videam: this strong statement is
ridiculed in
80.
De remo inflexo et de collo
columbae: cf.
79,
82.
The
κωπη εναλος
κεκλασμενη
and
περιστερας
τραχηλος are
frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the
deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g.
Pyrrhon. Hypot. I. 119-121,
Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day
before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug.
Cont. Ac.
III. 27.
Epicurus hoc viderit: see
79,
80. Epic. held all
sensation,
per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for
this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote.
Lumen
mutari: cf.
Brut. 261.
Intervalla ... diducimus: for
this cf. Sext.
Pyrrh.
I. 118
πεμπτος
εστι λογος
(i.e. the 5th sceptic
τροπος for showing sense to
be untrustworthy)
‛ο παρα τας
θεσεις (
situs)
και τα
διαστηματα
(
intervalla)
και τους
τοπους.
Multaque facimus
usque eo: Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 258
παντα ποιει
μεχρις αν
τρανην και
πληκτικην
σπαση
φαντασιαν.
Sui iudicii: see for the gen.
M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.
Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer.
Sui
cuiusque: for this use of
suus quisque as a single word see
M.D.F. V. 46.
§20. Ut oculi
... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other
hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary.
Quis est quin
cernat: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here
(
D.F. II. 27).
Umbris ...
eminentia: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses
umbra and
lumen, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk.
σκια and
σκιασμα are opposed to
λαμπρα; cf. also
σκιαγραφειν,
adumbrare, and Aesch.
Agam. 1328. Cic. often applies
metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g.
De Or.
III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g.
II. 17, 21.
Inflatu: cf.
86 (where an answer is given) and
αναβολη.
Antiopam: of Pacuvius.
Andromacham: of Ennius, often quoted
by Cic., as
De Div. I. 23.
Interiorem: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's
Socrates and the
Socratic Schools, 296.
Quia sentiatur:
αισθησις being
their only
κριτηριον.
Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R.
and P. and Zeller will show) conj.
cui adsentiatur, comparing
39,
58; cf. also
76.
Inter eum ... et inter: for the repetition
of
inter cf.
T.D. IV. 32 and Madv.
Gram. 470.
Nihil interesse: if the doctrine of the
Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied
himself in pleasure, and
vice versa; thus the distinction between
pleasure and pain would be obscured.
Sentiet ... insaniat: For the
sequence cf.
D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg's
fine note on
T.D. V. 102.
§21. Illud est
album: these are
αξιωματα,
judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see
Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too
long to quote entire:
αισθησεσι
μεν ουν
μοναις
λαβειν
ταληθες (which resides
only in the
αξιωμα)
ου δυναται
ανθρωπος. ...
φυσει γαρ
εισιν
αλογοι ... δει
δε εις
φαντασιαν
αχθηναι του
τοιουτου
πραγματος
"τουτο
λευκον εστι
και τουτο
γλυκυ εστιν."
τωι δε
τοιουτωι
πραγματι
ουκετι της
αισθησεως
εργον εστιν
επιβαλλειν
... συνεσεως
τε δει και
μνημης.
Ille deinceps:
deinceps is really out of place; cf.
24
quomodo primum for
pr. quom. Ille equus est: Cic.
seems to consider that the
αξιωμα, which affirms the
existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the
existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from
the Greek texts.
Expletam comprehensionem: full knowledge. Here we
rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g.
Adv.
Math. VII. ανθρωπος
εστι ζωον
λογικον
θνητον, νου
και
επιστημης
δεκτικον. The
Stoic
‛οροι, and this among them, are
amusingly ridiculed,
Pyrrh. Hyp. II.
208—211.
Notitiae: this Cic. uses as a translation both of
προληψις and
εννοια, for which see Zeller
79, 89. In
I. 40
notiones rerum is given.
Sine quibus:
δια
γαρ των
εννοιων τα
πραγματα
λαμβανεται
Diog.
VII. 42.
§22.
Igitur: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv.
Gram. 480.
Consentaneum: so Sextus constantly uses
ακολουθον.
Repugnaret: cf.
I. 19 and n.
Memoriae certe: n. on
106.
Continet: cf.
contineant in
40.
Quae potest esse: Cic. nearly always
writes
putat esse,
potest esse and the like, not
esse
putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause.
Memoria falsorum: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
Sophist. 238—239.
Ex multis animi perceptionibus: the
same definition of an art occurs in
N.D. II. 148,
D.F. III. 18
(see Madv.), Quint,
II. 17, 41, Sext.
Pyrrh.
Hyp. III. 188
τεχνην
ειναι
συστημα εκ
καταληψεον
συγγεγυμνασμενων
ib. III. 250.
Quam: for the change
from plural to singular (
perceptio in universum) cf. n. on
I. 38, Madv.
D.F. II. 61,
Em. 139.
Qui distingues: Sext.
Adv. Math. VIII. 280
ου
διοισει της
ατεχνιας ‛η
τεχνη. Sextus often comments on
similar complaints of the Stoics.
Aliud eiusmodi genus sit: this
distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence
in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext.
Adv. Math. XI. 197 who adds a third class of
τεχναι called
αποτελεσματικαι
to the usual
θεωρητικαι
and
πρακτικαι,
also Quint.
II. 18, 1 and 2, where
ποιητικη
corresponds to the
αποτ. of Sext.
Continget: "will be
the natural consequence." The notion that the verb
contingit
denotes necessarily
good fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer
on
T.D. III. 4.
Tractabit:
μελλει
μεταχειριζεσθαι.
§23.
Cognitio: like Germ.
lehre, the branch of learning which
concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of
καταληψις
here.
In quibus: the antecedent is not
virtutum, as Petrus
Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby,
but
multa. This is shown by
etiam; not
merely the
virtues but
also all
επιστημη depends
on
καταληψεις;
cf.
I. 40,
41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367.
Stabilem:
βεβαιον και
αμεταπτωτου.
Artem vivendi: "
tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos"
M.D.F. I. 42. Sextus constantly talks
about
‛η
ονειροπολουμενη
περι τον
βιον τεχνη
(
Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 250) the existence of
which he disproves to his own satisfaction (
Adv. Math. XI. 168 sq).
Ille vir bonus: in all ancient
systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the
sapiens must be
proof against the rack; cf. esp.
D.F. III. 29, 75,
T.D. V.
73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the
σοφος in Plato's
Gorgias.
Potius quam aut: Lamb.
ut; but I think C.F.
Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic.
never
inserts
ut after
potius quam with the subj. Tischer on
T.D. II. 52 affirms that
ut is
frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf.
De Off.
I. 86, Aug.
Cont. Ac. II. 12 who says the
sapiens of the Academy must
be
desertor officiorum omnium.
Comprehensi ... constituti:
cf. the famous
abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit.
Iis rebus:
note the assumption that the
sensation corresponds to the
thing which causes it.
Adsensus sit ... possint: nearly all
edd. before Halm read
possunt, but the subj. expresses the
possibility as present to the mind of the supposed
vir bonus. Cf.
Madv.
Gram. 368.
§24.
Primum: out of place, see on
21.
Agere: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if
consistent, be
ανενεργητος
εν βιωι (Sext.
Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. 23).
Extremum: similar
attempts to translate
τελος are made in D.F.
I. 11, 29,
V. 17.
Cum quid
agere: cf.
I. 23 for
the phrase
Naturae accommodatum. a purely Stoic expression,
‛ωμοιωμενον
τη φυσει; cf.
38 and
D.F. V. 17,
also
III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P.
390.
Impellimur:
κινουμεθα,
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 391, as often.
§25. Oportet
videri: "ought to be seen." For this use cf.
39,
81 and
122 of this book.
Videri at the end of this
section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly
from the one use to the other; cf.
I. 262 with
I. 270, and Munro's n., also
M.D.F. II. 52,
Em. Liv. p. 42.
Non poterit: as
the Academics allege.
Naturae ... alienum: Cic. uses this
adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by
ab;
I doubt whether the phrase
maiestate alienum (without the
preposition) can be right in
De Div. II.
102, where the best texts still keep it.
Non occurrit ... aget:
occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on
127.
§26. Quid quod
si: Goer., outrageously reads
quid quod si, si.
Tollitur: the verb
tollere occurs as frequently in this
sense as
αναιρειν does in
Sextus.
Lux lumenque: Bentl.
dux The expression
dux
vitae is of course frequent (cf.
N.D. I. 40,
T.D. V. 5 and
Lucretius), but there is no need to alter.
Lux is properly natural
light,
lumen artificial, cf.
Ad Att. XVI. 13, 1.
lumina dimiseramus, nec satis
lucebat, D.F.
III. 45
solis luce ...
lumen lucernae. There is the same difference between
φως and
φεγγος, the
latter is used for the former (
φεγγος
‛ηλιου) just as
lumen
is for
lux (
si te secundo lumine his offendere—
Ad
Att. VII. 26, 1) but not often
vice
versa. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 269 where the
φαντασια is
called
φεγγος.
Finis: so in
the beginning of the
Nicom. Eth. Aristot. assumes that the actual
existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a
τελος.
Aperta: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms
εκκαλυπτειν,
εκκαλυπτικος
etc., cf. Sextus
passim, and
D.F. I. 30.
Initium ... exitus =
αρχη ...
τελος.
Tenetur: MSS.
tenet, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be
ratio above.
Αποδειξις:
cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g.
Pyrrh. Hyp.
II. 143
λογος δι'
‛ομολογουμενων
λημματων
(premisses)
κατα
συναγωγην
επιφοραν
(conclusion)
εκκαλυπτων
αδηλον, also Diog.
VII. 45,
λογον δια
των μαλλον
καταλαμβανομενων
το ‛ηττον
καταλαμβανομενον
περαινοντα
(if the reading be right).
§27.
Notio: another trans. of
εννοια.
Conclusisse:
although the Greeks used
συμπερασμα
instead of
επιφορα sometimes for
the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb
συμπεραινειν
which has been supposed to correspond to
concludere. It is more
likely to be a trans. of
συναγειν, and
conclusum argumentum of
συνακτικος
λογος, which terms are of frequent
occurrence.
Rationibus progredi: to a similar question Sextus
answers,
ουκ εστιν
αναγκαιον
τας
εκεινον (the dogmatists)
δογματολογιας
προβαινειν,
πλασματωδεις
‛υπαρχουσας
(
Adv. Math. VIII. 367).
Sapientiae ...
futurum est: for the dat. with
facio and
fio see Madv.
Gram. 241, obs. 5,
Opusc. I. 370,
D.F. II. 79, and cf.
96 of this book.
Lex veri rectique: cf.
29; the
constitutio veri and the determination
of what is
rectum in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
Sapientique satis non sit: so Manut. for the
sapientisque
sit of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads
sapientis, neque satis
sit, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the
construction will run
neque dubitari potest quin satis sit, which
gives the exact opposite of the sense required.
Ratum: cf.
141.
§28.
Perceptum: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are
very frequent in Sextus, e.g.
Adv. Math. VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be
impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it
impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be
provable. Cf.
109 of this book.
Postulanti: making it a
necessity for the discussion; cf.
De Leg. I. 21.
Consentaneum esse:
ακολουθον
ειναι.
Ut alia:
although others.
Tantum abest ut—ut: cf. Madv.
Gram. 440 a.
§29.
Pressius: cf.
De Fato 31, 33,
N.D. II. 20,
T.D. IV. 14,
Hortensius fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in
109.
Decretum: of course the Academics would
say they did not hold this
δογμα as
stabile fixum ratum
but only as
probabile. Sextus however
Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in
reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma.
Sentitis enim: cf.
sentis in
D.F. III. 26.
Fluctuare: "to be at sea," Halm
fluctuari, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic.
Summa: cf.
summa philosophiae D.F. II. 86.
Veri falsi: cf. n. on
92.
Quae visa: so Halm for MSS.
quaevis, which edd. had changed to
quae a quovis.
Repudiari: the selection depended on the
probabile of
course, with the Academics.
Veri falsique: these words were used
in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by
them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements
in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext.
says,
ψιλη φασει
ισον
φερεται
ψιλη φασις
(
A.M. VII. 315),
φασει μεν
φασις
επισχεθησεται
(
ib. 337).
Cognoscendi initium: cf.
26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my
probabile."
Extremum expetendi: a rather unusual phrase for
the ethical
finis.
Ut moveri non possint: so
κινεισθαι
is perpetually used in Sext.
Est ut opinor: so Halm after Ernesti
for
sit of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading
is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek
‛ικανος
ειοησθω and the like.
The subj. is supported by
D.F. III. 20,
De Off. I. 8,
Ad Att. XIII. 14, 3, where
ut opinor is thrown in as
here, and by
Ac. II. 17,
D.F. III. 21, 24,
N.D. I. 109, where
si placet is
appended in a similar way.
§§30—36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we
might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is
naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and
so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason.
Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the
senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others
distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of
its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former
(32). Now they on the one hand profess to
distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no
absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is
possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How
can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains
that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all
if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There
is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after
careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is
still possibly false is useless (36).
§30.
Physicis: neuter not masc.; cf.
I. 6.
Libertatem et licentiam:
et = "and
even."
Libertas =
παρρησια as often
in Tacitus.
Abditis rebus et obscuris: cf. n. on
I. 15, and the word
συνεσκιασμενος
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 26.
Lucem
eripere: like
tollere (n. on
26), cf.
38,
103 and
N.D.
I. 6. For the sense see n. on
16, also
61.
Artificio: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to
ars
in all its senses, cf.
114 and
De Or.
II. 83.
Fabricata esset: the expression
is sneered at in
87.
Quem ad modum primum:
so Halm rightly for MSS.
prima or
primo, which latter is
not often followed by
deinde in Cicero.
Primum is out of
position, as in
24.
Appetitio pulsa: =
mota, set in motion. For
‛ορμη see
24.
Intenderemus: as in the exx. given in
20.
Fons: "reservoir," rather than "source"
here. It will be noted that
συγκαταθεσις
must take place before the
‛ορμη is roused.
Ipse sensus
est: an approach to this theory is made in Plat.
Theaet. 185,
191. Cf. especially Sext.
Adv. Math. VII.
350
και ‛οι μεν
διαφερειν
αυτην των
αισθησεων,
‛ως ‛οι
πλειους, ‛οι
δε αυτην
ειναι τας
αισθησεις ...
‛ης στασεως
ηρξε
Στρατον. All powers of
sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included
in the
‛ηγεμονικον,
cf. n. on
I. 38.
Alia
quasi: so Faber for
aliqua. "
In vera et aperta partitione
nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis—alius dixit, multo minus
alius—aliquis,"
M.D.F. III. 63.
Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he
forbears however, to produce them.
Recondit: so the
εννοιαι are called
αποκειμεναι
νοησεις (Plut.
De
Sto. Repug. p. 1057 a). In Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 373
μνημη is called
θησαυρισμος
φαντασιων.
Similitudinibus:
καθ'
‛ομοιωσιν
Sext.
Pyrr. Hyp. II. 75. Cic. uses this
word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not
immediately perceived by sense. In
D.F. III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see
Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best
translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in
N.D.
II. 22 38.
Construit: so MSS. Orelli gave
constituit.
Notitiae: cf.
22. Cic.
fails to distinguish between the
φυσικαι
εννοιαι or
κοιναι which are the
προληψεις,
and those
εννοιαι which are the
conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf.
M.D.F.
III. 21,
V. 60, for
this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also
Zeller 79.
Rerumque: "facts".
Perfecta:
sapientia,
virtus,
perfecta ratio, are almost convertible terms in the
expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf.
I. 20.
§31. Vitaeque
constantiam: which philosophy brings, see
23.
Cognitionem:
επιστημην.
Cognitio is used to translate
καταληψις
in
D.F. II. 16,
III. 17, cf. n. on
I. 41.
Ut dixi ... dicemus: For the repetition
cf.
135,
146, and
M.D.F. I. 41. The future tense is odd and
unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote
dicimus, I would rather read
dicamus; cf. n. on
29.
Per se:
καθ'
αυτην, there is no need to read
propter, as Lamb.
Ut virtutem efficiat: note that virtue is
throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the
reason.
Evertunt: cf.
eversio in
99.
Animal ... animo: Cic. allows
animus to all animals, not merely
anima; see Madv.
D.F. V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v.
animans is therefore wrong.
Temeritate:
προπετεια,
which occurs
passim in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled
at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 260, the sceptic is
called
εμβροντητος
for rejecting the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια.
§32.
Incerta:
αδηλα.
Democritus: cf.
I. 44.
Quae ...
abstruserit: "
because she has hidden."
Alii autem: note
the ellipse of the verb, and cf.
I. 2.
Etiam queruntur: "actually complain;" "go so
far as to complain."
Inter incertum: cf. Numenius in Euseb.
Pr.
Ev. XIV. 7, 12,
διαφοραν
ειναι
αδηλου και
ακαταληπτου,
και παντα
μεν ειναι
ακαταληπτα
ου παντα δε
αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades),
also
54 of this book.
Docere: "to prove,"
cf. n. on
121.
Qui haec distinguunt: the
followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on
I. 45.
Stellarum
numerus: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext.
e.g.
P.H.
II. 90, 98,
A.M.
VII. 243,
VIII. 147, 317;
where it is reckoned among things
αιωνιον
εχοντα
αγνωσιαν. So in
the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf.
110.
Aliquos: contemptuous;
απονενοημενους
τινας. Cf.
Parad. 33
agrestis aliquos.
Moveri: this probably refers to the
speech of Catulus; see Introd. p.
51. Aug.
Cont. Ac. III. 15 refers to this passage,
which must have been preserved in the second edition.
§33. Veri et
falsi: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and
Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate.
"You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false
while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The
discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
the term "true" to denote the
probably true, the Academics are not
open to the criticism here attempted; cf.
111
tam vera quam falsa cernimus.
Ut inter rectum et pravum:
the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this
distinction than of the other.
Communis: the
απαραλλακτος
of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
κοινη
φαντασια
αληθους και
ψευδους Sext.
A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175.
Notam: the
σημειον of Sextus; cf.
esp.
P.H.
II. 97 sq.
Eodem modo
falsum: Sext.
A.M. VII. 164 (R. and
P. 410)
ουδεμια
εστιν
αληθης
φαντασια
‛οια ουκ αν
γενοιτο
ψευδης.
Ut si quis:
Madv. in an important n. on
D.F. IV. 30
explains this thus;
ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit
dicere. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he
quotes, and still prefer to construe
quem as a strong relative,
making a pause between
quis and
quem.
Visionem:
Simply another trans. of
φαντασια.
Ut
Carneades: see Sext.
A.M. VII. 166
την τε
πιθανην
φαντασιαν
και την
πιθανην
‛αμα και
απερισπαστον
και
διεξωδευμενην
(R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524
"probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own
explanation. The merely
πιθανη is that sensation
which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true
(Sext.
A.M. VII. 167—175). Now no
sensation is perceived
alone; the percipient subject has always
other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (
περισπαν,
περιελκειν)
from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is
only called
απερισπαστος
when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in
harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175—181.) The word "undisputed,"
therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
διεξωδευμενη
("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of
the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite
external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which
they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space
within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person
and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's
mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
181—189).
§34.
Communitas:
απαραλλαξια
or
επιμιξια
των
φαντασιων;
Sext.
A.M. VII. 403,
P.H. I. 127.
Proprium: so Sext. often uses
ιδιομα, e.g.
A. M.
IX. 410.
Signo notari:
signo for
nota, merely from love of variety. The
in before
communi, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly
sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after
notare in
De Or.,
III. 186.
Convicio: so Madv.
Em. 143 corrected the corrupt MSS.
readings, comparing
Orator 160,
Ad Fam. XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on
Pro Murena 13 rightly
defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "
Non unum maledictum
appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio." He is
wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word
once in the
plural (
Ad Att. II. 18, 1), for it occurs
N.D. II. 20, and elsewhere.
Perspicua:
εναργη, a term used with
varying signification by all the later Greek schools.
Verum illud
quidem: "which is indeed what
they call 'true'."
Impressum: n. on
18.
Percipi atque
comprehendi: Halm retains the barbarous
ac of the MSS. before
the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The
two verbs are both trans. of
καταλαμβανεσθαι;
Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in
D.F.
III. 14
erit notius quale sit, pluribus
notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus.
Subtiliter: Cic.'s
constant trans. of
ακριβως or
κατ'
ακριβειαν
(
passim in Sext. e.g.
P.H. II.
123).
Inaniterne moveatur: MSS. agree in
ve for
ne,
on which see
M.D.F. IV. 76.
Inaniter =
κενως =
ψευδως. Cf.
n. on
I. 35, also
II. 47,
D.F. V. 3 (
inaniter moveri),
T.D. IV. 13,
De Div. II.
120, 126, 140 (
per se moveri), Greek
κενοπαθειν
(Sext.
P.H. II. 49),
κενοπαθεια
(=
inanis motus, Sext.
A.M. VIII.
184),
κενοπαθηματα
και
αναπλασματα
της
διανοιας
(
ib. VIII. 354),
διακενος
‛ελκυσμος
(
ib. VII. 241),
διακενος
φαντασια
(
ib. VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase
κινημα της
διανοιας. For the
meaning see n. on
47.
Relinquitur: so in
Sext.
απολειπειν
is constantly used as the opposite of
αναιρειν
(
tollere).
§35.
Neminem etc.: they are content to make strong statements without
any mark of certainty.
Primo quasi adspectu: the
merely
πιθανη
φαντασια is here
meant; see
33.
§36. Ex
circumspectione, etc.: the
διεξωδευμενη;
see n. on
33.
Primum quia ... deinde: for
the slight anacoluthia, cf.
M.D.F ed.
II.
p. 796.
Iis visis, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of
things, emitting a number of
appearances, and you cannot be
sure of uniting each
appearance to the
thing from which it
proceeds, then you can have no faith in any
appearance even if you
have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules.
Ad verum
ipsum: cf.
40.
Quam proxime: cf.
47, and also
7.
Insigne:
σημειον, the same as
nota and
signum above.
Quo obscurato: so Lamb. for
MSS.
obscuro which Halm keeps. Cf.
quam obscurari volunt in
42 and
quo sublato in
33.
Argumentum: Cic. seems to be thinking of
the word
τεκμηριον,
which, however, the Stoics hardly use.
Id quod significatur:
το
σημειωντον
in Sext.
§§37—40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to
act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to
assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts
and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena,
he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life
(38, 39).
§37.
Explicabamus:
19—
21 and
30 (
quae vis esset
in sensibus).
Inanimum: not
inanimatum, cf.
M.D.F.
IV. 36.
Agit aliquid:
I. 23.
Quae est in
nostra: Walker's insertion of
non before
est is
needless, cf. n. on
I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without,
not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext.
A.M. VIII. 397
το μεν γαρ
φαντασιωθηναι
αβουλητον
ην). For
in potestate cf.
De Fato 9,
N.D. I. 69
§38.
Eripitur: cf.
30.
Neque sentire:
Christ om.
neque; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob
people of their senses.
Cedere: cf.
εικειν,
ειξις in Sext.
P.H. I. 193, 230, Diog.
VII. 51,
των δε
αισθητικων
μετα ειξεως
και
συγκαταθεσεως
γινονται
[‛αι
φαντασια]; also
66 of this book.
Οικειον: cf.
34.
Adsentitur statim: this really contradicts
a good deal that has gone before, esp.
20.
Memoriam: cf.
22.
In nostra
potestate: this may throw light on fragm.
15 of
the
Ac. Post., which see.
§39.
Virtus: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on
I. 40.
Ante videri
aliquid for the doctrine cf.
25, for the
passive use of
videri, n. on
25.
Adsentiatur: the passive use is illustrated by Madv.
Em.
131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after
necesse
est on
D.F. V. 25.
Tollit e
vita: so
De Fato 29.
§§40—42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method.
They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the
different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
arguments, (1) things which produce sensations such as
might have been produced in the same form by other things, cannot
be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2)
sensations must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties
do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed.
Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be
real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the
false may assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from
false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no
sensation which is also a perception (40). Two
admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot
be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false,
cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions
they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2)
every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might
have if it proceeded from an unreality (41). To
prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are
sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they
show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a
certainly known sensation."]
§40. Quasi
fundamenta: a trans. probably of
θεμελιος or the
like; cf.
‛ωσπερ
θεμελιος in Sext.
A.M. V. 50.
Artem: method, like
τεχνη, cf.
M.D.F. III. 4, Mayor on Iuv.
VII.
177.
Vim: the general character which attaches to all
φαντασιαι;
genera the different classes of
φαντασιαι.
Totidem verbis: of course with a view to showing that nothing
really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the
reductio ad absurdum method.
Contineant ... quaestionem:
cf.
22 and
T.D. IV. 65
una res videtur causam continere.
Quae ita: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish
clearly the
sensation (
visum) from the
thing which
causes it. Here the
things are meant; two
things are
supposed to cause two
sensations so similar that the person who
has one of the
sensations cannot tell from which of the two
things it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that
it is absurd to divide
things into those which can be perceived
(known with certainty) and those which cannot.
Nihil interesse
autem: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity
of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is
enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to
discern whatever difference may exist, cf.
85.
Alia vera sunt: Numenius in Euseb.
Pr. Ev. XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and
falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of
things,
though not of
sensations. If we could only pierce
through a
sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to
believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
that
sensation and
thing correspond. Cf. Sext.
P.H.
I. 22
περι μεν του
φαισθαι
τοιον η
τοιον το
‛υποκειμενον
(i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds)
ουδεις ισως
αμφισβητει,
περι δε του
ει τοιουτον
εστιν
‛οποιον
φαινεται
ζητειται. Neither
Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done,
the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply
maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do
not give us correct information about them.
Eiusdem modi: cf.
33 eodem modo.
Non posse accidere: this
is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (
D.F. I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
recta oratio
to obliqua. Halm with Manut. reads
potest. Cf.
101.
§41. Neque
enim: a remark of Lucullus' merely.
Quod sit a vero: cf. Munio
on Lucr.
II. 51
fulgor ab auro.
Possit: for the om. of
esse cf. n. on
I. 29.
§42.
Proposita: cf.
προτασεις
passim in Sext.
In sensus: =
in ea, quae ad sensus
pertinent cf.
I. 20.
Omni consuetudine: "general experience"
εμπειρια, cf.
N.D. I. 83.
Quam obscurari volunt:
cf.
I. 33.
quod
explanari volebant; the em. of Dav.
obscurare is against
Cic.'s usage, that of Christ
quam observari nolunt is wanton
without being ingenious.
De reliquis: i.e.
iis quae a sensibus
ducuntur.
In singulisque rebus: the word
rebus must
mean
subjects, not
things, to which the words
in minima
dispertiunt would hardly apply.
Adiuncta: Sext.
A.M.
VII. 164 (R. and P. 410)
πασηι τη
δοκουσηι
αληθει
καθεσταναι
ευρισκεται
τις
απαραλλακτος
ψευδης, also
VII. 438, etc.
§§43—45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to
define, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things,
(2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be
capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes of reasoning their
probabile is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon
certain premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is
to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference,
then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate
clearness of visa, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
§43.
Horum: Lamb.
harum; the text however is quite right, cf.
Madv.
Gram. 214
b.
Luminibus: cf.
101.
Nihilo magis: =
ουδεν
μαλλον, which was constantly
in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext.
P.H. I. 14.
Num illa definitio ... transferri: I
need hardly point out that the
‛ορος of the Academics was merely
founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on
29). An Academic would say in reply to the question,
"probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it."
Vel illa vera:
these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them.
Vel = "even" i.e. if
even the definition is firmly known,
the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In
illa
vera we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of
veri et
falsi in
33.
In falsum: note that
falsum =
aliam rem above. For the sense cf. Sext.
P.H. II. 209
μοχθηρους
‛ορους
ειναι τους
περιεχοντας
τι των μη
προσοντων
τοις
‛οριστοις,
and the schoolmen's maxim
definitio non debet latior esse definito
suo.
Minime volunt: cf.
18.
Partibus: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but
omnibus
hardly ever stands for
omn. rebus, therefore C.F. Hermann reads
pariter rebus for
partibus. A little closer attention to
the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf.
42 dividunt in partis,
T.D. III. 24, where
genus = division,
pars =
subdivision.
§44. Impediri
... fatebuntur: essentially the same argument as in
33 at the end.
Occurretur: not an imitation of
εναντιουσθαι
as Goer. says, but of
απανταν, which occurs
very frequently in Sext.
Sumpta: the two premisses are in Gk.
called together
λημματα, separately
λημμα
and
προσληψις
(
sumptio et adsumptio De Div II.
108).
Orationis: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this
word like
ratio (
συλλογισμος),
cf.
De Leg. I. 48
conclusa oratio.
Fab. refers to Gell.
XV. 26.
Profiteatur:
so
‛υπισχνεισθαι
is often used by Sext. e.g.
A.M. VIII.
283.
Patefacturum: n. on
26,
εκκαλυπτειν,
εκκαλυπτικος,
δηλωτικος
(the last in Sext.
A.M. VIII. 277) often
recur in Greek.
Primum esse ... nihil interesse: there is no
inconsistency. Carneades allowed that
visa,
in themselves,
might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable
of distinguishing those
visa which proceed from real things and
give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are
mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it.
Lucullus confuses
essential with
apparent difference.
Non iungitur: a supposed case of
διαρτησις,
which is opposed to
συναρτησις
and explained in Sext.
A.M. VIII.
430.
§45.
Assentati: here simply =
assensi.
Praeteritis: here
used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed
over," cf.
in remissis Orat. 59.
Primum igitur ... sed
tamen: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv.
Gram. 480.
Iis
qui videntur: Goer.
is qui videtur, which is severely
criticised by Madv.
Em. 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see
n. on
79,
80.
§§46—48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to
the innate clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due
to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light
by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by
sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus:
you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then
do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really
existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation
produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say
they admit that mere phantom sensations do command assent. Why
should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely
resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)
§46.
Circumfusa sint: Goer. retains the MSS.
sunt on the ground
that the clause
quanta sint is inserted
παρενθετικως!
Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf.
122 circumfusa tenebris.
Interrogationibus: cf.
I. 5 where I showed that the words
interrogatio and
conclusio are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure
syllogisms are very frequently called
ερωτησεις,
and that he often introduces a new argument by
ερωταται
και τουτο, when
there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
Dissolvere:
απολυεσθαι
in Sext.
Occurrere: cf.
44.
§47.
Confuse
loqui: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in
D.F. II. 27.
Nulla sunt: on the
use of
nullus for
non in Cic. cf. Madv.
Gram. 455
obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and
Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters.
Inaniter:
cf.
34. There are two ways in which a sensation
may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be
supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different
thing, (2) it may be a mere
φαντασμα or
αναπλασμα
της
διανοιας, a
phantom behind which there is no reality at all.
Quae in somnis
videantur: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination
see Zeller 166,
De Div. I. 7, etc.
Quaerunt: a slight anacoluthon from
dicatis above.
Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino: this difficult passage can only
be properly explained in connection with
50 and
with the general plan of the Academics expounded in
41. After long consideration I elucidate it as
follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in
41 and
42 viz.
omnibus
veris visis adiuncta esse falsa. The criticism in
50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on
the assumption known to be Stoic,
omnia deum posse. If the god can
manufacture (
efficere) sensations which are false, but probable
(as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false
sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to
be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be
utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of
inter quae
nihil sit omnino is fixed by
40, where see
n.)?
Probabilia, then, denotes false sensations such as have only
a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding
stages the resemblance is made complete. The word
probabilia is a
sort of tertiary predicate after
efficere ("to manufacture so as
to be probable"). It
must not be repeated after the second
efficere, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section
placed out of harmony with
50.
Plane
proxime: =
quam proxime of
36.
§48. Ipsa per
sese: simply =
inaniter as in
34,
47, i.e. without the approach of any external object.
Cogitatione: the only word in Latin, as
διανοια
is in Greek, to express our "imagination."
Non numquam: so Madv.
for MSS.
non inquam. Goer. after Manut. wrote
non inquiunt
with an interrogation at
omnino.
Veri simile est: so Madv.
D.F. III. 58 for
sit. The argument
has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that
phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which
proceed from realities.
Ut si qui: the
ut here is merely
"as," "for instance," cf. n. on
33.
Nihil ut
esset: the
ut here is a repetition of the
ut used
several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend
on
sic. Lamb. expunged
ut before
esset and before
quicquam.
Intestinum et oblatum: cf. Sext.
A.M.
VII. 241
ητοι των
εκτος η των
εν ‛ημιν
παθων, and the two classes of
falsa visa mentioned in n. on
47.
Sin
autem sunt, etc.: if there
are false sensations which are
probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations
so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The
rest exactly as in
47.
§§49—53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as
soritae, and therefore faulty (49). The
admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false
sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing
between the true and the false (50). We contend
that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require
before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light
of the sensations we had while in it (51). But,
say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid
as our waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say
they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This
proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life.
All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our
attention (53).
§49.
Antiochus: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
similar subjects.
Ipsa capita:
αυτα τα
κεφαλαια.
Interrogationis: the
sorites was always in the form of a
series of questions, cf.
De Div. II. 11
(where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his
proposed trans.
acervalis is unnecessary),
Hortens. fragm.
47, and n. on
92.
Hoc vocant: i.e.
hoc
genus, cf.
D.F. III. 70
ex eo
genere, quae prosunt.
Vitiosum: cf.
D.F. IV. 50
ille sorites, quo nihil putatis (Stoici)
vitiosius. Most edd. read
hos, which indeed in
136 is a necessary em. for MSS.
hoc.
Tale
visum: i.e.
falsum.
Dormienti: sc.
τινι.
Ut probabile
sit, etc.: cf.
47,
48
and notes.
Primum quidque: not
quodque as Klotz; cf.
M.D.F. II. 105, to whose exx. add
De
Div. II. 112, and an instance of
proximus
quisque in
De Off. II. 75.
Vitium: cf.
vitiosum above.
§50. Omnia
deum posse: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at
least, see
De Div. II. 86. For the line
of argument here cf.
De Div. II. 106
fac dare deos, quod absurdum est.
Eadem: this does not mean
that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of
them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on
40.
Similes: after this
sunt was added
by Madv.
In suo genere essent: substitute
esse viderentur
for
essent, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would
allow that
things in their essence are divisible into
sharply-defined
genera, but would deny that the
sensations
which proceed from or are caused by the
things, are so
divisible.
§51. Una
depulsio: cf.
128 (
omnium rerum una est
definitio comprehendendi),
De Div. II. 136 (
omnium somniorum una ratio est).
In
quiete: =
in somno, a rather poetical usage.
Narravit:
Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into
narrat, most wantonly.
Visus
Homerus, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his
Annals, is referred to by Lucr.
I. 124,
Cic.
De Rep. VI. 10 (
Somn. Scip.
c. 1), Hor.
Epist. II. 1, 50.
Simul
ut: rare in Cic., see Madv.
D.F. II.
33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five
passages where he allows it to stand, the
ut precedes a vowel;
Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing
ac before a vowel, so that
in
D.F. II. 33
ut should probably
be written (with Manut. and others) for
et which Madv. ejects.
§52.
Eorumque: MSS. om.
que. Dav. wrote
ac before
eorum, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a
guttural condemned in n. on
34. For the argument
see n. on
80 quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
quid videatur.
Primum interest: for om. of
deinde cf.
45,
46.
Imbecillius:
cf.
I. 41.
Edormiverunt: "have slept
off the effects," cf.
αποβριζειν
in Homer.
Relaxentur: cf.
ανιεναι της
οργης Aristoph.
Ran. 700,
relaxare is used in the neut. sense in
D.F. II. 94.
Alcmaeonis: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is
often quoted by Cic., e.g.
D.F. IV.
62.
§53.
Sustinet:
επεχει; see on
94.
Aliquando sustinere: the point of the
Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the
εποχη of
the
sapiens becomes
habitual; he gives up the attempt to
distinguish between true and false
visa. Lucullus answers that,
did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even
in the sane condition.
Confundere: so
58,
110, Sext.
A.M. VIII. 56 (
συγχεουσι
τα
πραγματα),
ib. VIII. 157 (
συγχεομεν
τον βιον),
VIII. 372 (
‛ολην
συγχεει την
φιλοσοφον
ζητησιν), Plut.
De
Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos p. 1077 (
‛ως παντα
πραγματα
συγχεουσι).
Utimur: "we have to put up with," so
χρησθαι is used in Gk.
Ebriosorum: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
vinolenti above.
Illud attendimus: Goer., and Orelli write
num illud, but the emphatic
ille is often thus introduced
by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in
136.
Proferremus: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by
Madv. on
D.F. II. 35 of the subj. used to
denote "
non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri
debuerit." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they
can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a
condition is expressed without its
consequence. We have an
exact parallel in English, e.g. "
tu dictis Albane maneres" may
fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the
condition "
if thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the
consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such
a condition may be expressed without
si, just as in Eng. without
"
if," cf. Iuv.
III. 78 and Mayor's n. The
use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with
ει γαρ, etc., and
even without
ει) is
susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points
of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the
functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on
D.F. II. 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis
of a suppressed protasis, but as in his
Gram. 351
b, obs. 4
he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]
§§54—63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such
doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and
seals is childish (54). They press into their
service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much
ridiculed by them (55). Democritus may say that
innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I
appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has
its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The Servilii were distinguished from one another
by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the
appearance of an egg which hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are able
to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say
is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual
sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd
are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow.
The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable
logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas (59). What
nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad
influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of
philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding
that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath
that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the
continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should
not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my
view (63).
§54. Ne hoc
quidem: the common trans. "not even" for "
ne quidem" is often
inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this
either," cf. n.
on
I. 5.
Habeant:
the slight alteration
habeat introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite
destroys the point of the sentence.
Quod nolunt: cf.
44.
An sano: Lamb.
an ut sano, which
Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
Similitudines: cf.
84—
86. The impossibility
of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was
a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no
two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the
Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who
took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other
after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject
cf. Sextus
A.M. VII. 408—410.
Negat esse: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places
esse second, especially at the end of a clause.
Cur eo non
estis contenti: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which
concerned the
amount of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that
the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to
render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other,
the sceptics argued that it could.
Quod rerum natura non patitur:
again Lucullus confounds
essential with
phenomenal
difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on
50.
Nulla re differens: cf. the
nihil differens of
99, the substitution of which here would perhaps make
the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term
απαραλλακτος
(Sext.
A.M. VII. 252, etc.).
Ulla
communitas: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
Lamb.
nulla after the fine note of Madv. (
Em. 154),
approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the
Stoics may be stated thus
suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec
est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas (
ουδε
‛υπαρχει
επιμιγη
απαραλλακτος).
This opinion is negatived by
non patitur ut and it will be evident
at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs
(
est) into the subjunctive. The change of
ulla into
nulla is in no way needed.
Ut [
sibi]
sint:
sibi is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated
privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's
ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read
nulla re differens
communitas visi? Sint et ova etc. omitting
ulla and
ut
and changing
visi into
sibi (cf. Faber's em.
novas
for
bonas in
72). This ingenious but, as I
think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his
Adversaria. Lamb. reads
at tibi sint, Dav.
at si vis,
sint, Christ
ut tibi sint, Bait.
ut si sint after
C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer
sui for
sibi (SVI for SIBI).
B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip
in.
Eosdem: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps
intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on
50. Before leaving this section, I may point out
that the
επιμιγη or
επιμιξια
των
φαντασιων
supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic
τροποι, see
Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. 124.
§55.
Irridentur: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext.
A.M. IX. 1.
Absolute ita paris: Halm as well as
Bait. after Christ, brackets
ita; if any change be needed, it
would be better to place it before
undique. For this opinion of
Democr. see R. and P. 45.
Et eo quidem innumerabilis: this is the
quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
yet been proposed, cf.
125.
Nihil differat,
nihil intersit: these two verbs often appear together in Cic.,
e.g.
D.F. III. 25.
§56.
Potiusque: this adversative use of
que is common with
potius, e.g.
D.F. I. 51. Cf.
T.D. II. 55
ingemescere nonnum quam
viro concessum est, idque raro, also
ac potius,
Ad Att.
I. 10, etc.
Proprietates: the
ιδιοτητες
or
ιδιωματα of
Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue
between dogmatism and scepticism.
Cognoscebantur: Dav.
dignoscebantur, Walker
internoscebantur. The MSS. reading
is right, cf.
86.
Consuetudine: cf.
42, "experience".
Minimum: an adverb like
summum.
§57.
Dinotatas: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
recognise the word. Most edd. change it into
denotatas.
Artem:
τεχνην, a set of rules.
In
proverbio: so
venire in proverbium,
in proverbii usum
venire,
proverbii locum obtinere,
proverbii loco dici
are all used.
Salvis rebus: not an uncommon phrase, e.g.
Ad
Fam. IV. 1.
Gallinas: cf. fragm.
19 of the
Acad. Post. The similarity of eggs was
discussed
ad nauseam by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras
the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled,
ωι σκοπια (egg
investigation)
η περι
σοφιστειας
προς
Ακαδημαικους,
mentioned by Suidas.
§58. Contra
nos: the sense requires
nos, but all Halm's MSS. except one
read
vos.
Non internoscere: this is the reading of all the
MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits
non. The sense is, "we
are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we
shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent
us from making any positive assertion about the eggs."
Adsentiri:
for the passive use of this verb cf.
39.
Par
est: so Dav. for
per, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and
Orelli have
potest, with one MS.
Quasi: the em. of Madv.
for the
quam si of the MSS.
Transversum digitum: cf.
116.
Ne confundam omnia: cf.
53,
110.
Natura
tolletur: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to
discuss the nature of
things in themselves, and kept to
phenomena.
Intersit: i.e.
inter visa.
In
animos: Orelli with one MS. reads
animis; if the MSS. are
correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (
Antibarbarus, ed. 4)
"
imprimere wird klas sisch verbunden
in aliqua re, nicht
in aliquam rem," will require modification.
Species et quasdam
formas:
ειδη και
γενη,
quasdam marks the fact that
formas is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such
doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine
is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two
genera than between two individuals. If the
non before
vos were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been
inserted by copyists when
sed,
tamen, or some such word,
comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic
Ad
Quintum Fratrem,
II. 11, discussed by Munro,
Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.
§59. Illud
vero perabsurdum: note the omission of
est, which often takes
place after the emphatic pronoun.
Impediamini: cf. n. on
33.
A veris: if
visis be supplied the
statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if
rebus
be meant, it is wide of the mark.
Id est ... retentio: supposed to
be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on
I.
6,
8.
Constitit: from
consto, not from
consisto cf.
63
qui tibi constares.
Si vera sunt: cf.
67,
78,
112,
148. The
nonnulli are Philo and Metrodorus, see
78.
Tollendus est adsensus: i.e. even that qualified assent which the
Academics gave to probable phenomena.
Adprobare: this word is
ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on
104.
Id est peccaturum: "which is equivalent
to sinning," cf.
I. 42.
Iam nimium etiam: note
iam and
etiam in the same
clause.
§60. Pro
omnibus: note
omnibus for
omnibus rebus.
Ista
mysteria: Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 37, 38
speaks of various doctrines, which were
servata et pro mysteriis
custodita by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic
scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an
esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary
period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may
perhaps from a passage of Augustine,
C. Ac. III. 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be
attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is
ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all
succeeding inquirers.
Auctoritate: cf.
8,
9.
Utroque: this neuter, referring to two fem.
nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
Gram. 214
c.
§61.
Amicissimum: "
because you are my dear friend".
Commoveris: a military term, cf.
De Div. II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p.
53.
Sequere: either this is future, as in
109, or
sequeris, the constant form in Cic.
of the pres., must be read.
Approbatione omni: the word
omni is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified
assent, cf.
59.
Orbat sensibus: cf.
74, and
D.F. I. 64,
where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase
sensus tolli, on the ground that the Academics swept away not
sensus but
iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis. Goer. qu. Plin.
N.H. III. 5, Sil. Ital.
XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
Cimmerii, to show that
the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced
this mention of the legendary people.
Deus aliquis: so the best
edd. without comment, although they write
deus aliqui in
19. It is difficult to distinguish between
aliquis and
aliqui,
nescio quis and
nescio
qui,
si quis and
si qui (for the latter see n. on
81). As
aliquis is substantival,
aliqui adjectival,
aliquis must not be written with
impersonal nouns like
terror (
T.D. IV. 35,
V. 62),
dolor
(
T.D. I. 82,
Ad Fam. VII. 1, 1),
casus (
De Off. III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd.
vary, e.g.
deus aliqui (
T.D. I.
23,
IV. 35),
deus aliquis (
Lael.
87,
Ad Fam. XIV. 7, 1),
anularius
aliqui (
86 of this book),
magistratus
aliquis (
In Verr. IV. 146). With a
proper name belonging to a real person
aliquis ought to be written
(
Myrmecides in
120, see my n.).
Dispiciendum: not
despiciendum, cf.
M.D.F. II. 97,
IV. 64, also
De
Div. II. 81,
verum dispicere.
Iis
vinculis, etc. this may throw light on fragm.
15
of the
Acad. Post., which see.
§62. Motum
animorum: n. on
34.
Actio rerum: here
actio is a pure verbal noun like
πραξις, cf.
De Off.
I. 83, and expressions like
actio vitae
(
N.D. I. 2),
actio ullius rei (
108 of this book), and the similar use of
actus in Quintilian (
Inst. Or. X.
1, 31, with Mayor's n.)
Iuratusque: Bait. possibly by a mere
misprint reads
iratus.
Comperisse: this expression of Cic.,
used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a
cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See
Ad
Fam. V. 5, 2,
Ad Att. I. 14, 5.
Licebat: this is the reading of the
best MSS., not
liquebat, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the
support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see
3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p.
46 with respect to Catulus, in most of which
Lucullus is also mentioned.
§63. Quod ...
fecerat, ut: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
Gram.
481
b.
Quod refers simply to the fact of Lucullus'
admiration, which the clause introduced by
ut defines, "which
admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc."
Iocansne
an: this use of
ne ... an implies, Madv. says (on
D.F.
V. 87), more doubt than the use of
ne
alone as in
vero falsone.
Memoriter: nearly all edd. before
Madv. make this mean
e memoria as opposed to
de scripto; he
says, "
laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae" (on
D.F.
I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the
Antibarbarus, ed. 4.
Censuerim: more modest than
censeo, see Madv.
Gram. 380.
Tantum enim non te modo
monuit: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking
modo exc.
with
non, ejected it. Madv. (
Em. 160) retains it, making it
mean
paulo ante. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that
tantum non =
μονον ου occurs nowhere
else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects
non, taking
tantum as
hoc tantum, nihil praeterea. Livy certainly has the suspected use
of
tantum non.
Tribunus: a retort comes in
97,
144.
Antiochum:
cf.
I. 13.
Destitisse: on the difference between
memini followed by
the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv.
Gram. 408
b,
obs. 2.
§§64—71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The
strength of Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it
can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in
all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on
that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do
not deny that I make slips, but we must deal with the sapiens,
whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the sapiens
ever gives his assent he will be obliged to opine, but he never
will opine therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is
full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that
perception in the Stoic sense is impossible (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When
he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long
denied? (69) Some think he wished to found a
school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no
longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an
argumentum ad hominem (71).
§64. Quadam
oratione: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
quandam
orationem as Lamb., Orelli.
De ipsa re: cf.
de causa
ipsa above.
Respondere posse: for the om. of
me before
the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read
respondere (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert
me (as Lamb.), see
n. on
I. 7.
§65. Studio
certandi: =
φιλονεικια.
Pertinacia ... calumnia: n. on
14.
Iurarem: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of
his consulship.
§66.
Turpissimum: cf.
I. 45,
N.D. I. 1.
Opiner:
opinio or
δοξα is judgment based on insufficient
grounds.
Sed quaerimus de sapiente: cf.
115,
T.D. IV. 55, 59
also
De Or. III. 75
non quid ego sed
quid orator.
Magnus ... opinator: Aug.
Contra Acad.
III. 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the
Hortensius. He imitates it,
ibid. I. 15
magnus definitor.
Qua fidunt,
etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
Aratea, and are quoted in
N.D. II. 105, 106.
Phoenices: the
same fact is mentioned by Ovid,
Fasti III. 107,
Tristia IV.
3, 1.
Sed Helicen: the best MSS. om.
ad, which Orelli
places before
Helicen.
Elimatas: the MSS. are divided
between this and
limatas.
Elimare, though a very rare word
occurs
Ad Att. XVI. 7, 3.
Visis
cedo: cf. n. on
38.
Vim maximam: so
summum munus is applied to the same course of action in
D.F. III. 31.
Cogitatione: "idea".
Temeritate: cf.
I. 42,
De Div. I. 7, and
the charge of
προπετεια
constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext.
Praepostere: in
a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.
§67. Aliquando
... opinabitur: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic
doctrine,
nihil posse percipi.
Secundum illud ... etiam
opinari: it seems at first sight as though
adsentiri and
opinari ought to change places in this passage, as Manut.
proposes. The difficulty lies in the words
secundum illud, which,
it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas'
argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes
granted
as a second premiss the following statement, that the wise
man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of
Carneades would then run thus, (1)
Si ulli rei, etc. as above, (2)
adsentietur autem aliquando, (3)
opinabitur igitur.
§68. Adsentiri
quicquam: only with neuter pronouns like this could
adsentiri
be followed by an accusative case.
Sustinenda est:
εφεκτεον.
Iis
quae possunt: these words MSS. om.
Tam in praecipiti: for the
position of
in cf. n. on
I. 25. The best MSS. have here
tamen in. Madv.
altered
tamen to
tam in n. on
D.F. V. 26. The two words are often confused, as in
T.D. IV. 7, cf. also n. on
I. 16.
Sin autem, etc.:
cf. the passage of Lactantius
De Falsa Sapientia III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's
reprint)
si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque
opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est.
Nitamur
... percipi: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The
construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect
hoc, or
some such word, to have fallen out between
igitur and
nihil.
§69. Non
acrius: one of the early editions omits
non while Goer. reads
acutius and puts a note of interrogation at
defensitaverat.
M.
Em. 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the
old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his
new arguments against it.
Quis enim: so Lamb. for MSS.
quisquam
enim.
Excogitavit: on interrogations not introduced by a
particle of any kind see Madv.
Gram. 450.
Eadem dicit: on
the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the
proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
132.
Sensisse: =
iudicasse, n. on
I. 22.
Mnesarchi ... Dardani: see
Dict.
Biogr.
§70. Revocata
est: Manut. here wished to read
renovata, cf. n. on
I. 14.
Nominis
dignitatem, etc.: hence Aug.
Contra Acad. III. 41 calls him
foeneus ille Platonicus
Antiochus (that
tulchan Platonist).
Gloriae causa: cf.
Aug.
ibid. II. 15
Antiochus gloriae
cupidior quam veritatis.
Facere dicerent: so Camerarius for
the MSS.
facerent.
Sustinere: cf.
115 sustinuero Epicureos.
Sub Novis:
Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS.
sub nubes. The
Novae
Tabernae were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy.
In
De Or. II. 266 a story is told of
Caesar, who, while speaking
sub Veteribus, points to a
"
tabula" which hangs
sub Novis. The excellence of Faber's
em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut.
sub nube, and that of
Lamb.
nisi sub nube. I have before remarked that
b is
frequently written in MSS. for
v.
Maenianorum: projecting
eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their
inventor like
Vitelliana,
Vatinia etc.
§71. Quoque
... argumento: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is
picked up by
quod argumentum near the end.
Utrum: the
neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are
marked by
ne and
an. The same usage is found in
D.F.
II. 60,
T.D. IV.
9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of
utrum ... ne
... an, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g
De Invent.
II. 115
utrum copiane sit agri an penuria
consideratur. On this point cf. M.
Em. 163,
Gram. 452,
obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic.
Verr. IV. 73.
Honesti inane nomen esse: a modern would be inclined to write
honestum, in apposition to
nomen, cf.
D.F. V. 18
voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum.
Voluptatem etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called
‛ο
μεταθεμενος)
from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf.
T.D. II. 60, Diog. Laert.
VII.
166—7.
A vero: "coming from a reality," cf.
41, n.
Is curavit: Goer. reads
his,
"
solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire,"
says Madv. The scribes often prefix
h to parts of the pronoun
is, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.
§§72—78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to
ancient names like a revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and
Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the
truth of sense knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge
altogether (72, 73).
Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense
knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with
these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while
Plato pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but
take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties
concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them,
even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy
to escape being ensnared by them (75). The
Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to
keep clear from opinion. Arcesilas agreed but this without
knowledge was impossible. Knowledge consists of
perceptions. Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of
perception. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the
controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with opinion and
perception, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once
(77, 78).
§72. De
antiquis philosophis: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
Lamb. read
antiquos philosophos.
Popularis: cf.
13.
Res non bonas: MSS. om.
non, which
Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the
true reading to be
novas, which would be written
nobas, and
then pass into
bonas.
Nivem nigram: this deliverance of
Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In
P.H. I. 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of
φαινομενα
by means of
νοουμενα, "
Αναξαγορας
τωι λευκην
ειναι την
χιονα,
ανετιθει
‛οτι χιων
εστιν ‛υδορ
πεπηγος το
δε ‛υδορ
εστι μελαν
και ‛η χιων
αρα
μελαινα." There is an
obscure joke on this in
Ad Qu. Fratrem II. 13, 1
risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo
esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat.
Sophistes: here
treated as the demagogue of philosophy.
Ostentationis: =
επιδειξεος.
§73.
Democrito: Cic., as Madv. remarks on
D.F. I. 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in
order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf.
T.D. I. 22,
De Div. I. 5,
II. 139,
N.D. I.
120,
De Or. I. 42.
Quintae
classis: a metaphor from the Roman military order.
Qui veri esse
aliquid, etc.: cf.
N.D. I. 12
non
enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris
falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus.
Non obscuros sed tenebricosos:
"not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the
σκοτιη
γνωσις of Democr., by which he
meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things
as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also
held a
γνησιη
γνωσις, dealing with the
realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist
ετεηι
and not merely
νομωι as appearances do. See R. and
P. 51.
§74.
Furere: cf.
14.
Orbat sensibus: cf.
61, and for the belief of Empedocles about the
possibility of
επιστημη see the
remarks of Sextus
A.M. VII. 123—4
qu. R. and P. 107, who say "
patet errare eos qui scepticis
adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant."
Sonum fundere: similar
expressions occur in
T.D. III. 42,
V. 73,
D.F. II. 48.
Parmenides, Xenophanes: these are the last men who ought to be
charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against
sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the
reason. Cf. Grote,
Plato I. 54, Zeller
501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides.
Minus bonis: Dav. qu.
Plut.
De Audit. 45 A,
μεμψαιτο δ'
αν τις
Παρμενιδου
την
στιχοποιιαν.
Quamquam: on the proper use of
quamquam in clauses where
the verb is not expressed see
M.D.F. V.
68 and cf.
I. 5.
Quasi
irati: for the use of
quasi = almost cf.
In Verr. Act.
I. 22,
Orat. 41.
Aiebas
removendum: for om. of
esse see n. on
I. 43.
Perscripti sunt:
cf. n. on
I. 16.
Scire
se nihil se scire: cf.
I. 16,
44. The words referred to
are in Plat.
Apol. 21
εοικα γουν
τουτου
σμικρωι
τινι αυτωι
τουτωι
σοφωτερος
ειναι, ‛οτι
α μη οιδα
ουδε οιομαι
ειδεναι, a very
different statement from the
nihil sciri posse by which Cic.
interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That
επιστημη in the
strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left
to the Sophists.
De Platone: the doctrine above mentioned is an
absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are
called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real
επιστημη is
attainable.
Ironiam: the word was given in its Greek form in
15.
Nulla fuit ratio persequi: n. on
17.
§75.
Videorne: =
nonne videor, as
videsne =
nonne
vides.
Imitari numquam nisi: a strange expression for which
Manut. conj.
imitari? num quem, etc., Halm
nullum unquam in
place of
numquam. Bait. prints the reading of Man., which I think
harsher than that of the MSS.
Minutos: for the word cf.
Orat. 94, also
De Div. I. 62
minuti philosophi,
Brut. 256
minuti imperatores.
Stilponem, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. 177—182.
σοφισματα:
Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here the translation
cavillationes, to which Seneca
Ep. 116 refers, cf. Krische,
p. 65.
Fulcire porticum: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch".
Cf. the anonymous line
ει μη γαρ ην
Χρυσιππος,
ουκ αν ην
Στοα.
Quae in consuetudine
probantur: n. on
87.
Nisi videret: for
the tense of the verb, see Madv.
Gram. 347
b, obs. 2.
§76. Quid ...
philosophi: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. and
followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this reading,
which only requires the alteration of
Cyrenaei into
Cyrenaici (now made by all edd. on the ground that
Cyrenaeus is a citizen of Cyreno,
Cyrenaicus a follower of
Aristippus) and the insertion of
tibi. I see no difficulty in the
qui before
negant, at which so many edd. take offence.
Tactu intimo: the word
‛αφη I believe does not occur in ancient
authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was
παθος.
From
143 (
permotiones intimas) it might
appear that Cic. is translating either
παθος or
κινησις. For a clear
account of the school see Zeller's
Socrates, for the illustration
of the present passage pp 293—300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R.
and P. 162 sq.
Quo quid colore: cf. Sext.
A.M. VII. 191 (qu. Zeller
Socrates 297, R. and P.
165).
Adfici se: =
πασχειν.
Quaesieras: note the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect
or aorist.
Tot saeculis: cf. the same words in
15.
Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis: cf.
summis ingeniis, maximis studiis in
15.
Obtrectandi: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in
16; cf. also
I. 44.
§77.
Expresserat: "had put into distinct shape". Cf.
7 and
I. 19.
Exprimere and
dicere are always
sharply distinguished by Cic., the latter merely implying the mechanic
exercise of utterance, the former the moulding and shaping of the
utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp.
Orat. 3, 69, and
Ad
Att. VIII. 11, 1; also
De Or. I. 32,
De Div. I. 79,
qu. by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav.
exposuerat is
therefore needless.
Fortasse: "we may suppose".
Nec
percipere, etc.: cf.
68, n.
Tum illum:
a change from
ille, credo (sc.
respondit), the
credo
being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after
ita
definisse cf.
M.D.F. II. 13 (who
quotes exx.); also the construction with
ita iudico in
113.
Ex eo, quod esset: cf.
18, n.
Effictum: so Manut. for MSS.
effectum, cf.
18.
Ab eo, quod non
est: the words
non est include the two meanings "is non
existent," and "is different from what it seems to be"—the two
meanings of
falsum indeed, see n. on
47.
Eiusdem modi: cf.
40,
84. MSS. have
eius modi, altered by Dav.
Recte ... additum: the semicolon at
Arcesilas was added by
Manutius, who is followed by all edd. This involves taking
additum
=
additum est, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv.
Opusc. I. 448,
D.F. I. 43,
Gram. 479
a. I think it quite
possible that
recte consensit additum should be construed
together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly made." For the
omission of
esse in that case cf. Madv.
Gram. 406, and such
expressions as
dicere solebat perturbatum in
111, also
ita scribenti exanclatum in
108.
Recte, which with the ordinary stopping
expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain
in point. Qy, should
concessit be read, as in
118 concessisse is now read for MSS.
consensisse?
A vero: cf.
41.
§78. Quae
adhuc permanserit: note the subj., "which is of such a nature as to
have lasted".
Nam illud ... pertinebat: by
illud is meant
the argument in defence of
εποχη given in
67; by
nihil ... pertinebat nothing more is
intended than that there was no
immediate or
close
connection. Cf. the use of
pertinere in
D.F. III. 55.
Clitomacho: cf. n. on
59.
§§79—90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding
your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are
thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the
sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of
whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
we desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires
not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the
god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you want something
greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he
seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader
or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears
to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies
in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false
one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has
mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising
Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances exist.
Never mind, they seem to exist and that is enough. One mistaken
sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its own
genus this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two
sensations are absolutely similar, it is enough that human
faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to
rival your chicken rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So
we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea
this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses!
(86) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I
am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from
Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon,
of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides disprove
your point (88, 89). In
their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed. It is no good to talk about
the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of
their sensations at the time they were affected? (90)
§79. Communi
loco:
τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot
be disproved, see
19.
Quod ne [
id]:
I have bracketed
id with most edd. since Manut. If, however,
quod be taken as the conjunction, and not as the pronoun,
id is not altogether insupportable.
Heri: cf. Introd.
55.
Infracto remo: n. on
19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
Pantheism"—"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a
pool".
Manent illa omnia, iacet: this is my correction of the
reading of most MSS.
maneant ... lacerat. Madv.
Em. 176 in
combating the conj. of Goer.
si maneant ... laceratis istam
causam, approves
maneant ... iaceat, a reading with some MSS.
support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole confusion of the passage
arises from the mania of the copyists for turning indicatives into
subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. occur every few
pages. If
iacet were by error turned into
iaceret the
reading
lacerat would arise at once. The nom. to
dicit is,
I may observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans.
"all my arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his
senses are true quotha!" (For this use of
dicit cf.
inquit
in
101,
109,
115). Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed.
Cratandriana of 1528
latrat. Dav. conjectured comically
blaterat iste tamen et, Halm
lacera est ista causa.
Habes: as two good MSS. have
habes et eum, Madv.
Em.
176 conj.
habet. The change of person, however, (from
dicit
to
habes) occurs also in
101.
Epicurus: n. on
19.
§80. Hoc est
verum esse: Madv.
Em. 177 took
verum as meaning fair,
candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed
virum esse, a
very strange em. Halm's conj.
certum esse is weak and improbable.
Importune: this is in one good MS. but the rest have
importata, a good em. is needed, as
importune does not suit
the sense of the passage.
Negat ... torsisset: for the tenses cf.
104 exposuisset, adiungit.
Cum oculum
torsisset: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing
upwards or sideways. Cf. Aristot.
Eth. Eud. VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.)
οφθαλμους
διαστρεψαντα
‛ωστε δυο το
‛εν
φανηναι. Faber qu.
Arist.
Problemata XVII. 31
δια τι εις
το πλαγιον
κινουσι τον
οφθαλμον ου
(?) φαινεται
δυο το ‛εν. Also
ib. XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why
drunkards see double he says
ταυτο τουτο
γιγνεται
και εαν τις
κατωθεν
πιεση τον
οφθαλμον. Sextus
refers to the same thing
P.H. I. 47,
A.M. VII. 192 (
‛ο
παραπιεσας
τον
οφθαλμον) so Cic.
De Div. II. 120. Lucretius gives the same
answer as Timagoras,
propter opinatus animi (IV. 465), as does
Sext.
A.M. VII. 210 on behalf of
Epicurus.
Sed hic: Bait.
sit hic.
Maiorum: cf.
143.
Quasi quaeratur: Carneades refused to
discuss about things in themselves but merely dealt with the appearances
they present,
το γαρ
αληθες και
το ψευδες εν
τοις
πραγμασι
συνεχωρει
(Numen in Euseb.
Pr. Eu. XIV. 8). Cf.
also Sext.
P.H. I. 78, 87, 144,
II. 75.
Domi nascuntur: a proverb used like
γλαυκ' εσ'
Αθηνας and "coals to
Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut.
Miles II. 2, 38, and cf.
Ad Att. X. 14, 2,
Ad Fam. IX.
3.
Deus: cf.
19.
Audiret ... ageret:
MSS. have
audies ... agerent. As the insertion of
n in the
imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read
ageret and alter
audies to suit it. Halm has
audiret ... ageretur with Dav.,
Bait.
audiet, egerit.
Ex hoc loco video ... cerno: MSS.
have
loco cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno whence Lipsius
conj.
ex hoc loco e regione video. Halm ejects the words
regionem video, I prefer to eject
cerno regionem. We are
thus left with the slight change from
video to
cerno, which
is very often found in Cic., e.g.
Orat. 18. Cic. sometimes however
joins the two verbs as in
De Or. III.
161.
O praeclarum prospectum: the view was a favourite one with
Cic., see
Ad Att. I. 13, 5.
§81. Nescio
qui: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that
nescio quis implies
contempt, while
nescio qui does not, cf.
Div. in qu. Caec.
47, where
nescio qui would contradict his rule. It is as difficult
to define the uses of the two expressions as to define those of
aliquis and
aliqui, on which see
61
n. In
Paradoxa 12 the best MSS. have
si qui and
si
quis almost in the same line with identically the same meaning Dav.
quotes Solinus and Plin.
N.H. VII. 21, to
show that the man mentioned here was called Strabo—a misnomer
surely.
Octingenta: so the best MSS., not
octoginta, which
however agrees better with Pliny.
Quod abesset: "
whatever
might be 1800 stadia distant,"
aberat would have implied that Cic.
had some
particular thing in mind, cf. Madv.
Gram. 364,
obs. 1.
Acrius:
οξυτερον, Lamb.
without need read
acutius as Goer. did in
69.
Illos pisces: so some MSS., but the best
have
ullos, whence Klotz conj.
multos, Orelli
multos
illos, omitting
pisces. For the allusion to the fish, cf.
Acad. Post. fragm.
13.
Videntur: n. on
25.
Amplius: cf.
19
non video cur quaerat amplius.
Desideramus: Halm, failing
to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading
desiderant
(i.e.
pisces). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my
opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we
have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light
because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients
thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense
given by Halm's reading.
Quererer cum deo: would enter into an
altercation with the god. The phrase, like
λοιδορεσθαι
τινι as opposed to
λοιδορειν
τινα implies mutual recrimination, cf.
Pro Deiotaro 9
querellae cum Deiotaro. The reading
tam
quererer for the
tamen quaereretur of the MSS. is due to
Manut.
Navem: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in
P.H. I. 107,
A.M. VII. 414.
Non tu verum testem, etc.: cf.
105. For the om. of
te before
habere,
which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see
n. on
I. 6.
§82. Quid
ego: Bait. has
sed quid after Ernesti.
Nave: so the
best MSS., not
navi, cf. Madv.
Gram. 42.
Duodeviginti: so in
128. Goer. and Roeper
qu. by Halm wished to read
duodetriginta. The reff. of Goer. at
least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the sun
at 28 times the size of the earth.
Quasi pedalis: cf.
D.F.
I. 20
pedalis fortasse. For
quasi
=
circiter cf. note on
74. Madv. on
D.F. I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert.
X. 91, who preserves the very words of Epicurus, in
which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr.
V. 590, who copies Epicurus, and Seneca
Quaest.
Nat. I. 3, 10 (
solem sapientes viri
pedalem esse contenderunt). Madv. points out from Plut.
De Plac.
Phil. II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus
asserted the sun to be a foot wide, he does not however quote Stob.
Phys. I. 24, 1
‛ηλιον
μεγεθος
εχειν ευρος
ποδος
ανθρωπειου,
which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus.
Ne
maiorem quidem: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read
nec for
ne, incurring the reprehension of Madv.
D.F. p. 814, ed 2.
Nihil aut non multum: so in
D.F. V. 59, the correction of Orelli, therefore,
aut non
multum mentiantur aut nihil, is rash.
Semel: see
79.
Qui ne nunc quidem: sc.
mentiri sensus
putat. Halm prints
quin, and is followed by Baiter, neither
has observed that
quin ne ... quidem is bad Latin (see
M.D.F. V. 56). Nor can
quin ne go
together even without
quidem, cf. Krebs and Allgayer,
Antibarbarus ed. 4 on
quin.
§83. In parvo
lis sit: Durand's em. for the
in parvulis sitis of the MSS.,
which Goer. alone defends.
Quattuor capita: these were given in
40 by Lucullus, cf. also
77.
Epicurus: as above in
19,
79 etc.
§84.
Geminum: cf.
56.
Nota: cf.
58 and the speech of Lucullus
passim.
Ne
sit ... potest: cf.
80 quasi quaeratur quid
sit, non quid videatur. Si ipse erit for
ipse apparently =
is ipse cf.
M.D.F. II. 93.
§85. Quod non
est: =
qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur.
Sui generis: cf.
50,
54,
56.
Nullum esse pilum, etc.: a strong
expression of this belief is found in Seneca
Ep.. 113, 13, qu. R.
and P. 380. Note the word
Stoicum; Lucullus is of course not
Stoic, but Antiochean.
Nihil interest: the same opinion is
expressed in
40, where see my note.
Visa
res: Halm writes
res a re, it is not necessary, however,
either in Gk. or Lat. to express
both of two related things when a
word is inserted like
differat here, which shows that they
are related. Cf. the elliptic constructions in Gk. with
‛ομοιον,
μεταξυ,
μεσος, and such words.
Eodem
caelo atque: a difficult passage. MSS. have
aqua, an error
easy, as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood
caelum to be the
heaven, and not
γλυφειον, a
graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, adducing
passages to show that sky and water were important in the making of
statues. For
aqua Orelli conj.
acu =
schraffirnadel,
C.F. Hermann
caelatura, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian
word. Halm's
aeque introduces a construction with
ceteris
omnibus which is not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I
read
atque, taking
ceteris omnibus to be the abl. neut.
"all the other implements." Formerly I conj.
ascra, or
atque
in, which last leading would make
omnibus =
om.
statuis.
Alexandros: Lysippus alone was privileged to make
statues of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the
conqueror, cf.
Ad Fam. V. 12, 7.
§86.
Anulo: cf.
54.
Aliqui: n. on
61.
Gallinarium: cf.
57.
Adhibes artem: cf.
20 adhibita arte.
Pictor ... tibicen:
so in
20.
Simul inflavit: note
simul
for
simul atque, cf.
T.D. IV. 12.
Nostri quidem: i.e.
Romani.
Admodum: i.e.
adm.
pauci cf.
De Leg. III. 32
pauci
enim atque admodum pauci.
Praeclara: evidently a fem. adj.
agreeing with
natura. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
understanding
sunt interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge
are grand, viz.
quanto art. etc."
§87.
Scilicet: Germ. "naturlich."
Fabricata sit: cf.
30,
119,
121 and N.D.
I. 19.
Ne
modo: for
modo ne, a noticeable use.
Physicis: probably
neut.
Contra sensus: he wrote both for and against
συνηθεια; cf. R.
and P. 360 and 368.
Carneadem: Plut.
Sto. Rep. 1036 B
relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the
senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector:
δαιμονιε
φθισει σε το
σον μενος. From
Diog.
IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the
line qu. in n. on
75,
ει μη γαρ ην
Χρυσιππος
ουκ αν ην
εγω.
§88.
Diligentissime: in
48—
53.
Dicebas: in
52
imbecillius adsentiuntur.
Siccorum: cf. Cic.
Contra
Rullum I. 1
consilia siccorum.
Madere is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
Mostellaria I. 4, 6.
Non diceret:
Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit the verb, with one MS., cf.
15 and
I. 13. The omission of a verb in the subjunctive is,
Madv. says on
D.F. I. 9, impossible; for
other ellipses of the verb see
M.D.F. V.
63.
Alcmaeo autem: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; cf.
52.
Somnia reri: the best MSS. have
somniare. Goer. reads
somnia, supplying
non fuisse
vera. I have already remarked on his extraordinary power of
supplying. Halm conj.
somnia reprobare, forgetting that the
verb
reprobare belongs to third century Latinity, also
sua visa
putare, which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from
the MSS., I read
reri, which verb occurred in
I. 26,
39.
Possibly
putare, a little farther on, has got misplaced.
Non id
agitur: these difficulties supply Sextus with one of his
τροποι, i.e.
‛ο
περι τας
περιστασεις;
cf.
P.H. I. 100, also for the treatment
of dreams,
ib. I. 104.
Si modo,
etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it."
Aeque ac vigilanti: =
aeque ac si vigilaret. Dav. missing
the sense, and pointing out that
when awake Ennius did not assent
to his sensations at all, conj.
vigilantis. Two participles used
in very different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv.
Em.
Liv. p. 442.
Ita credit: MSS. have
illa, which Dav.
altered. Halm would prefer
credidit.
Itera dum, etc.: from
the
Iliona of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see
Ad
Att. XIV. 14, and
T.D. II. 44.
§89.
Quisquam: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences
cf. Virg.
Aen. I. 48 with the
FileOutputStreams of Wagner and Conington.
Tam certa putat: so
Sextus
A.M. VII. 61 points out that
Protagoras must in accordance with his doctrine
παντων
μετρον
ανθρωπος hold that
the
μεμηνως is the
κριτηριον
των εν
μανιαι
φαινομενων.
Video, video te: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was
Αιας
μαινομενος,
see Ribbeck
Trag. Lat. rel. p. 205. Cic. in
De Or. III. 162 thus continues the quotation, "
oculis
postremum lumen radiatum rape." So in Soph.
Aiax 100 the hero,
after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in
order to torture him.
Hercules: cf. Eur.
Herc. Fur.
921—1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are
often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g.
A.M. VII. 405
‛ο γουν
‛Ερακλης
μανεις και
λαβων
φαντασιαν
απο των
ιδιων
παιδων ‛ως
Ευρυσθεος,
την
ακολουθον
πραξιν
ταυτηι τη
φαντασιαι
συνηψεν.
ακολουθον
δε ην το τους
του εχθρου
παιδας
ανελειν,
‛οπερ και
εποιησεν. Cf. also
A.M. VII. 249.
Moveretur: imperf.
for plup. as in
90.
Alcmaeo tuus: cf.
52.
Incitato furore: Dav. reads
incitatus. Halm qu. from Wesenberg
Observ. Crit. ad Or. p.
Sestio p. 51 this explanation, "
cum furor eius initio remissior
paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus esset," he also refers to
Wopkens
Lect. Tull. p. 55 ed. Hand.
Incedunt etc.: the MSS.
have
incede, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the verb is
evidently
Furiae.
Adsunt: is only given once by MSS., while
Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.
Caerulea ... angui:
anguis fem is not uncommon in the old
poetry. MSS. here have
igni.
Crinitus:
ακερσεκομης,
"never shorn," as Milton translates it.
Luna innixus: the separate
mention in the next line of
Diana, usually identified with the
moon, has led edd. to emend this line. Some old edd. have
lunat,
while Lamb. reads
genu for
luna, cf. Ov.
Am. I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.)
lunavitque genu sinuosum
fortiter arcum. Wakefield on Lucr.
III. 1013
puts a stop at
auratum, and goes on with
Luna innixans.
Taber strangely explains
luna as =
arcu ipso lunato, Dav.
says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it is the
utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should not
regard
luna and
Diana as distinct.
§90. Illa
falsa: sc.
visa, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
perversely insists on taking
somniantium recordatione ipsorum
closely together.
Non enim id quaeritur: cf.
80 n. Sext. very often uses very similar language,
as in
P.H. I. 22, qu. in n. on
40.
Tum cum movebantur: so Halm for MSS.
tum commovebantur, the em. is supported by
88.
§§91—98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable
knowledge, its processes are not applicable to a large number of
philosophical questions (91). You value the art,
but remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the sorites,
which you say is faulty (92). If it is so, refute
it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will avail you
nothing (93). If you refrain because you
cannot answer, your knowledge fails you, if you can answer
and yet refrain, you are unfair (94). The art you
admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web, witness the
Mentiens, (95). You assent to arguments
which are identical in form with the Mentiens, and yet refuse to
assent to it Why so? (96) You demand that these
sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go
to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would
not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned Dialectic from
Antiochus, the Mentiens and the arguments identical with it in
form must stand or fall together (98).
§91. Inventam
esse: cf.
26,
27.
In
geometriane: with this inquiry into the special function of Dialectic
cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
Gorg. 453 D, 454 C.
Sol
quantus sit: this of course is a problem for
φυσικη, not
for
διαλεκτικη.
Quod sit summum bonum: not
διαλεκτικη
but
ηθικη must decide this.
Quae
coniunctio: etc. so Sext. often opposes
συμπλοκη or
συνημμενον
to
διεζευγμενον,
cf. esp
P.H. II. 201, and Zeller 109 sq.
with footnotes. An instance of a
coniunctio (hypothetical
judgment) is "
si lucet, lucet" below, of a
disiunctio
(disjunctive judgment) "
aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet".
Ambigue dictum:
αμφιβολον,
on which see
P.H. II. 256, Diog
VII. 62.
Quid sequatur:
το
ακολουθον,
cf.
I. 19 n.
Quid
repugnet: cf.
I. 19,
n.
De se ipsa: the
ipsa, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom.
and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an
art is not to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to
solve every problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in
Rep. II.) that the Expert is the man who
knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar
arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp.
P.H. II. 175 and the words
εαυτου
εσται
εκκαλυπτικον.
For the mode in which Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511.
The true ground of attack is that Logic always
assumes the truth
of phenomena, and cannot
prove it. This was clearly seen by
Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the Origin of
Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol
II. of his
Aristotle.
§92. Nata
sit: cf.
28,
59.
Loquendi: the Stoic
λογικη, it must be
remembered, included
‛ρητορικη.
Concludendi:
του
συμπεραινειν
or
συλλογιζεσθαι.
Locum:
τοπον in the philosophical sense.
Vitiosum:
49, n.
Num nostra culpa
est: cf.
32.
Finium: absolute limits;
the fallacy of the
sorites and other such sophisms lies entirely
in the treatment of purely
relative terms as though they were
absolute.
Quatenus: the same ellipse occurs in
Orator 73.
In acervo tritici: this is the false
sorites, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one
grain makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three,
four, etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins
to answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and
no heap. One grain therefore
does make a heap. The true
sorites or chain inference is still treated in books on logic, cf.
Thomson's
Laws of Thought, pp 201—203, ed 8.
Minutatim: cf. Heindorf's note on
κατα
σμικρον in
Sophistes 217 D.
Interrogati: cf.
104. In
94 we have
interroganti, which some edd. read here.
Dives pauper,
etc.: it will be easily seen that the process of questioning above
described can be applied to any relative term such as these are. For the
omission of any connecting particle between the members of each pair, cf.
29,
125,
T.D. I. 64,
V. 73, 114, Zumpt
Gram. 782.
Quanto addito aut dempto: after this there is a
strange ellipse of some such words as
id efficiatur, quod
interrogatur. [
Non]
habemus: I bracket
non in
deference to Halm, Madv. however (
Opusc. I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation
arising from a sort of anacoluthon, comparing
In Vatin. 3,
Ad
Fam. XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit
negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.
§93.
Frangite: in later Gk. generally
απολυειν.
Erunt ... cavetis: this form of the conditional sentence is
illustrated in Madv.
D.F. III. 70,
Em.
Liv. p. 422,
Gram. 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence
Heaut. V. 1, 59
quot incommoda tibi in
hac re capies nisi caves, cf. also
127,
140 of this book. The present is of course required
by the instantaneous nature of the action.
Chrysippo: he spent so
much time in trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his
by Persius
VI. 80.
inventus, Chrysippe, tui
finitor acervi. The titles of numerous distinct works of his on the
Sorites and
Mentiens are given by Diog.
Tria pauca
sint: cf. the instances in Sext.
A.M. VII. 418
τα
πεντηκοντα
ολιγα εστιν,
τα μυρια
ολιγα
εστιν, also Diog.
VII. 82
‛ησυχαζειν
the advice is quoted in Sext.
P.H. II.
253 (
δειν
‛ιστασθαι
και
επεχειν),
A.M.
VII. 416 (
‛ο σοφος
στησεται
και
‛ησυχασει).
The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see Sext.
P.H. II. 244,
III. 66.
Stertas: imitated by Aug.
Contra
Ac. III. 25
ter terna novem esse ... vel
genere humano stertente verum sit, also
ib. III. 22.
Proficit: Dav.
proficis, but
Madv. rightly understands
το
‛ησυχαζειν
(
Em. 184), cf.
N.D. II. 58.
Ultimum ... respondere: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of
defendere with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests
paucorum quid sit.
§94. Ut
agitator: see the amusing letter to Atticus
XIII. 21, in which Cic. discusses different
translations for the word
επεχειν, and quotes a
line of Lucilius
sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator
equosque, adding
semperque Carneades προβολην
pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit εποχη. Aug.
Contra Ac. trans.
εποχη by
refrenatio cf. also
Lael. 63.
Superbus es: I have thus corrected the MSS.
responde superbe; Halm writes
facis superbe, Orelli
superbis, which verb is hardly found in prose. The phrase
superbe resistere in Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 14 may be a reminiscence.
Illustribus:
Bait. with some probability adds
in, comparing
in decimo
below, and
107, cf. however Munro on Lucr.
I. 420.
Irretiat: parallel expressions occur in
T.D. V. 76,
De Or. I. 43,
De Fato 7.
Facere non sinis:
Sext.
P.H. II. 253 points the moral in
the same way.
Augentis nec minuentis: so Halm for MSS.
augendi
nec minuendi, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase
primum augendi to be Latin.
§95. Tollit
... superiora: cf.
Hortensius fragm. 19 (Orelli)
sed ad
extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
dialecticorum ratio.
Vestra an nostra: Bait. after Christ
needlessly writes
nostra an vestra.
αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed
in language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this
subject.
Effatum: Halm gives the spelling
ecfatum. It is
probable that this spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in
connection with religious and legal formulae as in
De Div. I. 81,
De Leg. II. 20,
see Corss.
Ausspr. I. 155 For the word
cf. Sen.
Ep. 117
enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod alii
effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum, in
T.D. I. 14
pronuntiatum is found, in
De Fato
26
pronuntiatio, in Gellius
XVI. 8 (from
Varro)
prologium.
Aut verum esse aut falsum: the constant
Stoic definition of
αξιωμα, see Diog.
VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107.
Mentiris
an verum dicis: the
an was added by Schutz on a comparison of
Gellius
XVIII. 10
cum mentior et mentiri me
dico, mentior an verum dico? The sophism is given in a more formally
complete shape in
De Div. II. 11 where
the following words are added,
dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis,
mentiris igitur. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301,
ed Orelli),
quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum
pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare? Inexplicabilia:
απορα in
the Greek writers.
Odiosius: this adj. has not the strong meaning
of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying."
Non
comprehensa: as in
99, the opposite of
comprehendibilia III. 1, 41. The past
partic. in Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in
-bilis.
Faber points out that in the
Timaeus Cic. translates
αλυτος by
indissolutus
and
indissolubilis indifferently.
Imperceptus, which one
would expect, is found in Ovid.
§96. Si
dicis: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by Manut.
with the exception of
nunc which was added by Dav. The idea of
Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
comic writers is untenable.
In docendo:
docere is not to
expound but to
prove, cf. n. on
121.
Primum ... modum: the word
modus
is technical in this sense cf.
Top. 57. The
προτος
λογος
αναποδεικτος
of the Stoic logic ran thus
ει ‛ημερα
εστι, φως
εστιν ... αλλα
μην ‛ημερα
εστιν φως
αρα εστιν (Sext.
P.H. II. 157, and other passages qu.
Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly
tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges
φως and
‛ημερα into
one word, or that of Zeller (
114, note). These
arguments are called
μονολημματοι
(involving only one premise) in Sext.
P.H. I. 152, 159,
II. 167.
Si
dicis te mentiri, etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does,
that when a man
truly states that he
has told a lie, he
establishes against himself not merely that he
has told a lie, but
also that he
is telling a lie at the moment when he makes the
true statement. The root of the sophism lies in the confusion of
past and present time in the one infinitive
mentiri.
Eiusdem
generis: the phrase
te mentiri had been substituted for
nunc lucere.
Chrysippea: n. on
93.
Conclusioni: on
facere with the dat. see n. on
27.
Cederet: some edd.
crederet, but
the word is a trans. of Gk.
εικειν; n. on
66.
Conexi: =
συνημμενον,
cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment.
Superius: the
συνημμενον
consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the
affirmative—called in Greek
‛ηγουμενον
and
ληγον; if one is admitted the other
follows of course.
§97.
Excipiantur: the legal
formula of the Romans generally
directed the
iudex to condemn the defendant if certain facts were
proved, unless certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went
by the name of
exceptio. See
Dict. Ant.
Tribunum ...
adeant: a retort upon Lucullus; cf.
13. The
MSS. have
videant or
adeant; Halm conj.
adhibeant,
comparing
86 and
Pro Rabirio 20.
Contemnit: the usual trans. "to despise" for
contemnere is
too strong; it means, like
ολιγωρειν,
merely to neglect or pass by.
Effabimur; cf.
effatum above.
Hermarchus: not
Hermachus, as most edd.; see
M.D.F.
II. 96.
Diiunctum:
διεζευγμενον,
for which see Zeller 112.
Necessarium: the reason why Epicurus
refused to admit this is given in
De Fato 21
Epicurus veretur
ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant.
The context of that passage should be carefully read, along with
N.D. I. 69, 70. Aug.
Contra Ac.
III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth
of disjunctive propositions.
Catus: so Lamb. for MSS.
cautus.
Tardum:
De Div. II.
103
Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici; cf. also
ib. II. 116, and the frequent use of
βραδυς in Sext., e.g.
A.M. VII. 325.
Cum hoc igitur: the
word
igitur, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.
Id est: n. on
I. 8.
Evertit: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343.
Zeller 399 sq.,
M.D.F. I. 22.
E
contrariis diiunctio: =
διεζευγμενον
εξ
εναντιων.
§98.
Sequor: as in
95,
96, where the
Dialectici refused to allow the
consequences of their own principles, according to Cic.
Ludere:
this reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for
which see Cope in the old
Journal of Philology. No. 7.
Iudicem
... non iudicem: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by
μεν and
δε, has been a great crux of
edd.; Dav. here wished to insert
cum before
iudicem, but is
conclusively refuted by Madv.
Em. 31. The same construction occurs
in
103.
Esse conexum: with great
probability Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the
copyists.
§§98—105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the
case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two
divisions of visa, one into those capable of being perceived and
those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments
aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the sapiens will
follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly
does (99, 100). Our
sapiens is not made of stone; many things seem to him true; yet he
always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics
themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission
together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible
(101). It is strange that our Probables do
not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He condemns those who say that sensation is
swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its necessary
certainty (103). There are two modes of
withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely
so far as to deny the certainty of phenomena. The latter mode
leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).
98. Tortuosum: similar
expressions are in
T.D. II. 42,
III. 22,
D.F. IV. 7.
Ut Poenus: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf.
D.F. IV. 56,
tuus ille Poenulus, homo
acutus. A different meaning is given by the
ut in passages
like
De Div. II. 30
Democritus non
inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius; "for a
physical philosopher."
§99.
Genera: here = classifications of, modes of dividing
visa.
This way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong
censure of Madv. (Pref. to
D.F. p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted
of ignorance, for representing Carneades as dividing
visa into
those which can be perceived and those which cannot. Is it possible that
any one should read the
Academica up to this point, and still
believe that Cic. is capable of supposing, even for a moment, that
Carneades in any way upheld
καταληψις?
Dicantur: i.e.
ab Academicis.
Si probabile: the
si is not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading
est, probabile nihil esse.
Commemorabas: in
53,
58.
Eversio: cf.
D.F. III. 50 (the same words), Plat.
Gorg. 481 C
‛ημων ‛ο
βιος
ανατετραμμενος
αν ειη, Sext.
A.M. VIII. 157
συγχεομεν
τον βιον.
Et
sensibus: no second
et corresponds to this;
sic below
replaces it. See Madv.
D.F. p. 790, ed. 2.
Quicquam tale
etc.: cf.
40,
41.
Nihil
ab eo differens: n. on
54.
Non
comprehensa: n. on
96.
§100. Si
iam: "if, for example;" so
iam is often used in Lucretius.
Probo ... bono: it would have seemed more natural to transpose
these epithets.
Facilior ... ut probet: the usual construction is
with
ad and the gerund; cf.
De Div. II. 107,
Brut. 180.
Anaxagoras: he made
no
‛ομοιομερειαι
of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is dark in colour.
Concreta: so Manut. for MSS.
congregata. In
121 the MSS. give
concreta without variation,
as in
N.D. II. 101,
De Div. I. 130,
T.D. I. 66,
71.
§101.
Impeditum: cf.
33, n.
Movebitur:
cf.
moveri in
24.
Non enim est: Cic.
in the vast majority of cases writes
est enim, the two words
falling under one accent like
sed enim, et enim (cf. Corss.
Ausspr. II. 851); Beier on
De Off.
I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
est enim, but the MSS. both of the
Lucullus and of Nonius
agree in the other form, which Madv. allows to stand in
D.F. I. 43, and many other places (see his note). Cf.
fragm.
22 of the
Acad. Post.
E robore:
so Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here
ebore.
Dolatus:
an evident imitation of Hom.
Od. T 163
ου γαρ απο
δριος εσσι
παλαιφατου
ουδ' απο
πετρης.
Neque tamen
habere: i.e.
se putat. For the sudden change from
oratio
recta to
obliqua cf.
40 with n.
Percipiendi notam: =
χαρακτηρα
της
συγκταθεσεως
in Sext.
P.H. I. 191. For the use of the
gerund cf. n. on
26, with Madv.
Gram. 418,
Munro on Lucr.
I. 313; for
propriam 34.
Exsistere. cf.
36.
Qui neget: see
79.
Caput: a legal term.
Conclusio
loquitur: cf.
historiae loquantur (
5),
consuetudo loquitur (
D.F. II. 48),
hominis institutio si loqueretur (
ib. IV. 41),
vites si loqui possint (
ib.
V. 39),
patria loquitur (
In Cat.
I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself
in
Orat. 85.
Inquit: "quotha," indefinitely, as in
109,
115; cf. also
dicit in
79.
§102.
Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis: Bait. follows Madv. in
placing a comma after
est, and a full stop at
probabilia.
Tamen ought in that case to follow
dicimus, and it is
noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait.,
and Hahn's ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word
tamen altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice
the omission.
Ista diceret: "stated the opinions you asked for."
Poetam: this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.
§103. For this
section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext.
P.H. I. 227 sq.
Academia ... quibus: a number of
exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on
D.F. V. 16.
Nullum: on the
favourite Ciceronian use of
nullus for
non see
47,
141, and Madv.
Gram. 455, obs. 5.
Illud sit disputatum: for the
construction cf.
98;
autem is omitted with
the same constr. in
D.F. V. 79, 80.
Nusquam alibi: cf.
50.
§104.
Exposuisset adiungit: Madv. on
D.F. III. 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of
tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers,
but no ex. so strong as this is produced.
Ut aut approbet quid aut
improbet: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent editors of
Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by
ut. Halm brackets a similar clause in
20,
and is followed in both instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the
most extensive
bracketer of modern times, rejects very many
clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works. In our passage, the
difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
approbare and
improbare may mean either to render an
absolute approval or
disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on
probability. For example, in
29 the words
have the first meaning, in
66 the second. The same
is the case with
nego and
aio. I trace the whole difficulty
of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the
difference between the two kinds of assent. The general sense will be as
follows. "There are two kinds of
εποχη, one which prevents a man
from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses
above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer
to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval
or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither
absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a
qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of the
clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the
Philologus (vol.
VII.), which I had not
read when this note was first written.
Alterum placere ... alterum
tenere: "the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual
practice." For the force of this see my note on
non probans in
148, which passage is very similar to this.
Neget ... aiat: cf.
97.
Nec ut
placeat: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the wrong sense, for
Clitomachus
did allow such
visa to stand as were sufficient
to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's
neu cui labours under
the same defect. Various emendations are
nam cum (Lamb., accepted
by Zeller 522),
hic ut (Manut.),
et cum (Dav. followed by
Bait.),
sed cum (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me
that of Manut. I should prefer
sic ut, taking
ut in the
sense of "although."
Respondere: "to put in as an answer," as in
93 and often.
Approbari: sc.
putavit. Such changes of construction are common in Cic., and I
cannot follow Halm in altering the reading to
approbavit.
§105. Lucem
eripimus: cf.
30.
§§105—111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this
time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was possible on my
principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If
nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will
be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient
basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us
to assent. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas,
and you yourself refuse assent to the sorites, why then should not
the Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your
other strong point is that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions of the dogmatist
proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the
hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where
probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics
first admit that there are true and false visa and then contradict
themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and
false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference exists; we do
deny that human faculties are capable of perceiving the difference (111).
105. Inducto ... prob.: so Aug.
Cont Ac. II. 12
Soluto, libero:
cf. n. on
8.
Implicato: =
impedito
cf.
101.
Iacere: cf.
79.
Isdem oculis: an answer to the question
nihil cernis? in
102.
Purpureum:
cf. fragm.
7 of the
Acad. Post.
Modo
caeruleum ... sole: Nonius (cf. fragm.
23)
quotes
tum caeruleum tum lavum (the MSS. in our passage have
flavum)
videtur, quodque nunc a sole. C.F. Hermann would
place
mane ravum after
quodque and take
quod as a
proper relative pronoun, not as = "because." This transposition certainly
gives increased clearness. Hermann further wishes to remove
a,
quoting exx. of
collucere without the prep., which are not at all
parallel, i.e.
Verr. I. 58,
IV. 71.
Vibrat: with the
ανηριθμον
γελασμα of Aeschylus.
Dissimileque: Halm, followed by Bait., om.
que.
Proximo
et: MSS. have
ei, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g.
De
Fato 44.
Non possis ... defendere: a similar line is taken in
81.
§106.
Memoria: cf.
22.
Polyaenus: named
D.F. I. 20, Diog.
X. 18, as one of the chief friends of Epicurus.
Falsum quod est: Greek and Latin do not distinguish accurately
between the
true and the
existent, the
false and the
non existent, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the confusion
is frequent, notably in the
Sophistes and
Theaetetus.
Si
igitur: "if then recollection is recollection only of things
perceived and known." The dogmatist theory of
μνημη and
νοησις is dealt with in
exactly the same way by Sext.
P.H. II. 5,
10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat
Theaet. 191 sq.
Siron: thus
Madv. on
D.F. II. 119 writes the name,
not
Sciron, as Halm.
Fateare: the em. of Dav. for
facile,
facere,
facias of MSS. Christ defends
facere, thinking that the constr. is varied from the subj. to the
inf. after
oportet, as after
necesse est in
39. For
facere followed by an inf. cf.
M.D.F. IV. 8.
Nulla: for
non, cf.
47,
103.
§107. Fiet
artibus: n. on
27 for the constr., for the
matter see
22.
Lumina: "strong points."
Bentl. boldly read
columina, while Dav. proposed
vimina or
vincula. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
D.F.
II. 70.
negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum
lumen est) N.D. I. 79, and
43 of this book.
Responsa: added by Ernesti.
Faber supplies
haruspicia, Orelli after Ern.
haruspicinam,
but, as Halm says, some noun in the plur. is needed.
Quod is non
potest: this is the MSS. reading, but most edd. read
si is, to
cure a wrong punctuation, by which a colon is placed at
perspicuum
est above, and a full stop at
sustineat. Halm restored the
passage.
Habuerint: the subj. seems due to the attraction
exercised by
sustineat. Bait. after Kayser has
habuerunt.
Positum: "when laid down" or "assumed."
§108.
Alterum est quod: this is substituted for
deinde, which
ought to correspond to
primum above.
Actio ullius rei: n.
on
actio rerum in
62, cf. also
148.
Adsensu comprobet: almost the same
phrase often occurs in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc.
Sit etiam:
the
etiam is a little strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti.
It seems to have the force of Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent
consists."
Sensus ipsos adsensus: so in
I. 41 sensus is defined
to be
id quod est sensu comprehensum, i.e.
καταληψις,
cf. also Stobaeus
I. 41, 25
αισθητικη
γαρ
φαντασια
συγκαταθεσις
εστι.
Appetitio: for all this cf.
30.
Et dicta ... multa: Manut. ejected
these words as a gloss, after
multa the MSS. curiously add
vide
superiora.
Lubricos sustinere: cf.
68
and
94.
Ita scribenti ... exanclatum: for
the om. of
esse cf.
77,
113 with notes.
Herculi: for this form of
the gen. cf. Madv. on
D.F. I. 14, who
doubts whether Cic. ever wrote
-is in the gen. of the Greek names
in
-es. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists
not to change the rarer form into the commoner, also that even
Priscian (see
M.D.F. V. 12) made gross
blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost
irresistible.
Temeritatem:
προπετειαν,
εικαιοτητα.
§109. In
navigando: cf.
100.
In conserendo:
Guretus interprets "
εν τω
φυτυεσθαι
τον αγρον," and is
followed by most commentators, though it seems at least possible that
manum is to be understood. For the suppressed accus.
agrum
cf. n. on
tollendum in
148.
Sequere: the fut. not the pres. ind., cf.
61.
Pressius: cf.
28.
Reprehensum: sc.
narrasti.
Id ipsum: =
nihil
posse comprehendi.
Saltem: so in
29.
Pingue: cf.
Pro Archia 10.
Sibi ipsum: note that
Cic. does not generally make
ipse agree in case with the
reflexive, but writes
se ipse, etc.
Convenienter:
"consistently".
Esse possit: Bait.
posset on the suggestion
of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not throwing it
back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant.
Ut hoc
ipsum: the
ut follows on
illo modo urguendum above.
Decretum quod: Halm followed by Bait. gives
quo, referring
to
altero quo neget in
111, which however
does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have
qui.
Et sine
decretis: Lamb. gave
nec for
et, but Dav. correctly
explains, "
multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed
tantum probabilia."
§110. Ut
illa: i.e. the
decreta implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
have
ille, while Dav. without necessity gives
alia.
Sic
hoc ipsum: Sext. then is wrong is saying (
P.H. I. 226) that the Academics
διαβεβαιουνται
τα πραγματα
ειναι
ακαταληπτα,
i.e. state the doctrine dogmatically, while the sceptics do not.
Cognitionis notam: like
nota percipiendi,
veri et
falsi, etc. which we have already had.
Ne confundere omnia: a
mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf.
58.
Incerta reddere: cf.
54.
Stellarum
numerus: another echo of Lucullus; see
32.
Quem ad modum ... item: see Madv. on
D.F. III. 48, who quotes an exact parallel from
Topica 46, and
sicut ... item from
N.D. I. 3, noting at the same time that in such exx.
neither
ita nor
idem, which MSS. sometimes give for
item, is correct.
§111. Dicere
... perturbatum: for om. of
esse cf.
108, etc.
Antiochus: this Bait. brackets.
Unum ... alterum: cf.
44.
Esse quaedam
in visis: it was not the
esse but the
videri, not the
actual existence of a difference, but the possibility of that difference
being infallibly perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied.
Cernimus: i.e. the
probably true and false.
Probandi
species: a phenomenal appearance which belongs to, or properly leads
to qualified approval.
§§112—115. Summary. If I had to deal with a
Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be
easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise
man sometimes opines (112). The
definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of
Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to
the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate your
assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic system like
yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to
join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who
thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I,
but the sapiens is to adopt (115).
§112. Campis
... exsultare ... oratio: expressions like this are common in Cic.,
e.g.
D.F. I. 54,
De Off. I. 61,
Orat. 26; cf. also Aug.
Cont. Ac.
III. 5
ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret
oratio.
Cum Peripatetico: nothing that Cic. states here is at
discord with what is known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf.
esp. Sext.
A.M. VII. 216—226. All
that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic formula, putting
upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic would have
wondered how a sceptic
could accept his formulae; but the
spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on
18) that we have here a trace of Philo's teaching,
as distinct from that of Carneades. I see absolutely no reason for the
very severe remarks of Madvig on
D.F. V.
76, a passage which very closely resembles ours.
Dumeta: same use
in
N.D. I. 68, Aug.
Cont. Ac.
II. 6; the
spinae of the Stoics are often
mentioned, e.g.
D.F. IV. 6.
E vero ...
a falso: note the change of prep.
Adhiberet: the MSS. are
confused here, and go Halm reads
adderet, and Bait. follows, while
Kayser proposes
adhaereret, which is indeed nearer the MSS.; cf.
however
I. 39
adhiberet.
Accessionem: for this cf.
18 and
77.
Simpliciter:
the opposite of
subtiliter; cf.
simpliciter—subtilitas in
I. 6.
Ne Carneade quidem: cf.
59,
67,
78,
148.
§113. Sed
qui his minor est: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for MSS.
sed mihi minores. Guietus gave
sed his minores, Durand
sed minutior, while Halm suggests
sed minutiores. I conj.
nimio minares, which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr.
I. 734
inferiores partibus egregie multis
multoque minores.
Tale verum:
visum omitted as in
D.F. V. 76.
Incognito: cf.
133.
Amavi hominem: cf. Introd. p.
6.
Ita iudico, politissimum; it is a mistake
to suppose this sentence incomplete, like Halm, who wishes to add
eum
esse, or like Bait., who with Kayser prints
esse after
politissimum. Cf.
108 ita scribenti,
exanclatum, and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on
D.F.
II. 13.
Horum neutrum: cf.
77 nemo.
Utrumque verum: Cic. of course
only accepts the propositions as Arcesilas did; see
77.
§114. Illud
ferre: cf.
136.
Constituas: this verb
is often used in connection with the ethical
finis; cf.
129 and
I. 19.
Idemque etiam: Krebs and Allgayer
(
Antibarbarus, ed. 4) deny that the expression
idem etiam
is Latin. One good MS. here has
atque etiam, which Dav. reads; cf.
however
Orat. 117.
Artificium: =
ars, as in
30.
Nusquam labar: cf.
138 ne labar.
Subadroganter: cf.
126.
§115. Qui
sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse: so Cic. vary often speaks of the
Peripatetics, as in
D.F. IV. 5,
V. 7.
Sustinuero: cf.
70.
Tam bonos: Cic. often speaks of them and
of Epicurus in this patronising way; see e.g.
T.D. II. 44,
III. 50,
D.F.
I. 25,
II. 81. For the
Epicurean friendships cf. esp.
D.F. I.
65.
Diodoto: cf. Introd. p.
2.
Nolumus: Halm and Bait., give
nolimus; so fine a line
divides the subjunctive from the indicative in clauses like these that
the choice often depends on mere individual taste.
De sapiente
loquamur: n. on
66.
§§116—128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy
take Physics first. Would your sapiens swear to the truth of any
geometrical result whatever? (116) Let us see
which one of actual physical systems the sapiens we are seeking
will select (117). He must choose one
teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great
men though they be, he must reject (118).
Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must
believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If
he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus,
must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to
be free, as I am and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles
of the universe! (120) Nothing can exist, say
you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the
deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs
from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato, yet I will not assent
absolutely either to his system or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We
know nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell
strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with
Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless
opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our
sapiens will be unable to decide (124). If
you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among
themselves about physical subjects, why will they not allow me to differ
from them? (126) Not that I deprecate the study
of Physics, for moral good results from it (127).
Our sapiens will be delighted if he attains to anything which
seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness
in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to
asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as
the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all
things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the
sun, I am almost content (128).
§116. Tres
partes: cf.
I. 19.
Et a vobismet: "and especially by you". The threefold division was
peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, cf. Sext.
P.H.
II. 13 (on the same subject)
‛οι
Στωικοι και
αλλοι
τινες. For other modes of dividing
philosophy see Sext.
A.M. VII. 2.
At
illud ante: this is my em. for the MSS.
velut illud ante,
which probably arose from a marginal variant "
vel ut" taking the
place of
at; cf. a similar break in
40
sed prius, also in
128 at paulum
ante. Such breaks often occur in Cic., as in
Orator 87
sed
nunc aliud, also
T.D. IV. 47
repenam fortasse, sed illud ante. For
velut Halm writes
vel (which Bait. takes), Dav.
verum.
Inflatus
tumore: cf.
De Off. I. 91
inflati
opinionibus. Bentl. read
errore.
Cogere: this word like
αναγκαζειν
and
βιαζεσθαι
often means simply to argue irresistibly.
Initia: as in
118, bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable
of proof, so
αρχαι in Gk.
Digitum: cf.
58,
143.
Punctum esse
etc.:
σημειον
εστιν ου
μερος
ουθεν (Sext.
P.H. III. 39),
στιγμη =
το
αμερες (
A.M. IX. 283, 377).
Extremitatem: =
επιφανειαν.
Libramentum: so this word is used by Pliny (see Forc.) for the
slope of a hill.
Nulla crassitudo: in Sext. the
επιφανεια
is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as
μηκος
μετα
πλατους (
P.H.
III. 39),
περας (
extremitas)
σοματος δυο
εχον
διαστασεις,
μηκος και
πλατος (
A.M. III. 77).
Liniamentum ... carentem: a difficult
passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as
μηκος
απλατες. (Sext. as
above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface
negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction
of
longitudinem which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others
propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather
add
et crassitudine before
carentem, comparing
I. 27 sine ulla specie et
carentem omni illa qualitate. I have merely bracketed
carentem, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in
this clause as in the other two, he suggests
quod sit sine.
Hermann takes
esse after
punctum as strongly predicative
("there
is a point," etc.), then adds
similiter after
liniamentum and ejects
sine ulla. Observe the awkwardness
of having the
line treated of after the
superficies, which
has induced some edd. to transpose. For
liniamentum =
lineam cf.
De Or. I. 187.
Si
adigam: the fine em. of Manut. for
si adiiciamus of MSS. The
construction
adigere aliquem ius iurandum will be found in Caes.
Bell. Civ. I. 76,
II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg.
Aen. III. 56
quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra
fames? Sapientem nec prius: this is the "
egregia
lectio" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm
sapientemne was
read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is
not that the
sapiens will swear to the size of the sun
after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations,
but that
the
sapiens, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which
Archimedes uses, will
not swear to the truth of the elaborate
conclusions which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in
128 against the absurdity of attaching one and
the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most complex truths,
and tries to condemn the Stoic
sapiens out of his own mouth, cf.
esp.
nec ille iurare posset in
123.
Multis partibus: for this expression see Munro on Lucr.
I. 734, for the sense cf.
82,
123,
126,
128.
Deum: see
126.
§117.
Vim: =
αναγκην, cf.
cogere in
116.
Ne ille: this
asseverative
ne is thus always closely joined with pronouns in
Cic.
Sententiam eliget et: MSS. have (by
dittographia of
m,
eli) added
melius after
sententiam, and
have also dropped
et. Dav. wished to read
elegerit,
comparing the beginning of
119.
Insipiens
eliget: cf.
115 quale est a non sapiente
explicari sapientiam? and
9 statuere qui sit
sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis.
Infinitae
quaestiones:
θεσεις, general propositions,
opposed to
finitae quaestiones, limited propositions, Gk.
‛υποθεσεις.
Quintal
III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former
An uxor ducenda, of the latter
An Catoni ducenda. These
quaestiones are very often alluded to by Cic. as in
D.F.
I. 12,
IV. 6,
De
Or. I. 138,
II.
65—67,
Topica 79,
Orat. 46, cf. also Quint.
X. 5,
II. E quibus omnia
constant: this sounds like Lucretius,
omnia =
το παν.
§118. For these
physici the student must in general be referred to R. and P.,
Schwegler, and Grote's
Plato Vol.
I. A
more complete enumeration of schools will be found in Sext.
P.H.
III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated by Aug
De
Civ. Dei XVIII. 37.
Concessisse
primas: Cic. always considers Thales to be
sapientissimus e
septem (
De Leg. II. 26). Hence
Markland on Cic.
Ad Brutum II. 15, 3
argued that that letter cannot be genuine, since in it the supremacy
among the seven is assigned to Solon.
Infinitatem naturae:
το
απειρον,
naturae
here =
ουσιας.
Definita: this
is opposed to
infinita in
Topica 79, so
definire is
used for
finire in
Orat. 65, where Jahn qu.
Verr.
IV. 115.
Similis inter se: an attempt to
translate
‛ομοιομερειας.
Eas primum, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog.
II. 6 in R. and P. 29
παντα
χρηματα ην
‛ομου ειτα
νους ελθων
αυτα
διεκοσμησε.
Xenophanes ... deum: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph. mainly
theological.
Neque natum unquam: cf.
neque ortum unquam in
119.
Parmenides ignem: cf. Arist.
Met.
A. 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence
of the phenomenal world, after which he made two
αρχαι,
θερμον και
ψυχρον
τουτων δε το
μεν κατα μεν
το ‛ον
θερμον
ταττει,
θατερον δε
κατα το μη
ον.
Heraclitus: n. on
I. 39.
Melissus: see
Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp.
το εον αιει
αρα ην τε και
εσται.
Plato: n. on
I. 27.
Discedent: a word
often used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 7, 17.
§119. Sic
animo ... sensibus: knowledge according to the Stoics was homogeneous
throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than another.
Nunc lucere: cf.
98, also
128 non enim magis adsentiuntur, etc.
Mundum sapientem: for this Stoic doctrine see
N.D. I. 84,
II. 32, etc.
Fabricata sit: see
87 n.
Solem:
126.
Animalis intellegentia: reason is the
essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138—9, also
28,
29 of Book
I. Permanet: the deity is to the Stoic
πνευμα
ενδιηκον δι
‛ολου του
κοσμου (Plut.
De Plac.
Phil. I. 7 qu. R. and P. 375),
spiritus
per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus. (Seneca,
Consol. ad Helvid. 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147).
Deflagret: the
Stoics considered the
κοσμος
φθαρτος, cf. Diog.
VII. 141, Zeller 156—7.
Fateri: cf.
tam vera quam falsa cernimus in
111.
Flumen aureum: Plut.
Vita Cic. 24 alludes to this (
‛οτι
χρυσιου
ποταμος ειη
ρεοντος). This is the
constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote,
Aristot.
Vol
I. p. 43, quotes
Topica 3,
De
Or. I. 49,
Brut. 121,
N.D.
II. 93,
De Inv. II. 6,
D.F. I. 14,
Ad Att. II. 1, and discusses the
difficulty of applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we
possess.
Nulla vis: cf.
I. 28.
Exsistere: Walker conj.
efficere,
"
recte ut videtur" says Halm. Bait. adopts it.
Ornatus: =
κοσμος.
§120.
Libertas ... non esse: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
liberty see Introd. p.
18.
Quod tibi
est: after these words Halm puts merely a comma, and inserting
respondere makes
cur deus, etc. part of the same sentence.
Bait. follows.
Nostra causa: Cic. always writes
mea, tua,
vestra, nostra causa, not
mei, tui, nostri, vestri, just as he
writes
sua sponte, but not
sponte alicuius. For the Stoic
opinion that men are the chief care of Providence, see
N.D. I. 23,
II. 37,
D.F.
III. 67,
Ac. I.
29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding
the opinion are treated of in Zeller 175,
N.D. II. 91—127. They supply in Sext.
P.H.
I. 32,
III. 9—12
an example of the refutation of
νοουμενα by means
of
νοουμενα.
Tam
multa ac: MSS. om.
ac, which I insert. Lactantius qu. the
passage without
perniciosa.
Myrmecides: an actual Athenian
artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot
which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee
concealed. See Plin.
Nat. Hist. VII. 21,
XXXVI. 5.
§121.
Posse: n. on
I. 29.
Strato: R. and P. 331.
Sed cum:
sed often marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read
et, as Halm.
Asperis ... corporibus: cf. fragm.
28 of the
Ac. Post., also
N.D. I. 66.
Somnia: so
N.D. I. 18
miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
somniantium,
ib. I. 42
non
philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia, also
ib. I. 66
flagitia Democriti.
Docentis:
giving
proof.
Optantis: Guietus humorously conj.
potantis, Durand
oscitantis (cf.
N.D. I. 72), others
opinantis. That the text is
sound however may be seen from
T.D. II.
30
optare hoc quidem est non docere,
De Fato 46,
N.D. I. 19
optata magis quam
inventa,
ib. III. 12
doceas
oportet nec proferas; cf. also
Orat. 59
vocis bonitas
optanda est, non est enim in nobis, i.e. a good voice is a thing to
be prayed for, and not to be got by exertion. There is a similar Greek
proverb,
ευχη μαλλον
η αληθεια, in
Sext.
P.H. VIII. 353.
Magno opere:
Hermann wishes to read
onere. The phrase
magnum onus is
indeed common (cf.
De Or. I. 116), but
magnum opus, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf.
T.D. III. 79, 84,
Orat. 75.
Modo hoc modo illud:
134.
§122. Latent
ista: see n. on fragm.
29 of the
Ac.
Post.; for
latent cf.
I. 45. Aug.
Cont. Ac. II.
12,
III. 1 imitates this passage.
Circumfusa: cf.
I. 44, and
46 of this book.
Medici: cf.
T.D. I. 46
Viderentur: a genuine passive, cf.
25,
39,
81.
Empirici: a
school of physicians so called.
Ut ... mutentur: exactly the same
answer was made recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he
was said to have assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same
properties as the dead.
Media pendeat: cf.
N.D. II. 98,
De Or. III.
178.
§123.
Habitari ait: for this edd. qu. Lactant.
Inst. III. 23, 12.
Portenta: "monstrosities these,"
cf.
D.F. IV. 70.
Iurare: cf.
116.
Neque ego, etc.: see fragm.
30 of
Ac. Post. Αντιποδας:
this doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut.
Plac. Phil. III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75), who give the name of
αντιχθων to the
opposite side of the world. Diog.
VIII. 26 (with
which passage cf. Stob.
Phys. XV. 7)
mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says
that Plato first invented the name. The word
αντιπους seems to
occur first in Plat.
Tim. 63 A. The existence of
αντιποδες;
was of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world
is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the
Tim. and by the Stoics,
see Stob.
Phys. XV. 6, Diog.
VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack
the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug.
De Civ. Dei
XVI. 9.
Hicetas: he was followed by
Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext.
A.M. X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the
mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in
Philolaus, see R. and P. 75.
Theophrastus: who wrote much on the
history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328.
Platonem: the words of
Plato (
Tim. 40 B) are
γην δε
τροφον μεν
‛ημετεραν,
ειλλομενην
δε περι τον
δια παντος
πολον
τεταμενον.
Quid tu, Epicure: the connection is that Cic., having given the
crotchets of other philosophers about
φυσικη, proceeds to give the
peculiar crotchet of Epic.
Putas solem ... tantum: a hard passage.
Egone? ne bis is the em. of Lamb. for MSS.
egone vobis, and
is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (
Em. 185) "
cum
interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82)
solem esse putaret, Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat
quantus videretur vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius
circumscribit, ne bis quidem tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem
et bipedalem". (
D.F. I. 20) This
explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
size, i.e. twice the apparent size.
Ne ... quidem may possibly
appear strange, cf. however
ne maiorem quidem in
82.
Aristo Chius: for this doctrine of his see
R. and P. 358.
§124. Quid
sit animus: an enumeration of the different ancient theories is given
in
T.D. I. 18—22, and by Sext.
A.M. VII. 113, who also speaks in
P.H. II. 31 of the
πολλη
και
ανηνυτος
μαχη concerning the soul. In
P.H.
II. 57 he says
Γοργιας
ουδε
διανοιαν
ειναι φησι.
Dicaearcho:
T.D. I. 21.
Tres
partis: in Plato's
Republic.
Ignis: Zeno's opinion,
T.D. I. 19.
Animam:
ib.
I. 19.
Sanguis: Empodocles, as in
T.D. I. 19 where his famous line
‛αιμα γαρ
ανθρωποις
περικαρδιον
εστι νοημα
is translated, see R. and P. 124.
Ut Xenocrates: some edd. read
Xenocrati, but cf.
I. 44,
D.F. II. 18,
T.D. III. 76.
Numerus: so Bentl.
for
mens of MSS., cf.
I. 39,
T.D. I. 20, 41. An
explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and
P. 244.
Quod intellegi etc.: so in
T.D. I. 41
quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide
dicitur.
Momenta n. on
I. 45.
§125.
Verecundius: cf.
114 subadroganter.
Vincam animum: a common phrase in Cic., cf.
Philipp. XII. 21.
Queru potissimum? quem?: In repeated
questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
quisnam, not
quis, in the second question, as in
Verr. IV. 5. The mutation of Augustine
Contra Ac. III. 33 makes it probable that
quemnam was the original reading here. Zumpt on
Verr. qu.
Quint.
IX. 2, 61, Plin.
Epist. I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud
it for its likeness to impromptu.
Nobilitatis: this is to be
explained by referring to
73—
75 (
imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi
nobilem), where Cic. protests against being compared to a demagogue,
and claims to follow the aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the
commentators to show that Democr. was literally an aristocrat have
failed.
Convicio: cf.
34.
Completa et
conferta: n. on
I. 27.
Quod movebitur ... cedat: this is the
theory of motion disproved by Lucr.
I. 370 sq.,
cf. also
N.D. II. 83. Halm writes
quo
quid for
quod (with Christ), and inserts
corpus before
cedat, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
body is pushed, gives way."
Tam sit mirabilis: n. on
I. 25.
Innumerabilis:
55.
Supra infra: n. on
92.
Ut nos nunc simus, etc.: n. on fragm.
13 of
Ac. Post. Disputantis:
55.
Animo videre: cf.
22.
Imagines:
ειδωλα, which Catius
translated (
Ad Fam. XV. 16) by
spectra, Zeller 432.
Tu vero: etc. this is all part of the
personal
convicium supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by
the Antiocheans, and beginning at
Tune aut inane above.
Commenticiis: a favourite word of Cic., cf.
De Div. II. 113.
§126. Quae
tu: elliptic for
ut comprobem quae tu comprobas cf.
125.
Impudenter:
115.
Atque haud scio:
atque here =
καιτοι, "and
yet," n. on
5 ac vereor.
Invidiam:
cf.
144.
Cum his: i.e.
aliis cum
his.
Summus deus: "the highest form of the deity" who was of
course one in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and
πυρ
τεχνικον is one of
the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf.
I. 29, Zeller 161 sq.
Solem: as of course being
the chief seat of fire.
Solis autem ... nego credere: Faber first
gave
ac monet for MSS.
admonens, which Halm retains, Manut.
then restored to its place
permensi refertis, which MSS. have
after
nego.
Hic, which MSS. have after
decempeda,
Madv. turns into
hunc, while
hoc, which stands immediately
after
nego, he ejects (
Em. 187).
Ergo after
vos is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this
arrangement.
Leniter: Halm and Hermann
leviter; the former
reads
inverecundior after Morgenstern, for what reason it is
difficult to see.
§127.
Pabulum: similar language in
D.F. II. 46.
Consideratio contemplatioque: Cic. is
fond of this combination, as
De Off. I.
153; cf. Wesenberg on
T.D. V. 9, who qu.
similar combinations from
D.F. V. 11, 58.
Elatiores: MSS. mostly have
latiores. Halm with Lamb. reads
altiores, in support of which reading Dav. qu.
D.F. II. 51, Val. Flaccus
Argon. II. 547, add Virg.
Aen. VI. 49, Cic.
Orat. 119.
Exigua et
minima:
σμικρα και
ελαχιστα. Madv. on
D.F. V. 78 notes that except here Cic.
always writes
exigua et paene minima or something of the kind.
Occultissimarum: n. on
I. 15.
Occurit ... completur: MSS. have
occuret mostly, if that is retained
complebitur must be
read. Madv.
Opusc. II. 282 takes
occurit, explaining it as a perfect, and giving numerous exx. of
this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on
T.D. IV. 35.
§128. Agi
secum: cf.
nobiscum ageret in
80.
Simile veri: cf.
66.
Notionem: =
cognitionem,
επιστημην.
At paulum: MSS.
et Halm
sed.; cf.
at illud
ante in
116.
Si quae: Halm and many
edd. have
se, quae. But the
se comes in very awkwardly, and
is not needed before the infinitive. Madv. indeed (
Em. 114), after
producing many exx. of the reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts
about this passage because
considero does not belong to the class
of verbs with which this usage is found, but he produces many instances
with
puto, which surely stands on the same level.
Non
magis: so in
119 nec magis approbabit nunc
lucere, etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely
cognisable phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to
absolute knowledge by refusing
τον ‛ηλιον
‛ομολογειν
ειναι
καταληπτον
(Galen
De Opt. Gen. Dicendi 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.).
Cornix: for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller
349—358.
Signum illud: the
xystus (
9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin.
Nat.
Hist. XXXIV. 8.
Duodeviginti:
82, I just note that
octodecim is not used by
Cic.
Sol quantus sit:
91.
Omnium rerum
... comprehendendi: not a case of a plural noun with a singular
gerund like
spe rerum potiendi, etc., but of two genitives
depending in different ways on the same word (
definitio). M.
Em. 197 qu. Plat.
Leg. 648 E
την παντων
‛ητταν
φοβουμενος
ανθρωπον
τοι
πωματος,
Brut.
163
Scaevolae dicendi elegantia,
De Or. III. 156. Other exx. in
M.D.F. I. 14. For the turn of expression cf.
T.D.
IV. 62
omnium philosophorum una est ratio
medendi,
Lael. 78
omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est,
also
51 of this book.
§§129—141. Summary. What contention is there among
philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems
like that of Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes,
Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho,
Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus,
Carneades (129-131). If I
desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me, while if I
follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must
be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks
virtue gives happiness. "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest
possible." How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those points in which
Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard emotion as harmful,
which the ancients thought natural and useful (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to Carneades "You do not
think me a praetor because I am not a sapiens." "That," said
Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137).
Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be
defended (138). I gravitate then towards one of
them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me
to join pleasure to herself (139). When I hear
the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved
by both, and so I find it impossible to choose (141, 142).
§129. Quod
coeperam: in
128 at
veniamus nunc ad boni
maique notionem.
Constituendi: n. on
114.
Bonorum summa: cf.
D.F. V. 21 and Madv.
Est igitur: so in
De
Div. II. 8,
igitur comes fourth word
in the clause; this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius.
Omitto: MSS.
et omitto, but cf. Madv.
Em. 201
certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro simplici 'omitto,' in
initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae exempla subiciuntur
per figuram omissionis.
Relicta: cf.
130 abiectos. Cic. generally classes Herillus
(or Erillus as Madv. on
D.F. II. 35
spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
systems, cf.
D.F. II. 43,
De Off.
I. 6,
T.D. V.
85.
Ut Herillum. MSS. have either
Erillum or
et
illum, one would expect
ut Herilli.
Cognitione et
scientia: double translation of
επιστημη. For the
finis of Herillus see Madv. on
D.F. II. 43.
Megaricorum:
Xenophanes. Cic
considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to
have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history.
The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic
doctrine. Zeller,
Socrates 211.
Unum et simile: for this
see Zell.
Socr. 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq.
Simile ought perhaps to be
sui simile as in
Tim. c.
7, already quoted on
I. 30, see my note there and cf.
I. 35.
Menedemo: see
Zeller
Socr. 238, R. and P. 182. The
Erctrian school was
closely connected with the Megarian.
Fuit: =
natus est, as
often.
Herilli: so Madv. for
ulli of MSS.
§130.
Aristonem: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines
of Aristo the Chian
ib. 358, Zeller 58 sq.
In mediis: cf.
I. 36,
37.
Momenta =
aestimationes,
αξιαι in
36, where
momenti is used in a different way.
Pyrrho autem: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but in
124 there is just the same change from
Pyrrhoni to
Xenocrates.
Απαθεια: Diog.
IX. 108 affirms this as well as
πραιοτης to be a
name for the sceptic
τελος, but the name scarcely occurs
if at all in Sext. who generally uses
αταραξια, but
occasionally
μετριοπαθεια;
cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338.
Απαθεια was also a
Stoic term.
Diu multumque: n. on
I. 4.
§131. Nec
tamen consentiens: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences between
the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
Callipho: as the genitive is
Calliphontis, Cic. ought
according to rule to write
Calliphon in the nom; for this see
Madv. on
D.F. II. 19, who also gives the
chief authorities concerning this philosopher.
Hieronymus:
mentioned
D.F. II. 19, 35, 41,
V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of him
quem
iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio.
Diodorus: see Madv. on
D.F. II. 19.
Honeste vivere, etc.:
in
D.F. IV. 14 the
finis of Polemo
is stated to be
secundum naturam vivere, and three Stoic
interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
passage—
omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint
fruentem vivere. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him
it is attributed to the
vetus Academia in
I. 22, where the words
aut
omnia aut maxima, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf.
Clemens Alex. qu. by Madv. on
D.F. IV.
15. See n. below on Carneades.
Antiochus probat: the germs of many
Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in Polemo; see
I. 34, n.
Eiusque amici:
Bentl.
aemuli, but Halm refers to
D.F. II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree
Stoicised.
Nunc: Halm
huc after Jo. Scala.
Carneades: this
finis is given in
D.F. II. 35 (
frui principiis naturalibus),
II. 42 (
Carneadeum illud quod is non tam ut
probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat
opponeret),
V. 20 (
fruendi rebus iis,
quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem
auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit),
T.D. V. 84 (
naturae primus aut omnibus aut maximis frui,
ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat). The
finis therefore,
thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is clear that
Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
virtus in it (see
D.F. II. 38, 42,
V. 22) while Polemo did (I.
22). See more on
139.
Zeno: cf.
D.F. IV. 15
Inventor
et princeps: same expression in
T.D. I. 48,
De Or. I. 91,
De Inv. II. 6;
inv. =
οικιστης.
§132.
Quemlibet: cf.
125,
126.
Prope singularem: cf.
T.D. I. 22
Aristoteles longe omnibus—Platonem
semper excipio—praestans; also
D.F. V. 7,
De Leg. I. 15.
Per ipsum Antiochum: a similar line of argument is taken in Sext.
P.H. I. 88,
II.
32, etc.
Terminis ... possessione: there is a similar play on the
legal words
finis terminus possessio in
De Leg. I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage.
Omnis ratio
etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf.
Aug.
De Civ. Dei XIX. 1
neque enim
existimat (Varro)
ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae
non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et
malorum, etc.
Si Polemoneus: i.e.
sapiens fuerit.
Peccat: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see
I. 37.
Academicos et:
MSS. om.
et as in
I. 16, and
que in
52 of
this book.
Dicenda: for the omission of the verb with the
gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic clauses) cf.
I. 7, and Madv. on
D.F.
I. 43, who how ever unduly limits the usage.
Hic igitur ... prudentior: MSS. generally have
assentiens,
but one good one (Halm's E) has
assentientes. I venture to read
adsentietur, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt,
as in
26 (
tenetur) and that then
adsentiet, under the attraction of the
s following, passed
into
adsentiens, as in
147 intellegat
se passed into
intelligentes.
N, I may remark, is
frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
I. 7 appellant,
16
disputant,
24 efficerentur), and all
the changes involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read
sin, inquam (
sc. adsentietur) for
si numquam of MSS.
The question
uter est prudentior is intended to press home the
dilemma in which Cicero has placed the supposed
sapiens. All the
other emendations I have seen are too unsatisfactory to be
enumerated.
§133. Non
posse ... esse: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
non
esse illa probanda sap. after Lamb., who also conj.
non posse illa
probata esse.
Paria:
D.F. III.
48,
Paradoxa 20 sq., Zeller 250.
Praecide:
συντομος or
συνελων
ειπε, cf.
Cat. Mai. 57,
Ad
Att. VIII. 4,
X.
16.
Inquit: n. on
79.
Quid quod
quae: so Guietus with the approval of Madv. (
Em. 203) reads
for MSS.
quid quae or
quid quaeque, Halm and Bait., follow
Moser in writing
Quid? si quae removing the stop at
paria,
and make
in utramque partem follow
dicantur, on Orelli's
suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often
omit one.
Dicebas: in
27.
Incognito:
133.
§134.
Etiam: = "yes," Madv.
Gram. 454.
Non beatissimam:
I. 22, n.
Deus
ille: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's
η θεος η
θηριον), if he can do without
other advantages. For the omission of
est after the emphatic
ille cf.
59, n.
Theophrasto, etc.:
n. on
I. 33,
35.
Dicente: before this Halm after Lamb.,
followed by Bait., inserts
contra, the need for which I fail to
see.
Et hic: i.e. Antiochus.
Ne sibi constet: Cic. argues
in
T.D. V. that there cannot be degrees
in happiness.
Tum hoc ... tum illud: cf.
121.
Iacere:
79.
In
his discrepant:
I. 42
in his constitit.
§135.
Moveri:
κινεισθαι,
29.
Laetitia efferri:
I. 38.
Probabilia: the
removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain.
Sapiensne ... deleta sit: see Madv.
D.F. p. 806, ed. 2, who
is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz),
non
timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit? which
involves the use of
nec for
ne ... quidem. I have followed
the reading of Madv. in his
Em., not the one he gives (after
Davies) in
D.F. ne patria deleatur, which Halm takes, as
does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS.
Decreta: some MSS.
durata; Halm conj.
dictata.
Mediocritates:
μεσοπετες,
as in Aristotle; cf.
T.D. III. 11, 22,
74.
Permotione:
κινεσει.
Naturalem
... modum: so
T.D. III. 74.
Crantoris: sc.
librum, for the omission of which see n. on
I. 13; add Quint.
IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read
in
Herodoti, supplying
libro.
Aureolus ... libellus: it is
not often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is
rather colloquial; cf.
T.D. III. 2,
N.D. III. 43, also for
aureolus 119 flumen aureum.
Panaetius: he had
addressed to Tubero a work
de dolore; see
D.F. IV. 23.
Cotem:
T.D. IV. 43, 48, Seneca
De Ira III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle
(
iram calcar esse virtutis).
Dicebant: for the repetition
of this word cf.
146,
I.
33.
§136. Sunt
enim Socratica: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
affirmed in
Parad. 4,
T.D. III.
10.
Mirabilia: Cic. generally translates
παραδοξα by
admirabilia as in
D.F. IV. 74, or
admiranda, under which title he seems to have published a work
different from the
Paradoxa, which we possess: see Bait., and
Halm's ed. of the Phil. works (1861), p. 994.
Quasi: = almost,
‛ως
επος
ειπειν.
Voltis: cf. the
Antiochean opinion in
I. 18,
22.
Solos reges: for
all this see Zeller 253 sq.
Solos divites:
‛οτι
μονος ‛ο
σοφος
πλουσιος,
Parad. VI. Liberum:
Parad.
V. ‛οτι μονος
‛ο σοφος
ελευθερος
και πας
αφρον
δουλος.
Furiosus:
Parad. IV. ‛οτι πας
αφρον
μαινεται.
§137. Tam
sunt defendenda: cf.
8,
120.
Bono modo: a colloquial and Plautine
expression; see Forc.
Ad senatum starent: "were in waiting on the
senate;" cf. such phrases as
stare ad cyathum, etc.
Carneade: the vocative is
Carneades in
De Div. I. 23.
Huic Stoico: i.e.
Diogeni; cf.
D.F. II. 24. Halm brackets
Stoico,
and after him Bait.
Sequi volebat: "professed to follow;" cf.
D.F. V. 13
Strato physicum se
voluit "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
D.F. II. 102.
Ille noster: Dav.
vester, as in
143 noster Antiochus.
But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf.
113.
Balbutiens: "giving an uncertain sound;"
cf.
De Div. I. 5,
T.D. V. 75.
§138. Mihi
veremini: cf. Caes.
Bell. Gall.
V. 9
veritus navibus. Halm and Bait. follow Christ's conj.
verenti, removing the stop at
voltis.
Opinationem:
the
οιησιν of Sext., e.g.
P.H. III. 280.
Quod minime voltis:
cf.
I. 18.
De
finibus: not "concerning," but "from among" the different
fines; otherwise
fine would have been written. Cf.
I. 4 si qui de nostris.
Circumcidit et amputat: these two verbs often come together, as in
D.F. I. 44; cf. also
D.F. III. 31.
Si vacemus omni molestia: which
Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure.
Cum honestate: Callipho
in
131.
Prima naturae commoda: Cic. here
as in
D.F. IV. 59,
V. 58 confuses the Stoic
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν with
τα του
σωματος
αγαθα και τα
εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which
see
I. 19. More on the
subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the
D.F. Relinquit:
Orelli
relinqui against the MSS.
§139.
Polemonis ... finibus: all these were composite
fines.
Adhuc: I need scarcely point out that this goes with
habeo
and not with
probabilius;
adhuc for
etiam with the
comparative does not occur till the silver writers.
Labor eo: cf.
Horace's
nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, also
D.F. V. 6
rapior illuc: revocat autem
Antiochus.
Reprehendit manu:
M.D.F. II. 3.
Pecudum:
I. 6,
Parad. 14
voluptatem esse summum bonum,
quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum; similar expressions
occur with a reference to Epicurus in
De Off. I. 105,
Lael. 20, 32.
T.D. V. 73,
D.F. II. 18;
cf. also Aristoph.
Plut. 922
προβατιου
βιον
λεγεις and
βοσκηματων
βιος in Aristotle. The meaning of
pecus is well shown in
T.D. I. 69.
Iungit deo: Zeller 176 sq.
Animum solum: the same criticism
is applied to Zeno's
finis in
D.F. IV. 17, 25.
Ut ... sequar: for the repeated
ut see
D.F. V. 10, Madv.
Gram. 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second
ut with Lamb.
Carneades ... defensitabat: this is quite a different view from
that in
131; yet another of Carneades is given in
T.D. V. 83.
Istum finem: MSS.
ipsum; the two words are often confused, as in
I. 2.
Ipsa veritas: MSS.
severitas, a frequent error; cf.
In Verr. Act. I. 3,
III. 162,
De
Leg. I. 4, also Madv. on
D.F. IV. 55.
Obversetur: Halm takes the conj. of
Lamb.,
adversetur. The MSS. reading gives excellent sense; cf.
T.D. II. 52
obversentur honestae
species viro. Bait. follows Halm.
Tu ... copulabis: this is
the feigned expostulation of
veritas (cf.
34 convicio veritatis), for which style see
125.
§140.
Voluptas cum honestate: this whole expression is in apposition to
par, so that
cum must not be taken closely with
depugnet; cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 7, 19
Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius (sc.
par)
cum Bitho Bacchius.
Si sequare, ruunt: for
constr. cf.
I. 7.
Communitas: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297.
Nulla potest
nisi erit: Madv.
D.F. III. 70 "
in
hac coniunctione—hoc fieri non potest nisi—fere semper
coniunctivus subicitur praesentis—futuri et perfecti indicativus
ponitur."
Gratuita: "disinterested."
Ne intellegi
quidem: n. on
I. 7,
cf. also
T.D. V. 73, 119.
Gloriosum in
vulgus: cf.
D.F. II. 44
populus
cum illis facit (i.e.
Epicureis).
Normam ... regulam:
n. on
Ac. Post. fragm.
8.
Praescriptionem:
I. 23, n.
§141.
Adquiescis: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads
adsciscis,
comparing
138. Add
D.F. I. 23 (
sciscat et probet),
III. 17 (
adsciscendas esse),
III. 70 (
adscisci et probari) Bait. follows
Halm.
Ratum ... fixum: cf.
27 and n. on
Ac. Post. fragm.
17.
Falso: like
incognito in
133.
Nullo discrimine:
for this see the explanation of
nihil interesse in
40, n.
Iudicia:
κριτηρια as
usual.
§§142—146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how
Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he
never even follows the vetus Academia, and never stirs a step from
Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements
of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus, do you
rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do
away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I
will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves,
exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being sapiens,
know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno
used to illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any
actual sapiens (145). Now as there is no
knowledge there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this
conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear
testimony.
§142. Venio
iam: Dialectic had been already dealt with in
91—
98 here it is merely
considered with a view to the choice of the supposed
sapiens, as
was Ethical Science in
129—
141 and Physics in
116—
128. With the
enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus
gives in
A.M. VII. 48 sq.
Protagorae: R. and P. 132 sq.
Qui putet: so MSS., Halm and
Bait.
putat after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
Permotiones intimas: cf.
20 tactus
interior, also
76.
Epicuri: nn. on
19,
79,
80.
Iudicium:
κριτηριον
as usual.
Rerum notitiis:
προληψεσι,
Zeller 403 sq.
Constituit: note the constr. with
in, like
ponere in.
Cogitationis: cf.
I. 30. Several MSS. have
cognitionis, the two
words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg
Fm. to
T.D.
III. p. 17, who says,
multo tamen saepius
"cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam contra, also
M.D.F III. 21.
§143. Ne
maiorum quidem suorum: sc.
aliquid probat. For
maiorum
cf.
80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the
so-called
vetus Academia, cf.
I. 33.
Libri: titles of some are preserved in
Diog. Laert.
IV. 11—14.
Nihil
politius: cf.
119, n.
Pedem nusquam:
for the ellipse cf.
58,
116,
Pro Deiot. 42 and
pedem latum in
Plaut.
Abutimur: this verb in the rhetorical writers means to use
words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, see Quint.
X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we
use the name Academic in a non natural fashion?"
Si dies est
lucet: a better trans of
ει φως
εστιν,
‛ημερα
εστιν than was given in
96, where see n.
Aliter Philoni: not Philo of
Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the Megarian,
mentioned also in
75. The dispute between Diodorus
and Philo is mentioned in Sext.
A.M. VIII. 115—117 with the same purpose as here, see
also Zeller 39.
Antipater: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded
Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school.
Archidemus:
several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as
VII. 68, 84.
Opiniosissimi: so the MSS. I
cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn it. Halm is
certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as
ingeniosissimi is necessary. I believe that the word
opiniosissimi (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was
manufactured on the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two
philosophers, who are playfully described as men full of
opinio or
δοξα—just the imputation which, as
Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's
spinosissimi is
ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable
as Halm thinks.
§144. In
contionem vocas: a retort, having reference to
14, cf. also
63,
72. For these
contiones see Lange,
Romische
Alterthumer II. 663, ed 2. They were called
by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of whom had the
right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under fewer
restrictions than the right of the others.
Occludi tabernas in
order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this
see Liv.
III. 27,
IV.
31,
IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O
Israel" in the Bible.
Artificia: n. on
30.
Tolli: n. on
26.
Ut opifices
concitentur: cf.
Pro Flacc. 18
opifices et tabernarios quid
neqoti est concitare? Expromam: Cic. was probably thinking of
the use to which he himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in
Pro
Murena 61, a use of which he half confesses himself ashamed in
D.F. IV. 74.
Exsules etc.:
136.
§145. Scire
negatis: cf. Sext.
A.M. VII. 153, who
says that even
καταληψις
when it arises in the mind of a
φαυλος is mere
δοξα and not
επιστημη; also
P.H. II. 83, where it is said that the
φαυλος is capable of
το
αληθες but not of
αληθεια, which the
σοφος alone has.
Visum ...
adsensus: the Stoics as we saw (II.
38, etc.)
analysed sensations into two parts; with the Academic and other schools
each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable unit, a
ψιλον
παθος. For this symbolic action of
Zeno cf.
D.F. II. 18,
Orat. 113,
Sextus
A.M. II. 7, Quint.
II. 20, 7, Zeller 84.
Contraxerat: so Halm who
qu. Plin.
Nat. Hist. XI. 26, 94
digitum contrahens aut remittens; Orelli
construxerat; MSS.
mostly
contexerat.
Quod ante non fuerat:
καταλαμβανειν
however is frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the
mind."
Adverterat: the best MSS. give merely
adverat, but
on the margin
admoverat which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one
good MS. has
adverterat.
Ne ipsi quidem: even Socrates,
Antisthenes and Diogenes were not
σοφοι according to the Stoics, but
merely were
εν
προκοπηι; see
Diog.
VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut.
Sto.
Rep. 1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli)
εστι δε
ουτος (i.e.
‛ο
σοφος)
ουδαμου γης
ουδε
γεγονε.
Nec tu: sc.
scis; Goer. has a strange note here.
§146.
Illa: cf.
illa invidiosa above (
144).
Dicebas: in
22.
Refero: "retort," as in Ovid.
Metam. I. 758
pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse
et non potuisse referri; cf. also
par pari referre dicto.
Ne nobis quidem: "
nor would they be angry;" cf. n. on.
I. 5.
Arbitrari:
the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
eye-witness," see Corssen
I. 238.
Ea non
ut: MSS. have
ut ea non aut. Halm reads
ut ea non
merely, but I prefer the reading I have given because of Cicero's
fondness for making the
ut follow closely on the negative: for
this see Madv.
Gram. 465
b, obs.
§147.
Obscuritate: cf.
I. 44, n. on
I. 15.
Plus uno:
115.
Iacere: cf.
79.
Plagas: cf. n. on
112.
§148. Ad
patris revolvor sententiam: for this see Introd.
50, and for the expression
18.
Opinaturum: see
59,
67,
78,
112.
Intellegat se: MSS.
intellegentes, cf. n. on
132.
Qua
re: so Manut. for
per of MSS.
Εποχην illam omnium
rerum: an odd expression; cf.
actio rerum in
62.
Non probans: so Madv.
Em. 204 for
MSS.
comprobans. Dav. conj.
improbans and is followed by
Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is wrong. The difficulty is
essentially the same as that involved in
104,
which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a
theoretical dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that
assent
(meaning absolute assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma
Catulus might well describe himself as formally approving
(
comprobans). The
practice is to give assent (meaning
modified assent). There is the same contrast in
104 between
placere and
tenere. I may
note that the word
alteri (cf.
altero in
104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice
are irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably
confirmed edd. in their introduction of the negative.
Nec eam
admodum: cf.
non repugnarem in
112.
Tollendum: many edd. have gone far astray in interpreting this
passage. The word is used with a double reference to
adsensus and
ancora; in the first way we have had
tollere used a score
of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
Bell. Gall. IV. 23,
Bell. Civ.
I. 31, where
tollere is used of weighing
anchor, and Varro
De Re Rust. III. 17, 1,
where it occurs in the sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any
reference to the sea. (The exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe
and this alone is referred to in
Ad Att. XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried
at first to manage a joke by using the word
inhibendum, which had
also a nautical signification, but finding that he had mistaken the
meaning of the word, substituted
tollendum.
[1] De Leg. II. §3.
[2] Cf.
De Or. II. §1
with II. §5.
[3] Ad Fam. XIII. 1,
Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut philosophus
probabatur.
[4] N.D. I. §93,
Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.
[5] Ad Fam. XIII.
1.
[6] Brutus, §309.
[7] Ad Att. II. 20,
§6.
[8] Ad Fam. XIII. 16.
T.D. V. §113.
Acad. II. §
115.
[9] Brutus, §306.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Rep. I. §7.
T.D. V. §5.
De Off. II. §§3,4.
De Fato, §2.
[12] Cf.
Brutus,
§§312, 322.
[13] Cf.
Brutus,
§§312, 314, 316.
[14] Brutus,
§315.
[15] N.D. I. §59.
[16] VII. I. §35.
[17] Cf.
N.D. I. §93
with
Ad Fam. XIII. 1, §1.
[18] Ac. I. §
46.
[19] D.F. V. §3.
[20] D.F. I. §16.
[21] D.F. V. §6,
etc.
[22] D.F. V. §8.
[23] Ac. II. §
4.
[24] Ib. §
69.
[25] Ad Att. XIII.
19, §5.
[26] Ac. II. §
113.
[27] Ac. II. §
113.
De Leg. I. §54.
[28] II. §
12.
[29] Brutus,
§316.
[30] Hortensius,
fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.
[31] T.D. II.
§61.
[32] De Div. I.
§130.
[33] D.F. I. §6.
[34] Ad Att. I. 10
and 11.
[35] Ibid. II. 1, §3.
N.D. I. §6.
[36] Ad Att. II.
2.
[37] Ibid. I. 20. Cf.
II. 1, §12.
[38] II. 6.
[39] Ad Att. II. 7
and 16.
[40] Ibid. II. 6,
§2.
[41] Cf.
Ad Att. IV.
11 with IV. 8 a.
[42] Ibid. IV.
10.
[43] Ibid. IV. 16,
§2.
[44] Ibid. IV. 16 c,
§10, ed. Nobbe.
[45] Ad Qu. Fr. II.
14.
[46] Ad Qu. Fr. III.
5 and 6.
[47] §332.
[48] Ad Fam. XIII. 1.
Ad Att. V. 11, §6.
[49] Ad Att. V. 10,
§5.
[50] De Off. I.
§1.
[51] Tim. c. 1.
[52] Cf.
Tim. c. 1
with
De Div. I. §5.
Brutus, §250.
[53] Ad Att. VI. 1,
§26.
[54] Ibid. VI. 2,
§3.
[55] Ibid. VI. 6,
§2.
[56] Ibid. VI. 7, §2.
Ad Fam. II. 17, §1.
[57] T.D. V. §22.
[58] Ad Att. VII. 1,
§1.
[59] Ibid. VII. 3,
VIII. 11.
[60] Ad Att. X. 8,
§6.
[61] Ibid. VIII. 2,
§4.
[62] περι
‛ομονοιας,
Ad Att. IX. 9, §2, etc.
[63] Ibid. IX. 4, §2;
9, §1.
[64] Ibid. IX. 10,
§2.
[65] Ad Fam. IX.
1.
[66] Ibid. IX. 3.
[67] Ibid. IV. 3 and
4.
[68] De Rep. I. §7.
T.D. V. §5, etc.
[69] Cf.
N.D. I.
§6.
[70] Esp. I. §§
26,
37.
[71] Cf.
Ac. II. §
29.
[72] Ac. II. §
70.
[73] De Div. II. §1.
Ac. I. §
45, etc.
[74] N.D. I. §1.
[75] Cf. esp.
N.D. I.
§5.
T.D. II. §5.
[76] De Div. II. §1.
N.D. I. §7, etc.
[77] T.D. II. §4.
[78] N.D. I. §10.
[79] Cf.
Ac. II. §
8.
N.D. I. §§10, 66.
[80] T.D. II. §9.
[81] N.D. I. §10.
[82] Ibid. I. §17.
Ac. II. §§
120,
137.
[83] T.D. V. §33.
[84] Ac. II. §
121.
[85] T.D. V. §82,
libas ex omnibus.
[86] Ac. II. §
143.
[87] T.D. V. §11.
[88] Ac. II. §
10.
[89] N.D. I. §12.
[90] Parad. §2.
De
Fato, §3.
T.D. I. §7.
De Off. I. §3.
[91] D.F. IV. §5.
[92] Paradoxa,
§2.
[93] T.D. I. §55.
De Div. II. §62.
[94] T.D. V. §11.
D.F. II. §§1 and 2, etc.
[95] §
13.
[96] Cf. esp.
N.D. i.
§6.
Ac. ii. §§
11 and
17.
[97] De Leg. I.
§39.
[98] Ibid. I. §§55,
56.
[99] N.D. I. §4.
[100] T.D. IV.
§53.
[101] Cf.
De Off.
III. §20.
[102] T.D. V.
§§21-31, esp. §23.
[103] Ibid. V.
§75.
[104] De Off. II.
§35.
[105] T.D. V.
§34.
[106] Ac. I. §
16.
[107] Paradoxa, §4.
Ac. II. §§
136,
137.
T.D. III. §10.
[108] Ac. II. §
135.
[109] See esp.
N.D.
I. §§3, 4.
[110] Ibid., also
T.D. V. §83.
[111] Grote's
Aristotle, vol. I. ch. 11.
[112] T.D. IV. §9.
D.F. III. §41.
[113] I. §
6.
[114] T.D. IV.
§7.
[115] Ibid. IV. §7.
Cf.
D.F. II. §44,
populus cum illis facit.
[116] Ac. I. §
6.
T.D. IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33.
D.F.
III. §40.
[117] T.D. IV.
§3.
[118] D.F. I.
§§4-6.
Ac. I. §
10.
D.F. III. §5.
[119] De Div. I.
§§4, 5.
[120] D.F. III. §5.
N.D. I. §8.
T.D. III. §§10, 16.
[121] T.D. I.
§5.
[122] T.D. II.
§5.
[123] De Div. II.
§1.
De Off. II. §4.
[124] De Div. II.
§6.
De Off. II. §2.
[125] See esp.
De
Consolatione, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe.
T.D. V. §5.
Ac. I.
§
11.
[126] N.D. I.
§6.
[127] T.D. II. §§1,
4.
De Off. II. §3.
D.F. I. §1.
[128] T.D. II. §1.
D.F. I. §§1, 3.
[129] D.F. I. §§1,
11.
[130] De Div. II.
§5.
De Off. II. §2.
T.D. IV. §1.
[131] De Div. II.
§4.
[132] N.D. I. §9.
T.D. II. §1.
[133] De Div. II.
§4.
[134] Ad Att. XII.
19, §1.
[135] Ibid. XII.
14, §3.
[136] Ibid. XII.
15, 16.
[137] Ibid. XII.
21, §5.
[138] Ibid. XII.
23, §2.
[139] Ut scias me ita
dolere ut non iaceam.
[140] De Or. III.
§109.
[141] Ad Att. XII.
28, §2.
[142] Cf. esp.
Ad
Att. XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.
[143] Ibid. XII.
40, §2.
[144] Ibid. XII.
40, §5.
[145] Ibid. XIII.
26.
[146] Ibid. XII.
41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.
[147] Ibid. XII.
46.
[148] Ad Att. XII.
45, §1.
[149] Ьber Cicero's
Akademika, p. 4.
[150] Cf.
Ad Att.
XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the first two
books.
[151] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[152] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[153] Ibid. XIII.
21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.
[154] II. §2.
[155] De Fin.
Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.
[156] Ad Att. XIII.
12, §3; 16, §1.
[157] Ibid. XVI. 3,
§1.
[158] Ibid. XVI. 6,
§4.
[159] Ac. II. §
61.
[160] D.F. I.
§2.
[161] T.D. II. §4.
De Div. II. §1.
[162] Cf. Krische, p.
5.
[163] Ac. II. §
61.
[164] Ad Att. XIII.
5, §1.
[165] Ibid. XIII.
32, §3.
[166] Ad Att. XIII.
33, §4.
[167] Ibid. XIII.
II. §1.
[168] Ibid. XII.
42.
[169] Ibid. XIII.
16, §1.
[170] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[171] Ibid. IV.
16a, §2.
[172] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.
[173] Ad Att. XIII.
12, §3.
[174] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[175] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[176] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[177] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.
[178] Ibid. XIII.
19, §3.
[179] Ad Att. XIII.
22, §1.
[180] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[181] Cf.
Ibid.
XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.
[182] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[183] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[184] Ad Att. XIII.
24.
[185] Ibid. XIII.
13, §1; 18.
[186] Ibid. XIII.
13, §1; 18; 19, §4.
[187] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates Schьtz assigns to
these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition of the
Academica in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.
[188] Ad Att. XIII.
13, §1.
[189] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[190] Ibid. XIII.
19, §3.
[191] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[192] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[193] Ibid. XIII.
21, §4.
[194] Ibid. XIII.
21, §5.
[195] Ad Att. XIII.
22, §3.
[196] Ibid. XIII.
24.
[197] Ibid. XIII.
35, 36, §2.
[198] Ibid. XIII.
38, §1.
[199] Ibid. XIII.
21, §§3, 4.
[200] T.D. II. §4.
Cf. Quintil.
Inst. Or. III. 6, §64.
[201] Ad Att. XVI.
6, §4.
N.D. I. §11.
De Div. II. §1.
[202] De Off. II.
§8,
Timжus, c. 1.
Ad Att. XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.
[203] Ad Att. XIII.
12; 16; 13; 19.
[204] Ibid. XVI. 6,
§4.
T.D. II. §4.
N.D. I. §11.
De Div. II. §1.
[205] Nat. Hist.
XXXI. c. 2.
[206] Inst. Or.
III. 6, §64.
[207] Plut.
Lucullus, c. 42.
[208] §§
12,
18,
148.
[209] Cf.
Att.
XIII. 19, §4.
[210] Lucullus,
§12.
[211] Ad Att. XIII.
16, §1.
[212] Lactant.
Inst. VI 2.
[213] Cf. esp.
De
Off. I. §133 with
Brutus, §§133, 134.
[214] Esp.
Pro Lege
Manilia, §51.
[215] Brutus,
§222.
[216] In Verrem,
II. 3, §210.
[217] Pro Lege
Manilia, §59.
[218] Pro Sestio,
§122.
[219] Pro Sestio,
§101.
[220] Philipp. II.
§12.
[221] Ad Att. II.
24, §4.
[222] Pis. §6.
Pro Sestio, §121.
Pro Domo, §113.
Post Reditum in
Senatu, §9.
Philipp. II. §12.
[223] Ad Fam. IX.
15, §3.
[224] Cf.
Post Reditum
in Senatu, §9.
Pro Domo, §113.
[225] Pro Archia,
§§6, 28.
[226] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
9 with §
80.
[227] §
62.
[228] Pro Plancio,
§12.
Pro Murena, §36.
Pro Rabirio, §26.
Pro Cornelia
II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.
[229] T.D. V. §56.
Cf.
De Or. III. §9.
N.D. III. §80.
[230] Cf. esp. III.
§173.
[231] Ibid. II.
§28.
[232] Ibid. II.
§§13, 20, 21.
[233] Ibid. II.
§51.
[234] Cf.
ibid. II.
§74 with III. §127.
[235] Cf. II. §152 with
III. §187.
[236] Ibid. II.
§154.
[237] Brutus,
§§132, 133, 134, 259.
De Or. III. §29.
[238] Brutus,
§132.
[239] De Or. II.
§244.
N.D. I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
[240] De Or. II.
§155.
[241] Ibid. III.
§194.
[242] Cf.
De Or.
II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.
[243] De Or. I. §82
sq.; II. §360.
[244] Ibid. I. §45;
II. §365; III. §§68, 75.
[245] §
12,
commemoravit a patre suo dicta
Philoni.
[246] Cf.
De Or.
III. §110.
[247] Ac. II. §
148.
[248] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
11.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid. §§
12,
18, with my notes.
[251] Ac. II. §
12:
ista quae heri defensa sunt compared with
the words
ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
[252] See below.
[253] Ac. II. §§
33—
36 inclusive; §
54.
[254] Ac. II. §
28.
[255] Cf.
Ac. II.
§§
59,
67,
78,
112,
148, with my notes.
[256] Ibid. II. §
10.
[257] Ibid. II. §
28.
[258] Cf. II. §
61 with the fragments of the
Hortensius; also
T.D. II. §4; III. §6;
D.F. I. §2.
[259] Lactant. III.
16.
[260] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
10.
[261] Ib. II. §
61.
[262] §§
44—
46.
[263] §
13.
[264] Cf. II. §
14 with I. §
44, and II. §§
55,
56.
[265] II. §§
17,
18,
22.
[266] Cf. II. §
31 with I. §
45.
[267] II. §§
17,
24,
26,
27,
29,
38,
54,
59.
[268] II. §
79.
[269] Cf. the words
tam
multa in II. §
79.
[270] See II. §
42, where there is a reference to the "
hesternus
sermo."
[271] II. §
10.
[272] Cf. II. §
10:
id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut
tota fere quaestio tractata videatur.
[273] What these were will
appear from my notes on the
Lucullus.
[274] II. §
12.
[275] Ad Fam. IX.
8.
[276] Cf.
Ad Att.
XIII. 25, §3:
Ad Brutum transeamus.
[277] This is not, as
Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death.
That lay at Puteoli: see
Ad Att. VII. 3, §9.
[278] II. §
9.
[279] Cf. II. §6
1.
[280] II. §
80:
O praeclarum prospectum!
[281] Cf. II. §
9 with §
128 (
signum
illud), also §§
80,
81,
100,
105,
125.
[282] II. §
115.
[283] II. §
63.
[284] II. §§
147,
148.
[285] II. §
135.
[286] Cf. II. §§
11, 12 with the words
quae erant contra ακαταληψιαν
praeclare collecta ab Antiocho:
Ad Att. XIII. 19, §3.
[287] Varro,
De Re
Rust. III. 17.
[288] II. §
11.
[289] Paradoxa, §1.
D.F. III. §8.
Brutus, §119.
[290] Ac. I. §
12.
D.F. V. §8.
[291] Cf. II. §
80.
[292] Cf. Aug.
Adv.
Acad. III. §35. Nonius, sub v.
exultare.
[293] Cf. the word
nuper in §
1.
[294] §
11.
[295] §§
3,
18.
[296] Ad Fam. IX.
8, §1.
[297] Ad Att. II.
25, §1.
[298] Ibid. III. 8,
§3.
[299] Ibid. III.
15, §3; 18, §1.
[300] Ad Fam. IX.
1—8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in
our collections.
[301] Above, pp.
xxxvii—xlii.
[302] De Civ. Dei,
XIX. cc. 1—3.
[303] See Madvig,
De
Fin. ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Brьckner,
Leben des
Cicero, I. p. 655, follows Mьller.
[304] Cf. Krische, p.
58.
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The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
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Title: Academica
Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***
Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
Proofreading Team
THE
ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED
BY
JAMES S. REID,
M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
LONDON:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1874
[All Rights reserved.]
TO
THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
THE ACADEMICA,
THIS EDITION
IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
BY
THE EDITOR.
PREFACE.
Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has
edited the
Academica. In Germany the last edition with explanatory
notes is that of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and
untrustworthiness of Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong
evidence; while the work of Davies, though in every way far superior to
that of Goerenz, is very deficient when judged by the criticism of the
present time.
This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures
given by me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work
in its present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the
Universities, and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where
the philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those
where an attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient
Philosophy as will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now
required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford
and Cambridge. My notes have been written throughout with a practical
reference to the needs of junior students. During the last three or four
years I have read the
Academica with a large number of intelligent
pupils, and there is scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested
by some difficulty or want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody
in an Introduction such information concerning Cicero's philosophical
views and the literary history of the
Academica as could not be
readily got from existing books; next, to provide a good text; then to
aid the student in obtaining a higher knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity,
and lastly, to put it in his power to learn thoroughly the philosophy
with which Cicero deals.
My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in
the edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second
edition of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that
editor. I have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass
without carefully weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also
studied all original criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain
access. The result is a text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than
that of Halm. My obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently
acknowledged in my notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled
Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos, published in 1825
at Copenhagen, but never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in
the edition of Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few
passages I have introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the
conjecttires of other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the
MSS. If any apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the
notes, questions of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from
a conviction that the very excellence of the texts now in use is
depriving a Classical training of a great deal of its old educational
value. The judgment was better cultivated when the student had to fight
his way through bad texts to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the
Latin tongue. The acceptance of results without a knowledge of the
processes by which they are obtained is worthless for the purposes of
education, which is thus made to rest on memory alone. I have therefore
done my best to place before the reader the arguments for and against
different readings in the most important places where the text is
doubtful.
My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the
students for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller
acquaintance than they ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties
of language which the best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide
them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding
editor of Cicero must build. His edition of the
De Finibus
contains more valuable material for illustrating, not merely the
language, but also the subject-matter of the
Academica, than all
the professed editions of the latter work in existence. Yet, even after
Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be done in pointing out what
is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have therefore added very many
references from my own reading, and from other sources. Wherever a
quotation would not have been given but for its appearance in some other
work, I have pointed out the authority from whom it was taken. I need
hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to look out all the
references given. It was necessary to provide material by means of which
the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if it were new to
him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that occurred. Want of
space has compelled me often to substitute a mere reference for an actual
quotation.
As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
touched upon somewhere in the
Academica, it is evidently
impossible for an editor to give information which would be complete for
a reader who is studying that subject for the first time. I have
therefore tried to enable readers to find easily for themselves the
information they require, and have only dwelt in my own language upon
such philosophical difficulties as were in some special way bound up with
the
Academica. The two books chiefly referred to in my notes are
the English translation of Zeller's
Stoics, Epicureans and
Sceptics (whenever Zeller is quoted without any further description
this book is meant), and the
Historia Philosophiae of Ritter and
Preller. The
pages, not the
sections, of the fourth edition
of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's
De Finibus,
all teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as
bringing together much scattered information illustrative of the
Academica, which was before difficult of access. The present work
will, I hope, prepare the way for an exhaustive edition either from my
own or some more competent hand. It must be regarded as an experiment,
for no English scholar of recent times has treated any portion of
Cicero's philosophical works with quite the purpose which I have kept in
view and have explained above. Should this attempt meet with favour, I
propose to edit after the same plan some others of the less known and
less edited portions of Cicero's writings.
In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited
I cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that
intellectual disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this
University, and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of
English scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
JAMES S. REID.
CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
December, 1873.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. =
De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat.
= Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum;
Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr.,
Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium;
In Cat. = In Catilinam.
Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia
Socratis; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto.
Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. =
Pyrrhoneфn Hypotyposeфn Syntagmata.
Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et
Platonis.
Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos;
De Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad
Helvidium.
Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv.
= Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc.
= Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzьge der Griechischen Etymologie.
Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd.
= Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits,
or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
subjunctive.
R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium
locis contexta.
THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
[i]
INTRODUCTION.
I. Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
Letters: 90—45 B.C.
It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and
spent the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived that strong
love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout
his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to
feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for
the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of
Athens, whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he
had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at
once to the tenets of the [ii] master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life
a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable
disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps,
the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any
literary power.[4]
Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
Epicurean school.[5]
At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important
to the orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the
monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days
with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems never to have been much
attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between
the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion
set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became
an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil
heir to a not inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
accomplished [iii] men of his time, and Cicero's feelings
towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war.
Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic
philosopher, he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice
of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for
Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly,
as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been
brought into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of
each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his
egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student.
In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to
philosophy.[11] It
would be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection [iv] which
subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks;
but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then
Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning
the ethical part of Greek philosophy.
During the years 88—81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly
with the study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many
ambitious works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him
at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the
Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular
course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one
philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he
was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern
Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla
through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of
Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which
rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even
when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other
cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by
his passionate style of oratory[13].
The whole two years 79—77 B.C. were spent in the society of
Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at
Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the
exception [v] of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent
rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city[14]. By the advice of
Philo himself[15],
Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as
Diogenes calls him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the
Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to
his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in
spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to
find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of
Carneades whom he had known[18]. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along
with Atticus who loved him beyond all other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much
time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the
two pupils[20].
Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere
explicitly stated. Cicero must at this time have attained an almost
complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.
There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school
then at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose
lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed
Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three
notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of
Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is probable,
however, from a mention of [vi] him in the De Oratore, that Cicero knew
himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named
by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
unknown to him.
The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at
this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a
Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to
treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised
over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point
which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still
continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however,
make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the
learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught after
Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers
of the time, both for talent and acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
pointed style[25];
in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the philosophers of the
age[26]. A
considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was
strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso,
Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of
Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted
with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the Academica[28] he is mentioned in
such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
[vii]
The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had
been to learn philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he
devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the guidance
of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was
his old friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian
school[29]. Cicero, however, formed while at Rhodes one
friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy,
that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius,
the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero
makes reference in his works oftener than to any other
instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom
Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put
himself to much trouble[31]; as a minute inquirer[32]. He
is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of
affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works
more than those of any other author[33]. Posidonius
was at a later time resident at Rome, and stayed in
Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of
Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time.
Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius,
belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was
well acquainted with the works of the former, he does
not seem to have known either personally.
From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters
begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political
affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed
much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; [viii] and we
know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style
by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers.
During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we
may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many
Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the
Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of
the Optimates; to this he added such reading as his leisure would allow.
The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus,
which range over the years 68—62 B.C., afford many proofs of the
abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier
part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a
library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the
strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for
books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the midst of
his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest for
the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
his intellect, but never his heart.
The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to
indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his
speeches, which were [ix] crowded, he says, with the maxims of
philosophy[35]; the
history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he
sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the
poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two
later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and
keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of
leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at
this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]." At this period
of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum,
Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these
facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere
dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of
Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of
literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department
considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with
the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38] will give a fair
picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political
writings of [x] the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
Dicaearchus[39]. He
also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of Theopompus[40].
The years from 59—57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private
cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return
from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring
literature" with a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla,
the son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us,
his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which
Atticus had, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of
office. Towards the end of the year, he was busily engaged on the De
Oratore, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with
Greek philosophy[43]. In the following year (54) he writes
that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns
unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the
student[44]. During
this year he was again for the most part at those of his country villas
where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the
De Republica, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his
old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop[45]. Aristotle is
especially mentioned as one of the authors [xi] read at this time[46]. In the year 52
B.C. came the De Legibus, written amid many distracting
occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
philosophers of the Socratic schools.
In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens,
much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the
house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His
acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the
affectionate mention in the Brutus[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of
Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens.
It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil
of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in
which Epicurus had lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat
disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the
only man of merit then resident there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his
province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at
Athens as head of the Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at
Mitylene, where Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
thoughts till the end of 50. [xii] Yet he yearned for Athens and
philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful
city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build
a προπυλον at the
Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It seems the
Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues
to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
the books De Republica[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still
kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke
of conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes,
with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who
accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56]. From thence they
went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his
friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of
Atticus[58].
On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The
letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times
contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn
in the De Republica[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's
description of the tyrant is present to [xiii] his mind[60]; when, he
deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recals
the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of
the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious to find Cicero, in the
very midst of civil war, poring over the book of Demetrius the Magnesian
concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in arguing with
himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny[63]. Nothing could
more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but
accident a politician. In these evil days, however, nothing was long to
his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant[64].
As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46
he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a
letter written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my
books." These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear
richer fruit than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also
to Sulpicius[67].
The Partitiones Oratoriae, the Paradoxa, the Orator,
and the Laudatio Catonis, to which Caesar replied by his
Anticato, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the
year the Hortensius and the De Finibus had probably both
been planned and commenced. [xiv] Early in the following year the
Academica, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was
written.
I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero
as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion
of his life which preceded the writing of the Academica. Even the
evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect
indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual
philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at
no time had he been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge
made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
period—the Hortensius—that he was a mere tiro in
philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more
occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic
life[69]. Did the
scope of this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in
showing from a minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with
ancient authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as
accurate as it was extensive. So far as the Academica is
concerned, I have had in my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's
substantial accuracy; of the success of the defence I must leave the
reader to judge. During the progress of this work I shall have to expose
the groundlessness of many feelings and judgments now current which have
contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's philosophical
attainments, but there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no
better opportunity of mentioning [xv] than the present. It is this. Cicero, the
philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the
politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness,
vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in
philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into
their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance the
illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the De Legibus as "an oasis in
the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political
partizanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in
hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the
Academica.
II. The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero.
In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student
of philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed
historical examination of the later Greek schools—the Stoic,
Peripatetic, Epicurean and new Academic. These it would be necessary to
know, not merely as they came from the hands of their founders, but as
they existed in Cicero's age; Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as
Posidonius and the other pupils of Panaetius propounded it; not merely
the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and
Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new
Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and Carneades; the
medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put forward by
Antiochus in the name of the Old [xvi] Academy. A systematic
attempt to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine
held by these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements
concerning any particular school are generally tested by comparing them
with the assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier
representatives of the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at
once concluded that Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all
probability, he is uttering opinions which would have been recognised as
genuine by those who were at the head of the school in his day. The
criticism of Madvig even is not free from this error, as will be seen
from my notes on several passages of the Academica[70]. As my space
forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I have indicated as desirable,
I can but describe in rough outline the relation in which Cicero stands
to the chief schools.
The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
standard[71]. We
have in the Academica Cicero's view of the first problem: that the
attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To go more into
detail here would be to anticipate the text of the Lucullus as
well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school,
and in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine
that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against
which all the other schools [xvii] were combined[72]. In that which was most distinctively
New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero.
Nothing was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he
was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on
both sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition
with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth.
One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
arrogance[73].
Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most opposite
opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all
doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart from
his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, and
repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In positiveness
of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and disgraceful,
unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a touch of feeling
thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar to some put
forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to Mill, to show
that the free conflict of opinion is necessary [xviii] to the progress
of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to maturity
in Greece[77].
Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, says Cicero, there
philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a warning example, and the
baneful effects of authority are often depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires
us to find out what can be said for every view. It is a positive duty to
discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old
Academy and Aristotle[80]. Those who demand a dogmatic statement
of belief are mere busybodies[81]. The Academics glory in their freedom
of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they
will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does
Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the Tusculan
Disputations, he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole
of the fourth book of the De Finibus, and when the discrepancy is
pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the score
that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius
videtur[84]." The
Academic sips the best of every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of
philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from
Chrysippus[86]. The
Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he
makes it his sole [xix] aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and
others of the mists of error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus
the Antiochean[88].
While professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero
indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek
for the truth, has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and Epicureans cared
nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those
with which the common sense of the world could have most sympathy[92]. The Academy also
was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Compared with its
system, all other philosophies were plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the
Socratic tradition was most estimable, ceteris paribus, and that
man was Carneades[94].
In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard,
we must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of [xx] conduct (ars
vivendi). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely
estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be
reared. This is equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the
dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were
mere outworks or ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school
was carried on. These were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy;
in time of peace ethics held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a
key to unlock many difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may
instance one passage in the beginning of the Academica
Posteriora[95],
which has given much trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro
with having deserted the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge.
How is this to be reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he
never recanted the doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus.
Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo had been too busy with their polemic
against Zeno and his followers, maintained on logical grounds, to deal
much with ethics. On the other hand, in the works which Cicero had
written and published before the Academica, wherever he had
touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The works
themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical [xxi] difference,
would naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus
Academia," so long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought
dialectic to the front, and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would
naturally regard him as a deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This
view is confirmed by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote,
the Academic dialectic had found no eminent expositor. So much was this
the case, that when Cicero wrote the Academica he was charged with
constituting himself the champion of an exploded and discredited school[96].
Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the
sphere of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in
the De Legibus when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he
begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects,
to be silent[97].
Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, is in the
De Legibus spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks with
something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of
Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
should be the only true philosophers [xxii] after all[100]. There was a
kind of magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited
to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions, therefore, we
often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism than even his
teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the philosophers of
the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The Stoics
maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero agrees
with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a life
enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be happy,
but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic
schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) and to allow
that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he
were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he admits the
purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104]. These
opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble
craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's
general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he
caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever
stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
[xxiii] regarded chiefly the dialectic. It
is just in this that the difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To
the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter
treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of
doubt[106]. On the
whole Cicero was more in accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in
all points, however: for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the
Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded
that they were Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the
Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in
his joys and sorrows, refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some
points Cicero was inconsistent. In the De Finibus he argued that
the difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of
terms; in the Tusculan Disputations he held it to be real. The
most Stoic in tone of all his works are the Tusculan Disputations
and the De Officiis.
With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a
comparatively small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this
branch of philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient
theology was, as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical
science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very
strongly to sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal
operation of divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were
impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine [xxiv] government of the
universe were denied[109]. It went to Cicero's heart that
Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic
theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim
was to arouse men to the investigation of the truth[110]. At the same
time, while really following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often believed
himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose from the actual
adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, which they
gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious and the
genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111]. Still, Cicero
contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic physics by a
study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of his notions
about physics, the Timaeus of Plato, which he knew well and
translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
aware of the fact.
Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's
estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not
very powerfully represented during his lifetime. The philosophical
descendants of the author of the Organon were notorious for their
ignorance of logic[112], and in ethics had approximated
considerably to the Stoic teaching. While not much influenced by the
school, Cicero generally [xxv] treats it tenderly for the sake of its
great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. With
the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood absolutely
alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they discarded
mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing but
loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
III. The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works.
It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a
philosopher, and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is
true, but still absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of
Cicero's purpose in writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek
speculation. The conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite
unwarranted. If the later philosophy of the Greeks is of any value,
Cicero's works are of equal value, for it is only from them that we get
any full or clear view of it. Any one who attempts to reconcile the
contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch
and other authorities, will perhaps feel little inclination to cry out
against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. Such outcry, now so common, is
due largely to the want, which I have already noticed, of any clear
exposition of the [xxvi] variations in doctrine which the late
Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before the
Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
(if we except the third book of the De Officiis), which he does
not freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the
time when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault
rather than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no
one had propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had
been simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing
tenets. It would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two
centuries are therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not
the substance of the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which
ultimately exercised no unimportant influence on society and on the
Christian religion itself.
When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have
been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed
study to those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the
best Greek speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the
education of his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at
the same time to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism
throughout Italy. The doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin
in a shape suited to catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a
very large Epicurean literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty
traces is now lost. C. Amafinius, mentioned in [xxvii] the
Academica[113], was the first to write, and his
books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large number of imitators,
who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in Cicero's strong
language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115]. Rabirius and
Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of Horace, were two
of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various reasons for
their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the
fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the
voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It
is exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean
literature dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics
than with the ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the
fact that the Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for
morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and did not
much feel the need of any speculative system; while the general decay
among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied
as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, prepared the
way for the acceptance of a purely mechanical explanation of the
universe. But of this subject, interesting and important as it is in
itself, and neglected though it has been, I can treat no farther.
These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached [xxviii] by
Cicero for their uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not
read them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious
question arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero
had for omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman
Epicureans. The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible
to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being
unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of
Epicurus, preferred to keep silence, which nothing compelled him to
break, since Lucretius was an obscure man and only slowly won his way to
favour with the public.
In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero
had a patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the
reproach that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He
often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had
left its mark on the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that
philosophy was best left to the Greek language, he replies with
indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a
glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled
to resort to Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the
Greek is a richer tongue than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the
Roman intellect to deal with philosophical [xxix] enquiries, he will
not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has
been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made.
The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an
impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the
wane in Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of
oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he
claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so
many of the most prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and
in those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125]. Philosophy
took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and politics[126]. It is strange
to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies as he does for devoting
himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to
egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such studies were
merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them
seemed well enough for Greeks, [xxx] but for Romans unmanly, unpractical and
unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others,
like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy
was good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that Cicero
should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging the
pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were
roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed.
The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the
books, and many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as
to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were
accustomed to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy
could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been
mastered[132].
This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest
works which we possess, the Academica and the De Finibus,
required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero
never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy [xxxi]
to the Romans. He never pretended to present new views of philosophy, or
even original criticisms on its history. The only thing he proclaims to
be his own is his style. Looked at in this, the true light, his work
cannot be judged a failure. Those who contrive to pronounce this judgment
must either insist upon trying the work by a standard to which it does
not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek philosophy it copies, or
perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed worthlessness of the
philosophy of his age.
In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his
oratorical and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
Hortensius, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only two
works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
the Academica, were the De Consolatione, founded on
Crantor's book, περι
πενθους, and the
Hortensius, which was introductory to philosophy, or, as it was
then called, protreptic.
For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of
their composition, the student must be referred to the Dict. of
Biography, Art. Cicero.
IV. History of the Academica.
On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45
B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which
was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and [xxxii]
Circeii[134]. Here
he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
De Consolatione was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
together[135]. At
other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near
his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall[136]. Often exertion
failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he
would return to the forum and the senate. A grief, which books and
solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt,
in the busy city[137].
It was amid such surroundings that the Academica was written.
The first trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a
letter of Cicero to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks
of his bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus
very much for historical and biographical details, and in the letter in
question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed
in writing the Academica. The words with which he introduces his
request imply that he had determined on some new work to which our
Academica would correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome
the embassy which Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader
of the Epicurean school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι
at Athens. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in
the De Oratore[140], [xxxiii] where Cicero
speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name.
It may be with reference to the progress of the Academica that in
a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder of
his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention
in his letters to Atticus of the Academica[142]. He declares that however much his
detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not read
the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the same
space of time that he has taken to write them[143].
In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
Antium[144], where
he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same
place he wrote to Atticus of his intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome
by way of Lanuvium about the middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately
following Tullia's death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she
died. This he felt now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either
abandon Tusculum altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even
ten years would make the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero
[xxxiv] wrote to Atticus that he had
finished while at Astura duo magna συνταγματα,
words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars, including Madvig,
have understood that the first edition of the Academica, along
with the De Finibus, is intended. Against this view the reasons
adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the letters to
Atticus that the De Finibus was being worked out book by book long
after the first edition of the Academica had been placed in the
hands of Atticus. The De Finibus was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it was
still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
Academica[151]. The final arrangement of the
characters in the De Finibus is announced later still[152]; and even at a
later date Cicero complains that Balbus had managed to obtain
surreptitiously a copy of the fifth book before it was properly
corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia having copied the whole five books
while in that state[153]. A passage in the De
Divinatione[154] affords almost direct evidence that
the Academica was published before the De Finibus. On all
these grounds I hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero
describes as having been finished simultaneously at Astura.
Another view of the συνταγματα
in question is that they are simply the two books, entitled
Catulus and Lucullus, of the Priora Academica. In my
opinion [xxxv] the word συνταγμα, the use
of which to denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains
its natural meaning. Cicero uses the word συνταξις of the
whole work[156],
while συνταγμα[157], and συγγραμμα[158], designate
definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content,
then, to refer the words of Cicero to the Catulus and
Lucullus. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides that
this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the
Hortensius (or de Philosophia) and the Priora
Academica are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is
correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the
Hortensius which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are
quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before
the Academica. This would be clear from the mention in the
Academica Posteriora alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the De
Finibus[160]
place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the Hortensius
had been published a sufficiently long time before the De Finibus,
to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in
the Tusculan Disputations and the De Divinatione[161] the
Hortensius and the Academica are mentioned together in such
a way as to show that the former was finished and given to the world
before the latter. Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's
conjecture, except the doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word
συνταγμα, which
equally affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
[xxxvi]
Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
Hortensius and the Academica must have been more closely
connected, in style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting
perhaps the Academica and the De Finibus. The interlocutors
in the Hortensius were exactly the same as in the Academica
Priora, for the introduction of Balbus into some editions of the
fragments of the Hortensius is an error[162]. The discussion in the Academica
Priora is carried on at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the
Hortensius at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather
surprising that under these circumstances there should be but one direct
reference to the Hortensius in the Lucullus[163].
While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45,
Cicero sent Atticus the Torquatus, as he calls the first book of
the De Finibus[164]. He had already sent the first
edition of the Academica to Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia
had been added to the Catulus and Lucullus, in which the
public characters from whom the books took their names were extolled. In
all probability the extant prooemium of the Lucullus is the one
which was then affixed. Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, had
doubtless pointed out the incongruity between the known attainments of
Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they were made to take in difficult
philosophical discussions. It is not uncharacteristic of Cicero that his
first plan for healing the incongruity should be a [xxxvii]
deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of statements
concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans which he
knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I may
note, as of some interest in connection with the Academica, the
fact that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was
one from Varro[166].
On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says,
to arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing
attentions of Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it
had been his intention to go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still
unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the Academica,
for the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of
Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on
the receipt of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work
should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the Academica, the De
Finibus[170].
Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems
to have been chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times
anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years before he had
pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of
the works on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to
comply with the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full
two years before the Academica was [xxxviii] written, to
dedicate to Cicero his great work De Lingua Latino. In answer to
the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much
dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is
evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of that work.
His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making
any progress[173],
shows that there could have been little of anything like friendship
between the two. Apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought
the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since the De Finibus was
already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer to Varro the
Academica, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble
birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they possess
that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been
made in the first edition of the Academica to maintain[176]. For them
another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
Academica would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus,
and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It happened
that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at
Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
Academica, which he now divided into four books instead of two,
making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position
occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite an [xxxix] inferior one, but
he was so pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often
in the future such minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta
should also be introduced was found impracticable[180].
Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his
plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the
work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over
again before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for
these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was
obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he could not
disclose in a letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did
appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of
Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is
δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.
So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles,
it may be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than
his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue
[183]." Cicero, then,
feared Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical
fastidiousness. Before these explanations Atticus
[xl] had concluded that
Cicero was afraid of the effect the work might produce on the public.
This notion Cicero assured him to be wrong; the only cause for his
vacillation was his doubt as to how Varro would receive the dedication
[184]. Atticus would
seem to have repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured
Cicero that there was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a
general assurance, and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the
reasons from which it proceeded
[185]. In order to stimulate his friend,
Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown
more favour
[186].
We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed
ignorant of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of
being actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently
while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the
De
Finibus, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the
dedication
[187].
Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the
Academica is often given in the letters. He tells us that it
extended, on the whole, to greater length than the first, though much had
been omitted;
[xli] he adds, "Unless human self love
deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves
have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them....
This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better
than the last
[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
possess
[189]."
Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what success, but with a
care which nothing could surpass
[190]." The binding and adornment of the
presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter
accompanying it was carefully elaborated
[191]. Yet after everything had been done
and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy as
to the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus:
"I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own
risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who is also a
follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou wert ever wont,
flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part "shuddered" at the
idea of taking the responsibility
[192]. After the work had passed into his
hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from
getting into circulation until they could meet one another in Rome
[193]. This warning
was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had just managed to get
access to the
De Finibus[194]. In a letter, dated apparently a day
or two later, Cicero declared his intention
[xlii] to meet Atticus at
Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable to do so,
after a consultation
[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
approve any course that might be taken
[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as
Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then,"
says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal step; oh
dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter
stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear
how the matter stands
[197]." Again, a little later: "You have
been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment
upon them, but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books
in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work
on the
Tusculan Disputations[198]. A copy of the first edition had
already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which
Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of
the
Academica, at a time when the fate of the second edition was
still undecided
[199]. From this fact we may conclude that
Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. If he
consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies of the first edition,
it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of course assumes that
Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, wishes to have the
"Splendidiora, breviora,
[xliii] meliora." Still, on every occasion
which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition
the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after
the
Academica Posteriora was completed
[200], and often subsequently, when he most
markedly mentioned the number of the books as four
[201]. That he wished
the work to bear the title
Academica is clear
[202]. The
expressions
Academica quaestio,
Ακαδημικη
συνταξις, and
Academia, are merely descriptive
[203]; so also is the frequent appellation
Academici libri[204]. The title
Academicae
Quaestiones, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the
Tusculanae Quaestiones, which was supported by the false notion,
found as early as Pliny
[205], that Cicero had a villa called
Academia, at which the book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his
Tusculan villa, which he called his Academia, but we are certain from the
letters to Atticus that the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium,
and Arpinum.
Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well
[206], but the second
edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books are
expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
title
Academica. Augustine speaks of them only as
Academici
libri, and his references show that he knew the second edition only.
Lactantius also uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks
of
[xliv] the
Academica. Plutarch shows
only a knowledge of the first edition
[207].
I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of
the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus.
That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding
theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the
two editions. A fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of
Goerenz. I now proceed to examine into the constitution and arrangement
of the two editions.
a. The lost dialogue "Catulus."
The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the Lucullus
are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party
whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue
was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the
political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely
inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the
time, and the nature of their connection with Cicero.
Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
Lucullus[208] that he did little more than put
forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would,
doubtless, have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for
himself, but in that case, as in the De Oratore, the author would
have been [xlv] compelled to exclude himself from the
conversation[209].
The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as
Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render
literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard[210]. For the
arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their ατριψια with respect to
philosophy[211].
This ατριψια did not amount
to απαιδευσια,
or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of
philosophy in the Hortensius[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the
father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of
Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where
the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning
of the son[213].
But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be
considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.
During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of
the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence
are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one of
the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be
classed with the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law,
and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic
power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one
[xlvi] voice "On you[217]." He alone was bold enough to rebuke
the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no
storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire
either fear or hope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence,
though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not
only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death[221].
Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there
were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the viri
consulares who had given their unreserved approval to the measures
taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the
first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title
"Father of his country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose
himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for
the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden
times[223]." The
statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never
been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except
when Cinna held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast
between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague
Antonius[224].
Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house
of the two Catuli[225].
[xlvii]
We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
edition of the Academica from circulation, he affixed a prooemium
to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second.
From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit
in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a
portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the Catulus. The
achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as
those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made
to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once
more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received
from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in
the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere.
Some allusion most likely was made to the connection of Archias with the
Catuli, and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honour. Then the
occasion of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the place where it was
held, were indicated. The place was the Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned
date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63,
the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the
Lucullus[227]. It is well known that in the
arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
anachronisms.
The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly
made to the Hortensius, in which the same speakers had been
engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of [xlviii] which would fall to Cicero's
share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the
dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views,
at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before
we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications
offered by the Lucullus, it is necessary to speak of the character
and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to
mention his sapientia, which implies a certain knowledge of
philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the
wisest, the holiest of men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of
surpassing worth, a second Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the De
Oratore, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view
of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is
treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made
to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and
philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance
with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the
Greeks from the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the
Latin historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek
rhetorical teaching, while he bestows [xlix] high commendation
on the early sophists[234]. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle
and Theophrastus is most to his mind[235]. An account is given by him of the
history of Greek speculation in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin
style made him seem to many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written
a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had
imitated[238], and
was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
Academica that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In
the De Oratore, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does not
declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his
long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded
that he was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools.
Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator
spring, and the whole tone of the De Oratore shows that Catulus
could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The
probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of
Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his
information [l] from books and especially from the writings
of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of
the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he
does in the case of Antonius[243], and Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any
direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place,
although one passage in the Lucullus seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo
had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one
at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well
acquainted with his opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and
Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the
latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were
probably not known to Catulus[248].
I now proceed to draw out from the references in the Lucullus
the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably
introduced by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the
speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon
the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated
with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of
the older Academics[250]. The most important part of the
speech, however, must have consisted of a defence of Carneades and
Arcesilas against [li] the dogmatic schools[251]. Catulus
evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with
that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly probable that he
touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he
developed fully that positive teaching about the πιθανον which was so
distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which
concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly
aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day
before[252]. On
the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the
constructive part of Academicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to
whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and
ακαταληπτα
would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by
Lucullus on the way in which the probabile had been handled
appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would
naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the
party—Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of
establishing an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of
Catulus, and the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the
innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only
object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for επιστημη, was
already attained by the Carneadean theory of the πιθανον; whereupon
Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that [lii] such a basis
was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had
wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the
discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the
Lucullus clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply
such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative
Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean πιθανον. One important
opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would
opine[255] (τον
σοφον
δοξασειν), seems
another indication of the generally constructive character of his
exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
extremely probable that he gave a rйsumй of the history of philosophy,
corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the Academica
Posteriora. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty
of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the
speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the Academica
Posteriora it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second
as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second
edition of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate only in
the mouth of one [liii] who was answering a speech already
made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the
fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the
lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy
altogether[258],
and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
historical rйsumй as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within
the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put
forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant
for stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We are thus
relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
commoveris[261], from which Krische infers that the
dialogue, entitled Hortensius, had ended in a conversion to
philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion
we have nowhere else any allusion.
The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character
and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to
have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it
was possible for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech
of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral
teaching of Antiochus.
The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of
the preceding speech is correct, [liv] it follows that
Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer
to Varro, part of which is preserved in the Academica Posteriora[262]. He justified
the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old,
and also with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus,
therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great
and ancient names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according
to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides,
Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a
historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη
φαντασια and εννοιαι (which though
really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary
to "manufacture" (fabricari) Latin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably
also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave
their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by
Lucullus[266].
That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be
seen by the fact that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms καταληψις
(i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual καταληπτικη
φαντασια), εναργεια,
‛ορμη,
αποδειξις,
δογμα,
οικειον,
αδηλα,
εποχη, nearly all important terms in
the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which
Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the
more clearly does it appear that the main purpose [lv] of Cicero in this
speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the
New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience,
which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he
expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him
in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely
introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these
arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech,
although foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary
classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of
the elaborate speech of Cicero in the Lucullus proves that no
general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the
dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before.
Cicero's argument in the Catulus was allowed by Lucullus to have
considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus,
Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out
for the discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there
was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the
Lucullus.
One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the
attack of Catulus? Krische believes [lvi] that the argument of
Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur.
Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary
doctrines[273].
The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching
had been dismissed by all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his
letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo
(partes mihi sumpsi Philonis[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to
those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly
supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief
sources for Cicero's speech in the Catulus were, doubtless, Philo
himself and Clitomachus.
In that intermediate form of the Academica, where Cato and
Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no
doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato.
Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of
Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem
strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to
represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from
Zeno. The rфle given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any
cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to
sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been
reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in
the Academica Priora. He would naturally occupy the [lvii] place
given to Varro in the second edition[276]. If this be true, Brutus would not
speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough
connected with the Academica to render it necessary to treat of
him farther.
b. The "Lucullus."
The day after the discussion narrated in the Catulus, during
which Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the
Cuman villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of
Hortensius at Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind
favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his
at Pompeii[278].
Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round
which so many legends lingered[279]. The scenery in view was
magnificent[280].
As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines
of statues, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the
horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour
under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and
Puteoli, thirty stadia distant[281].
Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and [lviii] to keep
it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still
living, although when the words were written he had been dead for many
years[282]. The
surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private
troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept
carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of
thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at
Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last
section of the book, while in the last but one the De Finibus, the
De Natura Deorum and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another
passage the design of the Tusculan Disputations, which was carried
out immediately after the publication of the Academica and De
Finibus, is clearly to be seen[285].
Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly all
that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to
have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private
citizen, was directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train
when he went to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his
residence in [lix] the East he sought to attach learned men
to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus,
Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of
philosophic tastes[288]. He is several times mentioned by
Pliny in the Natural History as the patron of Greek artists. Yet,
as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus
that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus,
by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly
stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus
engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to
that of Cicero in the Catulus. Any closer examination of its
contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
same may be said of Cicero's answer.
In the intermediate form of the Academica, the speech of
Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a
slight connection with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much
more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close
relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have
had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife
of Lucullus[289].
Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
during the war between Pompey [lx] and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
c. The Second Edition.
When Cicero dedicated the Academica to Varro, very slight
alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the
piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost
within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene
was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date of
the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many allusions
are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian
party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
Hortensius[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death
and the writing of the Academica, it can be shown that Varro,
Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore
for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This
impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his
wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
philosophical [lxi] opinions, are alone needed here. The
first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself
sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like
friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the
trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had
eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to
send Varro the eulogy to read, adding "Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut
nosti, ελικτα και
ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the
letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to
write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf,
during his exile[298]. Several passages show that Cicero
refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's
return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state.
About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged
his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of
the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little
closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the
Academica was published, testify to this approximation[300]. Still they are
all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero
addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius,
Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to
the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast
learning which is by [lxii] no means natural to Cicero. The
negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of
the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable
accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro
De Philosophia[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of
Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school
from, among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, by an
elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious
in Augustine. My notes on the Academica Posteriora will show that
there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's
philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to Mьller, who,
from Stoic phrases in the De Lingua Latina, concluded that Varro
had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was
Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical
exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by
Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, [lxiii] which Cicero had given in the first
edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of
Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by
Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the
negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had formed part of
the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in
reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. 1. Book
IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. Atticus must
have been almost a κωφον
προσωπον.
I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
editions the Lucullus is marked throughout as Academicorum
liber IV. This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of
Nonius' quotations, which are always from the second edition, and
can tell us nothing about the constitution of the first. One other
thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the
Academica Priora before the Posteriora. This seems to me an
unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the Varro is
certainly prior, logically, to that of the Lucullus.
M. TULLII CICERONIS
ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM
LIBER PRIMUS.
I.
1. In Cumano nuper cum
mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone, venisse eum
Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos
venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam
putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et vetustate
amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque
cum
ab eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: atque
ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam
villam reduximus.
2. Hic pauca
primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus:
Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus,
quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. Silent enim diutius
Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae
scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: intemperantis enim arbitror
esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo opus magnum in manibus,
idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum—me autem dicebat—quaedam
institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius.
3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam,
Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e
Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium—nihil enim eius modi celare
possumus—non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de
manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in
mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas,
quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam
a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum
multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo
excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus
antecedat.
II.
4. Tum ille: Rem a me
saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans
respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re
multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam viderem
diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de nostris
eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.
5. Vides autem—eadem enim ipse
didicisti—non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui
nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone
disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione
concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant.
Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque
vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque
novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti
ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur
labor.
6. Iam vero physica, si
Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium
sustuleris, de corpusculorum—ita enim appellat
atomos—concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae
cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format
effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam
enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere?
Quid,
haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi
enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud nostros
autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut
quis intelligat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab
honestate seiungi: quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine
voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari
quidem. Si vero
Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit
illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra
Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem
ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem
animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis
datum munus homini.
8. Sed meos
amicos, in quibus est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire
iubeo, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae
autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea,
quantum potui—nihil enim magno opere meorum miror—feci ut
essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii
nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris,
quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus,
multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice †quae
quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum
invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis
†philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
III.
9. Tum, ego. Sunt,
inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque
tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando
qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones
temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam
disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque
rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, plurimumque poetis
nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque
ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque
multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum.
10. Causam autem probabilem tu
quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne
haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo
vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent
sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi
legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius,
Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt
poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum,
Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
sint aut Demosthenem imitati.
11. Ego autem—dicam enim, ut res est—dum
me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum
tenebat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum
licebat, legendo. Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et
administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia
peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic
aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus,
hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil
utilius aut, si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus.
12. Brutus quidem noster,
excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu,
cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
litterarum.
IV.
13. Tum, ille. Istuc
quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit,
quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te veterem illam, inquit,
tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho id magis licuerit,
nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam nobis in novam e
vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime.
Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat
in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse
erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, ut dicis: sed
ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra
ea Philonis Antiochus
scripserit.
14. Immo vero et
ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi
molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, inquam, si videtur. Sane istud
quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed videamus idemne Attico
placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi vero, ille: quid est enim
quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari? et simul videre
satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum essent dicta, in
conspectu consedimus [omnes].
15. Tum Varro ita exorsus
est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus
occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi
occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse,
ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret,
caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si
maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
valere.
16. Hic in omnibus fere
sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie
et
copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil
se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae
nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque
rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec
esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum
diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen
in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis
consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi
potest.
17. Platonis autem
auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et
sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique
Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam
composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam
dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita
consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates
probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio
disciplinae.
18. Quae quidem
erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos
et illam veterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni
praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat
utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi
non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum
Atticus: Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque
nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid
me, inquam, putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro
exhibiturum? Pergamus igitur, inquit, quoniam placet.
19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a
Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de
natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid
falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid
repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura
petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in
natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur,
constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum
adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. Corporis autem
alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: valetudinem, viris
pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam
aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus,
claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem:
20. animi autem, quae essent ad
comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et
mores dividebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant:
quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant
studia esse et quasi consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis
adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa.
In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem
appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae
omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec
animorum.
21. Vitae
autem—id enim erat tertium—adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad
virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et
in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt.
Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis
humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac
de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad
id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam,
ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.
VI.
22. Atque haec illa
sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem
non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud imprudenter, si alios
esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur.
Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci
quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut
maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute
versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute
esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et
corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad virtutis usum idonea.
23. Ex hac descriptione agendi
quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat
in conservatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur
fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque
susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum,
quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia
exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis
vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio
et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.
24. De natura
autem—id enim sequebatur—ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant,
in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen
utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi
contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non
alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi
qualitatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus
inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur,
utamur verbis interdum inauditis.
VII.
25. Nos vero, inquit
Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum voles, si te Latina forte
deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce
modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam
appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis.
Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas
ποιοτητας
Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed
philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt
publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut
enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.
Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur,
quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare
conamur?
26. Tu vero, inquam,
Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo
copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus ergo,
inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
Itaque aлr—utimur enim pro Latino—et ignis et aqua et terra
prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae
gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa
dicuntur: e quibus aлr et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi,
reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram.
Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor,
quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.
27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus
sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate—faciamus enim
tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius—materiam quandam, ex qua
omnia expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit
omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in
nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum
sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem
moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi
possint.
28. Et cum ita
moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem
nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia,
quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta
insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo
intereat:
29. quam vim animum
esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem
deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam
quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae
pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia
nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et
immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
VIII.
30. Tertia deinde
philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur
ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium
veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam
censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper
esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
ιδεαν
appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
dicere.
31. Sensus autem
omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res
eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut
sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil
umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur
et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant.
32. Scientiam autem nusquam
esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa
definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,
adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa
quaeque essent ita nominata, quam
ετυμολογιαν
appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad
probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque
tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione
conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur,
explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
33. Haec erat illis disciplina a
Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos
vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.
IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur
Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus
species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat
amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem,
vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et
ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem
veteris disciplinae: spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque
reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.
34. Nam Strato, eius auditor,
quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est:
qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in
virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae
contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et
Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et
post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati,
diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem
audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque
subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est
disciplinam. Eam quoque, si videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut
solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, inquam, videtur, quod vides idem
significare Pomponium.
X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos
virtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam
pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis,
idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum
bonum.
36. Cetera autem etsi
nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia
naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis
relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.
37. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex
iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita
appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam
vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium
et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in bonis
actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem servata
praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi.
38. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione
esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis
in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi,
seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat
nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse
praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur.
Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et
condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent,
sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi
morbis voluit carere sapientem.
39. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse
dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia
rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes
voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium
perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam
intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum
illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici
rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae
quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod
nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset
corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse
dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse
esse non corpus.
40. Plurima
autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam
quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille
φαντασιαν,
nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim
utendum in reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi
accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis
positam et voluntariam.
41.
Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis hoc? Nos vero,
inquit. Quonam enim modo
καταληπτον
diceres?—Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem
appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam
nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset,
plurimisque idem novis verbis—nova enim dicebat—usus est.
Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita
erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter,
inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset
imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis.
42. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam
comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis
neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo
sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta
sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia, quae
essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset
relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui
dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus
non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae
reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem
et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et
constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his
fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.
XII.
43. Quae cum
dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, inquam, a te,
Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse [autem]
arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem veteris
Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc Varro:
Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea,
quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio.
44. Tum ego: Cum Zenone, inquam,
ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut
studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate,
quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante
Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis paene veteres: qui
nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos
sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut Democritus, in
profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri,
nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse
dixerunt.
45. Itaque
Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum,
quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto:
neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis
nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione
approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem,
quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur,
neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni
adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat
consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
sustineretur.
46. Hanc
Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex
illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque
partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur: sed
tamen illa, quam exposui
sti, vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae
usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem
Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis
ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicureo
Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros
mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.
EX LIBRO I.
1. Nonius p. 65 Merc.
Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis.
Cicero Academicorum lib. I.: quid autem stomachatur Menesarchus? quid
Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
2. Nonius s.v.
concinnare p. 43. Idem in Academicis lib. I.: qui cum
similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
EX LIBRO II.
3. Nonius p. 65. Aequor ab
aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. vocabulum accepisse
confirmat: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor
illud poetae vocant.
4. Nonius p. 69. Adamare
Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: qui enim serius honores adamaverunt vix
admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.
5. Nonius p. 104. Exponere
pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II.: frangere
avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum
iuventuti.
6. Nonius p. 121. Hebes
positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid?
lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et
senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur cornua.
7. Nonius p. 162.
Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: quid? mare nonne
caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
8. Nonius p. 162.
Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: atqui si id
crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.
9. Nonius p. 394. Siccum
dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, non madidum
... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: alius (color) adultis, alius
adulescentibus, alius aegris, alius sanis, alius siccis, alius
vinulentis ...
10. Nonius p. 474.
Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.: si quando enim nos
demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
cernimus.
11. Nonius p. 545.
Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: quibus etiam alabaster
plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
EX LIBRO III.
Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. De gloria librum ad te misi: at in
eo prooemium id est, quod in Academico tertio.
12. Nonius p. 65.
Digladiari ... idem tertio: digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum
facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum
dixerit?
13. Nonius p. 65.
Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: et ut
nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus ...
14. Nonius p. 123.
Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: in
tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur
cognitionis et scientiae.
15. Nonius p. 419.
Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum lib. III.:
aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
16. Lactantius Inst. div.
VI. 24. Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico tertio verba sunt: quod
si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, sic vitam deviam secutis
corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.
17. Diomedes p. 373, ed.
Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. Varro ad Ciceronem tertio fixum et
Cicero Academicorum tertio (= Lucullus §27): †malcho in opera adfixa.
18. Nonius p. 139.
Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. Academicorum
lib. III.: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse
dicemus. = Lucullus §51.
19. Nonius p. 117.
Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae gallina
peperisset dicere solebant. = Lucullus §57.
EX LIBRO IIII.
20. Nonius p. 69, Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in
Academicis lib. IIII.: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = Lucullus
§67.
21. Nonius p. 65.
Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia.
Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: item ille cum aestuaret, veterum ut
Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = Lucullus §70.
22. Nonius p. 99. Dolitum, quod dolatum usu
dicitur, quod est percaesum vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum
Academicorum lib. IIII.: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
dolatus. = Lucullus §100.
23. Nonius p. 164. Ravum
fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: quia nobismet ipsis tum
caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet.... =
Lucullus §105.
24. Nonius p. 107. Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi
quendam laborem exanclatum. = Lucullus §108.
25. Nonius p. 163. Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = Lucullus
§109.
26. Nonius p. 122. Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.:
at hoc Anaximandro infinitatem. = Lucullus §118.
27. Nonius p. 65. Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII.: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. =
Lucullus §120.
28. Nonius p. 189.
Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ut ille qui
asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. =
Lucullus §121.
29. Martianus Capella V.
§517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. Cicero ... in Academicis: latent ista
omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. = Lucullus
§122.
30. Nonius p. 102. E
regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nec ego
non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae
qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. = Lucullus §123.
31. Nonius p. 80.
Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione
trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: plane, ut supra dictus,
Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = Lucullus §135.
Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
32. Lactantius Inst. div.
III. 14. Haec tua verba sunt (sc. Cicero!): mihi autem non
modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte
cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
33. August. contra
Academicos II. §26.: id probabile vel veri
simile Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent
invitare. ... Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi videntur omnia
quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine
vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid
dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum
opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [Proximis post
hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat Augustinus haec ipsius esse
Ciceronis verba.]
34. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
§15. Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam....
Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
35. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
§43. Ait enim Cicero illis (i.e.
Academicis) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam,
nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei
VI. 2. Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. Varroni) tale
testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi versatur
disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone, homine, inquit,
omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM
LIBER II.
I.
1. Magnum ingenium Luci
Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna
homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro
maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adolescens
cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna
cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos
annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus
aedilis, continuo praetor—licebat enim celerius legis
praemio—, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium,
quae de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum.
2. Idque eo fuit mirabilius,
quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui adolescentiam
in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto
gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum
iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis,
partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum
esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam
memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis
gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam
fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem
ferunt: qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum
primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle
discere, credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat.
Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat.
3. Tantus ergo imperator in omni
genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis totiusque
belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a
se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur.
In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque
civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis
servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate
rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni
peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a
Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam
debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem
currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in
maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito
testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.
II.
4. Sed quae populari
gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris
celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora
cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni
litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant
arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore
aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse
occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii
relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse
potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus
audiebat.
5. Ac vereor interdum ne
talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim
multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam,
reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem
principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas
litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani
historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit,
Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec
philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro.
6. Restat ut iis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi
nolint personas tam gravis illigari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut
tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum
colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis
philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo
quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos
populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de
opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo
non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut
plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam
augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has
etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus.
7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis,
qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus
disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam
mortuis invidere.
III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non
probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam
philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem,
quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii
a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est,
qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus, idque summa cura
studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa
difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis
nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire
se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos
studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes
quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et
tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime
accedat.
8. Neque inter nos
et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non
dubitant quin ea vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus,
quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et
solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut
omnia, quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate
ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset
optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut
obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione
capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam
quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt.
9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se
credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes
et indocti iudicare potuissent—statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel
maxime videtur esse sapientis—, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus
rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem
re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio
quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt,
pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur
exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata
sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et
Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus.
Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, quod erat constitutum, si ventus
esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur
pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.
IV.
10. Hic Catulus:
Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene explicatum est, ut tota
fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus
es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, inquit Hortensius,
feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit.
Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu erant, dicta
sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: Non sane, inquit,
Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis, qui placere
volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea, quae dico,
probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus,
si non fuerint,
non vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut
quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi
tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota
enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio,
eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam
quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos
ereximus.
11. At ille: Cum
Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat
iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et
Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista
philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum
quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem
isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant
adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo
natura lenissimus—nihil enim poterat fieri illo
mitius—stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante
videram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo
viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico
audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id
quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et
C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab
eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse.
12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum
igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et
item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut
causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito
doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea
Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat,
multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae
contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est
adversarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino
dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam
Carneademque veniamus.
V.
13. Quae cum
dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini—me autem
nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint,
cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem
agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis
tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q.
Pompeium: illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum
solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P.
Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut
videmus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C.
Marium. Et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum
atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt.
14. Similiter vos, cum
perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam
constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem,
Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus,
ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum
illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia.
Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant
quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere
videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil
omnino quale sit posse reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes
isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire
quam sciant.
15. Quod si
illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est
ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas
qui constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate
delitisceret, qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e
numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit
perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus
differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam
sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in
disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud
agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione,
quam Graeci
ειρωνειαν
vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea
vitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
VI.
16. Sed fuerint illa
veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est igitur actum, quod
investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans
nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum
huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus
tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam
floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime
a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat,
Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu
tenuit: nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum
floruerunt: e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho
fuit—declarat multitudo librorum—ingeni non minus in
[Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene
autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur.
17. Iam Clitomacho Philo
vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium
Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra
Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres
faciendum omnino non putabant: nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum
iis, qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo
fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset
cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam
καταληψιν
illi vocant, eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod
comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod
nihil esset clarius
εναργειαι,
ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi—me appellabat
iocans—hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant
illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent,
definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam
priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere
putabant, ne qui fallerentur.
18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam
evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et
homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova
quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum
pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre
Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum
enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset—id enim
volumus esse
ακαταληπτον—,
si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum—iam enim hoc pro
φαντασιαι
verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus—visum igitur impressum
effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse,
quod est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque
Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam
definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi
nihil posse concedimus.
VII.
19. Ordiamur igitur
a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae
nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris
incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid
quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo
aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur
tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa. Meo
autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac
valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen
mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et intervalla
aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus
ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in
sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium
requirat acrius.
20.
Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures
cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa
vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam
multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui
primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, quum id nos
ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in
quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et
eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis?
in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
sentiatur:—potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat,
et inter eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet
non apertissime insaniat?
21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum
illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa,
non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series
deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus
nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest.
22. Quod si essent falsae
notitiae—
εννοιας enim notitias
appellare tu videbare—, si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi
visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem
his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset,
quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo
philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet,
nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum?
aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero
quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi
perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab
inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo
atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
tractabit, multa perceperit?
VIII.
23. Maxime vero
virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus
solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo
rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque
sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem
constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut
quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum
perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat
aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit, cum quam ob
rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti,
constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet
aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium
recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint.
24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se
ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen
sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter
audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit
extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit
esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse
initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur, idque initium
esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter appetitio—eam enim volumus
esse
‛ορμην—, qua ad
agendum impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest.
25. Illud autem, quod
movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id,
quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri
animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur
accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit
non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam
impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est,
necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, videri.
26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet
ur. Itaque
argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece
αποδειξις,
ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non
percipiebatur, adducit.'
IX.
27. Quod si omnia
visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent,
neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse
aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides?
Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit
exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare
debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
δογματα, quorum nullum
sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique
proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum
nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum
possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile,
fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem
neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa visa, e quibus
omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse.
28. Ex hoc illud est natum,
quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente
diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum
diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, consentaneum esse unum
tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius
resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut
maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod
perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem,
quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
29. Antiochus ad istum locum
pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici
decretum,—sentitis enim iam hoc me
δογμα dicere—, nihil posse
percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis
a accipi
oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique
iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in
philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse,
qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut
unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere
dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a
sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut
hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de
inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse
potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
X.
30. Sequitur
disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior—habet enim
aliquantum a physicis—, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari
poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum
animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad
modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa
sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim
ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim
habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit,
ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur.
Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae
rerum, quas Graeci tum
εννοιας, tum
προληψεις
vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit.
31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam
vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime
cognitionem, et istam
καταληψιν,
quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum
ipsam per se amat—nihil est enim ei veritatis luce
dulcius—tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et
artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam
corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo
ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.
32. Nec vero satis
constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum
enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, quae disputentur,
vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos?
num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait
Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam
queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit
inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque
distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim—et hoc quidem vel
maxime vos animadvertebam moveri—probabile aliquid esse et quasi
veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac
disserendo.
XI.
33. Quae ista regula
est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non
possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut
inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si nihil interest,
nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique communis,
ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt
hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo
falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter.
Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis
quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non ademisse.
Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria
veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu probabilem
visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat,
sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo agimus,
tibi erit revertendum.
34.
In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia
proprium in communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil
erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi videatur verum, ut
non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio
veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur
ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo
atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim
modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id,
quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua
dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne
moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec
sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur.
35. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid
dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed
qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant
neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque adseverare sine aliqua eius
rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est
igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo
quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo levius?
36. Sin ex circumspectione
aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod visum sit, id se dicent sequi,
tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis visis, inter quae nihil
interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse
accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit,
exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero,
ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam
proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis
esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum
sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum
ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re
id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut
nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae
dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se
ipsa defendet.
XII.
37. His satis
cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione,
quam Graeci
συγκαταθεσιν
vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta
sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul
illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine
adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime
intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari
quidem potest quale sit—, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae
est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio.
38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos
neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo
non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam
appareat—Graeci id
οικειον
appellant—, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare.
Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de
adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed
haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec
notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in
nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.
39. Ubi igitur virtus, si
nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum
esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in
virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus
constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri
aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua
re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e
vita.
XIII.
40. Nunc ea
videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius
eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem
quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt,
in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis
quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc
quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint
nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non
percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum
est, id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est,
ut eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius
modi, ut in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi
possint, alia non possint.
41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.'
Quae autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa
sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit,
ex iis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non
possint:' reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item
duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum:
'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit
esse.'
42. Haec duo
proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima
dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta
esse falsa, quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse
comprehendi.
XIV.
43. Hanc ego
subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum causa,
qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et
horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et
earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma
et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa
esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos
quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si
posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit?
si
n negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio
transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id
percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
partibus.
44. Si enim
dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla
communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem
negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius
progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum
non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut
falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et
perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi,
quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque ipsa natura
accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam quod non
appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea,
quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam
falsa visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem,
inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
45. Sed progrediamur
longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur, quaeque ab
iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus.
Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim, ut
ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut
maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel
arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi
praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire
erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
XV.
46. Quam ob rem cum
duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem
sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt
animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea
circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et
captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas
dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae
pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam
diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum
captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui.
47. Exponam igitur generatim
argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum
conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum
animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis,
quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea,
quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis
declarentur—haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
disputant—, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus
efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant,
efficere non possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
nihil sit omnino?
48.
Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant, quae
cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis
videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non
modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis nihil
intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
visis distinctio appareat.
XVI.
49. Ad has omnis
visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una
re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa
capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod captiosissimo
genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari
solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc
vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. Vitiosum sane et
captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum obiectum est a deo
dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur
deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc
si perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin
ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum.
50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut
ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid cui
simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi
canibus similes
sunt, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis
similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime
artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse?
Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud
genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium
generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in
alieno.
51. Quod fieri qui
potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa
cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:
'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'
Idemque in Epicharmo:
'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'
Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita
habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.
XVII.
52. At enim dum
videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum
que, quae vigilantes
videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non
eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente
nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt
qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:
'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
adspectu' ...
53. At enim ipse sapiens
sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem
saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte gravitas aut tarditas
aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate
excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere
adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut
semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter
vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter
adfecti, tum nihil interesse.
54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta,
quod nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae
αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita
habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano,
cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non
mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum
anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum
similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si
satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo
non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius
contenditis, quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit
tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla
communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid
pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis
esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non
similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest.
55. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in
Academia irridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais
Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter
sese non solum similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut
inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque
homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut
inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque
nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil
intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus
gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus
innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in
hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?
XVIII.
56. Primum quidem
me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id,
quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis singularum rerum singulas
proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt,
tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non
cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus
hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos
consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti ne minimum quidem
similes viderentur?
57.
Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum
sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant, quas
non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso
adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et
ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis possit distinguere,
et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater geminos
internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si adsueveris.
Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc
accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id
gallina peperisset dicere solebant.
58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis est ova
illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc illud
esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam, ut
talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas
impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum.
Quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata
veri et falsi nota.
59.
Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla
impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his
illa necessario nata est
εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio,
in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non
nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est,
tollendus adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare
non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse
eo delabi interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse
sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi
possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil
opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae.
60. Restat illud, quod dicunt,
veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo
igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt
tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam
vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate
ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant,
nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi
quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et
perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam
maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?
XIX.
61. Haec Antiochus
fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam adseverantius,
in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata
causa te, hominem amicissimum—me autem appellabat—et aliquot
annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris,
eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos
iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis
quidem, quibus adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat
sive eius loci, quem incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis
uti lumine licebat, isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris
ne scintillam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si
sequamur, iis vinculis simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus.
62. Sublata enim adsensione
omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo
recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas
aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse,
quod mihi quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem
ullam quae cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam
atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur
auctoritas. Quae cum dixisset ille, finem fecit.
63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius,
me quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens—non enim satis
intellegebam—, coepit hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi
Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter,
accurate, copiose, taceo neque te quo minus, si tibi ita videatur,
sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud vero non censuerim, ut eius
auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo monuit, inquit adridens, ut
caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum vides quanta copia
semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione quaereret qui tibi
constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te
comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De causa autem ipsa
malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno opere mirabor.
Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac
visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes
intueri.
XX.
64. Tum ego non
minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius modi quadam oratione
sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit, ut docti
hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, quae pro illa
causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem.
Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem
tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
65. Ego enim si aut
ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum
philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et
naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia
reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu consilioque
totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum
etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione
id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum solet,
iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et
ea sentire, quae dicerem.
66. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum
gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse
iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec
tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam adsentiar,
qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus
quidem sum opinator—non enim sum sapiens—et meas cogitationes
sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,
'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'
ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,
'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'
sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non
de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter
mentem sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec
percipio tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens;
itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet
Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne
fallatur videre. Nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de
gravitate sapientis, errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur
loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque,
Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur—ut praepostere tecum
agam, mox referam me ad ordinem—haec primum conclusio quam habeat
vim considera.
XXI.
67. Si ulli rei
sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur: numquam autem
opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas
probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam
secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari,
quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed illud primum, sapientem,
si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et
eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non
possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere.
68. Nobis autem primum, etiam
si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse
videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri
quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio,
ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa
veris, eaque, quae percipi non possunt,
iis quae possunt—si
modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus—, ut tam in praecipitem
locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod
percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem
nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnes cohibiturum,
ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem.
Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse percipi: etenim de
eo omnis est controversia.
XXII.
69. Sed prius
pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me defenduntur, et didicit apud
Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de
his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusavit in senectute quam
antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen
inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero,
qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse negitavisset, veri et
falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Poenituit illa
sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim
erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? quid?
Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone
discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere.
70. Unde autem subito vetus
Academia revocata est? Nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa
descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere
dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii, qui se sequerentur, Antiochii
vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum
omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla
communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam reliquorum
philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub Novis solem
non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum, sic
Academicorum umbram secutus est.
71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, cum ei
placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes
utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis oportere,
illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset,
honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset,
honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum: qui ex illius
commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a
vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit
ut quod
argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.
XXIII.
72. Et primum
quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a nobis de antiquis
philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros, sed tamen
popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res
non bonas tractent,
similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri, quae
vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?—sic enim
appellabantur ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa
philosophabantur—: maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingeni gloria.
73. Quid loquar de Democrito?
Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam
animi? qui ita sit ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil
excipit de quo non profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa?
quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis
inferioris aetatis? qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur.
Atque is non hoc dicit, quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus,
percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse: sensus quidem non
obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc
maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus initio libri, qui est de natura:
'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id
ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an
nihil sit.'
74. Furere tibi
Empedocles videtur: at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur,
sonum fundere. Num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum
magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt,
iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus, sed
tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum
sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum
Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum
iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari
non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum,
'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? qui
certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset, nisi probavisset.
Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio
persequi.
XXIV.
75. Videorne tibi,
non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari numquam
nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minutos,
Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam
σοφισματα;
sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum
habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa
ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine
probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit
sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, quae nos fallerent probabilitate
magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile posse.
76. Quid Cyrenaici
tibi
videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod
percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu intimo
sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid colore aut quo
sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.
Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem
post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis
tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te
ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone
pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur.
77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum
non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari,
nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum
vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone
fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec
opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset,
quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur
visum? tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum
et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset
visum verum, quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse
visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem
modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad
definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si
esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut
doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso
possit esse.
78. Haec est
una contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum
esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim
nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum:
equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab
eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe
opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio,
ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum
esse.
XXV.
79. Quid ergo est
quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle,
communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere posses, idcirco heri non
necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas
infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo
sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores
nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?—Manent illa
omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.—Igitur
semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim
rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli
umquam esse credendum.
80.
Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et importune insistere!
Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas
ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse mendacium, non
oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed hic quidem
maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia
falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi nobis
ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et integris
sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?—Utinam
quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem,
non videmus.
81. At ille
nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et octingenta stadia
quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. Responderem igitur
audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me
acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et
nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt. Ergo ut
illis aqua, sic nobis aлr crassus offunditur. At amplius non desideramus.
Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo, quod
parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis
videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur
ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non
tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere
ostenderis.
XXVI.
82. Quid ego de
nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest
esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus
confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi quidem
quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam
videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta
incitatione fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem
possit, tamen nobis stare videatur.
83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso,
quam in parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse
quod nosci, percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E
quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id
percipi, tertium, inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut
eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum
verum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo
nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum
secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos,
quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est.
84. Qui igitur P. Servilium
Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi
visum, quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a
falso: qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum
Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non
posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino,
sed cum adversario facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet
igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit.
Sublato enim iudicio illo, quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem
videris, qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis
oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa.
85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus
videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non
sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis
esse, nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum
credibile 'nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius,
nullum granum.' Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod
agitur, nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an
internosci non possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo
tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere,
eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros
eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres?
86. Quid? si in eius
dem
modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?
XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae
nos non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur.
Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad
quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura!
87. Cur non extimescam
opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam
vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo
utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita?
quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur etiam
eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis
mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo ante
dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam, res
iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:—de quo queri solent Stoici, dum
studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque
omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem
inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.—
88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et
furiosorum visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum,
sanorum. Quo modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se
vidisse Homerum, sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:
'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'
Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit,
eum somnia re
ri et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea
vera, quae essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum
videbantur, quo modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non
putamus ita totum illud audivisse,
si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit
illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:
nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde
enim illa:
'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur
minorem habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?
XXVIII.
89. Quid loquar
de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam
sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur?
Quid ille, qui:
'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'
nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid?
apud Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat
sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde
movebatur falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat
'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:
'unde haec flamma oritur?'
et illa deinceps:
'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, adsunt, me expetunt:'
Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:
'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
cum ardentibus taedis.'
Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:
'Intendit crinitus Apollo
arcum auratum, luna innixus:
Diana facem iacit a laeva.'
90. Qui magis haec
crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur? Apparet enim iam
'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, ut illud
efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et falsa ad
animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa falsa
vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non enim
id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti sint,
aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium
aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.
91. Quid est quod
ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, veri et falsi
quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi? et in qua re? In
geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in
litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur. Sol
quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat
iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet?
Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem
pollicebatur. Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in
philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis.
92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne
contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit elementa
loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis
additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu
modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.
XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura
nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus
quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla
omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit,
multa pauca, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito
aut dempto certum respondeamus [non] habemus.—
93. At vitiosi sunt
soritae.—Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt
enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum
gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto
prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur,
‛ησυχαζειν.
Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid
proficit? Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo
interroget. Quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero,
multane erunt? Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim
fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere
posse. Cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit
accedere.
94. Nihil me
laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem
veniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi,
praeceps erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose
interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus
es: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed
negas te usque ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si
id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te
captare volt, utrum tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad
novem, verbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo
insistis: etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me
in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista
adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut
postremum docet.
95. Quid?
quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum
superiora. Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum
dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant
αξιωμα, quod est quasi
effatum—, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an
falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris
an
verum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius
quam illa, quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.
XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec
eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa
sint, ubi est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum
sit'? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias
improbandas, quae sint in genere contrario.
96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
dicis
nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere
et verum dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime
conclusum dicitis. Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum
traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars
ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis
te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque
dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris
eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem
dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet
autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum
concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa
conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris
igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare.
97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si
ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in
utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec
inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem
numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et
contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita
effabimur, 'aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic
statuant, omne, quod ita diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non
modo verum esse, sed etiam necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti
tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse,
necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est
in natura rerum talis necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id
est, Antiochus et Stoici: totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e
contrariis diiunctio—contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat,
alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est.
98. Mecum vero quid habent
litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat,
sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose,
minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec
autem merces erat dialecticorum. Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab
Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob
eam causam, quod ita didici, omne, quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum
esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut
igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.
XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis
sententia Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam,
ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad
senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde
studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis
adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo.
99. Duo placet esse Carneadi
genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi
possint, alia quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse
probabilia; alia non probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque
perspicuitatem dicantur, ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra
posteriorem nihil dici oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum
esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra
naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam
tu, Luculle, commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa
sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non
etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit
specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi
contrarium, utetur eo sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur.
Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur
probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa, sed similia
veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur.
100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num
comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui
potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta,
probo navigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur
se illuc venturum esse salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et
agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam
erat Anaxagoras, qui id non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret
aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri
quidem.
101. Et
quaecumque res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla
re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
dolatus, habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut
ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam
percipiendi notam: eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem
modi exsistere falsum aliquod, cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra
sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque
aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur,
praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis
tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio
tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est,
nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid
sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non
concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus
est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus,
tibi adsentior.
102.
Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem
maxime, cui erant ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec
quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse,
certe levior reprehensio est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia,
non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere,
quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis?
nihil tibi est perspicuum?' Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo
modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a
Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poлtam, cum
scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, eum, qui consul cum M.
Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis—sunt enim mihi nota,
propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima institutio et
quasi disciplina illo libro continetur—, sed scriptum est ita:
103. 'Academicis placere
esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles videantur,
aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia
non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi
perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait vehementer errare eos, qui
dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem
aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in
his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam.
104. Quae cum exposuisset,
adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc
intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri: altero, cum se a
respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget
aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam
adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec
aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere possit.
†Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa,
quibus ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque
partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit,
dum sine adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea,
quae nulla re impedirentur.
105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane,
invidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos
percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri
dicimus.
XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem
expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle,
iacere iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens,
de quo loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur,
isdem sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare
illud, quod nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro
videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum
videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et
vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis
rationem reddere cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod
videbatur oculis, defendere.
106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim
quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid?
Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro
adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae
sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut
vobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque
rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque
percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron
Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed
tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi
remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si comprehensio
perceptioque nulla sit.
107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne, quae ipsae
fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae tantum id,
quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera et falsa
diiudicent?
Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum
enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio
Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici
certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum [
responsa], auspicia,
oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is
potest facere vel de iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas
habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est
aliquid, quod positum vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non
possit? an tu in soritis poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus
non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione
ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam sequi?
108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim
videri oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos
adsensus esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli
autem omnia, si visa tollantur.
XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa,
sed brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
sequitur, nulla re impediente?
109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod statuet, ne
id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque impediet in
navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis
plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.
Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater,
sed, ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret
consentaneum esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum
saltem dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et
sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil
comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo
potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum
esse possit nisi comprehensum, perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum
decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse
perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat et sine
decretis vitam agere possit!
110. Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic
hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam,
eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus.
Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non
enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit, stellarum numerus par an
impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de rebus, in quibus
versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis enim nihil
probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid
faciat nec quid respondeat.
111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle,
reprehensionem Antiochi—nec mirum: in primis enim est
nobilis—, qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum.
Cum enim sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea
differre a veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse
concessum, quod videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli
altero, quo neget visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id
ita esset, si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam
falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum
habemus.
XXXV.
112. Ac mihi
videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim campus in quo
exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum
dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id
percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque
etiam, si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille
sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem
huic loco valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum?
113. Quaero enim quid sit
quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus,
ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito
nimirum adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus
Academia concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet,
vel quod amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum
et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero
quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam
alia, haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae
aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale,
quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo.
Horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque
verum puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.
XXXVI.
114. Illud
ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes idque turpissimum
esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges, ut exponas
disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, finis
bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar
definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et
artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens
nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me
deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est.
115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque
rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem
esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse,
sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se
amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? qui mecum
vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? qui ista
Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola, si
vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet
ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec
quaestio est.
116. In tres igitur
partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est.
Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, videamus: at
illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire
persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura pendent, quae
disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi
necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non persuadere,
sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non quaero ex
his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum progredi non
possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat: extremitatem et
quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: liniamentum sine
ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius
iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes
omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem
esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem deum
censet esse, contempserit.
117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget
et disciplinam? Etsi
quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e
physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor
quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia
constant, videamus quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa
dissensio.
XXXVII.
118. Princeps
Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse primas ferunt, ex
aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo,
non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia
gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aлra, sed ea, quae ex
eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his
omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis inter
se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et
fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a
deo sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis
proficisci volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem,
credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo
condemnatique discedent.
119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic
animo comprehensam habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit
nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem,
habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur,
moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis,
terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea
permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore
deflagret.
XXXVIII. Sint ista vera—vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse
veri—, comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste
Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis
aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum
esse umquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari
operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat
motus mutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum
exsistere, ut hic ornatus umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare,
illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit,
cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur.
120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium,
quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est?
Cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis—,
tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa
ac perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite
tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius
quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque
perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum
opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur.
121. Negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e
transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem
muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius
habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum.
Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec, ut ille, qui
asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse
dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis,
sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut
sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et
motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim
potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum
numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cui non
accidit?—extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen
adsentior, nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.
XXXIX.
122. Latent
ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla
acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare
possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium, quam vim
quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea
nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora
esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid
nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus, ut
videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
media pendeat?
123.
Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram multarum urbium et
montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui dixit, iurare
posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e
regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent
contra nostra vestigia, quos
αντιποδας
vocatis: cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis,
qui, cum audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait
Theophrastus, caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare
censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum
axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae,
si stante terra caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo
dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure?
loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos
ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali
irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat
posse.
124. Sed redeo ad
animum et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura
sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an,
ut Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis
habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex
unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut
Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore—quod intellegi quale sit vix
potest—et, quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in
partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur,
nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in
plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.
XL.
125. Sin agis
verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar, sed
quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem potissimum?
quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui.
Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse,
cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur corporum
cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos ullas,
e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua
mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic
tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post,
alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc simus
ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem
esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire.
126. Non ergo id agitur, ut
aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne
probabilia quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam
esse arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud
scio an ita sit.
XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio?
an Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et
reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua
omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem—ipse enim hic radiatus me
intueri videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui—vos ergo
huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior?
127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones physicorum
exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam
quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, elatiores
fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia
haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum
maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid
occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
voluptate.
128. Quaeret
igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur,
credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi
secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.
Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum
est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde adfirmant,
earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, amittere.
Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix
cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis adfirmabunt
signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non
possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo
illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui
ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non
percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse
percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera
percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis
minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio
comprehendendi.
XLII.
129. Sed quod
coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? nempe fines
constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur: qua de
re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? Omitto illa, quae
relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum
bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo
dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod
esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A
Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne
bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli
similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius.
130. Hos si contemnimus et
iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui
cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse
bonum nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in
mediis ea momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum
bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae
αδιαφορια
ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae
απαθεια nominatur. Has
igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu
multumque defensa sunt.
131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum
princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post
Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de
ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse
Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate
Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,
quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut
indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles
eiusque amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam
Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse
frui rebus iis, quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere,
quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum,
qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.
XLIII.
132. Iam illud
perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis
esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: modo ne quis illud tam
ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem.' Nihil
potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne—omitto
per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem—per
ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca
mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine. Nam
aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non
potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione
contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de
qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur
uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si
Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens—nam vos quidem
nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum—: sin vera sunt Zenonis,
eadem in veteres Academicos
et Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur
neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior?
133. Quid? cum ipse
Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia
peccata esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat
tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue
aliquando quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in
utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim
dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito
assentiar: quod mihi tecum est dogma commune.
134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno in una
virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis
et fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat,
si sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur,
et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
discrepant.
XLIV.
135. Quid? illa,
in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum
numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia
sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non
timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni
necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi vero,
Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem
multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et
venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint
ab Academia vetere
decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant
esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu.
Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit,
ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura
dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa,
misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis
quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus.
136. Atrocitas quidem ista
tua quo modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non
possum, non quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia
Stoicorum, quae
παραδοξα
nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? hos enim
quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges,
solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse?
neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum
quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?
insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta
Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis
quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium?
137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si
es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:
mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.
XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad
senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M.
Marcello coss. praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit,
doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem
dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia
sapiens non sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico
non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat,
non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas
incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca
balbutiens.
138. Vos
autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et
comprobem incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur
saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de
finibus bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem
esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id
esse, si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere,
sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum
honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima
naturae commoda adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat
probabiliter posse defendi.
139. Sit sane ita—quamquam a Polemonis et
Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam
habeo adhuc probabilius—, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas
sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut
Aristippo. Revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos
motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam
Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno,
quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem
sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut
eam probare etiam videretur. Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se
intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim
sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu,
cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate
tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?
XLVI.
140. Unum igitur
par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo
fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa
ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas, amicitia,
iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit
gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur,
ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra
illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte,
quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: fontem omnium
bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem
esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur
habiturum.
141. Nihil
igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam
moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum
interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas,
verum illud certum, comprehensum, perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse
vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil
eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso,
quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia
ista dialecticae nulla sint.
142. Venio enim iam ad
tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium Protagorae est, qui putet id
cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter
permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii: aliud Epicuri, qui omne
iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit.
Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab
opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit.
143. Num quid horum probat
noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut
Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum
probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil
politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.
XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut
cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in
elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne
sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta
contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet.
Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet!
quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus,
opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt?
144. Quid me igitur,
Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut
seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud,
cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui
si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam
primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules,
servos, insanos esse dicatis: deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad
multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos
Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim
defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere.
145. At scire negatis
quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat.
Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat,
'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius
modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem
illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non
fuerat,
καταληψιν
imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte
vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem
nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi
quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu,
Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse.
146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen
nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi
posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile
esset, satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem
sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut
Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos
docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci:
ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod
nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem
maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi
sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,'
quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret,
ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati
iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'
pronuntiarentur.
XLVIII.
147. Verum,
quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat
navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est
mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de
dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae
deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto
opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse
sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum
mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici
texuerunt.
148. Tum
Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim
congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur,
requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum
Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille
Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem
non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita, ut
intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi
possit: qua re
εποχην illam omnium rerum non
probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,
vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum
aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:
Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia.
Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras
descendimus.
NOTES.
BOOK I.
§§1—14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae
(1). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the
promised dedication of the De Lingua Latina is too long delayed,
turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves
this subject untouched (2, 3).
Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and
points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4—6). He greatly believes in
philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he
devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion,
but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless.
Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and
orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and
instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy
(9—12). Varro putting
the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for
the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement
that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to
Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on
the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus
and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of
Antiochus (13, 14).
§1.
Noster:
our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus than of
Cic., see Introd. p.
37.
Nuntiatum: the
spelling
nunciatum is a mistake, cf. Corssen,
Ausspr. I. p. 51.
A M. Varrone:
from M. Varro's
house news came.
Audissemus: Cic. uses the contracted forms of
such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms
like
audiissemus.
Confestim: note how artfully Cic. uses
the dramatic form of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for
Varro.
Ab eius villa: the prep is absent from the MSS., but
Wesenberg (
Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum, p. 62) shows that it must be
inserted. Cic. writes
abesse Roma (
Ad Fam. V. 15, 4),
patria (
T.D. V. 106) etc., but not
abesse officio (
De
Off. I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the
like.
Satis eum longo intervallo: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after
Davies, reads
se visentum for
satis eum, quoting
Ad
Att. I. 4, Madv.
tum for
eum
(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the
repetition of pronouns (
illum,
eum) is quite Ciceronian.
The emphatic
ille is often repeated by the unemphatic
is,
cf.
T.D. III. 71, and
M.D.F. V. 22. I may note that the separation of
satis
from
longo by the word
eum is quite in Cicero's style (see
my note on
25 quanta id magis). Some
editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking
intervallo of
distance in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly
press
satis, which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently."
The words
satis longo intervallo simply = "after a tolerably long
halt." For the clause
ut mos, etc., cf.
De Or. II. 13.
§2.
Hic pauca
primo: for the omission of
locuti, cf. the very similar
passages in
D.F. I. 14,
III. 8, also my note on
14.
Atque ea: Halm brackets
ea, quite needlessly, for its
insertion is like Cic.
Ecquid forte Roma novi:
Roma is the
ablative, and some verb like
attulisset is omitted. (So Turnebus.)
To take it as nom., understanding
faciat, is clearly wrong.
Percontari: the spelling
percunctari rests on false
derivation (Corss.
I. 36).
Ecquid ipse
novi: cf.
De Or. II. 13. The MSS.
have
et si quid, bad Latin altered by Manutius.
Istum: some
edd.
ipsum, but Cic. often makes a speaker use
iste of a
person who is present. Goer. qu.
Brut. 125,
De Or. II. 228.
Velit: Walker reads
velis with
St Jerome. For
quod velit =
quod quis velit, cf.
De
Or. I. 30.
In manibus: so often, cf.
Cat. Mai. 38.
Idque: MSS. have in the place of this
quod with variants
que,
quae,
qui,
quo. Dav. gave
quia, which was the vulgate reading down to
Halm, who reads
idque, after Christ.
Ad hunc enim ipsum:
MSS. have
eum for
enim (exc. Halm's G). Such a combination
of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for expressions like
me illum
ipsum (
Ad Att. II. 1, 11) are not in
point. Of course if
quia be read above,
eum must be ejected
altogether.
Quaedam institui: the
De Lingua Latina; see
Ad. Att XIII. 12.
§3.
E Libone:
the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cжsar
B. Civ. III. 5, 16, 24.
Nihil enim eius modi again all
MSS. except Halm's G. have
eum for
enim. Christ conj.
enim eum; so Baiter.
Illud ... requirere: i.e. the question
which follows; cf.
requiris in
4.
Tecum
simul: Halm's G om.
tecum; but cf.
De Or. III. 330.
Mandare monumentis—letteris
illustrare: common phrases in Cic., e.g.
D.F. I. 1,
T.D. I. 1,
De
Div. II. 4.
Monumentis: this, and not
monimentis (Halm) or
monementis, is probably the right
spelling; cf. Corss.
II. 314.
Ortam a:
Cic.
always writes the prep. after
ortus; cf.
M.D.F.
V. 69.
Genus: regularly used by Cic. as
opus by Quintilian to mean "department of literature."
Ea
res: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has
ars; on the
other hand Bentley (if the
amicus so often quoted in Davies' notes
be really he) reads
artibus for
rebus below. The slight
variation, however, from
res to
artibus is such as Cic.
loves.
Ceteris: the spelling
caeteris (Klotz) is absolutely
wrong, cf. Corss.
I. 325.
Antecedat: some
MSS. give
antecellat. a frequent variant, cf.
De Off. I. 105
§4.
Deliberatam—agitatam: Cic. as usual exaggerates the
knowledge possessed by the
personae of the dialogue; cf. Introd.
p.
38,
De Or. II. 1.
In promptu: so
II. 10.
Quod ista ipsa ...
cogitavi: Goer., who half a page back had made merry over the gloss
hunters, here himself scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo
expels the words. Yet they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf.
De Div.
II. 1,
Cat. Mai. 38), and moreover
nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and clauses in
slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense desire to
flatter Varro.
Si qui ... si essent: the first
si has
really no conditional force,
si qui like
ειτινες
merely means "all who," for a strong instance see
Ad Fam. I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe,
si accusandi sunt, si qui
pertimuerunt.
Ea nolui scribere, etc.: very similar
expressions occur in the prologue to
D.F. I., which should be compared with this prologue
throughout.
§5. Vides ...
didicisti: MSS. have
vides autem eadem ipse didicisti enim. My
reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has
vides autem ipse—didicisti enim eadem—non posse, etc.
Similis: Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write
i and
e indiscriminately in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write
i everywhere, we shall thus, I believe, be far nearer Cicero's
real writing. Though I do not presume to say that his usage did not vary,
he must in the vast majority of instances have written
i, see
Corss.
I. 738—744.
Amafinii aut
Rabirii: cf. Introd. p.
26.
Definiunt ...
partiuntur: n. on
32.
Interrogatione:
Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
Bentl.
argumentatione, Ernesti
ratione. But the word as it
stands has exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
Interrogatio is merely the
conclusio or syllogism put as a
series of questions. Cf.
Paradoxa 2, with
T.D. II. 42 which will show that
interrogatiuncula
and
conclusiuncula are almost convertible terms. See also
M.D.F. I. 39.
Nec dicendi nec
disserendi: Cic.'s constant mode of denoting the Greek
‛ρητορικη
and
διαλεκτικη;
note on
32.
Et oratorum etiam: Man., Lamb.
om.
etiam, needlessly. In
Ad Fam. IX. 25, 3, the two words even occur without any other
word to separate them. For
oratorum Pearce conj.
rhetorum.
Rhetor, however is not thus used in Cic.'s phil. works.
Utramque vim virtutem: strange that Baiter (esp. after Halm's
note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj.
unam for
virtutem. Any power or faculty (vis,
δυναμις) may be called
in Gk.
αρετη, in Lat
virtus. Two
passages,
D.F. III. 72,
De Or.
III. 65, will remove all suspicion from the
text.
Verbis quoque novis: MSS. have
quanquam which however
is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf.
M.D.F. V. 68).
Ne a nobis quidem: so all the MSS., but
Orelli (after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "
arrogantius dictum"
places
quidem after
accipient. The text is quite right,
ne quidem, as Halm remarks, implies no more than the Germ.
auch
nicht, cf. also Gk.
ουδε.
Suscipiatur labor: MSS. om.
the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.
§6. Epicurum, id
est si Democritum: for the charge see
D.F. I. 17,
IV. 13,
N.D.
I. 73.
Id est often introduces in Cic. a
clause which intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause,
exx. in
M.D.F. I. 33.
Cum causas rerum
efficientium sustuleris: cf.
D.F. I.
18, the same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists,
Met. A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read
efficientis, which would then govern
rerum (cf.
D.F.
V. 81,
De Fato, 33, also Gk.
ποιητικος).
But the genitive is merely one of definition, the
causae are the
res efficientes, for which cf.
24 and
Topica, 58,
proximus locus est rerum efficientium, quae causae
appellantur. So Faber, though less fully.
Appellat: i.e.
Amafinius, who first so translated
ατομος.
Quae cum
contineantur: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must
be kept, and
adhibenda etiam begins the
apodosis. Madvig
(
Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos, Hauniae, 1825, p.
108) tacitly reads
continentur without
cum, so Orelli and
Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without
cum.
Quam quibusnam: Durand's em. for
quoniam quibusnam of the
MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (
Em. p. 108) made a
forced defence of
quoniam, as marking a rapid transition from one
subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like the Gk.
επει, only one
parallel instance, however, was adduced (
T.D. III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.
Adducere?: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole
sentence, so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true
system of physics. If
quoniam is read and no break made at
adducere, all after
quoniam will refer to ethics, in that
case there will be a strange change of subject in passing from
quisquam to
haec ipsa, both which expressions will be
nominatives to
poterit, further, there will be the almost
impossible ellipse of
ars,
scientia, or something of the
kind after
haec ipsa. On every ground the reading of Madv. is
insupportable.
Quid, haec ipsa: I have added
quid to fill
up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to have fallen out.
[The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be
elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on
II. 123]
Illi enim
simpliciter: "frankly," cf.
Ad Fam. VIII. 6, 1
Pecudis et hominis: note on
II. 139.
§7. Sive sequare
... magnum est: for the constr. cf.
II. 140.
Magnum est: cf.
quid est magnum,
6.
Verum et simplex bonum: cf.
35.
Quod bonum ... ne suspicari quidem an
opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
T.D. III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with
the Greek preserved by Diog. Laert.
X. 6 (qu.
Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus,
VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353).
Ne suspicari
quidem: for this MSS. give
nec suspicari, but Madv.
(
D.F., Excursus
III.) has conclusively
shown that
nec for
ne ... quidem is post Augustan Latin.
Christ supposes some thing like
sentire to have fallen out before
nec suspicari; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in
D.F. II. 20, 30,
T.D. III. 46,
N.D. I. 111,
where the same opinion of Epicurus is dealt with, we have either
ne
suspicari quidem or
ne intellegere quidem (cf. also
In
Pisonem 69). Further,
ne ... quidem is esp frequent with
suspicari (
D.F. II. 20), and verbs
of the kind (
cogitari II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end
of sentences eg
Verr. II. 1, 155. Notice
negat ... ne suspicari quidem without
se, which however
Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous passages produced from Cic. by
Madv. (
Em. 111), in which not only
se, but
me,
nos, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
infinitive, after verbs like
negat. Cf. also the omission of
sibi in
Paradoxa 40.
Si vero: this, following
sive enim above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule which is to write
sive—sive or
si—sin, but not
si—sive or
sive—si. This and two or three other
similar passages in Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most
important and exhaustive excursus to his
D.F. (p. 785, ed. 2), and
are connected with other instances of broken sequence. There is no need
therefore to read
sive here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others.
Quam nos ... probamus: cf. Introd. p.
62.
Erit explicanda: for the separation of these words by other words
interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see
11,
17. I am surprised that Halm
and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical objection to the
phrase
explicare Academiam, and read
erunt against the
MSS., making
illa plural. If
erunt is read,
erit
must be supplied from it to go with
disserendum, which is harsh.
Quam argute, quam obscure: at first sight an oxymoron, but
argute need not only imply
clearness, it means merely
"acutely".
Quantum possum: some MSS. have
quantam, which is
scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only follows
nequeo,
volo,
malo,
possum, and such verbs when an
infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For
velle see a
good instance in
D.F. III. 68, where
consult Madv.
Constantiam: the notions of firmness, consistency,
and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, cf.
II. 53.
Apud Platonem:
Timaeus, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by Cic., cf.
De
Leg. I. 58,
Laelius 20, 47,
T.D. I. 64.
§8. Id est ...
jubeo: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. But Cicero
is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight variations
in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of slightly varied
phrases connected by
id est in
D.F. I. 72,
II. 6, 90. I therefore
hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words.
Ea a:
Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
e for
a, which Halm would also prefer.
De,
ab, and
ex follow
haurire indifferently in Cic.
Rivulos consectentur: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The
metaphor involved in
fontibus—rivulos is often applied by
Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus in
N.D. I. 120.
Nihil enim magno
opere:
magno opere should be written in two words, not as
magnopere, cf. the phrases
maximo opere,
nimio
opere, the same holds good of
tanto opere,
quanto
opere.
L. Aelii: MSS.
Laelii. The person meant is L.
Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the master of Varro, and the earliest
systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil.
Inst. Or. X. 1, 99, Gellius
X. 21,
Sueton.
Gramm. 3.
Occasum: an unusual metaphor.
Menippum: a Cynic satirist, see
Dict. Biogr. Considerable
fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and have often been
edited—most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
Imitati
non interpretati: Cic.
D.F. I. 7,
gives his opinion as to the right use to be made of Greek models.
†Quae quo: these words are evidently wrong. Halm after
Faber ejects
quae, and is followed by Baiter. Varro is thus made
to say that he stated many things dialectically,
in order that the
populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault lies in the word
quo, for which I should prefer to read
cum (=
quom,
which would be written
quō in the MSS.) The general sense
would then be "Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature
which the unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the
learned read."
Laudationibus:
λογοις
επιταφιοις,
cf.
Ad Att. XIII. 48 where Varro's are
mentioned.
†Philosophe scribere: the MSS. all give
philosophie. Klotz has
philosophiam, which is demonstrably
wrong,
physica,
musica etc.
scribere may be said,
but not
physicam,
musicam etc.
scribere. The one
passage formerly quoted to justify the phrase
philosophiam
scribere is now altered in the best texts (
T.D. V. 121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads
philosophiae scribere; his explanation is, as Orelli gently says,
"vix Latina." I can scarcely think Halm's
philosophe to be right,
the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. almost condemns it by his use of
the Greek
φιλοσοφως
(
Ad Att. XIII. 20). In older Greek the
adverb does not appear, nor is
φιλοσοφος
used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses
philosophus adjectivally
in
T.D. V. 121,
Cat. Mai. 22,
N.D. III. 23, just as he uses
tyrannus (
De Rep. III. 45), and
anapaestus (
T.D. III. 57) Might we
not read
philosophis, in the dative, which only requires the
alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would
then be "to write
for philosophers," which would agree with my
emendation
cum for
quo above.
Philosophice would be
a tempting alteration, but that the word
φιλοσοφικος
is not Greek, nor do
philosophicus,
philosophice occur till
very late Latin times.
Si modo id consecuti sumus: cf.
Brut. 316.
§9. Sunt ista:
=
εστι
ταυτα, so often, e.g.
Lael.
6. Some edd. have
sint, which is unlikely to be right.
Nos in
nostra: Augustine (
De Civ. Dei VI. 2)
quotes this with the reading
reduxerunt for
deduxerunt,
which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's
remark, "
deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus
humanitatis." The words, however, are almost convertible; see
Cat.
Mai. 63. In
Lael. 12,
Brut. 86, we have
reducere, where Durand's rule requires
deducere, on the
other hand cf.
Ad Herennium IV. 64,
hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae etc., August. (
De Civ.
Dei VI. 3) describes Varro's "
Libri
Antiquitatum" (referred to in
8), in which most
of the subjects here mentioned were treated of.
Descriptiones
temporum: lists of dates, so
χρονοι is technically used
for dates, Thuc.
V. 20, etc.
Tu
sacerdotum: after this Lamb. inserts
munera to keep the
balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of
formal accuracy.
Domesticam—bellicam: opposed like
domi
bellique, cf.
Brut. 49,
De Off. I. 74. Augustine's reading
publicam shows him
to have been quoting from memory.
Sedem: so the best MSS. of Aug.,
some edd. here give
sedium. The argument for
sedem is the
awkwardness of making the three genitives,
sedium,
regionum,
locorum, dependent on the accusatives,
nomina,
genera,
officia,
causas. Cic. is fond
of using
sedes,
locus,
regio together, see
Pro
Murena, 85,
Pro Cluentio, 171, quoted by Goer.
Omnium
divinarum humanarumque rerum: from the frequent references of Aug. it
appears that the "
Libri Antiquitatum" were divided into two parts,
one treating of
res humanae, the other of
res divinae
(
De Civ. Dei,
IV. 1, 27,
VI. 3).
Et litteris luminis: for
luminis, cf.
T.D. I. 5.
Et
verbis: Manut. reads
rebus from
26.
Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant.
Multis locis
incohasti: Varro's book "
De Philosophia" had apparently not
yet been written.
§10. Causa:
=
προφασις.
Probabilem: = specious.
Nesciunt: Halm with his one MS. G,
which is the work of a clever emendator, gives
nescient to suit
malent above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to
force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm
himself allows to be broken in two similar passages,
II. 20,
105.
Sed da mihi nunc, satisne probas?: So
all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj.
sed ea (eam) mihi non
sane probas. This last Baiter gives, while Halm after Durand reads
sed eam mihi non satis probas, which is too far from the MSS. to
please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though
da
mihi for
dic mihi is certainly poetic.
Da te mihi
(Manut., Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be
supported by
12,
Brut. 306,
Ad Fam.
II. 8, or such like passages.
Attius: the
old spelling
Accius is wrong.
Si qui ... imitati: note the
collocation, and cf.
17. Halm needlessly writes
sint for MSS.
sunt. For this section throughout cf. the
prologues to
D.F. I.,
T.D. I. and
II.
§11.
Procuratio: for the proper meaning of
procurator and
procuratio see Jordan on
Pro Caecina 55.
Implacatum et
constrictum: the conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual;
cf.
17 plenam ac refertam,
II. 127 exigua et
minima, so
και
in Greek.
Inclusa habebam: cf.
T.D. I. 1.
Obsolescerent, used of
individual
memory, is noteworthy.
Percussus volnere: many edd. give the
frequent variant
perculsus. The
volnus, which Goer. finds
so mysterious, is the death of Tullia, cf.
N.D. I. 9,
De Consolatione, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe,
and Introd. p.
32.
Aut ... aut ... aut ...
aut: This casting about for an excuse shows how low philosophy stood
in public estimation at Rome. See Introd. p.
29.
The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the exordium of
N.D. I.
§12. Brutus:
the same praise often recurs in
D.F. and the
Brutus Graecia
desideret so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has
Graeca. Halm
(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger,
Graeca
desideres. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's
Philologus
XXIV. 483, approves the reading on the curious
ground that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but
rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to have recourse to Greece for
philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for Greece with Cicero is the
supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if she is satisfied the
philosophic world is tranquil. Cf.
Ad Att. I. 20, 6,
D.F. I. 8,
Ad Qu. Fr. II. 16, 5. I just note the em.
of Turnebus,
a Graecia desideres, and that of Dav.
Graecia
desideretur.
Eandem sententiam: cf. Introd. p.
56.
Aristum: cf.
II.
11, and
M.D.F. V.
8.
§13. Sine
te: =
σου
διχα.
Relictam: Cic. very rarely
omits
esse, see note on
II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.
20.
Veterem illam: MSS. have
iam for
illam. The position of
iam would be strange, in the passage
which used to be compared,
Pro Cluentio 16, Classen and Baiter now
om. the word. Further,
vetus and
nova can scarcely be so
barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading
illam is from Madv. (
Em. 115), and is supported by
illam
veterem (
18),
illa antiqua (
22),
istius veteris (
D.F. V. 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and
Bait.) thinks
iam comprises the last two syllables of
Academiam, which he reads.
Correcta et emendata: a fine
sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often occur
together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of expression,
cf.
De Leg. III. 30,
D.F. IV. 21, also Tac.
Hist. I. 37.
Negat: MSS. have
negaret, but
Cic. never writes the subj. after
quamquam in
oratio recta,
as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the
sentence; see
M.D.F. III. 70. Nothing is
commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for the
pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and
vice versa.
In
libris: see
II. 11.
Duas Academias: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
refer to R. and P. 404.
Contra ea Philonis: MSS. have
contra
Philonis merely, exc. Halm's
V., which gives
Philonem, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added
ea.
Orelli quotes
Ad Att. XII. 23, 2,
ex
Apollodori. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and
libros may be
supplied from
libris above, so in
Ad Att. XIII. 32, 2,
Dicaearchi περι
ψυχης utrosque, the word
libros has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar
ellipse of
bona in
19,
22. Madvig's
Philonia is improbable from its
non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective
Antiochius
is frequent. Halm inserts
sententiam, a heroic remedy. To make
contra an adv. and construe
Philonis Antiochus together,
supplying
auditor, as is done by some unknown commentators who
probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified
by
D.F. V. 13.
§14. A qua absum
iam diu: MSS. have strangely
aqua absumtam diu, changed by
Manut.
Renovari: the vulg.
revocari is a curious instance
of oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note
he gave
renovari. Orelli—who speaks of Goerenz's
"
praestantissima recensio," and founds his own text upon it two
years after Madvig's crushing exposure in his
Em. often quoted by
me—not only reads
revocari, but quotes
renovari as an
em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no
independent value, took it.
Renovare in Cic. often means "to
refresh the memory," e.g.
11,
Brut. 315.
Nisi molestum est: like
nisi alienum putas, a variation on
the common
si placet, si videtur.
Adsidamus: some MSS. have
adsideamus, which would be wrong here.
Sane istud: Halm
istuc from G.
Inquit: for the late position of this word,
which is often caused by its affinity for
quoniam,
quidem,
etc., cf.
M.D.F. III. 20
Quae cum
essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes): most edd. since
Gulielmus print this without
essent as a hexameter, and suppose it
a quotation. But firstly, a verse so commonplace, if familiar, would
occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if not familiar, would not be given
without the name of its author. Secondly, most MSS. have
sint or
essent before
dicta. It is more probable therefore that
omnes was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
hexameter rhythm. Phrases like
quae cum essent dicta consedimus
often occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf.
De Div.
II. 150, and Augustine, the imitator of Cic.,
Contra Academicos,
I. 25, also
consedimus at the end of a clause in
Brut. 24, and
considitur in
De Or. III. 18.
Mihi vero: the omission of
inquit, which is strange to
Goer., is well illustrated in
M.D.F. I.
9. There is an odd ellipse of
laudasti in
D.F. V. 81.
§§15—42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy.
First part of Varro's Exposition, 15—18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics
supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets,
his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of
ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (16).
Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master, from him sprang
two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted
definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one
another—the Peripatetic and the Academic (17,
18).
§15. A rebus ...
involutis: physical phenomena are often spoken of in these words by
Cic., cf.
19,
Timaeus c. 1,
D.F.
I. 64,
IV. 18,
V. 10,
N.D. I. 49.
Ursinus rejected
ab here, but the insertion or omission of
ab after the passive verb depends on the degree to which
natura is personified, if
28 be compared
with
Tim. c. 1, this will be clear.
Involutis = veiled; cf.
involucrum. Cic. shows his feeling of the metaphor by adding
quasi in
II. 26,
and often.
Avocavisse philosophiam: this, the Xenophontic view of
Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's time, cf.
II. 123,
T.D. V. 10,
D.F. V. 87, 88,
also Varro in Aug.
De Civ. Dei,
VIII. 3.
Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were curiously answered
in
De Rep. I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug.
De Civ. Dei,
VIII. 4). The same view is
supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the passages quoted by R. and P.
141. To form an opinion on this difficult question the student should
read Schleiermacher's
Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a
Philosopher (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's
Socrates and the
Socratic Schools, Eng. Trans., pp. 112—116 [I dissent from his
view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's
Handbook, so far
as it relates to Socrates and Plato.
Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
valere:
valere is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm,
its use in
21 makes it more probable than
conferre, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius vainly tries to
justify the MSS. reading by such passages as
D.F. I. 39,
T.D. I. 70. The
strangest ellipse with
nihil ad elsewhere in Cic. is in
De
Leg. I. 6.
§16. Hic ...
illum: for this repetition of pronouns see
M.D.F. IV. 43.
Varie et copiose: MSS. omit
et,
but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two
adverbs stand
together without
et, though three may (cf.
II. 63), and though with pairs of
nouns and
adjectives, et often is left out, as in the passages quoted here
by Manut.
Ad Att. IV. 3, 3,
Ad
Fam. XIII. 24,
XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg,
reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works
(1861), on
T.D. III. 6.
Varie et
copiose is also in
De Or. II. 240.
Cf. the omission of
que in
23, also
II. 63.
Perscripti: Cic.
like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were
authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf.
II. 74.
Nihil adfirmet:
so
T.D. I. 99. "
Eoque praestare
ceteris" this is evidently from Plato
Apol. p. 21, as to the
proper understanding of which see note on
II. 74.
Ab Apolline, Plato
Apol. 21 A,
Omnium: Dav. conj.
hominum needlessly.
Dictum:
Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads
iudicatum, it is remarkable that
in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (
Cato Mai.
78,
Lael. 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb
iudicare.
Una
omnis: Lamb.
hominis, Baiter also.
Omnis eius oratio
tamen:
notwithstanding his negative dialectic he gave positive
teaching in morals.
Tamen: for MSS.
tam or
tum is
due to Gruter, Halm has
tantum.
Tam,
tum and
tamen are often confused in MSS., e.g.
In Veri (
Act
II.)
I. 3, 65,
II. 55, 112,
V. 78, where see
Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that
tum ... et,
tum
... que,
et ... tum, correspond in Cic. like
tum ...
cum,
tum ... tum. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled
by
Ac. II. 1,
43.
Ad virtutis studium cohortandis: this
broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's
Socrates 88,
with footnote.
§17. Varius et
multiplex, et copiosus: these characteristics are named to account
for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
multiplex "many sided," cf.
T.D. V. 11.
Una et consentiens: this is an opinion
of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
D.F.
IV. 5
De Leg. I.
38,
De Or. III. 67. Five ancient
philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious
Academico-Peripatetic school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus,
Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
D.F. IV. 2),
sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have been first
broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in Aug.
De
Civ. Dei XIX. 1, cf. also
34. Antiochus doubtless rested his theory almost
entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
D.F.
V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus,
this appears, as also in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as
though ethics were the whole of philosophy (cf. also
De Off. III. 20). Antiochus probably made light of such
dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
ιδεαι,
which had long ceased. Krische
Uber Cicero's Akademika p. 51, has
some good remarks.
Nominibus: the same as
vocabulis above.
Cic. does not observe Varro's distinction (
De L. L. IX. 1) which confines
nomen to proper nouns,
vocabulum to common nouns, though he would not use
vocabulum as Tac. does, for the name of a person (
Annals
XII. 66, etc.).
Quasi heredem ... duos
autem: the conj. of Ciaconus "
ex asse heredem, secundos autem"
is as acute as it is absurd.
Duos: it is difficult to decide
whether this or
duo is right in Cic., he can scarcely have been so
inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and Halm's ed.,
Ac. II. 11,
13 with
De Div. I.
6). The older inscr. in the
Corpus vol.
I. have
duo, but only in
duoviros, two
near the time of Cic. (
C.I. vol.
I. nos.
571 and 1007) give
duos, which Cic. probably wrote.
Duo is
in old Latin poets and Virgil.
Chalcedonium: not
Calchedonium as Klotz, cf. Gk.
Χαλκηδονιον.
Praestantissimos: Halm wrongly, cf.
Brut. 125.
Stagiritem: not
Stagiritam as Lamb., for Cic., exc. in a
few nouns like
Persa,
pirata, etc., which came down from
antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in
-ης into Latin nouns in
-a. See
M.D.F.
II. 94.
Coetus ... soliti: cf.
10.
Platonis ubertate: cf. Quintilian's
"
illa Livii lactea ubertas."
Plenum ac refertam: n. on
11.
Dubitationem: Halm with one MS., G, gives
dubitantem, Baiter
dubitanter, Why alter?
Ars quaedam
philosophiae: before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert
disserendi, probably from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and
ejects
philosophiae, while Lamb., Day read
philosophia in
the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy became entirely
dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics.
Ars =
τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so
Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the
certa dogmata of this old
school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy.
Descriptio: so Halm here, but often
discriptio. The
Corp. Inscr., vol.
I. nos. 198 and 200,
has thrice
discriptos or
discriptum, the other spelling
never.
§18. Ut mihi
quidem videtur: MSS. transpose
quidem and
videtur, as
in
44.
Quidem, however nearly always comes
closely after the pronoun, see
M.D.F. IV.
43, cf. also
I. 71,
III. 28,
Opusc. I.
406.
Expetendarum fugiendarumque:
‛αιρετων
και
φευκτων, about which
more in n. on
36. The Platonic and Aristotelian
ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the
two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did
away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system.
The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of
Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much
greater than it was.
Non sus Minervam: a Greek proverb, cf.
Theocr.
Id. V. 23,
De Or. II. 233,
Ad Fam. IX.
18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the
Academica, also
quotes Plutarch
Prжc. Polit. 7.
Inepte ... docet: elliptic
for
inepte docet, quisquis docet.
Nostra atque nostros: few
of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian,
and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the
words "
tui cives," meaning the Athenians, often occur.
Quid me
putas: i.e.
velle.
Exhibiturum: Halm inserts
me
before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist.
For the omission of
me, cf. note on
7.
§§19—23. Part II. of Varro's
Exposition: Antiochus' Ethics. Summary. The threefold division of
philosophy into ηθικη,
φυσικη,
διαλεκτικη.
Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural
advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The
bodily are described (19); then the mental, which
fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of
the acquired (20), then the external, which form
with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated,
in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing
happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the
possession of all three classes of advantages (22).
With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account
of action and duty (23).
§19. Ratio
triplex: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's
time, so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug.
De Civ. Dei
VIII. 4, and by Diog. Laert.
III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself
cannot be traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian
Peripatetics, to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp.
Adv. Math.
VII. 16. It was probably first brought into
strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more sharply and
decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. esp.
M.D.F. IV. 3.
Quid verum ... repugnans
iudicando: MSS. exc. G have
et before
quid falsum,
whence Klotz conj.
sit in order to obviate the awkwardness of
repugnet which MSS. have for
repugnans. Krische wishes to
read
consequens for
consentiens, comparing
Orator
115,
T.D. V. 68,
De Div. II. 150, to which add
T.D. V. 21 On the other hand cf.
II. 22,
91. Notice the double translations of the Greek
terms,
de vita et moribus for
ηθικη, etc. This is very
characteristic of Cic., as we shall see later.
Ac primum: many
MSS. and edd.
primam, cf.
23,
30.
A natura petebant: how Antiochus could have
found this in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so,
however, is indubitable; see
D.F. V.
24—27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro
in Aug.
XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is
the
ιδεα of
the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the
abstract
φυσις, that he scarcely appeals
even incidentally to
φυσις in his ethical works. The
abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly
apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into
those of Antiochus.
Adeptum esse omnia: put rather differently in
D.F. V. 24, 26, cf. also
D.F.
II. 33, 34,
Ac. II. 131.
Et animo et
corpore et vita: this is the
τριας or
τριλογια
των αγαθων,
which belongs in this form to late Peripateticism (cf.
M.D.F.
III. 43), the third division is a development
from the
βιος
τελειος of Aristotle.
The
τριας in this distinct shape is
foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus,
Ethica II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro
seems to merge the two last divisions into one in Aug.
De Civ. Dei
XIX 3. This agrees better with
D.F. V.
34—36, cf. also Aug.
VIII. 8. On the
Antiochean
finis see more in note on
22.
Corporis alia: for ellipse of
bona, see n. on
13.
Ponebant esse: n. on
36.
In toto in partibus: the same distinction
is in Stob.
Eth. II. 6, 7; cf. also
D.F. V. 35.
Pulchritudinem: Cic.
Orator 160, puts the spelling
pulcher beyond a doubt; it
often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only
pulcrai,
pulcrum, etc., occur in inscr., exc.
pulchre, which is found once (
Corp. Inscr. I. no 1019).
Sepulchrum, however, is frequent
at an early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see
Boscher in Curtius'
Studien II. 1, p.
145. In the case of
pulcher the false derivation from
πολυχροος
may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger
derived it from
πολυ χειρ
(Curtius'
Grundz ed. 3, p. 8) For
valetudinem viris
pulchritudinem, cf. the
‛υγιεια
ισχυς
καλλος of Stob.
Eth.
II. 6, 7, and
T.D. V. 22.
Sensus integros ευαισθησια
in Stob., cf. also
D.F. V. 36 (
in
sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus).
Celeritatem: so
ποδωκεια in
Stob.,
bene currere in Aug.
XIX. 3.
Claritatem in voce: cf.
De Off. I.
133.
Impressionem: al.
expressionem. For the former cf.
De Or. III. 185, which will show the
meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter
De
Or. III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's
remark "
imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit." See also
De
Off. I. 133. One old ed. has
pressionem, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls
presse
loqui, and
N.D. II. 149. Pliny,
Panegyric, c. 64, has
expressit explanavitque verba; he and
Quintilian often so use
exprimere.
§20.
Ingeniis: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf.
T.D. III. 2, and
animis below and in
N.D.
II. 58.
In naturam et mores: for
in ea
quae natura et moribus fiunt. A similar inaccuracy of expression is
found in
II. 42. The
division is practically Aristotle's, who severs
αρεται into
διανοητικαι
and
ηθικαι (
Nic. Eth.
I. c. 13,
Magna Mor. I. c. 5). In
D.F. V.
38 the
διανοητικαι
are called
non voluntariae, the
ηθικαι voluntariae.
Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam: cf. the
ευμαθεια,
μνημη of Arist. (who adds
αγχινοια
σοφια
φρονησις), and the
docilitas, memoria of
D.F. V. 36.
Quasi consuetudinem: the
quasi marks a translation from the
Greek, as frequently, here probably of
εθισμος (
Nic.
Eth. II. c. 1).
Partim ratione
formabant: the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in
Nic. Eth. VI. c. 2.
In quibus:
i.e.
in moribus. All the late schools held that ethics formed the
sole ultimate aim of philosophy.
Erat: note the change from
oratio obliqua to
recta, and cf. the opposite change in
II. 40.
Progressio: this, like the whole of the sentence in which it
stands, is intensely Stoic. For the Stoic
προκορη,
προκοπτειν
εις αρετην,
cf.
M.D.F. IV. 64, 66, R. and P. 392,
sq., Zeller,
Stoics 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be
Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus.
Perfectio
naturae: cf. esp.
De Leg. I. 25. More
Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the
reason, cf.
II. 26,
D.F. IV. 35,
V. 38, and Madvig's note on
D.F. II. 88. Faber quotes Galen
De Decr. Hipp. et
Plat. c. 5,
‛η αρετη
τελειοτης
εστι της
‛εκαστου
φυσεος.
Una res optima:
the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug.
XIX. 3, cf. also
D.F. V. 36, 38.
§21. Virtutis
usum: so the Stoics speak of their
αδιαφορα as the
practising ground for virtue (
D.F. III.
50), cf.
virtutis usum in Aug.
XIX. 1.
Nam virtus: most MSS. have
iam, which is out of place here.
Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam: MSS. omit
et between
cernitur and
in, exc. Halm's G which has
in before
animi and also before
corporis. These last
insertions are not necessary, as may be seen from
Topica 80,
causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur
aut in
omnibus aut in
plerisque, also
T.D. V. 22. In Stob.
II. 6, 8, the
τελος
of the Peripatetics is stated to be
το κατ'
αρετην ζην
εν τοις περι
σωμα και
τοις εξωθεν
αγαθοις, here
quibusdam quae etc., denote the
εξωθεν or
εκτος
αγαθα, the third class in
19.
Hominem ... societate: all this is strongly
Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob.
II. 6, 7 (
κοινη
φιλανθρωπια),
etc., doubtless the humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the
φυσει
ανθρωπος
πολιτικον
ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf.
D.F. III. 66,
De Leg. I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293—296. The
repetitions
hominem,
humani,
hominibus,
humana are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous
friend) proposed
mundana from
T.D. V. 108, Varro, however, has
humana societas in
Aug.
XIX. 3.
Cetera autem: what are these
cetera? They form portion of the
εκτος
αγαθα, and although not strictly
contained within the
summum bonum are necessary to enrich it and
preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob.
II. 6, 8, 13,
φιλια,
φιλοι would belong to the
quaedam of Cicero, while
πλουτος
αρχη
ευτυχια
ευγενεια
δυναστεια
would be included in
cetera. The same distinction is drawn in Aug.
VIII. 8.
Tuendum: most MSS.
tenendum, but
tuendum corresponds best with the division of
αγαθα into
ποιητικα and
φυλακτικα,
Stob.
II. 6, 13. For the word
pertinere
see
M.D.F. III. 54.
§22.
Plerique: Antiochus believes it also Academic.
Qui tum
appellarentur: MSS.
dum, the subj. is strange, and was felt to
be so by the writer of Halm's G, which has
appellantur.
Videbatur: Goer. and Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that
it has the strong meaning of the Gr.
εδοκει, "it was their dogma,"
so often.
Adipisci: cf.
adeptum esse,
19.
Quae essent prima natura: MSS. have
in
natura. For the various modes of denoting the
πρωτα
κατα φυσιν
in Latin see Madvig's
Fourth Excursus to the D.F., which the
student of Cic.'s philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase
prima
natura (abl.) could not stand alone, for
τα πρωτα τη
φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous
forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A
comparison of this statement of the ethical
finis with that in
19 and the passages quoted in my note there, will show
that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic
τα
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν and the Peripatetic
τριλογια. That
this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his
Excursus, but he
does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly
correctly reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug.
De
Civ. Dei XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in
every particular. Even the
inexplicabilis perversitas of which
Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen
from Augustine
XIX. 1, 3, included even
virtus among the
prima naturae. A little reflection will
show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical
identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the
finis. I regret
that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther.
For the Stoic
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν see Zeller, chap
XI. Ipsa per sese expetenda: Gk.
‛αιρετα, which is
applied to all things contained within the
summum bonum. As the
Stoic
finis was
αρετη only, that alone to them was
‛αιρετον, their
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν were not
‛αιρετα, (cf.
D.F. III. 21). Antiochus'
prima
naturae were
‛αιρετα to him, cf.
Aug.
XIX. 3,
prima illa naturae propter se
ipsa existimat expetenda so Stob.,
II. 6, 7,
demonstrates each branch of the
τριλογια to be
καθ'
‛αυτο
‛αιρετον.
Aut
omnia aut maxima: so frequently in Cic., e.g.
D.F. IV. 27, so Stob.
II. 6, 8,
τα
πλειστα και
κυριωτατα.
Ea sunt maxima: so Stob., Varro in Aug.
passim.
Sensit: much misunderstood by edd., here =
iudicavit not
animadvertit cf.
M.D.F. II. 6.
Reperiebatur: for change of constr. cf.
D.F. IV. 26
Nec tamen beatissimam: the question
whether
αρετη was
αυταρκες
προς
ευδαιμονιαν
was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to
Antiochus, consult
M.D.F. V. 67.
§23. Agendi
aliquid: Gk.
πραξεως, the usual
translation, cf.
II. 24,
37.
Officii ipsius initium:
του
καθηκοντος
αρχην, Stob.
II. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New
Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the
ground from action and duty, see
II. 24.
Recti honestique: these words are redolent
of the Stoa.
Earum rerum: Halm thinks something like
appetitio has fallen out,
susceptio however, above, is
quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in
D.F. III. 32.
Descriptione
naturae: Halm with one MS. (G) gives
praescriptione, which is
in
II. 140, cf. also
praescriberet above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf.
prima
constitutio naturae in
D.F. IV. 15.
Aequitas: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
επιεικεια.
Eaeque: so Halm for MSS.
haeque,
haecque. Of course
haecque, like
hicque,
sicque, would be
un-Ciceronian.
Voluptatibus: a side blow at the Epicureans.
Forma see n. on
33.
§§24—29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus'
Physics. Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which
are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate.
When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed
entity (ποιον τι or
quale)—(24). These formed entities are
either primary or secondary. Air, fire, water, earth are
primary, the two first having an active, the two last a passive function.
Aristotle added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed
entities is the formless matter, matter and space are infinitely
subdivisible (27). Force or form acts on the
formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside which no
matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This
Reason has various names—Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom,
Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing
(28, 29).
§24. Natura:
this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a translation both
of
φυσις and
ουσια. Here it is
ουσια
in the broadest sense, all that exists.
In res duas: the
distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in
the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however
probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this
read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of
Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler,
Handbook, pp
99—105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important
coincidence of Force with logical
genus (
ειδος), and of Matter
(
‛υλη) with
logical
differentia (
διαφορα). For the
duae res, cf.
D.F. I. 18.
Efficiens ... huic se praebens: an attempt to translate
το
ποιουν and
το
πασχον of the
Theaetetus,
το
οθεν and
το
δεχομενον of
the
Timaeus (50 D). Cic. in
Tim. has
efficere and
pati, Lucretius
I. 440
facere and
fungi.
Ea quae: so Gruter, Halm for MSS.
eaque. The
meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by an active generative
form results in an
aliquid, a
τοδε τι as Aristotle calls
it. Passive matter
‛υλη is only potentially
τοδε τι,
passing into actual
τοδε τι, when affected by the
form. (Cf.
τοδε,
τουτο, Plato
Tim. 49 E, 50 A,
also Arist.
Metaph H, 1, R. and P. 270—274). A figurative
description of the process is given in
Timaeus, 50 D.
In eo
quod efficeret ... materiam quandam: Cic. is hampered by the
patrii sermonis egestas, which compels him to render simple Greek
terms by laboured periphrases.
Id quod efficit is not distinct
from, but
equivalent to
vis,
id quod efficitur to
materia.
Materiam quandam: it is extraordinary how edd.
(esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over
quandam and
quasi
used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) simply mark the
unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, in the Greek
‛υλη the
strangeness had had time to wear off.
In utroque: for
in eo
quod ex utroque (sc.
vi et materia)
fit, the meaning is
clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot
actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed
entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.
Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur: the meaning of this
is clear, that nothing can
exist except in space
(alicubi),
it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless
est be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence
the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent
the belief of Aristotle and Plato. The
ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato
in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle
explicitly says this,
Phys. III. 4).
Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in space,
as in
Phys. IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289).
Cic. perhaps translates here from
Tim. 52 B,
φαμεν
αναγκαιον
ειναι που το
‛ον ‛απαν
εν τινι
τοπω. For ancient theories about space the
student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair summary
is given by Stob.
Phys. περι κενου
και τοπου
και χωρας, ch.
XVIII. 1.
Corpus et quasi qualitatem:
note that
corpus is
formed, as contrasted with
materia,
unformed matter.
Qualitas is here wrongly
used for
quale; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the
product of Force and Matter, cf.
28. The Greeks
themselves sometimes confuse
ποιοτης and
ποιον, the
confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the phrase
το
ποιον in Greek, which may either
denote the
τοδε
τι as
ποιον, or the Force which makes it
ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of
his categories
το
ποιον and
ποιοτης
indifferently For the Stoic view of
ποιοτης, see Zeller,
96—103, with footnotes.
§25. Bene
facis:
passim in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf.
D.F.
III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly
like this.
Rhetoricam: Hьlsemann conj.
ethicam, which
however is
not Latin. The words have no philosophical significance
here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised.
D.F. III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words
make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first
declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in
en.
Non est vulgi verbum: it first appears in
Theaet. 182 A, where it is called
αλλοκοτον
ονομα.
Nova ... facienda: =
imponenda in
D.F. III. 5.
Suis
utuntur: so
D.F. III. 4.
Transferenda:
transferre =
μεταφερειν,
which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor,
De Or. III. 153 sq., where
necessitas is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf.
also
De Or. III. 149.
Saecula: the
spelling
secula is wrong; Corss.
I. 325,
377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from
secare, and
sequi.
Quanto id magis: Cic. is exceedingly fond of
separating
tam quam ita tantus quantus, etc., from the words with
which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g.
Lael. 53
quam id recte,
Acad. II. 125
tam sit mirabilis,
II. 68
tam in praecipitem; also
D.F.
III. 5
quanto id nobis magis est concedendum
qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere.
§26. Non modo
rerum sed verborum: cf.
9.
Igitur picks
up the broken thread of the exposition; so
35, and
frequently.
Principes ... ex his ortae: the Greek terms are
‛απλα and
συνθετα, see Arist.
De Coelo,
I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The
distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both
Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly
Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be
found in R. and P. 297.
Quasi multiformes: evidently a trans. of
πολυειδεις,
which is opposed to
‛απλους in Plat.
Phaedr. 238 A, and often. Plato uses also
μονοειδης
for
unius modi; cf. Cic.
Tim. ch.
VII., a transl. of Plat.
Tim. 35 A.
Prima
sunt:
primae (sc.
qualitates) is the needless em. of
Walker, followed by Halm.
Formae =
genera,
ειδη. The word is applied to
the four elements themselves,
N.D. I. 19;
cf. also
quintum genus below, and
Topica, 11—13. A
good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be
gained from the section of Stob.
Phys., entitled
περι αρχων
και
στοιχειων
και του
παντος. It will be there seen
that Cic. is wrong in making
initia and
elementa here and
in
39 (
αρχαι and
στοιχεια)
convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements
στοιχεια but
not αρχαι, which term would be reserved
for the primary Matter and Force.
Aлr et ignis: this is Stoic but
not Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary
properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two
former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns
two
of these properties,
one active and
one passive, to each of
the four elements; each therefore is to him
both active and
passive. The Stoics assign only
one property to each element; heat
to fire, cold to air (cf.
N.D. II. 26),
moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at
once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.
Accipiendi ... patiendi:
δεχεσθαι often
comes in Plat.
Tim. Quintum genus: the note on this,
referred to in Introd. p.
16, is postponed to
39.
Dissimile ... quoddam: so MSS.; one would
expect
quiddam, which Orelli gives.
Rebatur: an old
poetical word revived by Cic.
De Or. III.
153; cf. Quintil.
Inst. Or. VIII. 3,
26.
§27. Subiectam
... materiam: the
‛υποκειμενη
‛υλη of Aristotle, from which our word
subject-matter is descended.
Sine ulla specie:
species here
=
forma above, the
ειδος or
μορφη of Arist.
Omnibus without
rebus is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes
avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in
21 in
quibusdam,
quae.
Expressa: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf.
expressa effigies
De Off.
III. 69);
efficta, moulded
as by a potter (see
II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS.
effecta. So Matter is called an
εκμαγειον
in Plat.
Tim. Quae tota omnia: these words have given rise
to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them.
Tota is
feminine sing.; cf.
materiam totam ipsam in
28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can
suffer all changes." For the word
omnia cf.
II. 118, and Plat.
Tim.
50 B (
δεχεται γαρ
ηι τα
παντα), 51 A (
ειδος
πανδεχες). The
word
πανδεχες is also
quoted from Okellus in Stob.
I. 20, 3. Binder is
certainly wrong in taking
tota and
omnia both as
neut.—"
alles und jedes." Cic. knew the
Tim. well and
imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the
passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
Plato's
‛υλη and that of Aristotle.
Eoque
interire: so MSS.; Halm after Dav.
eaque. Faber was right in
supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the
materia what he ought
to have said of the
qualia. Of course the
προτε
‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian,
is imperishable (cf.
Tim. 52 A.
φθοραν ου
προσδεχομενον).
Non in nihilum: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that
infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing
and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr.
I. 215—264, and elsewhere.
Infinite
secari: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the
infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox
one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf.
D.F. I. 20
ne illud quidem physici credere esse
minimum, Arist.
Physica,
I. 1
ουκ
εστιν
ελαχιστον
μεγεθος. The history of
ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close
enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn
Plato's opinions from
Tim. 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,
tripping over the old
αντιφασις
of the One and the Many, denied
παν μεγεθος
διαιρετον
ειναι και
μερος
εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus
followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378).
Intervallis
moveri: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr.
I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext.
Emp.
Adv. Math. VII. 214. Aristotle
denied the existence of void either within or without the universe,
Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence
without (Stob.
I. 18, 1), the Stoics did the
exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the
universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes).
Quae intervalla ...
possint: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter
atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed
Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and
especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the
Physica.
§28. Ultro
citroque: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness.
MSS. have
ultro introque, whence
ed. Rom. (1471) has
ultro in utroque. I think that
in utroque, simply, was the
reading, and that
ultro is a dittographia from
utro. The
meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound,"
utroque being as in
24 for
eo quod ex
utroque fit. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
motion and is ever thus on the move."
Ultro citroque is an odd
expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with
a
quasi. Indeed if it is kept I suggest
quasi for
cum
sic. The use of
versetur is also strange.
E quibus in omni
natura: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject
in. It is
perfectly sound if
natura be taken as
ουσια = existence
substance. The meaning is "out of which
qualia, themselves
existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf.
totam
commutari above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was
formed." For the
in cf.
N.D. II.
35,
in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid, also a similar use
ib. II. 80, and
Ac. II. 42. If
in utroque be
read above,
in omni natura will form an exact contrast, substance
as a whole being opposed to the individual
quale.
Cohaerente et
continuata: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than
any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in
N.D. II. 19, 84, 119,
De Div.
II. 33,
De Leg. fragm. 1. (at the end of
Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if
they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob.
I. 22, 3. The
partes mundi are spoken of in
most of the passages just quoted, also in
N.D. II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic
sources.
Effectum esse mundum: Halm adds
unum from his
favourite MS. (G).
Natura sentiente: a clumsy trans. of
αισθητη
ουσια = substance which can affect
the senses. The same expression is in
N.D. II. 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to
the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf.
N.D. II. 22, 47, 87.
Teneantur: for
contineantur; cf.
N.D. II. 29 with
II. 31
In qua ratio perfecta insit: this
is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are
interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145—150 By an
inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason
is the
Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being
in the Universe, as
here (cf. Diog. Laert.
VII. 138,
N.D.
II. 34) In a curious passage (
N.D. I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same
inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life,
extends through all extent".
Sempiterna: Aristotle held this: see
II. 119 and
N.D.
II. 118, Stob.
I. 21,
6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire
(Diog. Laert.
VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob.
I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an
absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out
of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert.
VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics
however denied the
εκπυρωσις.
Nihil enim valentius: this is an argument often urged, as in
N.D. II. 31 (
quid potest esse mundo
valentius?), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159.
A quo intereat:
interire here replaces the passive of
perdere cf.
αναστηναι,
εκπιπτειν
‛υπο
τινος.
§29. Quam vim
animum: there is no need to read
animam, as some edd. do. The
Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch.
VI. passim. Nearly all these names occur in
N.D. II. The whole of this section is
undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
Sapientiam: cf.
N.D. II. 36 with
III. 23, in which latter passage the Stoic
opinion is severely criticised.
Deum: Cic. in
N.D. I. 30 remarks that Plato in his
Timaeus had
already made the
mundus a God.
Quasi prudentium quandam:
the Greek
προνοια is translated
both by
prudentia and
providentia in the same passage,
N.D. II. 58, also in
N.D. II. 77—80.
Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad
homines: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see
Ac. II. 120,
N.D. I. 23,
II. 160 (where there
is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq.
Necessitatem:
αναγκην, which is
ειρμος
αιτιων,
causarum series
sempiterna (
De Fato 20, cf.
N.D. I. 55,
De Div. I. 125,
127, Diog.
VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This
is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of
cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is
expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence.
Τυχη therefore is
defined as
αιτια
αδηλος
ανθρωπινωι
λογισμωι (Stob.
I. 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed
to Anaxagoras—see also
Topica, 58—66). This
identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and
excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward
by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob.
I. 5, 15.
Nihil aliter possit: on
posse for
posse fieri see
M.D.F. IV. 48, also
Ac. II. 121. For the sense of
Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God),
ουδε τι
γιγνεται
εργον επι
χθονι σου
διχα
δαιμον.
Inter quasi
fatalem: a trans. of the Gk.
κατηναγκασμενον.
I see no reason for suspecting
inter, as Halm does.
Ignorationemque causarum: the same words in
De Div. II. 49; cf. also August.
Contra Academicos
I. 1. In addition to studying the reff. given
above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's
Physica
II. ch. 4—6, with M. Saint Hilaire's
explanation, for the views of Aristotle about
τυχη and
το
αυτοματον,
also ch. 8—9 for
αναγκη. Plato's doctrine of
αναγκη, which is
diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in
Timaeus p. 47, 48, Grote's
Plato,
III. 249—59.
§§30—32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus'
Ethics. Summary. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based
knowledge on the senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of
truth, but the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true
(30). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and
unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come
into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of
their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts
were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based only on sense was
therefore mere opinion (31). Real knowledge only
came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they defined
everything about which they argued, and also used verbal explanations,
from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their
dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (32).
§30. Quae
erat: the Platonic
ην,
= was, as we said.
In ratione et disserendo: an instance of
Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf.
D.F. I. 22
quaerendi ac disserendi.
Quamquam
oriretur: the sentence is inexact, it is
knowledge which takes
its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind
itself; cf. however
II. 30 and n.
Iudicium: the constant translation
of
κριτηριον,
a word foreign to the older philosophy.
Mentem volebant rerum esse
iudicem: Halm with his pet MS. writes
esse rerum, thus giving
an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that
there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that
no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring
contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose,
Orator 194 sq.,
De Or. III. 182
sq.
Solam censebant ... tale quale esset: probably from Plato's
Tim. 35 A thus translated by Cic.,
Tim. c. 7
ex ea
materia quae individua est et unius modi (
αει κατα
ταυτα
εχουσης cf. 28 A.
το
κατα ταυτα
εχον)
et sui simile, cf. also
T.D. I. 58
id solum esse quod semper
tale sit quale sit, quam ιδεαν appellat ille, nos
speciem, and
Ac. II. 129.
Illi ιδεαν, etc.: there is more than one
difficulty here. The words
iam a Platone ita nom seem to exclude
Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an
oversight, but to say first that the school (
illi, cf.
sic
tractabatur ab utrisque) which included Aristotle held the doctrine
of
ιδεαι, and next, in
33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears
very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
ιδεαι
and Aristotle's
τα
καθαλου would naturally
seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in
his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid
at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with
Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very
knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what
inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's
opinions with a much more cautious step.
§31. Sensus
omnis hebetes: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean
view as given in
II. 12—
64, cf. esp.
19 sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia
sunt, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato
by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the
certain from the uncertain.
Res eas ... quae essent aut ita: Halm
by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has
greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads
res ullas
... quod aut ita essent; thus making Antiochus assert that
no
true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in
the
Lucullus, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
reminiscences of the
Theaetetus and of Xenocrates; see below.
Nec percipere: for this see
Lucullus passim. Christ's conj.
percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum, which Halm seems
to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf.
II. 101 neget rem ullam
percipi posse sensibus, so
21,
119 (just like
ratione percipi 91), also
I. 41 sensu comprehensum.
Subiectae
sensibus: cf.
II. 74
and Sext. Emp.
Adv. Math. VIII. 9,
τα
‛υποπιπτοντα
τη
αισθησει.
Aut
ita mobiles, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the
Theaetetus, esp. 160 D sq. For
constans cf.
εστηκος, which so often
occurs there and in the
Sophistes.
Ne idem: Manut. for MSS.
eidem. In the
Theaetetus, Heraclitus' theory of flux is
carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even
the word
εμε is
stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas
the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore
ought to be
τους εμε.
Continenter:
ουνεχως; cf. Simplicius
quoted in Grote's Plato,
I. p. 37, about
Heraclitus,
εν μεταβολη
γαρ συνεχει
τα οντα.
Laberentur et
fluerent: cf. the phrases
‛ροη, παντα
‛ρει, ‛οιον
‛ρευματα
κινεισθαι
τα παντα, etc., which
are scattered thickly over the
Theaet. and the ancient texts about
Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in
Orator 10.
Opinabilem:
δοξαστην, so
opinabile =
δοξαστον in Cic.
Tim ch.
II. The term was largely used by
Xenocrates (R. and P. 243—247), Arist. too distinguishes between
the
δοξαστον and the
επιστητον,
e.g
Analyt. Post. I. 33 (qu. R. and P.
264).
§32. For this cf.
D.F. IV. 8—10.
Notionibus:
so one MS. for
motionibus which the rest have.
Notio is
Cicero's regular translation for
εννοια, which is Stoic. This
statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each
would put a separate meaning on the word
notio.
Επιστημη in Plato
is of the
ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it
is
τον
καθολου; cf.
Anal.
Post. I. 33 (R. and P. 264),
λεγω
νουν αρχην
επιστημης.
Definitiones rerum: these must be carefully distinguished fiom
definitiones nominum, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in
R. and P. 265, note b. The
definitio rei really involves the whole
of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with
moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the
Politicus and
Sophistes, to Aristotle from the passages
quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as
clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole
of Aristotle's philosophy.
Verborum explicatio: this is quite a
different thing from those
definitiones nominum just referred to;
it is
derivation, which does not necessitate definition.
ετυμολογιαν:
this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek
Prose, as are
ετυμος and all its
derivatives. (
Ετυμως means "etymologically"
in the
De Mundo, which however is not Aristotle's). The word
ετυμολογια
is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather
ονοματων
ορθοτης (Diog. Laert.
VII. 83), the title of their books on the
subject preserved by Diog. is generally "
περι των
ετυμολογικων"
The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when
it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had
given the first impulse (
N.D. III. 63).
Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in
N.D. II. and ridiculed in
N.D. III. (cf. esp. 62
in enodandis nominibus quod
miserandum sit laboratis).
Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis
ducibus: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something
about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
Topica
10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
veriloquium of
ετυμολογια
and adopts
notatio, the
rerum nota (Greek
συμβολον) being
the name so explained (
Top. 35). Varro translated
ετυμολογια
by
originatio (Quintil.
I. 6, 28).
Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of
etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be
said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer
examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em.
notationibus for
notas ducibus, the word
notatio is
used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular
derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g.
D.F. V. 74) describes
verba or
nomina as
rerum notae. Berkley's
nodis for
notis has no
support, (
enodatio nominum in
N.D. III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I
conclude this wearisome note. The
quasi marks
rerum nota as
an unfamiliar trans. of
συμβολον. Davies
therefore ought not to have placed it before
ducibus, which word,
strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance
in
T.D. I. 27.
Itaque tradebatur:
so Halm improves on Madvig's
ita for
in qua of the MSS.,
which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to
30
pars for an antecedent to
qua (
in ea parte in qua)
is violent, while Goerenz's resort to
partem rerum opinabilem is
simply silly. Manut. conj.
in quo, Cic. does often use the neut.
pronoun, as in
Orator 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes
thought that Cic. wrote
haec, inquam (cf.
huic below).
Dialecticae: as
λογικη had not been
Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote
λογικη, of
which
διαλεκτικη
is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus,
‛ρητορικη
which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69,
70.
Orationis ratione conclusae: speech drawn up in a syllogistic
form which becomes
oratio perpetua under the influence of
‛ρητορικη.
Quasi ex altera parte: a trans. of Aristotle's
αντιστροφος
in the beginning of the
Rhetoric.
Oratoria: Halm brackets
this word; cf. however a close parallel in
Brut. 261
oratorio
ornamenta dicendi. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s
favourite double genitive (
T.D. III. 39),
oratoria being put for
oratoris.
Ad persuadendum:
το
πιθανον is with Arist.
and all ancient authorities the one aim of
‛ρητορικη.
§§33—42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures
from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the
ιδεαι
of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus,
Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to
which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could
influence happiness, and would allow the name good to nothing else
(35). All other things he divided into three
classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with
nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive
value, and called them preferred to the second a negative value
and called them rejected, to the third no value
whatever—mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms
right action and sin belong only to virtue and vice, he
thought there was an appropriate action (officium) and an
inappropriate, which concerned things preferred and things
rejected (37). He made all virtue
reside in the reason, and considered not the practice but the mere
possession of virtue to be the important thing, although the
possession could not but lead to the practice (38).
All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded
the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while
he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two
parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in
passing which the will was entirely free (40).
Sensations (visa) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
sensation he called it Knowledge, if otherwise, Ignorance
(41). Perception, thus defined, he regarded
as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of
truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in
the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with
virtue and perfect wisdom (42).
§33. Haec erat
illis forma: so Madv.
Em. 118 for MSS.
prima, comparing
formulam in 17, also
D.F. IV. 19,
V. 9,
T.D. III.
38, to which add
Ac. I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
MSS. reading and supply
pars, as usual. His power of
supplying is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the
difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in
6,
15,
32 and here.
Immutationes: so Dav. for
disputationes, approved by Madv.
Em. 119 who remarks that the phrase
disputationes
philosophiae would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain
by
mutavit in
40,
commutatio in
42, and
De Leg. I. 38.
Halm's odd em.
dissupationes, so much admired by his reviewer in
Schneidewin's
Philologus, needs support, which it certainly does
not receive from the one passage Halm quotes,
De Or. III. 207.
Et recte: for the
et cf.
et
merito, which begins one of Propertius' elegies.
Auctoritas:
"system".
Inquit: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
omission of
igitur after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to
begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in
8
says
nihil enim meorum magno opere miror) would not eulogise
himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is
meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying.
Aristoteles: after
this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture,
inserts
igitur, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his
exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter
IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader
would not be much incommoded.
Labefactavit, that Antiochus still
continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic
school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical
resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro
in Aug.
XIX. 1
nulla est causa philosophandi
nisi finis boni.
Divinum: see R. and P. 210 for a full
examination of the relation in which Plato's
ιδεαι stand to his
notion of the deity.
Suavis: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu.
R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from
his style (cf.
loquendi nitor ille divinus, Quint.
X. 1, 83). For
suavis of style cf.
Orat.
161,
Brut. 120.
Negavit: for his various offences see
D.F. V. 12 sq.,
T.D. V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he
departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic
view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In
II. 134 Cic. speaks very
differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that
of Antiochus in
22 the difference is merely verbal.
Beate vivere: the only translation of
ευδαιμονιαν.
Cic.
N.D. I. 95 suggests
beatitas
and
beatitudo but does not elsewhere employ them.
§34. Strato:
see
II. 121. The
statement in the text is not quite true for Diog.
V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven
ethical works, while Stob.
II. 6, 4 quotes his
definition of the
αγαθον.
Diligenter ...
tuebantur: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,
cf. Diog. Laert.
IV. 18,
Ac. II. 131,
D.F. II. 34, and R. and P.
Congregati: "
all
in the Academic fold," cf.
Lael. 69,
in nostro, ut ita dicam,
grege. Of Crates and Crantor little is known.
Polemonem ... Zeno
et Arcesilas: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
teachers (Diog.
VII. 2, 3), while he is not
mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is
that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from
Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb.
Praep. Ev. XIV. 5,
συμφοιτωντες
παρα
Πολεμωνι
εφιλο
τιμηθησαν.
Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.
§35. Anteiret
aetate: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the
dates are uncertain.
Dissereret: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
missing the meaning conj.
definiret.
Peracute moveretur:
Bentl.
partiretur; this with
definiret above well
illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted
the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to
the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs
Ad
Fam. XV. 21, 4, see other close parallels in
n. on
II. 37.
Nervos
... inciderit: same metaphor in
Philipp. XII. 8, cf. also
T.D. II. 27
nervos virtutis elidere,
III. 83
stirpis aegritudinis elidere. (In both
these passages Madv.
Em. Liv. 135 reads
elegere for
elidere, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses
νευρα
εκτεμνειν
metaphorically. Notice
inciderit but
poneret. There is no
need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon
in Cic., e.g.
D.F. III. 33.
Omnia,
quae: MSS.
quaeque, which edd. used to take for
quaecunque. Cf. Goerenz's statement "
negari omnino nequit hac
vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri" with Madvig's utter refutation in
the sixth Excursus to his
D.F. Solum et unum bonum: for the
Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for
himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special
difficulties of the
Academica.
§36. Cetera:
Stoic
αδιαφορα, the
presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly
protested against their being called either
bona or
mala,
and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek
philosophy.
Secundum naturam ... contraria: Gr.
κατα
φυσιν, παρα
φυσιν.
His ipsis ...
numerabat: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words
quae minoris below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness
(with Halm). The word
media is the Gk.
μεσα, which word however is
not usually applied to
things, but to
actions.
Sumenda: Gk.
ληπτα.
Aestimatione:
αξια, positive
value.
Contraque contraria: Cic. here as in
D.F. III. 50 feels the need of a word to express
απαξια (negative value).
(Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word
inaestimatio.)
Ponebat esse: cf.
19,
M.D.F. V. 73.
§37. To cope
thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the
student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and
Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
appears at first sight to have made the
αποπροηγμενα
a subdivision of the
ληπτα (
sumenda), the two
being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (
D.F. III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the
text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads
media in the place of
sumenda, must be rejected. Nor can
anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in
order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe
that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best
known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the
αποπροηγμενα
formed a branch of the
ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is
strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in
36 had
explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the
αδιαφορα, nor is
there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory
any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the
intention to speak of the
sumenda only and then rapidly extended
his thought so as to embrace the whole class of
αδιαφορα, which
he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in
the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I
defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance
of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in
D.F. III. 52,
quae secundum locum
obtinent,
προηγμενα
id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et
remota. If this language be closely pressed, the
αποπροηγμενα
are made of a subdivision of the
προηγμενα,
though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention.
So if his words in
D.F. V. 90 be pressed,
the
sumenda are made to include both
producta and
reducta, in
D.F. III. 16
appeterent includes
fugerent,
ibid. II. 86 the opposite of
beata vita is abruptly
introduced. So
D.F. II. 88
frui
dolore must be construed together, and
ibid. II. 73
pudor modestia pudicitia are said
coerceri, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the
vices which are opposite to these virtues.
I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by
ex iis Cic. means
mediis, and not
sumendis, about
which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that
pluris aestimanda and
minoris aestimanda simply indicate
the
αξια and
απαξια of the Greek,
not different degrees of
αξια (positive value). That
minor
aestimatio should mean
απαξια need not surprise us
when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing
this
απαξια or negative value in
Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on
36;
(2) on the strong negative meaning which
minor bears in Latin,
e.g.
sin minus in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall
victims to the task of expressing
απαξια. Stobaeus, in a
passage closely resembling ours makes
ελαττων
αξια equivalent to
πολλη
απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext.
Emp. after rightly defining
αποπροηγμενα
as
τα
‛ικανην
απαξιαν
εχοντα (
Adv. Math.
XI. 62—64) again speaks of them as
τα
μη ‛ικανην
εχοντα
αξιαν (
Pyrrhon. Hypot. III. 191) words which usually have an opposite
meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words
minoris aestimanda bear
quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus,
τα
μη ‛ικανην
αξιαν
εχοντα. I therefore conclude
that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express
the Stoic doctrine that, of the
αδιαφορα, some
have
αξια
while others have
απαξια. He may fairly claim
to have applied to his words the rule "
re intellecta in verborum usu
faciles esse debemus" (
D.F. III. 52).
There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of
misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are
difficulties connected with the terms
‛ικανη
αξια and
‛ικανη
απαξια which are not
satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret
that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the
D.F. quoted in this note.
Non tam rebus quam vocabulis:
Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen
the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never
properly belonged to the Stoics at all.
Inter recte factum atque
peccatum: Stob. speaks
II. 6, 6 of
τα
μεταξυ
αρετης και
κακιας. (This does not
contradict his words a little earlier,
II. 6, 5,
αρετης δε
και κακιας
ουδεν
μεταξυ, which have regard to
divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however,
VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see
R. and P. 393.)
Recte factum =
κατορθωμα,
peccatum =
‛αμαρτημα,
officium =
καθηκον (cf. R. and P.
388—394, Zeller 238—248, 268—272).
Servata
praetermissaque: MSS. have
et before
servata, which all
edd. since Lamb. eject. Where
et and
que correspond in
Cic., the
que is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the
et. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this
oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate
clauses it is possible. Cf.
43 and
M.D.F. V. 64.
§38. Sed quasdam
virtutes: see
20. This passage requires careful
construing: after
quasdam virtutes not the whole phrase
in
ratione esse dicerent must be repeated but
dicerent merely,
since only the
virtutes natura perfectae, the
διανοητικαι
αρεται of Arist., could be
said to belong to the reason, while the
virtutes more perfectae
are Aristotle's
ηθικαι
αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of
certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be)
by habit."
Ea genera virtutum: both Plato and Arist. roughly
divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the
emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf.
T.D. II. 47, and Arist.
το
μεν ‛ως
λογον εχον,
το δε
επιπειθες
λογωι); Zeno however asserted the
nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason,
to which he gave the name
‛ηγεμονικον
(Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller
248,
D.F. III. passim). When the
‛ηγεμονικον
was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there
was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not
resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle,
but a civil war carried on in one and the same country.
Virtutis
usum: cf. the description of Aristotle's
finis in
D.F.
II. 19.
Ipsum habitum: the mere
possession. So Plato,
Theaetet. 197 B, uses the word
‛εξις, a
use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
Ethics of Arist. In this sense virtue is
not a
‛εξις,
according to the Stoics, but a
διαθεσις (Stob.
II. 6, 5, Diog.
VII.
89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a
‛εξις,
VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes).
Nec
virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur: cf. Stob.
II. 6, 6
δυο γενη των
ανθρωπων
ειναι το μεν
των
σπουδαιων,
το δε των
φαυλων, και
το μεν των
σπουδαιων
δια παντος
του βιου
χρησθαι
ταις
αρεταις, το
δε των
φαυλων ταις
κακιαις.
Perturbationem: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of
the
Acad. appears, should read the plural
perturbationes, a
conj. of Walker.
Perturbationem means emotion in the abstract;
perturbationes below, particular emotions. There is exactly the
same transition in
T.D. III. 23, 24,
IV. 59, 65,
V. 43,
while
perturbatio is used, in the same sense as here, in at least
five other passages of the
T.D., i.e.
IV.
8, 11, 24, 57, 82.
Quasi mortis: a trans. of Stoic
παθεσι, which
Cic. rejects in
D.F. III. 35.
Voluit
carere sapientem: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the
reason, and perfect reason being virtue (
20), it
follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All
emotions are reasonless;
‛ηδονη or
laetitia
for instance is
αλογος
επαρσις. (
T.D.
Books
III. and
IV.
treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg,
Em. to
the
T.D. III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses
efferri laetitia but
ferri libidine.
§39. Aliaque in
parte: so Plato,
Tim. 69 C,
Rep. 436, 441, Arist.
De
Anima II. 3, etc.; cf.
T.D. I. 20.
Voluntarias: the whole aim of the Stoic
theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the
will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
Stoic fatalism we are not told.
Opinionisque iudicio suscipi: all
emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external
object; cf. Diog.
VII. 111.
τα
παθη
κρισεις
ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller
233. For
iudicio cf.
D.F. III. 35,
T.D. III. 61,
IV. 14, 15, 18.
Intemperantiam: the same in
T.D. IV. 22, Gk.
ακολασια, see
Zeller 232.
Quintam naturam: the
πεμπτη
ουσια or
πεμπτον
σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its
existence in
De Coelo I. 2, in a curious
and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist.
derived
mind from this fifth element, though the finest and
highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in
T.D. I. 22, 41, 65,
D.F. IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important
note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from
Stob.
I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the
time were in the habit of deriving the mind from
αιθηρ, which is the
very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (
σωμα
αιθεριον in the
De Coelo), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The
error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred
influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen
into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of
these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time
succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed
νους
εν αιθερι (see
Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial
existence The notion that
νους or
ψυχη came from
αιθηρ was also
fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as
αεικινητος
in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his
mind One from the
Phaedrus 245 C is translated twice, in
Somnium Scipionis (
De Rep. VI.),
and
T.D. I. 53 sq. Now the only thing
with Aristotle which is
αεικινητος
in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion
is alone perfect and eternal), is the
αιθηρ or
πεμπτον
σωμα, that fiery external rim of the
universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve.
How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that
the
αεικινητος
ψυχη of Plato came from the
αεικινητος
αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had
guarded himself by saying that the soul as an
αρχη
κινησεως must be
ακινητος, but
Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob.
I.
41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to
the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just
where Arist. placed his
πεμπτον
σωμα Any one who will compare
T.D.
I. 43 with the
Somn. Scipionis will see
what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the
mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on
as divine (cf.
Somn. Scip. 15) These considerations will be enough
to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible
for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by
the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too
late.
Sensus: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction
drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being
αναλογον τω
των αστρων
στοιχειω (
De
Gen. An. II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299).
Ignem: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree,
between
αιθηρ and
πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190.
Ipsam
naturam:
πυρ is
κατ'
εξοχην
στοιχειον
(Stob.
I. 10, 16), and is the first thing
generated from the
αποιος
‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water,
from water earth (Diog. Laert.
VII. 136, 137)
The fire is
λογικον, from it comes
the
‛ηγεμονικον
of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.
These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics
(Zeller ch.
VIII. with notes) For his view of
sensation and thought see Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 127—129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics
probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's
Plato I. 34 sq.
Expers corporis:
for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a
connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed
from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (
ου γαρ
εγχωρειν τα
‛ετερα και
διαφεροντα
πασχειν ‛υπ'
αλληλων, qu. from Arist.
De Gen. et Corr. I. 7, by R. and P. 43),
the same is affirmed loosely of all the old
φυσικοι, (Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 116), and by Empedocles
in his lines
γαιαι μεν
γαιαν
οπωπαμεν, etc.
Plato in the
Timaeus fosters the same notion, though in a
different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of
thought.
Xenocrates: see
II. 124, n.
Superiores: merely the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school.
Posse esse non corpus: there is no
ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see
Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
§40.
Iunctos: how can anything be a
compound of one thing? The
notion that
iunctos could mean
aptos (R. and P. 366) is
untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his
D.F.) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say
iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum, but having to
explain
φαντασια was
obliged to break off and resume at
sed ad haec. The explanation of
a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in
De Off. I. 153. Schuppe,
De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis p.
9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf.
D.F. II. 44
e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus
Ernesti em.
cunctos, Dav.
punctos,
ingeniose ille
quidem says Halm,
pessime I should say.
Φαντασιαν:
a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by
Zeller, ch.
V., R. and P. 365 sq.
Nos
appellemus licet: the same turn of expression occurs
D.F.
III. 21,
IV. 74.
Hoc
verbum quidem hoc quidem probably ought to be read, see
18.
Adsensionem =
συγκαταθεσιν.
In nobis positam: the usual expression for freedom of the will,
cf.
II. 37,
De
Fato, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is
involuntary (
ακουσιον Sext.
Emp.
Adv. Math. VIII. 397).
Tironum
causa I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the
mind as
involuntary, while the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια
compels assent (see
II. 38). This is, however, only true of the healthy
reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
§41. Visis non
omnibus: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno
abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner
citadel of the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια.
Declarationem:
εναργειαν,
a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on
II. 17.
Earum rerum:
only this class of sensations gives correct information of the
things lying behind.
Ipsum per se: i.e. its whole truth
lies in its own
εναργεια, which
requires no corroboration from without.
Comprehendibile: this form
has better MSS. authority than the vulg
comprehensibile. Goerenz's
note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity
Nos
vero, inquit: Halm with Manut. writes
inquam. Why change?
Atticus answers as in
14,
25,
33.
Καταληπτον:
strictly the
thing which emits the
visum is said to be
καταληπτον,
but, as we shall see in the
Lucullus, the sensation and the thing
from which it proceeds are often confused.
Comprehensionem: this
word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the
individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use
καταληψις
for
καταληπτικη
φαντασια very
often.
Quae manu prehenderentur: see
II.
145.
Nova enim dicebat: an admission not
often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno
merely renamed old doctrines (cf.
43).
Sensum: so Stob.,
I. 41, 25 applies the
term
αισθησις to the
φαντασια.
Scientiam: the word
επιστημη is used
in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or
systematised perceptions (
καταληψεις
or
καταληπτικαι
φαντασιαι)
sometimes also called
τεχνη (cf. Sext.
Pyrrh. Hyp.
III. 188
τεχνην δε
ειναι
συστημα εκ
καταληψεων
συγγεγυμνασμενων);
(2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be
seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80.
Ut convelli ratione non
posset: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all
καταληπτικαι
φαντασιαι
were
ασφαλεις,
αμεταπτωτοι
‛υπο λογου.
Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to
logical tests; see Sext.
Adv. Math. VII.
253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every
καταληπτικη
φαντασια, instead
of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of
sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller
remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic
theory.
Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret: I know nothing like this
in the Stoic texts;
αμαθια is very seldom talked
of there.
Opinio:
δοξα, see Zeller and cf.
Ac. II. 52,
T.D. II. 52,
IV. 15, 26.
§42. Inter
scientiam: so Sextus
Adv. Math. VII.
151 speaks of
επιστημην
και δοξαν
και την εν
μεθοπιαι
τουτων
καταληψιν.
Soli: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives
solum ei.
Non quod omnia: the meaning is that the reason
must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can
know thoroughly any one
thing. This will appear if the whole
sentence be read
uno haustu; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same
view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek.
Quasi: this points out
normam as a trans. of some Gk. word,
κριτηριον
perhaps, or
γνωμων or
κανων.
Notiones
rerum: Stoic
εννοιαι; Zeller
81—84, R. and P. 367, 368.
Quodque natura: the omission of
eam is strange; Faber supplies it.
Imprimerentur: the terms
εναπεσφραγισμενη,
εναπομεμαγμενη,
εντετυπωμενη
occur constantly, but generally in relation to
φαντασιαι,
not to
εννοιαι.
Non
principia solum: there seems to be a ref. to those
αρχαι
της
αποδειξεως
of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the
bases of all proof. (See Grote's
Essay on the Origin of Knowledge,
first printed in Bain's
Mental and Moral Science, now re-published
in Grote's
Aristotle.) Zeno's
εννοιαι were all this
and more.
Reperiuntur: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from
oratio obliqua to
recta, which however has repeatedly taken
place during Varro's exposition, and for which see
M.D.F. I. 30,
III. 49; (2) the
phrase
reperire viam, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm
give
aperirentur. There is no MSS. variant.
Aliena: cf.
alienatos D.F. III. 18.
A
virtute sapientiaque removebat: cf.
sapiens numquam fallitur in
iudicando D.F. III. 59. The
firma
adsensia is opposed to
imbecilla 41. For
the
adsensio of the
sapiens see Zeller 87. More information
on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the
first part of the
Lucullus.
In his constitit: cf.
II. 134.
§§43—end. Cicero's
historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas'
philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the
obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of
knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of
Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).
§43.
Breviter: MSS.
et breviter; see
37.
Tunc: rare before a consonant; see Munro on
Lucr. I. 130.
Verum esse [autem] arbitror: in
deference to Halm I bracket
autem, but I still think the MSS.
reading defensible, if
verum be taken as the neut. adj. and not as
meaning
but. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it
is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that
esse
was needed to go with
putandam. This is a total mistake; cf.
ait ... putandam, without
esse II.
15,
aiebas removendum II. 74; a hundred other
passages might be quoted from Cic.
§44. Non
pertinacia aut studio vincendi: for these words see n. on
II. 14. The sincerity of
Arcesilas is defended also in
II. 76.
Obscuritate: a side-blow at
declaratio 41.
Confessionem
ignorationis: see
16. Socrates was far from
being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on
II. 74.
Et iam ante
Socratem: MSS.
veluti amantes Socratem; Democritus
(460—357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates
(468—399) who died nearly sixty years before him.
Omnis paene
veteres: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised
II. 14. None of these
were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on
II.
73, for Empedocles on
II. 74, for Anaxagoras on
II. 72.
Nihil
cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri: the verbs are all equivalent;
cf.
D.F. III. 15
equidem soleo etiam
quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere.
Angustos
sensus: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles
στεινοποι
μεν γαρ
παλαμαι
κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.
Brevia curricula
vitae: cf. Empedocles'
παυρον δε
ζωης αβιου
μερος. Is there an allusion in
curricula to Lucretius'
lampada vitai tradunt, etc.?
In
profundo: Dem.
εν
βυθω, cf.
II. 32. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would
suit better.
Institutis:
νομω of Democritus, see R. and P. 50.
Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.
Deinceps
omnia:
παντα
εφεξης there is no need to
read
denique for
deinceps as Bentl., Halm.
Circumfusa
tenebris: an allusion to the
σκοτιη
γνωσις of Democr., see
II. 73.
Dixerunt: Halm
brackets this because of
dixerunt above, parts of the verb
dicere are however often thus repeated by Cic.
§45. Ne illud
quidem: cf.
16.
Latere censebat Goer.
omitted
censebat though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as
usual. For the sense
II. 122.
Cohibereque: Gk.
επεχειν, which we shall
have to explain in the
Lucullus.
Temeritatem ... turpius:
for these expressions, see
II. 66, note.
Praecurrere: as was the case with
the dogmatists.
Paria momenta: this is undiluted scepticism, and
excludes even the possibility of the
probabile which Carneades put
forward. For the doctrine cf.
II. 124, for the expression Euseb.
Praep. Evan.
XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas,
ειναι γαρ
παντα
ακαταληπτα
και τους εις
εκατερα
λογους
ισοκρατεις
αλληλοις, Sextus
Adv. Math. IX. 207
ισοσθενεις
λογοι; in the latter writer the word
ισοσθενεια
very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g
Pyrrhon. Hyp. I. 8 (add
N.D. I. 10,
rationis momenta)
§46.
Platonem: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed,
Sextus
Pyrrhon. Hyp. I. 221
τον Πλατωνα
οιν ‛οι μεν
δογματικον
εφασαν
ειναι, ‛οι
δε απο
ητικον, ‛οι
δε κατα μεν
τι
απορητικον,
κατα δε τι
δογματικον.
Stobaeus
II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the
difficulty;
Πλατων
πολυφωνος
ων, ουχ ‛ως
τινες
οιονται
πολυδοξος.
Exposuisti: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm,
etc. for MSS.
exposui.
Zenone: see Introd. p.
5.
NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.
BOOK I.
1. Mnesarchus:
see II. 69, De Or.
I. 45, and Dict. Biogr. 'Antipater'; cf.
II. 143, De Off.
III. 50. Evidently this fragment belongs to that
historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cicero
to have concluded the first book.
2. The word
concinere occurs D.F. IV. 60,
N.D. I. 16, in both which places it is
used of the Stoics, who are said re concinere, verbis discrepare
with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had already
mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this
fragment. Krische remarks that Augustine, Cont. Acad. II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated that part of
Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic. must have
condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order to excuse
the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
BOOK II.
3. This fragm. clearly
forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments which Cic. in the
first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so
level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not
level.
4. On this I have
nothing to remark.
5. There is nothing
distinctive about this which might enable us to determine its connection
with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who serius adamavit
honores.
6. The changing aspects
of the same thing are pointed to here as invalidating the evidence of the
senses.
7. This passage has the
same aim as the last and closely resembles Lucullus 105.
8. The fact that the
eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy the senses are. A
similar argument occurs in Luc. 86.
Perpendiculum is a plumb line, norma a mason's square, the
word being probably a corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt.
Grundz p. 169, ed. 3), regula, a rule.
9. The different
colours which the same persons show in different conditions, when young
and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober and when drunken,
are brought forward to prove how little of permanence there is even in
the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
10. Urinari is
to dive; for the derivation see Curt. Grundz p. 326. A diver would
be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in Luc. 81, which are unable to see that which lies
immediately above them and so illustrate the narrow limits of the power
of vision.
11. Evidently an
attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy. Different people pass
different judgments on one and the same odour. The student will observe
that the above extracts formed part of an argument intended to show the
deceptive character of the senses. To these should probably be added
fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that
the impossibility of distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been
brought forward in the Catulus, was allowed to stand in the second
edition, other difficulties of the kind, such as those connected with the
bent oar, the pigeon's neck, the twins, the impressions of seals
(Luc. 19, 54), would
also appear in both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses
must have been summed up in the phrase cuncta dubitanda esse which
Augustine quotes from the Academica Posteriora (see fragm. 36).
BOOK III.
12. This forms part
of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in substance to Lucullus'
speech in the Academica Priora The drift of this extract was most
likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against
criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to
fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. See
another view in Krische, p. 62.
13. Krische believes
that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show that the senses were
trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with which the fishes
were seen leaping from the water was brought up as evidence. (In
Luc. 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an
argument hostile to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The
explanation seems to me very improbable. The words bear such a striking
resemblance to those in Luc. 125 (ut
nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic innumerabilis paribus
in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis) that I am inclined to think
that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and not Book III., and
that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the Lucrine lake, also
changed Puteolosque into pisciculosque exultantes for the
sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the
Lucrine.
14. The passion for
knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by Varro as an argument
in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be attainable. The same line
is taken in Luc. 31, D.F. III. 17, and elsewhere.
15. It is so much
easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than in that of
Lucullus in the Academica Priora that I think the reference in
Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than
a dogmatist (see Luc. 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of
the same). If my conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a different opinion, but very
hesitatingly, p. 63.
16. This may well
have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις,
temeritas being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics
as by the Academics cf. I. 42.
17. I conjecture
malleo (a hammer) for the corrupt malcho, and think that in
the second ed. some comparison from building operations to illustrate the
fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις
was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the Lucullus. I note in Vitruvius,
quoted by Forc. s.v. malleolus, a similar expression (naves
malleolis confixae) and in Pliny Nat. Hist. XXXIV. 14 navis fixa malleo. Adfixa
therefore in this passage must have agreed with some lost noun either in
the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
18. This and fragm.
19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
notes, the Stoic εναργεια had
evidently been translated earlier in the book by perspicuitas as
in Luc. 17.
19. See on
Luc. 57.
BOOK IV.
Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on
the parallel passages of the Lucullus.
21. Viam
evidently a mistake for the umbram of Luc. 70.
23. The best MS. of
Nonius points to flavum for ravum (Luc. 105). Most likely an alteration was made in the
second edition, as Krische supposes, p. 64.
28.
Corpusculis: Luc. 121 has
corporibus. Krische's opinion that this latter word was in the
second edition changed into the former may be supported from I. 6, which he does not notice.
The conj. is confirmed by Aug. Contr. Ac. III. 23.
29. Magnis
obscurata: in Luc. 122 it is
crassis occultata, so that we have another alteration, see
Krische, p. 64.
30. Only slight
differences appear in the MSS. of the Luc. 123, viz. contraria, for in c., ad
vestigia for contra v.
31. Luc. 137 has dixi for dictus. As Cic. does
not often leave out est with the passive verb, Nonius has probably
quoted wrongly. It will be noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the Luc.,
those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic.
therefore divided the Luc. into two portions at or about 63.
UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
32. I have already
said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary assault on the
senses made by Cic. in the second book.
33. In the Introd. p.
55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the probabile was
incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
that part this fragment must probably be referred.
34. This important
fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a
jocular application of the Carneadean probabile, as may be seen
from the words probabiliter posse confici.
35. Krische assigns
this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book. With this opinion I
find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the Lucullus (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition
this allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have
occurred either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no
reason whatever appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer
to regard it as belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of
Academic doctrine in the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the
Academic school must not be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see
Luc. 119, also 66
and N.D. I. 12. Also Aug. Contra.
Ac. II. 29.
36. It is difficult
to see where this passage could have been included if not in that
prooemium to the third book which is mentioned Ad. Att. XVI. 6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me
wrong in holding that the whole four books formed one discussion,
finished within the limits of a single day. Why interrupt the discussion
by the insertion of a prologue of so general a nature as to be taken from
a stock which Cic. kept on hand ready made? (Cf. Ad Att. as
above.)
Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications
of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled
Contra
Academicos, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
imitated throughout the second edition of the
Academica of Cic. No
writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
and opinions of Augustine as the
Academica and the lost
Hortensius. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications
of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's
works. In Aug.
Contr. Ac. II. 14, 15, we
have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book
I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not
be regarded as having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to
discuss that new doctrine of
καταληψις
advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of
ακαταληψια
though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct
shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather
enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under
the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife
between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.
must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his
opinion (
Contra. Ac. II. 1) that New
Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it
appeared. Indications of Book
II. in Aug. are
scarce, but to it I refer
Contra. Ac. I.
7
placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad
eius inventionem non valeat pervenire, also
ibid. III. 10
illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse
hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse.
These I refer to Cicero's development of the
probabile in Book
II., although I ought to say that Krische, p.
65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the
Ac.
Priora transferred to Book
IV. of the
Ac.
Posteriora. As this would leave very meagre material for Book
II., nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of
the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement;
mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first
edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book
II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally
well to the later attack in Book
IV. As to Books
III. and
IV., I do not
think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement
between them and the
Lucullus, which will find a better place in
my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from
other sources. These are the translation of
σοφισματα
by
cavillationes in
Luc. 75 (Seneca
Ep. III.), and the insertion in
118 of
essentia as a translation of
ουσια.
BOOK II.
ENTITLED LUCULLUS.
§§1—12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and
cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during
his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was
due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits
as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till
just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I
cannot now tell (3). He was not merely a general;
he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read
much for himself (4). Those enemies of Greek
culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be
referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these
dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach
beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy
which I follow—the Academic. This is natural, but they must know
that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (7). My
school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to
authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
Catulus (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to
defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to
do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day
before (10). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard
discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo,
and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday
came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book
against his old teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter
against Philo (12).
§1. Luculli:
see Introd. p.
58, and
Dict. Biog.
Digna homini nobili: a good deal of learning would have been
considered
unworthy of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p.
30.
Percepta: "gained," "won;" cf.
percipere fruges, "to reap,"
Cat. Mai. 24.
Caruit:
"was cut off from;"
carere comes from a root
skar meaning
to divide, see Corss.
I. 403. For the three
nouns with a singular verb see Madv.
Gram. 213 A, who confines the
usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common
reading
dissensit in
De Or. III.
68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
Admodum: "to a
degree."
Fratre: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro,
and was a man of distinction also; see
Dict. Biog. Magna cum
gloria: a ref. to
Dict. Biog. will show that the whole affair
was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have
gained greater glory by letting it drop.
Quaestor: to Sulla, who
employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia.
Continuo: without any interval.
Legis praemio: this seems
to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who
had restored the old
lex annalis in all its rigour, and yet
excepted his own officers from its operation.
Prooemio, which has
been proposed, would not be Latin, see
De Leg. II. 16.
Consulatum: he seems to have been
absent during the years 84—74, in the East.
Superiorum:
scarcely that of Sulla.
§2. Laus:
"merit," as often, so
praemium, Virg.
Aen. XII. 437, means a deed worthy of reward.
Non
admodum exspectabatur: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with
distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war.
In Asia
pace: three good MSS. have
Asiae; Baiter ejects
Asia;
Guilelmus read
in Asia in pace (which Davies conjectures, though
he prints
Asiae).
Consumere followed by an ablative without
in is excessively rare in Cic. Madv.
D.F. V. 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however,
to our passage, I note
hoc loco consumitur in
T.D. IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give
no variants.
Pace here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like
tranqullo.
Indocilem: this is simply passive, = "untaught,"
as in Prop.
I. 2, 12, Ov.
Fast. III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong
in making it active.
Factus: =
perfectus; cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 5, 33
homo factus ad
unguem, Cic.
De Or. III. 184,
In
Verr. IV. 126. So
effectus in silver
Latin.
Rebus gestis: military history, so often.
Divinam
quandam memoriam: the same phrase in
De Or. II. 360.
Rerum, verborum: same distinction in
De Or. II. 359.
Oblivisci se
malle: the same story is told
D.F. II. 104,
De Or. II.
299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person
denoted here by
cuidam) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis,
for whom see
De Or. II. 360.
Consignamus: cf.
consignatae in animis notiones in
T.D. I. 57.
litteris must be an
ablative of the instrument.
Mandare monum.: cf.
I. 3.
Insculptas: rare in
the metaphorical use, cf.
N.D. I. 45.
§3. Genere:
"department" cf.
I. 3.
Navalibus pugnis:
ναυμαχιαις.
Instrumento et adparatu:
κατασκευη
και
παρασκευη.
Rex: Mithridates.
Quos legisset: =
de quibus l.; cf.
the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g.
Trist. IV. 4, 14. I take of course
rex to be nom. to
legisset, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and
that
quos legisset =
quorum commentarios legisset I think
improbable.
Hodie: Drakenborch on Livy
V.
27 wants to read
hodieque, which however, is not Ciceronian. In
passages like
De Or. I. 103 and
Verr. V. 64, the
que connects
clauses and does not modify
hodie. On this subject see Madv.
Opuscula I. 390.
Etsi:
M.D.F. V. 68, shows that in Cic. a
parenthetic clause with
etsi always has a common verb with its
principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same
holds of
quamquam, see n. on
I. 5.
Calumnia: properly a fraudulent use of
litigation,
συκοφαντια.
The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him.
In
urbem: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city.
Profuisset: this ought properly to be
profuerit, but the
conditional
dicerem changes it.
Potius ... quam ...
communicem: n. on
23.
§4. Sunt ...
celebrata: cf.
I. 11,
17 for the collocation of the words.
Externa ...
interiora: cf.
De Div. II. 124
sed
haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus.
Pro
quaestore: for this Faber wrote
quaestor, arguing that as Luc.
was Sulla's
quaestor and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be
pro quaestor. But surely after the first year he would be
pro
quaestor. Dav. reads
quaestor here and
11, saying "
veterem lectionem iugulavit
Faber".
Ea memoria ... quam: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give
qua, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor.
Sat. I. 6, 15. A passage like ours is
D.F. I. 29,
ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis, where
one MS. has
qua. Read Madvig's lucid note there.
De quibus
audiebat: Madv.
Em. 121 makes this equivalent to
de eis
rebus de quibus, the necessity of which explanation, though approved
by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic.,
and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf.
e.g.
Cat. Mai. 83. I take
quibus as simply =
libris.
§5. Ac:
strong, as often, =
και μην.
Personarum:
public characters,
προσωπων
πολεως (
Ad. Fam. XV. 17, 2), so
personas 6.
Multi ... plures: cf. Introd. p.
30.
Reliqui: many MSS. insert
qui by
dittographia, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains
it. On the retention or omission of this
qui will depend the
choice of
putant or
putent below.
Earum rerum
disputationem: for
disp. followed by genitive see n. on
I. 33.
Non ita decoram:
for this feeling see Introd. p.
30. For
non
ita cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae".
Historiae
loquantur:
hist. means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than
"history," which is better expressed by
res gestae. Note that the
verb
loqui not
dicere is used, and cf. n. on
101.
Legatione: to the kings in Egypt and
the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the
embassy see
Dict. Biogr. art. 'Panactius'.
Auctorem: one
would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read
fautorem, Dav.
auditorem.
§6.
Illigari: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use
Forc. qu. Liv.
XXXIII. 21, Tac.
Ann.
XIII. 40.
Aut ludicros sermones: =
aut
clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat.
Rerum leviorum: a
similar argument in
D.F. I. 12.
Quodam
in libro: the
Hortensius.
Gradu: so the word "degree"
was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad.
De opera
publica detrahamus: the dative often follows this verb, as in
D.F. III. 7
nihil operae reipublicae
detrahens, a passage often wrongly taken.
Operae is the dat.
after the verb, not the gen. after
nihil,
reip. the gen.
after
operae, like
opera publica here, not the dat. after
detrahens.
Nisi forensem: the early oratorical works may
fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the
De
Republica or the
De Leg. both of which fall within the period
spoken of.
Ut plurimis prosimus: cf. Introd. p.
29.
Non modo non minui, sed: notice
non
modo ... sed thrice over in two sentences.
§7. Sunt ... qui
negent: and truly, see Introd. p.
38. In
Cat. Mai. §3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned
than he really was.
Mortuis: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about
57, Hortensius 50.
Contra omnis dicere quae videntur: MSS. mostly
insert
qui between
dicere and
quae, one of the best
however has
dicere quae aliis as a correction, while another has
the marginal reading
qui scire sibi videntur. The omission of
qui, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2)
referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense.
Verum invenire: cf.
60.
Contentione: =
φιλονεικια
as usual.
In ... rebus obscuritas: cf.
I.
44 rerum obscuritate.
Infirmitas: cf.
I. 44 imbecillos
animos.
Antiquissimi et doctissimi: on the other hand
recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime I. 13.
Diffisi: one of
the best MSS. has
diffissi, which reminds one of the spelling
divisssiones, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint.
Inst. Or.
I. 7, 20.
In utramque partem:
επ'
αμφοτερα, cf.
I. 45.
Exprimant:
"embody," cf. n. on
I. 19.
§8.
Probabilia:
πιθανα, for which see
33.
Sequi: "act upon," cf.
99-
101.
Liberiores et
solutiores: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and
illustrate his love for petty variations; see
105, also
T.D. V.
43,
De Div. I. 4,
De Rep. IV. 4,
N.D. I. 56,
Orat. 64.
Integra: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "
non
mihi integrum est"—"I have committed my self."
Et quasi:
MSS. have
et quibus et quasi.
Cogimur: for this Academic
freedom see Introd. p.
18.
Amico cuidam:
Orelli after Lamb.
cuipiam; for the difference see Madv.
Gram. 493
b,
c.
§9. Ut
potuerint, potuerunt: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was
simply
ut potuerunt, "granting that they had the ability, they
gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they
did
decide on a single hearing," etc.
Iudicaverunt autem: so Lamb. for
MSS.
aut. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "
arguta
hariolatio," read
an for
aut and put a note of
interrogation at
contulerunt. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's
Philologus VII. 466) introduces by conj.
a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's
remarks in
Em. 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed,
followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion
of
aut between
sed and
ut at the beginning; of this
Madv. says "
non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat."
For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
N.D. I. 10,
De Leg. I. 36.
Quam adamaverunt: "which they have learned to love;" the
ad
has the same force as
προ in
προμανθανειν,
which means "to learn
on and on, to learn by degrees" (cf.
προυμαθον
στεργειν
κακοις), not, as the lexica
absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly."
Constantissime: "most consistently".
Quae est ad Baulos:
cf. Introd. p.
57.
In spatio: this
xystus was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called
ξυστος from its polished
floor and pillars.
Consedimus: n. on
I.
14.
§10. Servatam
oportuit: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but
rarely, in Cic. and Livy.
In promptu ... reconditiora: cf.
in
promptu ... interiora in
De Div. II.
124, also
Ac. I. 4.
Quae dico: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and
wishes to read
dixero. But the substitution of the pres. for the
future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv.
IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note.
Si non
fuerint: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have
si
vera etc. In support of the text, see
I. 9 (
sunt ista) and note.
Labefactata: this
is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
Ed. Rom.
(1471); the others have
labefacta. Orelli's statement (note to his
separate text of the
Academica 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
perfect
labefeci and the part,
labefactus is quite wrong.
The former is indeed the vulg. reading in
Pro Sestio 101, the
latter in
De Haruspicum Responsis 60, but the last of these two
passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like
sustentatus, which occurs with
labefactatus in
Cat.
Mai. 20. For the perfect
labefactavit cf.
I. 33.
Agam igitur: Cic.
rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the
learning of Lucullus.
§11. Pro
quaestore: cf.
4.
Essem: MSS.
issem, whence Goer. conj.
Alexandriam issem.
Heraclitus
Tyrius: scarcely known except from this passage.
Clitomachum:
for this philosopher see Zeller 532.
Quae nunc prope dimissa
revocatur: sc.
a Cicerone. Philo's only notable pupils had
combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
Academica the New Academic dialectic had been without a
representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p.
21.
Libri duo: cf.
I. 13.
Heri for this indication of the contents of
the lost
Catulus, see Introd. p.
50.
Implorans: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to
with tears," see Corss.
I. 361.
Philonis:
sc.
esse.
Scriptum agnoscebat: i.e. it was an actual work
of Ph.
Tetrilius: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the
name
Tertinius is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
Tretilius, which may be a mistake for
Tertilius, a name
formed like
Pompilius,
Quintilius,
Sextilius. Qy,
should
Petrilius, a derivative from the word for four, be read?
Petrilius and
Pompilius would then agree like
Petronius and
Pomponius,
Petreius and
Pompeius. For the formation of these names see Corss.
I. 116.
Rogus: an ill omened and unknown name.
Rocus, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
denarii of the
gens Creperia.
De Philone ... ab eo ipso: note the change
of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy."
De and
ex
are common in Cic. after
audire, while
ab is rather rarer.
See
M.D.F. I. 39, and for
describere
ab aliquo cf.
a te in
Ad Att. XIII. 22, 3.
§12. Dicta
Philoni: for this see Introd. p.
50. It cannot
mean what Goer. makes it mean, "
coram Philone." I think it
probable that
Philoni is a marginal explanation foisted on the
text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by
18.
Academicos: i.e.
novos, who are
here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
title.
Aristo: see Introd. p.
11.
Aristone: Diog.
VII. 164 mentions an
Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
unknown.
Negat: see n. on
18.
Lenior: some MSS.
levior, as is usual with these two words.
In
11 one of the earliest editions has
leviter for
leniter.
§§13—18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted
like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as
supporters of scepticism (13), Those very
philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, seem to me, if anything,
too dogmatic (14). Even if they were often in
doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many
centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was
a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel
against a good government (15). Has nothing really
been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists
think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument
can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however do allow of discussion with
sceptics. Philo in his innovations was induced to state falsehoods, and
incurred all the evils he wished to avoid, his rejection of Zeno's
definition of the καταληπτικη
φαντασια really
led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then
must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (18).
§13. Rursus
exorsus est: cf.
exorsus in
10.
Popularis:
δημοτικους.
Ii a: so Dav. for MSS.
iam.
Tum ad hos: so MSS.,
Dav.
aut hos. The omission of the verb
venire is very
common in Cic.'s letters.
C. Flaminium: the general at lake
Trasimene.
Aliquot annis: one good MS. has
annos, cf.
T.D. I. 4, where all the best MSS. have
annos. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and
indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers
ever use any
accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to
express duration (cf. Prop.
I. 6, 7 and Madv.
Gram. 235, 2).
L. Cassium: this is L. Cassius Longinus
Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (
De Leg.
III. 35), he was the author of the
cui
bono principle and so severe a judge as to be called
scopulus
reorum. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty
with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C.
P. Africanum: i.e.
the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have
done nothing else for the democrats.
Fratres: Lamb.
viros,
but cf.
Brut. 98.
P. Scaevolam: the pontifex, consul in the
year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against
the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about
the legal effect the bills would have.
Ut videmus ... ut
suspicantur: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that
the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but
him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be
allowed the inconsistency.
§14.
Similiter: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have
simile.
Xenophanem: so Victorius for the MSS.
Xenoplatonem.
Ed. Rom. (1471) has
Cenonem, which
would point to
Zenonem, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea.
Saturninus: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer.
says
frustra quaeritur. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of
Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
Arcesilae calumnia: this was a common charge, cf.
Academicorum
calumnia in
N.D. II. 20 and
calumnia in
18 and
65 of this book. So August.
Contra Acad. II. 1 speaks of
Academicorum vel calumnia vel
pertinacia vel pericacia.
Democriti verecundia: Cic. always
has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on
D.F. I. 20 remarks, cf.
De Div. II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the
general
arrogantia of the
physici.
Empedocles quidem ...
videatur: cf.
74. The exordium of his poem is
meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text,
see R. and P. 108.
Quale sit: the emphasis is on
sit, the
sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence.
Quasi modo
nascentes: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however
T.D.
II. 5
ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... ,
philosophia nascatur.
§15.
haesitaverunt: Goer. cf.
De Or. I.
40.
Constitutam: so in
14.
Delitisceret: this is the right spelling, not
delitesceret,
which one good MS. has here, see Corssen
II.
285.
Negavissent: "had denied, as they said."
Tollendus
est: a statement which is criticised in
74.
Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt: genuine Antiochean
opinions, see the
Academica Posteriora 17,
43.
De se ipse: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
Madv.
Gram. 487
b).
Diceret: this is omitted by the
MSS., but one has
agnosceret on the margin; see n. on
88.
Fannius: in his "Annals." The same
statement is quoted in
De Or. II. 270,
Brutus 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius
(
Ad Att. XII. 5, 3).
§16.
Veteribus: Bentley's em. of MSS.
vetera: C.F. Hermann
(Schneid
Philol. VII. 457), thinking the
departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
vetera and changes
incognita into
incondita, comparing
De Or. I. 197,
III. 173. A glance,
however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely
"disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between
order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that
incognita is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS.
reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were
not
knowledge, but mere
opinion." The conj. of Kayser
veri nota for
vetera (cf.
76) and
investigatum below, is fanciful and improbable.
Quod
investigata sunt: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
disturbs the text which since Madv.
Em. 127 supported it (quoting
T.D. V. 15, Liv.
XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that
illa
in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects
nihilne est igitur actum as a dittographia (!) from
15 nihilne explicatum, and reads
quot
for
quod with Bentl. For the meaning cf.
T.D. III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as
there quoted.
Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans: see n. on
I. 34. These charges were
brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch
Adv. Colotem
p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge
is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was
often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug.
Contra Acad.
II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm.
2 and
35 of the
Academica
Posteriora.
Immutatione verborum: n. on
I. 33. This phrase has also
technical meanings; it translates the Greek
τροποι
(
Brut. 69) and
αλληγορια
in
De Or. II. 261, where an ex. is given.
Definitiones: n. on
18.
Tenebras
obducere: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is
mentioned, cf.
30 (
lucem eripere),
N.D. I. 6 (
noctem obfundere) Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 14 (
quasdam nebulas
obfundere), also the joke of Aug.
II. 29
tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse.
Non admodum
probata: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533.
Lacyde: the most important passages in ancient authorities
concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that
Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of
information about his teacher's doctrines.
Tenuit: cf. the use of
obtinere in
De Or. I. 45.
In
Aeschine: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher
see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have
hac nonne Christ conj.
Hagnone which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to
adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon
just mentioned in Quint.
II. 17, 15. There is
not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
at all, from these two passages only.
§17.
Patrocinium: for the word cf.
N.D. I. 6.
Non defuit: such patronage
was
wanting in the time of Arcesilas (
16).
Faciendum omnino non putabant: "Epictetus (Arrian,
Diss.
I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by
saying
ουκ αγω
σχολην προς
ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another
passage (Arrian,
I. 5) Epict. says it is no more
use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse.
Ullam rationem
disputare: the same constr. occurs in
74 and
Pro Caecina 15,
Verr. Act. I. 24.
Antipatrum: cf. fragm.
1 of Book
I. Verbum e verbo: so
31,
D.F. III. 15,
T.D. III. 7, not
verbum de verbo,
which Goer. asserts to be the usual form.
Comprehensio: cf.
I. 41.
Ut Graeci: for the
ellipse of the verb cf.
I. 44 ut Democritus.
Evidentiam: other
translations proposed by Cic. were
illustratio (Quint.
VI. 2, 32) and
perspicientia (
De Off.
I. 15).
Fabricemur: cf.
87,
119,
121.
Me appellabat: Cic. was the great
advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (
D.F. III. 15).
Sed tamen: this often resumes the
interrupted narrative, see Madv.
Gram. 480.
Ipsa evidentia:
note that the verb
evidere is not Latin.
§18.
Sustinere: cf.
70.
Pertinaciam: the
exact meaning of this may be seen from
D.F. II. 107,
III. 1. It denotes
the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to
see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term
to the Academics, cf. n. on
14,
66, also
I. 44 and
D.F. V. 94,
N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages
the Academy is called
procax.
Mentitur: cf.
12.
Ita negaret: this
ita corresponds
to
si below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf.
19.
Ακαταληπτον:
the conj. of Turnebus
καταληπτον
is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in
negaret.
Visum: cf.
I. 40.
Trivimus: cf.
I. 27.
Visum igitur: the Greek of this definition
will be found in Zeller 86. The words
impressum effictumque are
equivalent to
εναπεσφραγισμενη
και
εναπομεμαγμενη
in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to
be a real alteration (
‛ετεροιωσις)
of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external
thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf.
Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes.
Ex eo unde esset ... unde non
esset: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given
by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in
Adv. Math. VIII. 86
Pyrrh.
Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt),
and in Diog. Laert.
VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a
clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It
is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of
his
Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words
κατ'
αυτο το
‛υπαρχον. Sextus
Adv. Math. VII. 249 considers them
essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra,
mistook her for an Erinys. The
φαντασια
therefore which he had although
απο
‛υπαρχοντος
(proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not
κατα το
‛υπαρχον, i.e.
did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug.
Cont. Acad.
II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses
it thus;
his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest
habere quod falsum est.
Iudicium:
κριτηριον,
a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known.
Eo, quo
minime volt: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a
reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of
knowledge on a ground quite different from the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια, which he
pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to
suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf.
11, Sextus
Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans
believed all things to be
ακαταληπτα,
Philo held them to be
καταληπτα,
and Numenius in Euseb.
Praep. Ev. XIV. 8,
p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is
evident from the
Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The
foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to
comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be
in their
own nature καταληπτα
(‛οσον δε
επι τη φυσει
των
πραγματων
αυτων
καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades
would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that
things
in themselves were incognisable,
but that human
faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore
Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such
a doctrine. The Stoics by their
καταληπτικη
φαντασια professed
to be able to get at
the thing in itself, in its real being, if
then Philo did away with the
καταλ.
φαντ. and substituted no other mode of
curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense,
he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius
treats his polemic against the
καταλ.
φαντ. as a mere feint intended to cover
his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in
112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be
expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually
does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to
be "
quod impressum esset e vero" (
φαντασια
απο
‛υπαρχοντος
εναπομεμαγμενη),
refusing to add "
quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (
‛οια ουκ αν
γενοιτο απο
μη
‛υπαρχοντος),
cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that
the cognisable was equivalent to the
δηλον or
πιθανον of Carneades,
hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the
wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on
phenomena. (See
78 of this book.) The scarcity of
references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact
view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or
nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
entitled
Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli).
With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie"
consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that
they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (
12). I
may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of
Stobaeus'
Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left
dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is,
that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new
Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
genuinely Academic.
Revolvitur: cf.
De Div. II. 13, also
148 of this book.
Eam definitionem: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that
all knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility
depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.
§§19—29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and
unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things.
Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must
see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be
removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated senses of painters and
musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally
clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of
sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we
arrive at definitions and ideas (21). If these
ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at
once rendered impossible (22). That true
perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the
things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing
certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can
proceed (24). Credence must be given to the thing
which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an
end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never
be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled,
should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are
rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a
sure basis (27). Hence the Academics have been
urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible, to be a
certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be
inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there
can be any true perception (28). Antiochus
declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they
had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
§19.
Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word
sensus
like
αισθησις means
two things, (1) one of the
five senses, (2) an individual act of
sensation.
Deus: for the supposed god cf.
T.D. II. 67.
Non videam: this strong statement is
ridiculed in
80.
De remo inflexo et de collo
columbae: cf.
79,
82.
The
κωπη εναλος
κεκλασμενη
and
περιστερας
τραχηλος are
frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the
deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g.
Pyrrhon. Hypot. I. 119-121,
Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day
before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug.
Cont. Ac.
III. 27.
Epicurus hoc viderit: see
79,
80. Epic. held all
sensation,
per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for
this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote.
Lumen
mutari: cf.
Brut. 261.
Intervalla ... diducimus: for
this cf. Sext.
Pyrrh.
I. 118
πεμπτος
εστι λογος
(i.e. the 5th sceptic
τροπος for showing sense to
be untrustworthy)
‛ο παρα τας
θεσεις (
situs)
και τα
διαστηματα
(
intervalla)
και τους
τοπους.
Multaque facimus
usque eo: Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 258
παντα ποιει
μεχρις αν
τρανην και
πληκτικην
σπαση
φαντασιαν.
Sui iudicii: see for the gen.
M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.
Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer.
Sui
cuiusque: for this use of
suus quisque as a single word see
M.D.F. V. 46.
§20. Ut oculi
... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other
hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary.
Quis est quin
cernat: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here
(
D.F. II. 27).
Umbris ...
eminentia: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses
umbra and
lumen, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk.
σκια and
σκιασμα are opposed to
λαμπρα; cf. also
σκιαγραφειν,
adumbrare, and Aesch.
Agam. 1328. Cic. often applies
metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g.
De Or.
III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g.
II. 17, 21.
Inflatu: cf.
86 (where an answer is given) and
αναβολη.
Antiopam: of Pacuvius.
Andromacham: of Ennius, often quoted
by Cic., as
De Div. I. 23.
Interiorem: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's
Socrates and the
Socratic Schools, 296.
Quia sentiatur:
αισθησις being
their only
κριτηριον.
Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R.
and P. and Zeller will show) conj.
cui adsentiatur, comparing
39,
58; cf. also
76.
Inter eum ... et inter: for the repetition
of
inter cf.
T.D. IV. 32 and Madv.
Gram. 470.
Nihil interesse: if the doctrine of the
Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied
himself in pleasure, and
vice versa; thus the distinction between
pleasure and pain would be obscured.
Sentiet ... insaniat: For the
sequence cf.
D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg's
fine note on
T.D. V. 102.
§21. Illud est
album: these are
αξιωματα,
judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see
Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too
long to quote entire:
αισθησεσι
μεν ουν
μοναις
λαβειν
ταληθες (which resides
only in the
αξιωμα)
ου δυναται
ανθρωπος. ...
φυσει γαρ
εισιν
αλογοι ... δει
δε εις
φαντασιαν
αχθηναι του
τοιουτου
πραγματος
"τουτο
λευκον εστι
και τουτο
γλυκυ εστιν."
τωι δε
τοιουτωι
πραγματι
ουκετι της
αισθησεως
εργον εστιν
επιβαλλειν
... συνεσεως
τε δει και
μνημης.
Ille deinceps:
deinceps is really out of place; cf.
24
quomodo primum for
pr. quom. Ille equus est: Cic.
seems to consider that the
αξιωμα, which affirms the
existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the
existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from
the Greek texts.
Expletam comprehensionem: full knowledge. Here we
rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g.
Adv.
Math. VII. ανθρωπος
εστι ζωον
λογικον
θνητον, νου
και
επιστημης
δεκτικον. The
Stoic
‛οροι, and this among them, are
amusingly ridiculed,
Pyrrh. Hyp. II.
208—211.
Notitiae: this Cic. uses as a translation both of
προληψις and
εννοια, for which see Zeller
79, 89. In
I. 40
notiones rerum is given.
Sine quibus:
δια
γαρ των
εννοιων τα
πραγματα
λαμβανεται
Diog.
VII. 42.
§22.
Igitur: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv.
Gram. 480.
Consentaneum: so Sextus constantly uses
ακολουθον.
Repugnaret: cf.
I. 19 and n.
Memoriae certe: n. on
106.
Continet: cf.
contineant in
40.
Quae potest esse: Cic. nearly always
writes
putat esse,
potest esse and the like, not
esse
putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause.
Memoria falsorum: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
Sophist. 238—239.
Ex multis animi perceptionibus: the
same definition of an art occurs in
N.D. II. 148,
D.F. III. 18
(see Madv.), Quint,
II. 17, 41, Sext.
Pyrrh.
Hyp. III. 188
τεχνην
ειναι
συστημα εκ
καταληψεον
συγγεγυμνασμενων
ib. III. 250.
Quam: for the change
from plural to singular (
perceptio in universum) cf. n. on
I. 38, Madv.
D.F. II. 61,
Em. 139.
Qui distingues: Sext.
Adv. Math. VIII. 280
ου
διοισει της
ατεχνιας ‛η
τεχνη. Sextus often comments on
similar complaints of the Stoics.
Aliud eiusmodi genus sit: this
distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence
in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext.
Adv. Math. XI. 197 who adds a third class of
τεχναι called
αποτελεσματικαι
to the usual
θεωρητικαι
and
πρακτικαι,
also Quint.
II. 18, 1 and 2, where
ποιητικη
corresponds to the
αποτ. of Sext.
Continget: "will be
the natural consequence." The notion that the verb
contingit
denotes necessarily
good fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer
on
T.D. III. 4.
Tractabit:
μελλει
μεταχειριζεσθαι.
§23.
Cognitio: like Germ.
lehre, the branch of learning which
concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of
καταληψις
here.
In quibus: the antecedent is not
virtutum, as Petrus
Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby,
but
multa. This is shown by
etiam; not
merely the
virtues but
also all
επιστημη depends
on
καταληψεις;
cf.
I. 40,
41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367.
Stabilem:
βεβαιον και
αμεταπτωτου.
Artem vivendi: "
tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos"
M.D.F. I. 42. Sextus constantly talks
about
‛η
ονειροπολουμενη
περι τον
βιον τεχνη
(
Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 250) the existence of
which he disproves to his own satisfaction (
Adv. Math. XI. 168 sq).
Ille vir bonus: in all ancient
systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the
sapiens must be
proof against the rack; cf. esp.
D.F. III. 29, 75,
T.D. V.
73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the
σοφος in Plato's
Gorgias.
Potius quam aut: Lamb.
ut; but I think C.F.
Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic.
never
inserts
ut after
potius quam with the subj. Tischer on
T.D. II. 52 affirms that
ut is
frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf.
De Off.
I. 86, Aug.
Cont. Ac. II. 12 who says the
sapiens of the Academy must
be
desertor officiorum omnium.
Comprehensi ... constituti:
cf. the famous
abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit.
Iis rebus:
note the assumption that the
sensation corresponds to the
thing which causes it.
Adsensus sit ... possint: nearly all
edd. before Halm read
possunt, but the subj. expresses the
possibility as present to the mind of the supposed
vir bonus. Cf.
Madv.
Gram. 368.
§24.
Primum: out of place, see on
21.
Agere: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if
consistent, be
ανενεργητος
εν βιωι (Sext.
Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. 23).
Extremum: similar
attempts to translate
τελος are made in D.F.
I. 11, 29,
V. 17.
Cum quid
agere: cf.
I. 23 for
the phrase
Naturae accommodatum. a purely Stoic expression,
‛ωμοιωμενον
τη φυσει; cf.
38 and
D.F. V. 17,
also
III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P.
390.
Impellimur:
κινουμεθα,
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 391, as often.
§25. Oportet
videri: "ought to be seen." For this use cf.
39,
81 and
122 of this book.
Videri at the end of this
section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly
from the one use to the other; cf.
I. 262 with
I. 270, and Munro's n., also
M.D.F. II. 52,
Em. Liv. p. 42.
Non poterit: as
the Academics allege.
Naturae ... alienum: Cic. uses this
adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by
ab;
I doubt whether the phrase
maiestate alienum (without the
preposition) can be right in
De Div. II.
102, where the best texts still keep it.
Non occurrit ... aget:
occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on
127.
§26. Quid quod
si: Goer., outrageously reads
quid quod si, si.
Tollitur: the verb
tollere occurs as frequently in this
sense as
αναιρειν does in
Sextus.
Lux lumenque: Bentl.
dux The expression
dux
vitae is of course frequent (cf.
N.D. I. 40,
T.D. V. 5 and
Lucretius), but there is no need to alter.
Lux is properly natural
light,
lumen artificial, cf.
Ad Att. XVI. 13, 1.
lumina dimiseramus, nec satis
lucebat, D.F.
III. 45
solis luce ...
lumen lucernae. There is the same difference between
φως and
φεγγος, the
latter is used for the former (
φεγγος
‛ηλιου) just as
lumen
is for
lux (
si te secundo lumine his offendere—
Ad
Att. VII. 26, 1) but not often
vice
versa. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 269 where the
φαντασια is
called
φεγγος.
Finis: so in
the beginning of the
Nicom. Eth. Aristot. assumes that the actual
existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a
τελος.
Aperta: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms
εκκαλυπτειν,
εκκαλυπτικος
etc., cf. Sextus
passim, and
D.F. I. 30.
Initium ... exitus =
αρχη ...
τελος.
Tenetur: MSS.
tenet, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be
ratio above.
Αποδειξις:
cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g.
Pyrrh. Hyp.
II. 143
λογος δι'
‛ομολογουμενων
λημματων
(premisses)
κατα
συναγωγην
επιφοραν
(conclusion)
εκκαλυπτων
αδηλον, also Diog.
VII. 45,
λογον δια
των μαλλον
καταλαμβανομενων
το ‛ηττον
καταλαμβανομενον
περαινοντα
(if the reading be right).
§27.
Notio: another trans. of
εννοια.
Conclusisse:
although the Greeks used
συμπερασμα
instead of
επιφορα sometimes for
the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb
συμπεραινειν
which has been supposed to correspond to
concludere. It is more
likely to be a trans. of
συναγειν, and
conclusum argumentum of
συνακτικος
λογος, which terms are of frequent
occurrence.
Rationibus progredi: to a similar question Sextus
answers,
ουκ εστιν
αναγκαιον
τας
εκεινον (the dogmatists)
δογματολογιας
προβαινειν,
πλασματωδεις
‛υπαρχουσας
(
Adv. Math. VIII. 367).
Sapientiae ...
futurum est: for the dat. with
facio and
fio see Madv.
Gram. 241, obs. 5,
Opusc. I. 370,
D.F. II. 79, and cf.
96 of this book.
Lex veri rectique: cf.
29; the
constitutio veri and the determination
of what is
rectum in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
Sapientique satis non sit: so Manut. for the
sapientisque
sit of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads
sapientis, neque satis
sit, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the
construction will run
neque dubitari potest quin satis sit, which
gives the exact opposite of the sense required.
Ratum: cf.
141.
§28.
Perceptum: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are
very frequent in Sextus, e.g.
Adv. Math. VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be
impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it
impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be
provable. Cf.
109 of this book.
Postulanti: making it a
necessity for the discussion; cf.
De Leg. I. 21.
Consentaneum esse:
ακολουθον
ειναι.
Ut alia:
although others.
Tantum abest ut—ut: cf. Madv.
Gram. 440 a.
§29.
Pressius: cf.
De Fato 31, 33,
N.D. II. 20,
T.D. IV. 14,
Hortensius fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in
109.
Decretum: of course the Academics would
say they did not hold this
δογμα as
stabile fixum ratum
but only as
probabile. Sextus however
Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in
reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma.
Sentitis enim: cf.
sentis in
D.F. III. 26.
Fluctuare: "to be at sea," Halm
fluctuari, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic.
Summa: cf.
summa philosophiae D.F. II. 86.
Veri falsi: cf. n. on
92.
Quae visa: so Halm for MSS.
quaevis, which edd. had changed to
quae a quovis.
Repudiari: the selection depended on the
probabile of
course, with the Academics.
Veri falsique: these words were used
in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by
them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements
in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext.
says,
ψιλη φασει
ισον
φερεται
ψιλη φασις
(
A.M. VII. 315),
φασει μεν
φασις
επισχεθησεται
(
ib. 337).
Cognoscendi initium: cf.
26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my
probabile."
Extremum expetendi: a rather unusual phrase for
the ethical
finis.
Ut moveri non possint: so
κινεισθαι
is perpetually used in Sext.
Est ut opinor: so Halm after Ernesti
for
sit of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading
is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek
‛ικανος
ειοησθω and the like.
The subj. is supported by
D.F. III. 20,
De Off. I. 8,
Ad Att. XIII. 14, 3, where
ut opinor is thrown in as
here, and by
Ac. II. 17,
D.F. III. 21, 24,
N.D. I. 109, where
si placet is
appended in a similar way.
§§30—36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we
might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is
naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and
so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason.
Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the
senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others
distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of
its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former
(32). Now they on the one hand profess to
distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no
absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is
possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How
can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains
that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all
if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There
is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after
careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is
still possibly false is useless (36).
§30.
Physicis: neuter not masc.; cf.
I. 6.
Libertatem et licentiam:
et = "and
even."
Libertas =
παρρησια as often
in Tacitus.
Abditis rebus et obscuris: cf. n. on
I. 15, and the word
συνεσκιασμενος
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 26.
Lucem
eripere: like
tollere (n. on
26), cf.
38,
103 and
N.D.
I. 6. For the sense see n. on
16, also
61.
Artificio: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to
ars
in all its senses, cf.
114 and
De Or.
II. 83.
Fabricata esset: the expression
is sneered at in
87.
Quem ad modum primum:
so Halm rightly for MSS.
prima or
primo, which latter is
not often followed by
deinde in Cicero.
Primum is out of
position, as in
24.
Appetitio pulsa: =
mota, set in motion. For
‛ορμη see
24.
Intenderemus: as in the exx. given in
20.
Fons: "reservoir," rather than "source"
here. It will be noted that
συγκαταθεσις
must take place before the
‛ορμη is roused.
Ipse sensus
est: an approach to this theory is made in Plat.
Theaet. 185,
191. Cf. especially Sext.
Adv. Math. VII.
350
και ‛οι μεν
διαφερειν
αυτην των
αισθησεων,
‛ως ‛οι
πλειους, ‛οι
δε αυτην
ειναι τας
αισθησεις ...
‛ης στασεως
ηρξε
Στρατον. All powers of
sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included
in the
‛ηγεμονικον,
cf. n. on
I. 38.
Alia
quasi: so Faber for
aliqua. "
In vera et aperta partitione
nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis—alius dixit, multo minus
alius—aliquis,"
M.D.F. III. 63.
Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he
forbears however, to produce them.
Recondit: so the
εννοιαι are called
αποκειμεναι
νοησεις (Plut.
De
Sto. Repug. p. 1057 a). In Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 373
μνημη is called
θησαυρισμος
φαντασιων.
Similitudinibus:
καθ'
‛ομοιωσιν
Sext.
Pyrr. Hyp. II. 75. Cic. uses this
word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not
immediately perceived by sense. In
D.F. III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see
Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best
translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in
N.D.
II. 22 38.
Construit: so MSS. Orelli gave
constituit.
Notitiae: cf.
22. Cic.
fails to distinguish between the
φυσικαι
εννοιαι or
κοιναι which are the
προληψεις,
and those
εννοιαι which are the
conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf.
M.D.F.
III. 21,
V. 60, for
this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also
Zeller 79.
Rerumque: "facts".
Perfecta:
sapientia,
virtus,
perfecta ratio, are almost convertible terms in the
expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf.
I. 20.
§31. Vitaeque
constantiam: which philosophy brings, see
23.
Cognitionem:
επιστημην.
Cognitio is used to translate
καταληψις
in
D.F. II. 16,
III. 17, cf. n. on
I. 41.
Ut dixi ... dicemus: For the repetition
cf.
135,
146, and
M.D.F. I. 41. The future tense is odd and
unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote
dicimus, I would rather read
dicamus; cf. n. on
29.
Per se:
καθ'
αυτην, there is no need to read
propter, as Lamb.
Ut virtutem efficiat: note that virtue is
throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the
reason.
Evertunt: cf.
eversio in
99.
Animal ... animo: Cic. allows
animus to all animals, not merely
anima; see Madv.
D.F. V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v.
animans is therefore wrong.
Temeritate:
προπετεια,
which occurs
passim in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled
at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in
Sext.
Adv. Math. VII. 260, the sceptic is
called
εμβροντητος
for rejecting the
καταληπτικη
φαντασια.
§32.
Incerta:
αδηλα.
Democritus: cf.
I. 44.
Quae ...
abstruserit: "
because she has hidden."
Alii autem: note
the ellipse of the verb, and cf.
I. 2.
Etiam queruntur: "actually complain;" "go so
far as to complain."
Inter incertum: cf. Numenius in Euseb.
Pr.
Ev. XIV. 7, 12,
διαφοραν
ειναι
αδηλου και
ακαταληπτου,
και παντα
μεν ειναι
ακαταληπτα
ου παντα δε
αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades),
also
54 of this book.
Docere: "to prove,"
cf. n. on
121.
Qui haec distinguunt: the
followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on
I. 45.
Stellarum
numerus: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext.
e.g.
P.H.
II. 90, 98,
A.M.
VII. 243,
VIII. 147, 317;
where it is reckoned among things
αιωνιον
εχοντα
αγνωσιαν. So in
the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf.
110.
Aliquos: contemptuous;
απονενοημενους
τινας. Cf.
Parad. 33
agrestis aliquos.
Moveri: this probably refers to the
speech of Catulus; see Introd. p.
51. Aug.
Cont. Ac. III. 15 refers to this passage,
which must have been preserved in the second edition.
§33. Veri et
falsi: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and
Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate.
"You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false
while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The
discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
the term "true" to denote the
probably true, the Academics are not
open to the criticism here attempted; cf.
111
tam vera quam falsa cernimus.
Ut inter rectum et pravum:
the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this
distinction than of the other.
Communis: the
απαραλλακτος
of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
κοινη
φαντασια
αληθους και
ψευδους Sext.
A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175.
Notam: the
σημειον of Sextus; cf.
esp.
P.H.
II. 97 sq.
Eodem modo
falsum: Sext.
A.M. VII. 164 (R. and
P. 410)
ουδεμια
εστιν
αληθης
φαντασια
‛οια ουκ αν
γενοιτο
ψευδης.
Ut si quis:
Madv. in an important n. on
D.F. IV. 30
explains this thus;
ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit
dicere. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he
quotes, and still prefer to construe
quem as a strong relative,
making a pause between
quis and
quem.
Visionem:
Simply another trans. of
φαντασια.
Ut
Carneades: see Sext.
A.M. VII. 166
την τε
πιθανην
φαντασιαν
και την
πιθανην
‛αμα και
απερισπαστον
και
διεξωδευμενην
(R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524
"probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own
explanation. The merely
πιθανη is that sensation
which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true
(Sext.
A.M. VII. 167—175). Now no
sensation is perceived
alone; the percipient subject has always
other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (
περισπαν,
περιελκειν)
from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is
only called
απερισπαστος
when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in
harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175—181.) The word "undisputed,"
therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
διεξωδευμενη
("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of
the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite
external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which
they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space
within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person
and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's
mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
181—189).
§34.
Communitas:
απαραλλαξια
or
επιμιξια
των
φαντασιων;
Sext.
A.M. VII. 403,
P.H. I. 127.
Proprium: so Sext. often uses
ιδιομα, e.g.
A. M.
IX. 410.
Signo notari:
signo for
nota, merely from love of variety. The
in before
communi, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly
sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after
notare in
De Or.,
III. 186.
Convicio: so Madv.
Em. 143 corrected the corrupt MSS.
readings, comparing
Orator 160,
Ad Fam. XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on
Pro Murena 13 rightly
defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "
Non unum maledictum
appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio." He is
wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word
once in the
plural (
Ad Att. II. 18, 1), for it occurs
N.D. II. 20, and elsewhere.
Perspicua:
εναργη, a term used with
varying signification by all the later Greek schools.
Verum illud
quidem: "which is indeed what
they call 'true'."
Impressum: n. on
18.
Percipi atque
comprehendi: Halm retains the barbarous
ac of the MSS. before
the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The
two verbs are both trans. of
καταλαμβανεσθαι;
Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in
D.F.
III. 14
erit notius quale sit, pluribus
notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus.
Subtiliter: Cic.'s
constant trans. of
ακριβως or
κατ'
ακριβειαν
(
passim in Sext. e.g.
P.H. II.
123).
Inaniterne moveatur: MSS. agree in
ve for
ne,
on which see
M.D.F. IV. 76.
Inaniter =
κενως =
ψευδως. Cf.
n. on
I. 35, also
II. 47,
D.F. V. 3 (
inaniter moveri),
T.D. IV. 13,
De Div. II.
120, 126, 140 (
per se moveri), Greek
κενοπαθειν
(Sext.
P.H. II. 49),
κενοπαθεια
(=
inanis motus, Sext.
A.M. VIII.
184),
κενοπαθηματα
και
αναπλασματα
της
διανοιας
(
ib. VIII. 354),
διακενος
‛ελκυσμος
(
ib. VII. 241),
διακενος
φαντασια
(
ib. VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase
κινημα της
διανοιας. For the
meaning see n. on
47.
Relinquitur: so in
Sext.
απολειπειν
is constantly used as the opposite of
αναιρειν
(
tollere).
§35.
Neminem etc.: they are content to make strong statements without
any mark of certainty.
Primo quasi adspectu: the
merely
πιθανη
φαντασια is here
meant; see
33.
§36. Ex
circumspectione, etc.: the
διεξωδευμενη;
see n. on
33.
Primum quia ... deinde: for
the slight anacoluthia, cf.
M.D.F ed.
II.
p. 796.
Iis visis, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of
things, emitting a number of
appearances, and you cannot be
sure of uniting each
appearance to the
thing from which it
proceeds, then you can have no faith in any
appearance even if you
have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules.
Ad verum
ipsum: cf.
40.
Quam proxime: cf.
47, and also
7.
Insigne:
σημειον, the same as
nota and
signum above.
Quo obscurato: so Lamb. for
MSS.
obscuro which Halm keeps. Cf.
quam obscurari volunt in
42 and
quo sublato in
33.
Argumentum: Cic. seems to be thinking of
the word
τεκμηριον,
which, however, the Stoics hardly use.
Id quod significatur:
το
σημειωντον
in Sext.
§§37—40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to
act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to
assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts
and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena,
he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life
(38, 39).
§37.
Explicabamus:
19—
21 and
30 (
quae vis esset
in sensibus).
Inanimum: not
inanimatum, cf.
M.D.F.
IV. 36.
Agit aliquid:
I. 23.
Quae est in
nostra: Walker's insertion of
non before
est is
needless, cf. n. on
I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without,
not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext.
A.M. VIII. 397
το μεν γαρ
φαντασιωθηναι
αβουλητον
ην). For
in potestate cf.
De Fato 9,
N.D. I. 69
§38.
Eripitur: cf.
30.
Neque sentire:
Christ om.
neque; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob
people of their senses.
Cedere: cf.
εικειν,
ειξις in Sext.
P.H. I. 193, 230, Diog.
VII. 51,
των δε
αισθητικων
μετα ειξεως
και
συγκαταθεσεως
γινονται
[‛αι
φαντασια]; also
66 of this book.
Οικειον: cf.
34.
Adsentitur statim: this really contradicts
a good deal that has gone before, esp.
20.
Memoriam: cf.
22.
In nostra
potestate: this may throw light on fragm.
15 of
the
Ac. Post., which see.
§39.
Virtus: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on
I. 40.
Ante videri
aliquid for the doctrine cf.
25, for the
passive use of
videri, n. on
25.
Adsentiatur: the passive use is illustrated by Madv.
Em.
131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after
necesse
est on
D.F. V. 25.
Tollit e
vita: so
De Fato 29.
§§40—42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method.
They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the
different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
arguments, (1) things which produce sensations such as
might have been produced in the same form by other things, cannot
be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2)
sensations must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties
do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed.
Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be
real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the
false may assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from
false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no
sensation which is also a perception (40). Two
admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot
be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false,
cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions
they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2)
every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might
have if it proceeded from an unreality (41). To
prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are
sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they
show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a
certainly known sensation."]
§40. Quasi
fundamenta: a trans. probably of
θεμελιος or the
like; cf.
‛ωσπερ
θεμελιος in Sext.
A.M. V. 50.
Artem: method, like
τεχνη, cf.
M.D.F. III. 4, Mayor on Iuv.
VII.
177.
Vim: the general character which attaches to all
φαντασιαι;
genera the different classes of
φαντασιαι.
Totidem verbis: of course with a view to showing that nothing
really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the
reductio ad absurdum method.
Contineant ... quaestionem:
cf.
22 and
T.D. IV. 65
una res videtur causam continere.
Quae ita: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish
clearly the
sensation (
visum) from the
thing which
causes it. Here the
things are meant; two
things are
supposed to cause two
sensations so similar that the person who
has one of the
sensations cannot tell from which of the two
things it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that
it is absurd to divide
things into those which can be perceived
(known with certainty) and those which cannot.
Nihil interesse
autem: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity
of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is
enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to
discern whatever difference may exist, cf.
85.
Alia vera sunt: Numenius in Euseb.
Pr. Ev. XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and
falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of
things,
though not of
sensations. If we could only pierce
through a
sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to
believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
that
sensation and
thing correspond. Cf. Sext.
P.H.
I. 22
περι μεν του
φαισθαι
τοιον η
τοιον το
‛υποκειμενον
(i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds)
ουδεις ισως
αμφισβητει,
περι δε του
ει τοιουτον
εστιν
‛οποιον
φαινεται
ζητειται. Neither
Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done,
the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply
maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do
not give us correct information about them.
Eiusdem modi: cf.
33 eodem modo.
Non posse accidere: this
is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (
D.F. I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
recta oratio
to obliqua. Halm with Manut. reads
potest. Cf.
101.
§41. Neque
enim: a remark of Lucullus' merely.
Quod sit a vero: cf. Munio
on Lucr.
II. 51
fulgor ab auro.
Possit: for the om. of
esse cf. n. on
I. 29.
§42.
Proposita: cf.
προτασεις
passim in Sext.
In sensus: =
in ea, quae ad sensus
pertinent cf.
I. 20.
Omni consuetudine: "general experience"
εμπειρια, cf.
N.D. I. 83.
Quam obscurari volunt:
cf.
I. 33.
quod
explanari volebant; the em. of Dav.
obscurare is against
Cic.'s usage, that of Christ
quam observari nolunt is wanton
without being ingenious.
De reliquis: i.e.
iis quae a sensibus
ducuntur.
In singulisque rebus: the word
rebus must
mean
subjects, not
things, to which the words
in minima
dispertiunt would hardly apply.
Adiuncta: Sext.
A.M.
VII. 164 (R. and P. 410)
πασηι τη
δοκουσηι
αληθει
καθεσταναι
ευρισκεται
τις
απαραλλακτος
ψευδης, also
VII. 438, etc.
§§43—45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to
define, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things,
(2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be
capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes of reasoning their
probabile is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon
certain premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is
to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference,
then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate
clearness of visa, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
§43.
Horum: Lamb.
harum; the text however is quite right, cf.
Madv.
Gram. 214
b.
Luminibus: cf.
101.
Nihilo magis: =
ουδεν
μαλλον, which was constantly
in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext.
P.H. I. 14.
Num illa definitio ... transferri: I
need hardly point out that the
‛ορος of the Academics was merely
founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on
29). An Academic would say in reply to the question,
"probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it."
Vel illa vera:
these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them.
Vel = "even" i.e. if
even the definition is firmly known,
the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In
illa
vera we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of
veri et
falsi in
33.
In falsum: note that
falsum =
aliam rem above. For the sense cf. Sext.
P.H. II. 209
μοχθηρους
‛ορους
ειναι τους
περιεχοντας
τι των μη
προσοντων
τοις
‛οριστοις,
and the schoolmen's maxim
definitio non debet latior esse definito
suo.
Minime volunt: cf.
18.
Partibus: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but
omnibus
hardly ever stands for
omn. rebus, therefore C.F. Hermann reads
pariter rebus for
partibus. A little closer attention to
the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf.
42 dividunt in partis,
T.D. III. 24, where
genus = division,
pars =
subdivision.
§44. Impediri
... fatebuntur: essentially the same argument as in
33 at the end.
Occurretur: not an imitation of
εναντιουσθαι
as Goer. says, but of
απανταν, which occurs
very frequently in Sext.
Sumpta: the two premisses are in Gk.
called together
λημματα, separately
λημμα
and
προσληψις
(
sumptio et adsumptio De Div II.
108).
Orationis: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this
word like
ratio (
συλλογισμος),
cf.
De Leg. I. 48
conclusa oratio.
Fab. refers to Gell.
XV. 26.
Profiteatur:
so
‛υπισχνεισθαι
is often used by Sext. e.g.
A.M. VIII.
283.
Patefacturum: n. on
26,
εκκαλυπτειν,
εκκαλυπτικος,
δηλωτικος
(the last in Sext.
A.M. VIII. 277) often
recur in Greek.
Primum esse ... nihil interesse: there is no
inconsistency. Carneades allowed that
visa,
in themselves,
might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable
of distinguishing those
visa which proceed from real things and
give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are
mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it.
Lucullus confuses
essential with
apparent difference.
Non iungitur: a supposed case of
διαρτησις,
which is opposed to
συναρτησις
and explained in Sext.
A.M. VIII.
430.
§45.
Assentati: here simply =
assensi.
Praeteritis: here
used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed
over," cf.
in remissis Orat. 59.
Primum igitur ... sed
tamen: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv.
Gram. 480.
Iis
qui videntur: Goer.
is qui videtur, which is severely
criticised by Madv.
Em. 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see
n. on
79,
80.
§§46—48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to
the innate clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due
to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light
by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by
sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus:
you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then
do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really
existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation
produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say
they admit that mere phantom sensations do command assent. Why
should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely
resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)
§46.
Circumfusa sint: Goer. retains the MSS.
sunt on the ground
that the clause
quanta sint is inserted
παρενθετικως!
Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf.
122 circumfusa tenebris.
Interrogationibus: cf.
I. 5 where I showed that the words
interrogatio and
conclusio are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure
syllogisms are very frequently called
ερωτησεις,
and that he often introduces a new argument by
ερωταται
και τουτο, when
there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
Dissolvere:
απολυεσθαι
in Sext.
Occurrere: cf.
44.
§47.
Confuse
loqui: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in
D.F. II. 27.
Nulla sunt: on the
use of
nullus for
non in Cic. cf. Madv.
Gram. 455
obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and
Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters.
Inaniter:
cf.
34. There are two ways in which a sensation
may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be
supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different
thing, (2) it may be a mere
φαντασμα or
αναπλασμα
της
διανοιας, a
phantom behind which there is no reality at all.
Quae in somnis
videantur: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination
see Zeller 166,
De Div. I. 7, etc.
Quaerunt: a slight anacoluthon from
dicatis above.
Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino: this difficult passage can only
be properly explained in connection with
50 and
with the general plan of the Academics expounded in
41. After long consideration I elucidate it as
follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in
41 and
42 viz.
omnibus
veris visis adiuncta esse falsa. The criticism in
50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on
the assumption known to be Stoic,
omnia deum posse. If the god can
manufacture (
efficere) sensations which are false, but probable
(as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false
sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to
be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be
utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of
inter quae
nihil sit omnino is fixed by
40, where see
n.)?
Probabilia, then, denotes false sensations such as have only
a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding
stages the resemblance is made complete. The word
probabilia is a
sort of tertiary predicate after
efficere ("to manufacture so as
to be probable"). It
must not be repeated after the second
efficere, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section
placed out of harmony with
50.
Plane
proxime: =
quam proxime of
36.
§48. Ipsa per
sese: simply =
inaniter as in
34,
47, i.e. without the approach of any external object.
Cogitatione: the only word in Latin, as
διανοια
is in Greek, to express our "imagination."
Non numquam: so Madv.
for MSS.
non inquam. Goer. after Manut. wrote
non inquiunt
with an interrogation at
omnino.
Veri simile est: so Madv.
D.F. III. 58 for
sit. The argument
has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that
phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which
proceed from realities.
Ut si qui: the
ut here is merely
"as," "for instance," cf. n. on
33.
Nihil ut
esset: the
ut here is a repetition of the
ut used
several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend
on
sic. Lamb. expunged
ut before
esset and before
quicquam.
Intestinum et oblatum: cf. Sext.
A.M.
VII. 241
ητοι των
εκτος η των
εν ‛ημιν
παθων, and the two classes of
falsa visa mentioned in n. on
47.
Sin
autem sunt, etc.: if there
are false sensations which are
probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations
so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The
rest exactly as in
47.
§§49—53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as
soritae, and therefore faulty (49). The
admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false
sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing
between the true and the false (50). We contend
that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require
before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light
of the sensations we had while in it (51). But,
say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid
as our waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say
they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This
proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life.
All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our
attention (53).
§49.
Antiochus: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
similar subjects.
Ipsa capita:
αυτα τα
κεφαλαια.
Interrogationis: the
sorites was always in the form of a
series of questions, cf.
De Div. II. 11
(where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his
proposed trans.
acervalis is unnecessary),
Hortens. fragm.
47, and n. on
92.
Hoc vocant: i.e.
hoc
genus, cf.
D.F. III. 70
ex eo
genere, quae prosunt.
Vitiosum: cf.
D.F. IV. 50
ille sorites, quo nihil putatis (Stoici)
vitiosius. Most edd. read
hos, which indeed in
136 is a necessary em. for MSS.
hoc.
Tale
visum: i.e.
falsum.
Dormienti: sc.
τινι.
Ut probabile
sit, etc.: cf.
47,
48
and notes.
Primum quidque: not
quodque as Klotz; cf.
M.D.F. II. 105, to whose exx. add
De
Div. II. 112, and an instance of
proximus
quisque in
De Off. II. 75.
Vitium: cf.
vitiosum above.
§50. Omnia
deum posse: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at
least, see
De Div. II. 86. For the line
of argument here cf.
De Div. II. 106
fac dare deos, quod absurdum est.
Eadem: this does not mean
that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of
them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on
40.
Similes: after this
sunt was added
by Madv.
In suo genere essent: substitute
esse viderentur
for
essent, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would
allow that
things in their essence are divisible into
sharply-defined
genera, but would deny that the
sensations
which proceed from or are caused by the
things, are so
divisible.
§51. Una
depulsio: cf.
128 (
omnium rerum una est
definitio comprehendendi),
De Div. II. 136 (
omnium somniorum una ratio est).
In
quiete: =
in somno, a rather poetical usage.
Narravit:
Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into
narrat, most wantonly.
Visus
Homerus, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his
Annals, is referred to by Lucr.
I. 124,
Cic.
De Rep. VI. 10 (
Somn. Scip.
c. 1), Hor.
Epist. II. 1, 50.
Simul
ut: rare in Cic., see Madv.
D.F. II.
33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five
passages where he allows it to stand, the
ut precedes a vowel;
Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing
ac before a vowel, so that
in
D.F. II. 33
ut should probably
be written (with Manut. and others) for
et which Madv. ejects.
§52.
Eorumque: MSS. om.
que. Dav. wrote
ac before
eorum, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a
guttural condemned in n. on
34. For the argument
see n. on
80 quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
quid videatur.
Primum interest: for om. of
deinde cf.
45,
46.
Imbecillius:
cf.
I. 41.
Edormiverunt: "have slept
off the effects," cf.
αποβριζειν
in Homer.
Relaxentur: cf.
ανιεναι της
οργης Aristoph.
Ran. 700,
relaxare is used in the neut. sense in
D.F. II. 94.
Alcmaeonis: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is
often quoted by Cic., e.g.
D.F. IV.
62.
§53.
Sustinet:
επεχει; see on
94.
Aliquando sustinere: the point of the
Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the
εποχη of
the
sapiens becomes
habitual; he gives up the attempt to
distinguish between true and false
visa. Lucullus answers that,
did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even
in the sane condition.
Confundere: so
58,
110, Sext.
A.M. VIII. 56 (
συγχεουσι
τα
πραγματα),
ib. VIII. 157 (
συγχεομεν
τον βιον),
VIII. 372 (
‛ολην
συγχεει την
φιλοσοφον
ζητησιν), Plut.
De
Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos p. 1077 (
‛ως παντα
πραγματα
συγχεουσι).
Utimur: "we have to put up with," so
χρησθαι is used in Gk.
Ebriosorum: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
vinolenti above.
Illud attendimus: Goer., and Orelli write
num illud, but the emphatic
ille is often thus introduced
by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in
136.
Proferremus: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by
Madv. on
D.F. II. 35 of the subj. used to
denote "
non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri
debuerit." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they
can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a
condition is expressed without its
consequence. We have an
exact parallel in English, e.g. "
tu dictis Albane maneres" may
fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the
condition "
if thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the
consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such
a condition may be expressed without
si, just as in Eng. without
"
if," cf. Iuv.
III. 78 and Mayor's n. The
use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with
ει γαρ, etc., and
even without
ει) is
susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points
of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the
functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on
D.F. II. 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis
of a suppressed protasis, but as in his
Gram. 351
b, obs. 4
he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]
§§54—63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such
doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and
seals is childish (54). They press into their
service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much
ridiculed by them (55). Democritus may say that
innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I
appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has
its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The Servilii were distinguished from one another
by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the
appearance of an egg which hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are able
to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say
is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual
sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd
are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow.
The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable
logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas (59). What
nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad
influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of
philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding
that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath
that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the
continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should
not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my
view (63).
§54. Ne hoc
quidem: the common trans. "not even" for "
ne quidem" is often
inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this
either," cf. n.
on
I. 5.
Habeant:
the slight alteration
habeat introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite
destroys the point of the sentence.
Quod nolunt: cf.
44.
An sano: Lamb.
an ut sano, which
Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
Similitudines: cf.
84—
86. The impossibility
of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was
a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no
two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the
Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who
took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other
after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject
cf. Sextus
A.M. VII. 408—410.
Negat esse: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places
esse second, especially at the end of a clause.
Cur eo non
estis contenti: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which
concerned the
amount of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that
the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to
render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other,
the sceptics argued that it could.
Quod rerum natura non patitur:
again Lucullus confounds
essential with
phenomenal
difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on
50.
Nulla re differens: cf. the
nihil differens of
99, the substitution of which here would perhaps make
the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term
απαραλλακτος
(Sext.
A.M. VII. 252, etc.).
Ulla
communitas: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
Lamb.
nulla after the fine note of Madv. (
Em. 154),
approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the
Stoics may be stated thus
suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec
est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas (
ουδε
‛υπαρχει
επιμιγη
απαραλλακτος).
This opinion is negatived by
non patitur ut and it will be evident
at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs
(
est) into the subjunctive. The change of
ulla into
nulla is in no way needed.
Ut [
sibi]
sint:
sibi is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated
privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's
ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read
nulla re differens
communitas visi? Sint et ova etc. omitting
ulla and
ut
and changing
visi into
sibi (cf. Faber's em.
novas
for
bonas in
72). This ingenious but, as I
think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his
Adversaria. Lamb. reads
at tibi sint, Dav.
at si vis,
sint, Christ
ut tibi sint, Bait.
ut si sint after
C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer
sui for
sibi (SVI for SIBI).
B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip
in.
Eosdem: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps
intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on
50. Before leaving this section, I may point out
that the
επιμιγη or
επιμιξια
των
φαντασιων
supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic
τροποι, see
Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. 124.
§55.
Irridentur: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext.
A.M. IX. 1.
Absolute ita paris: Halm as well as
Bait. after Christ, brackets
ita; if any change be needed, it
would be better to place it before
undique. For this opinion of
Democr. see R. and P. 45.
Et eo quidem innumerabilis: this is the
quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
yet been proposed, cf.
125.
Nihil differat,
nihil intersit: these two verbs often appear together in Cic.,
e.g.
D.F. III. 25.
§56.
Potiusque: this adversative use of
que is common with
potius, e.g.
D.F. I. 51. Cf.
T.D. II. 55
ingemescere nonnum quam
viro concessum est, idque raro, also
ac potius,
Ad Att.
I. 10, etc.
Proprietates: the
ιδιοτητες
or
ιδιωματα of
Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue
between dogmatism and scepticism.
Cognoscebantur: Dav.
dignoscebantur, Walker
internoscebantur. The MSS. reading
is right, cf.
86.
Consuetudine: cf.
42, "experience".
Minimum: an adverb like
summum.
§57.
Dinotatas: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
recognise the word. Most edd. change it into
denotatas.
Artem:
τεχνην, a set of rules.
In
proverbio: so
venire in proverbium,
in proverbii usum
venire,
proverbii locum obtinere,
proverbii loco dici
are all used.
Salvis rebus: not an uncommon phrase, e.g.
Ad
Fam. IV. 1.
Gallinas: cf. fragm.
19 of the
Acad. Post. The similarity of eggs was
discussed
ad nauseam by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras
the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled,
ωι σκοπια (egg
investigation)
η περι
σοφιστειας
προς
Ακαδημαικους,
mentioned by Suidas.
§58. Contra
nos: the sense requires
nos, but all Halm's MSS. except one
read
vos.
Non internoscere: this is the reading of all the
MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits
non. The sense is, "we
are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we
shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent
us from making any positive assertion about the eggs."
Adsentiri:
for the passive use of this verb cf.
39.
Par
est: so Dav. for
per, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and
Orelli have
potest, with one MS.
Quasi: the em. of Madv.
for the
quam si of the MSS.
Transversum digitum: cf.
116.
Ne confundam omnia: cf.
53,
110.
Natura
tolletur: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to
discuss the nature of
things in themselves, and kept to
phenomena.
Intersit: i.e.
inter visa.
In
animos: Orelli with one MS. reads
animis; if the MSS. are
correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (
Antibarbarus, ed. 4)
"
imprimere wird klas sisch verbunden
in aliqua re, nicht
in aliquam rem," will require modification.
Species et quasdam
formas:
ειδη και
γενη,
quasdam marks the fact that
formas is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such
doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine
is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two
genera than between two individuals. If the
non before
vos were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been
inserted by copyists when
sed,
tamen, or some such word,
comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic
Ad
Quintum Fratrem,
II. 11, discussed by Munro,
Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.
§59. Illud
vero perabsurdum: note the omission of
est, which often takes
place after the emphatic pronoun.
Impediamini: cf. n. on
33.
A veris: if
visis be supplied the
statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if
rebus
be meant, it is wide of the mark.
Id est ... retentio: supposed to
be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on
I.
6,
8.
Constitit: from
consto, not from
consisto cf.
63
qui tibi constares.
Si vera sunt: cf.
67,
78,
112,
148. The
nonnulli are Philo and Metrodorus, see
78.
Tollendus est adsensus: i.e. even that qualified assent which the
Academics gave to probable phenomena.
Adprobare: this word is
ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on
104.
Id est peccaturum: "which is equivalent
to sinning," cf.
I. 42.
Iam nimium etiam: note
iam and
etiam in the same
clause.
§60. Pro
omnibus: note
omnibus for
omnibus rebus.
Ista
mysteria: Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 37, 38
speaks of various doctrines, which were
servata et pro mysteriis
custodita by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic
scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an
esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary
period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may
perhaps from a passage of Augustine,
C. Ac. III. 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be
attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is
ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all
succeeding inquirers.
Auctoritate: cf.
8,
9.
Utroque: this neuter, referring to two fem.
nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
Gram. 214
c.
§61.
Amicissimum: "
because you are my dear friend".
Commoveris: a military term, cf.
De Div. II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p.
53.
Sequere: either this is future, as in
109, or
sequeris, the constant form in Cic.
of the pres., must be read.
Approbatione omni: the word
omni is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified
assent, cf.
59.
Orbat sensibus: cf.
74, and
D.F. I. 64,
where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase
sensus tolli, on the ground that the Academics swept away not
sensus but
iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis. Goer. qu. Plin.
N.H. III. 5, Sil. Ital.
XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
Cimmerii, to show that
the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced
this mention of the legendary people.
Deus aliquis: so the best
edd. without comment, although they write
deus aliqui in
19. It is difficult to distinguish between
aliquis and
aliqui,
nescio quis and
nescio
qui,
si quis and
si qui (for the latter see n. on
81). As
aliquis is substantival,
aliqui adjectival,
aliquis must not be written with
impersonal nouns like
terror (
T.D. IV. 35,
V. 62),
dolor
(
T.D. I. 82,
Ad Fam. VII. 1, 1),
casus (
De Off. III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd.
vary, e.g.
deus aliqui (
T.D. I.
23,
IV. 35),
deus aliquis (
Lael.
87,
Ad Fam. XIV. 7, 1),
anularius
aliqui (
86 of this book),
magistratus
aliquis (
In Verr. IV. 146). With a
proper name belonging to a real person
aliquis ought to be written
(
Myrmecides in
120, see my n.).
Dispiciendum: not
despiciendum, cf.
M.D.F. II. 97,
IV. 64, also
De
Div. II. 81,
verum dispicere.
Iis
vinculis, etc. this may throw light on fragm.
15
of the
Acad. Post., which see.
§62. Motum
animorum: n. on
34.
Actio rerum: here
actio is a pure verbal noun like
πραξις, cf.
De Off.
I. 83, and expressions like
actio vitae
(
N.D. I. 2),
actio ullius rei (
108 of this book), and the similar use of
actus in Quintilian (
Inst. Or. X.
1, 31, with Mayor's n.)
Iuratusque: Bait. possibly by a mere
misprint reads
iratus.
Comperisse: this expression of Cic.,
used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a
cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See
Ad
Fam. V. 5, 2,
Ad Att. I. 14, 5.
Licebat: this is the reading of the
best MSS., not
liquebat, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the
support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see
3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p.
46 with respect to Catulus, in most of which
Lucullus is also mentioned.
§63. Quod ...
fecerat, ut: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
Gram.
481
b.
Quod refers simply to the fact of Lucullus'
admiration, which the clause introduced by
ut defines, "which
admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc."
Iocansne
an: this use of
ne ... an implies, Madv. says (on
D.F.
V. 87), more doubt than the use of
ne
alone as in
vero falsone.
Memoriter: nearly all edd. before
Madv. make this mean
e memoria as opposed to
de scripto; he
says, "
laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae" (on
D.F.
I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the
Antibarbarus, ed. 4.
Censuerim: more modest than
censeo, see Madv.
Gram. 380.
Tantum enim non te modo
monuit: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking
modo exc.
with
non, ejected it. Madv. (
Em. 160) retains it, making it
mean
paulo ante. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that
tantum non =
μονον ου occurs nowhere
else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects
non, taking
tantum as
hoc tantum, nihil praeterea. Livy certainly has the suspected use
of
tantum non.
Tribunus: a retort comes in
97,
144.
Antiochum:
cf.
I. 13.
Destitisse: on the difference between
memini followed by
the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv.
Gram. 408
b,
obs. 2.
§§64—71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The
strength of Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it
can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in
all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on
that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do
not deny that I make slips, but we must deal with the sapiens,
whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the sapiens
ever gives his assent he will be obliged to opine, but he never
will opine therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is
full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that
perception in the Stoic sense is impossible (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When
he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long
denied? (69) Some think he wished to found a
school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no
longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an
argumentum ad hominem (71).
§64. Quadam
oratione: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
quandam
orationem as Lamb., Orelli.
De ipsa re: cf.
de causa
ipsa above.
Respondere posse: for the om. of
me before
the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read
respondere (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert
me (as Lamb.), see
n. on
I. 7.
§65. Studio
certandi: =
φιλονεικια.
Pertinacia ... calumnia: n. on
14.
Iurarem: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of
his consulship.
§66.
Turpissimum: cf.
I. 45,
N.D. I. 1.
Opiner:
opinio or
δοξα is judgment based on insufficient
grounds.
Sed quaerimus de sapiente: cf.
115,
T.D. IV. 55, 59
also
De Or. III. 75
non quid ego sed
quid orator.
Magnus ... opinator: Aug.
Contra Acad.
III. 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the
Hortensius. He imitates it,
ibid. I. 15
magnus definitor.
Qua fidunt,
etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
Aratea, and are quoted in
N.D. II. 105, 106.
Phoenices: the
same fact is mentioned by Ovid,
Fasti III. 107,
Tristia IV.
3, 1.
Sed Helicen: the best MSS. om.
ad, which Orelli
places before
Helicen.
Elimatas: the MSS. are divided
between this and
limatas.
Elimare, though a very rare word
occurs
Ad Att. XVI. 7, 3.
Visis
cedo: cf. n. on
38.
Vim maximam: so
summum munus is applied to the same course of action in
D.F. III. 31.
Cogitatione: "idea".
Temeritate: cf.
I. 42,
De Div. I. 7, and
the charge of
προπετεια
constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext.
Praepostere: in
a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.
§67. Aliquando
... opinabitur: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic
doctrine,
nihil posse percipi.
Secundum illud ... etiam
opinari: it seems at first sight as though
adsentiri and
opinari ought to change places in this passage, as Manut.
proposes. The difficulty lies in the words
secundum illud, which,
it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas'
argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes
granted
as a second premiss the following statement, that the wise
man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of
Carneades would then run thus, (1)
Si ulli rei, etc. as above, (2)
adsentietur autem aliquando, (3)
opinabitur igitur.
§68. Adsentiri
quicquam: only with neuter pronouns like this could
adsentiri
be followed by an accusative case.
Sustinenda est:
εφεκτεον.
Iis
quae possunt: these words MSS. om.
Tam in praecipiti: for the
position of
in cf. n. on
I. 25. The best MSS. have here
tamen in. Madv.
altered
tamen to
tam in n. on
D.F. V. 26. The two words are often confused, as in
T.D. IV. 7, cf. also n. on
I. 16.
Sin autem, etc.:
cf. the passage of Lactantius
De Falsa Sapientia III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's
reprint)
si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque
opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est.
Nitamur
... percipi: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The
construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect
hoc, or
some such word, to have fallen out between
igitur and
nihil.
§69. Non
acrius: one of the early editions omits
non while Goer. reads
acutius and puts a note of interrogation at
defensitaverat.
M.
Em. 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the
old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his
new arguments against it.
Quis enim: so Lamb. for MSS.
quisquam
enim.
Excogitavit: on interrogations not introduced by a
particle of any kind see Madv.
Gram. 450.
Eadem dicit: on
the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the
proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
132.
Sensisse: =
iudicasse, n. on
I. 22.
Mnesarchi ... Dardani: see
Dict.
Biogr.
§70. Revocata
est: Manut. here wished to read
renovata, cf. n. on
I. 14.
Nominis
dignitatem, etc.: hence Aug.
Contra Acad. III. 41 calls him
foeneus ille Platonicus
Antiochus (that
tulchan Platonist).
Gloriae causa: cf.
Aug.
ibid. II. 15
Antiochus gloriae
cupidior quam veritatis.
Facere dicerent: so Camerarius for
the MSS.
facerent.
Sustinere: cf.
115 sustinuero Epicureos.
Sub Novis:
Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS.
sub nubes. The
Novae
Tabernae were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy.
In
De Or. II. 266 a story is told of
Caesar, who, while speaking
sub Veteribus, points to a
"
tabula" which hangs
sub Novis. The excellence of Faber's
em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut.
sub nube, and that of
Lamb.
nisi sub nube. I have before remarked that
b is
frequently written in MSS. for
v.
Maenianorum: projecting
eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their
inventor like
Vitelliana,
Vatinia etc.
§71. Quoque
... argumento: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is
picked up by
quod argumentum near the end.
Utrum: the
neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are
marked by
ne and
an. The same usage is found in
D.F.
II. 60,
T.D. IV.
9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of
utrum ... ne
... an, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g
De Invent.
II. 115
utrum copiane sit agri an penuria
consideratur. On this point cf. M.
Em. 163,
Gram. 452,
obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic.
Verr. IV. 73.
Honesti inane nomen esse: a modern would be inclined to write
honestum, in apposition to
nomen, cf.
D.F. V. 18
voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum.
Voluptatem etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called
‛ο
μεταθεμενος)
from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf.
T.D. II. 60, Diog. Laert.
VII.
166—7.
A vero: "coming from a reality," cf.
41, n.
Is curavit: Goer. reads
his,
"
solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire,"
says Madv. The scribes often prefix
h to parts of the pronoun
is, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.
§§72—78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to
ancient names like a revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and
Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the
truth of sense knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge
altogether (72, 73).
Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense
knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with
these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while
Plato pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but
take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties
concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them,
even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy
to escape being ensnared by them (75). The
Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to
keep clear from opinion. Arcesilas agreed but this without
knowledge was impossible. Knowledge consists of
perceptions. Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of
perception. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the
controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with opinion and
perception, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once
(77, 78).
§72. De
antiquis philosophis: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
Lamb. read
antiquos philosophos.
Popularis: cf.
13.
Res non bonas: MSS. om.
non, which
Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the
true reading to be
novas, which would be written
nobas, and
then pass into
bonas.
Nivem nigram: this deliverance of
Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In
P.H. I. 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of
φαινομενα
by means of
νοουμενα, "
Αναξαγορας
τωι λευκην
ειναι την
χιονα,
ανετιθει
‛οτι χιων
εστιν ‛υδορ
πεπηγος το
δε ‛υδορ
εστι μελαν
και ‛η χιων
αρα
μελαινα." There is an
obscure joke on this in
Ad Qu. Fratrem II. 13, 1
risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo
esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat.
Sophistes: here
treated as the demagogue of philosophy.
Ostentationis: =
επιδειξεος.
§73.
Democrito: Cic., as Madv. remarks on
D.F. I. 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in
order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf.
T.D. I. 22,
De Div. I. 5,
II. 139,
N.D. I.
120,
De Or. I. 42.
Quintae
classis: a metaphor from the Roman military order.
Qui veri esse
aliquid, etc.: cf.
N.D. I. 12
non
enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris
falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus.
Non obscuros sed tenebricosos:
"not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the
σκοτιη
γνωσις of Democr., by which he
meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things
as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also
held a
γνησιη
γνωσις, dealing with the
realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist
ετεηι
and not merely
νομωι as appearances do. See R. and
P. 51.
§74.
Furere: cf.
14.
Orbat sensibus: cf.
61, and for the belief of Empedocles about the
possibility of
επιστημη see the
remarks of Sextus
A.M. VII. 123—4
qu. R. and P. 107, who say "
patet errare eos qui scepticis
adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant."
Sonum fundere: similar
expressions occur in
T.D. III. 42,
V. 73,
D.F. II. 48.
Parmenides, Xenophanes: these are the last men who ought to be
charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against
sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the
reason. Cf. Grote,
Plato I. 54, Zeller
501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides.
Minus bonis: Dav. qu.
Plut.
De Audit. 45 A,
μεμψαιτο δ'
αν τις
Παρμενιδου
την
στιχοποιιαν.
Quamquam: on the proper use of
quamquam in clauses where
the verb is not expressed see
M.D.F. V.
68 and cf.
I. 5.
Quasi
irati: for the use of
quasi = almost cf.
In Verr. Act.
I. 22,
Orat. 41.
Aiebas
removendum: for om. of
esse see n. on
I. 43.
Perscripti sunt:
cf. n. on
I. 16.
Scire
se nihil se scire: cf.
I. 16,
44. The words referred to
are in Plat.
Apol. 21
εοικα γουν
τουτου
σμικρωι
τινι αυτωι
τουτωι
σοφωτερος
ειναι, ‛οτι
α μη οιδα
ουδε οιομαι
ειδεναι, a very
different statement from the
nihil sciri posse by which Cic.
interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That
επιστημη in the
strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left
to the Sophists.
De Platone: the doctrine above mentioned is an
absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are
called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real
επιστημη is
attainable.
Ironiam: the word was given in its Greek form in
15.
Nulla fuit ratio persequi: n. on
17.
§75.
Videorne: =
nonne videor, as
videsne =
nonne
vides.
Imitari numquam nisi: a strange expression for which
Manut. conj.
imitari? num quem, etc., Halm
nullum unquam in
place of
numquam. Bait. prints the reading of Man., which I think
harsher than that of the MSS.
Minutos: for the word cf.
Orat. 94, also
De Div. I. 62
minuti philosophi,
Brut. 256
minuti imperatores.
Stilponem, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. 177—182.
σοφισματα:
Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here the translation
cavillationes, to which Seneca
Ep. 116 refers, cf. Krische,
p. 65.
Fulcire porticum: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch".
Cf. the anonymous line
ει μη γαρ ην
Χρυσιππος,
ουκ αν ην
Στοα.
Quae in consuetudine
probantur: n. on
87.
Nisi videret: for
the tense of the verb, see Madv.
Gram. 347
b, obs. 2.
§76. Quid ...
philosophi: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. and
followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this reading,
which only requires the alteration of
Cyrenaei into
Cyrenaici (now made by all edd. on the ground that
Cyrenaeus is a citizen of Cyreno,
Cyrenaicus a follower of
Aristippus) and the insertion of
tibi. I see no difficulty in the
qui before
negant, at which so many edd. take offence.
Tactu intimo: the word
‛αφη I believe does not occur in ancient
authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was
παθος.
From
143 (
permotiones intimas) it might
appear that Cic. is translating either
παθος or
κινησις. For a clear
account of the school see Zeller's
Socrates, for the illustration
of the present passage pp 293—300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R.
and P. 162 sq.
Quo quid colore: cf. Sext.
A.M. VII. 191 (qu. Zeller
Socrates 297, R. and P.
165).
Adfici se: =
πασχειν.
Quaesieras: note the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect
or aorist.
Tot saeculis: cf. the same words in
15.
Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis: cf.
summis ingeniis, maximis studiis in
15.
Obtrectandi: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in
16; cf. also
I. 44.
§77.
Expresserat: "had put into distinct shape". Cf.
7 and
I. 19.
Exprimere and
dicere are always
sharply distinguished by Cic., the latter merely implying the mechanic
exercise of utterance, the former the moulding and shaping of the
utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp.
Orat. 3, 69, and
Ad
Att. VIII. 11, 1; also
De Or. I. 32,
De Div. I. 79,
qu. by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav.
exposuerat is
therefore needless.
Fortasse: "we may suppose".
Nec
percipere, etc.: cf.
68, n.
Tum illum:
a change from
ille, credo (sc.
respondit), the
credo
being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after
ita
definisse cf.
M.D.F. II. 13 (who
quotes exx.); also the construction with
ita iudico in
113.
Ex eo, quod esset: cf.
18, n.
Effictum: so Manut. for MSS.
effectum, cf.
18.
Ab eo, quod non
est: the words
non est include the two meanings "is non
existent," and "is different from what it seems to be"—the two
meanings of
falsum indeed, see n. on
47.
Eiusdem modi: cf.
40,
84. MSS. have
eius modi, altered by Dav.
Recte ... additum: the semicolon at
Arcesilas was added by
Manutius, who is followed by all edd. This involves taking
additum
=
additum est, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv.
Opusc. I. 448,
D.F. I. 43,
Gram. 479
a. I think it quite
possible that
recte consensit additum should be construed
together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly made." For the
omission of
esse in that case cf. Madv.
Gram. 406, and such
expressions as
dicere solebat perturbatum in
111, also
ita scribenti exanclatum in
108.
Recte, which with the ordinary stopping
expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain
in point. Qy, should
concessit be read, as in
118 concessisse is now read for MSS.
consensisse?
A vero: cf.
41.
§78. Quae
adhuc permanserit: note the subj., "which is of such a nature as to
have lasted".
Nam illud ... pertinebat: by
illud is meant
the argument in defence of
εποχη given in
67; by
nihil ... pertinebat nothing more is
intended than that there was no
immediate or
close
connection. Cf. the use of
pertinere in
D.F. III. 55.
Clitomacho: cf. n. on
59.
§§79—90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding
your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are
thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the
sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of
whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
we desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires
not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the
god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you want something
greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he
seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader
or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears
to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies
in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false
one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has
mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising
Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances exist.
Never mind, they seem to exist and that is enough. One mistaken
sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its own
genus this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two
sensations are absolutely similar, it is enough that human
faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to
rival your chicken rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So
we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea
this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses!
(86) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I
am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from
Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon,
of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides disprove
your point (88, 89). In
their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed. It is no good to talk about
the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of
their sensations at the time they were affected? (90)
§79. Communi
loco:
τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot
be disproved, see
19.
Quod ne [
id]:
I have bracketed
id with most edd. since Manut. If, however,
quod be taken as the conjunction, and not as the pronoun,
id is not altogether insupportable.
Heri: cf. Introd.
55.
Infracto remo: n. on
19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
Pantheism"—"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a
pool".
Manent illa omnia, iacet: this is my correction of the
reading of most MSS.
maneant ... lacerat. Madv.
Em. 176 in
combating the conj. of Goer.
si maneant ... laceratis istam
causam, approves
maneant ... iaceat, a reading with some MSS.
support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole confusion of the passage
arises from the mania of the copyists for turning indicatives into
subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. occur every few
pages. If
iacet were by error turned into
iaceret the
reading
lacerat would arise at once. The nom. to
dicit is,
I may observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans.
"all my arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his
senses are true quotha!" (For this use of
dicit cf.
inquit
in
101,
109,
115). Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed.
Cratandriana of 1528
latrat. Dav. conjectured comically
blaterat iste tamen et, Halm
lacera est ista causa.
Habes: as two good MSS. have
habes et eum, Madv.
Em.
176 conj.
habet. The change of person, however, (from
dicit
to
habes) occurs also in
101.
Epicurus: n. on
19.
§80. Hoc est
verum esse: Madv.
Em. 177 took
verum as meaning fair,
candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed
virum esse, a
very strange em. Halm's conj.
certum esse is weak and improbable.
Importune: this is in one good MS. but the rest have
importata, a good em. is needed, as
importune does not suit
the sense of the passage.
Negat ... torsisset: for the tenses cf.
104 exposuisset, adiungit.
Cum oculum
torsisset: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing
upwards or sideways. Cf. Aristot.
Eth. Eud. VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.)
οφθαλμους
διαστρεψαντα
‛ωστε δυο το
‛εν
φανηναι. Faber qu.
Arist.
Problemata XVII. 31
δια τι εις
το πλαγιον
κινουσι τον
οφθαλμον ου
(?) φαινεται
δυο το ‛εν. Also
ib. XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why
drunkards see double he says
ταυτο τουτο
γιγνεται
και εαν τις
κατωθεν
πιεση τον
οφθαλμον. Sextus
refers to the same thing
P.H. I. 47,
A.M. VII. 192 (
‛ο
παραπιεσας
τον
οφθαλμον) so Cic.
De Div. II. 120. Lucretius gives the same
answer as Timagoras,
propter opinatus animi (IV. 465), as does
Sext.
A.M. VII. 210 on behalf of
Epicurus.
Sed hic: Bait.
sit hic.
Maiorum: cf.
143.
Quasi quaeratur: Carneades refused to
discuss about things in themselves but merely dealt with the appearances
they present,
το γαρ
αληθες και
το ψευδες εν
τοις
πραγμασι
συνεχωρει
(Numen in Euseb.
Pr. Eu. XIV. 8). Cf.
also Sext.
P.H. I. 78, 87, 144,
II. 75.
Domi nascuntur: a proverb used like
γλαυκ' εσ'
Αθηνας and "coals to
Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut.
Miles II. 2, 38, and cf.
Ad Att. X. 14, 2,
Ad Fam. IX.
3.
Deus: cf.
19.
Audiret ... ageret:
MSS. have
audies ... agerent. As the insertion of
n in the
imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read
ageret and alter
audies to suit it. Halm has
audiret ... ageretur with Dav.,
Bait.
audiet, egerit.
Ex hoc loco video ... cerno: MSS.
have
loco cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno whence Lipsius
conj.
ex hoc loco e regione video. Halm ejects the words
regionem video, I prefer to eject
cerno regionem. We are
thus left with the slight change from
video to
cerno, which
is very often found in Cic., e.g.
Orat. 18. Cic. sometimes however
joins the two verbs as in
De Or. III.
161.
O praeclarum prospectum: the view was a favourite one with
Cic., see
Ad Att. I. 13, 5.
§81. Nescio
qui: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that
nescio quis implies
contempt, while
nescio qui does not, cf.
Div. in qu. Caec.
47, where
nescio qui would contradict his rule. It is as difficult
to define the uses of the two expressions as to define those of
aliquis and
aliqui, on which see
61
n. In
Paradoxa 12 the best MSS. have
si qui and
si
quis almost in the same line with identically the same meaning Dav.
quotes Solinus and Plin.
N.H. VII. 21, to
show that the man mentioned here was called Strabo—a misnomer
surely.
Octingenta: so the best MSS., not
octoginta, which
however agrees better with Pliny.
Quod abesset: "
whatever
might be 1800 stadia distant,"
aberat would have implied that Cic.
had some
particular thing in mind, cf. Madv.
Gram. 364,
obs. 1.
Acrius:
οξυτερον, Lamb.
without need read
acutius as Goer. did in
69.
Illos pisces: so some MSS., but the best
have
ullos, whence Klotz conj.
multos, Orelli
multos
illos, omitting
pisces. For the allusion to the fish, cf.
Acad. Post. fragm.
13.
Videntur: n. on
25.
Amplius: cf.
19
non video cur quaerat amplius.
Desideramus: Halm, failing
to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading
desiderant
(i.e.
pisces). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my
opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we
have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light
because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients
thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense
given by Halm's reading.
Quererer cum deo: would enter into an
altercation with the god. The phrase, like
λοιδορεσθαι
τινι as opposed to
λοιδορειν
τινα implies mutual recrimination, cf.
Pro Deiotaro 9
querellae cum Deiotaro. The reading
tam
quererer for the
tamen quaereretur of the MSS. is due to
Manut.
Navem: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in
P.H. I. 107,
A.M. VII. 414.
Non tu verum testem, etc.: cf.
105. For the om. of
te before
habere,
which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see
n. on
I. 6.
§82. Quid
ego: Bait. has
sed quid after Ernesti.
Nave: so the
best MSS., not
navi, cf. Madv.
Gram. 42.
Duodeviginti: so in
128. Goer. and Roeper
qu. by Halm wished to read
duodetriginta. The reff. of Goer. at
least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the sun
at 28 times the size of the earth.
Quasi pedalis: cf.
D.F.
I. 20
pedalis fortasse. For
quasi
=
circiter cf. note on
74. Madv. on
D.F. I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert.
X. 91, who preserves the very words of Epicurus, in
which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr.
V. 590, who copies Epicurus, and Seneca
Quaest.
Nat. I. 3, 10 (
solem sapientes viri
pedalem esse contenderunt). Madv. points out from Plut.
De Plac.
Phil. II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus
asserted the sun to be a foot wide, he does not however quote Stob.
Phys. I. 24, 1
‛ηλιον
μεγεθος
εχειν ευρος
ποδος
ανθρωπειου,
which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus.
Ne
maiorem quidem: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read
nec for
ne, incurring the reprehension of Madv.
D.F. p. 814, ed 2.
Nihil aut non multum: so in
D.F. V. 59, the correction of Orelli, therefore,
aut non
multum mentiantur aut nihil, is rash.
Semel: see
79.
Qui ne nunc quidem: sc.
mentiri sensus
putat. Halm prints
quin, and is followed by Baiter, neither
has observed that
quin ne ... quidem is bad Latin (see
M.D.F. V. 56). Nor can
quin ne go
together even without
quidem, cf. Krebs and Allgayer,
Antibarbarus ed. 4 on
quin.
§83. In parvo
lis sit: Durand's em. for the
in parvulis sitis of the MSS.,
which Goer. alone defends.
Quattuor capita: these were given in
40 by Lucullus, cf. also
77.
Epicurus: as above in
19,
79 etc.
§84.
Geminum: cf.
56.
Nota: cf.
58 and the speech of Lucullus
passim.
Ne
sit ... potest: cf.
80 quasi quaeratur quid
sit, non quid videatur. Si ipse erit for
ipse apparently =
is ipse cf.
M.D.F. II. 93.
§85. Quod non
est: =
qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur.
Sui generis: cf.
50,
54,
56.
Nullum esse pilum, etc.: a strong
expression of this belief is found in Seneca
Ep.. 113, 13, qu. R.
and P. 380. Note the word
Stoicum; Lucullus is of course not
Stoic, but Antiochean.
Nihil interest: the same opinion is
expressed in
40, where see my note.
Visa
res: Halm writes
res a re, it is not necessary, however,
either in Gk. or Lat. to express
both of two related things when a
word is inserted like
differat here, which shows that they
are related. Cf. the elliptic constructions in Gk. with
‛ομοιον,
μεταξυ,
μεσος, and such words.
Eodem
caelo atque: a difficult passage. MSS. have
aqua, an error
easy, as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood
caelum to be the
heaven, and not
γλυφειον, a
graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, adducing
passages to show that sky and water were important in the making of
statues. For
aqua Orelli conj.
acu =
schraffirnadel,
C.F. Hermann
caelatura, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian
word. Halm's
aeque introduces a construction with
ceteris
omnibus which is not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I
read
atque, taking
ceteris omnibus to be the abl. neut.
"all the other implements." Formerly I conj.
ascra, or
atque
in, which last leading would make
omnibus =
om.
statuis.
Alexandros: Lysippus alone was privileged to make
statues of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the
conqueror, cf.
Ad Fam. V. 12, 7.
§86.
Anulo: cf.
54.
Aliqui: n. on
61.
Gallinarium: cf.
57.
Adhibes artem: cf.
20 adhibita arte.
Pictor ... tibicen:
so in
20.
Simul inflavit: note
simul
for
simul atque, cf.
T.D. IV. 12.
Nostri quidem: i.e.
Romani.
Admodum: i.e.
adm.
pauci cf.
De Leg. III. 32
pauci
enim atque admodum pauci.
Praeclara: evidently a fem. adj.
agreeing with
natura. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
understanding
sunt interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge
are grand, viz.
quanto art. etc."
§87.
Scilicet: Germ. "naturlich."
Fabricata sit: cf.
30,
119,
121 and N.D.
I. 19.
Ne
modo: for
modo ne, a noticeable use.
Physicis: probably
neut.
Contra sensus: he wrote both for and against
συνηθεια; cf. R.
and P. 360 and 368.
Carneadem: Plut.
Sto. Rep. 1036 B
relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the
senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector:
δαιμονιε
φθισει σε το
σον μενος. From
Diog.
IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the
line qu. in n. on
75,
ει μη γαρ ην
Χρυσιππος
ουκ αν ην
εγω.
§88.
Diligentissime: in
48—
53.
Dicebas: in
52
imbecillius adsentiuntur.
Siccorum: cf. Cic.
Contra
Rullum I. 1
consilia siccorum.
Madere is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
Mostellaria I. 4, 6.
Non diceret:
Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit the verb, with one MS., cf.
15 and
I. 13. The omission of a verb in the subjunctive is,
Madv. says on
D.F. I. 9, impossible; for
other ellipses of the verb see
M.D.F. V.
63.
Alcmaeo autem: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; cf.
52.
Somnia reri: the best MSS. have
somniare. Goer. reads
somnia, supplying
non fuisse
vera. I have already remarked on his extraordinary power of
supplying. Halm conj.
somnia reprobare, forgetting that the
verb
reprobare belongs to third century Latinity, also
sua visa
putare, which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from
the MSS., I read
reri, which verb occurred in
I. 26,
39.
Possibly
putare, a little farther on, has got misplaced.
Non id
agitur: these difficulties supply Sextus with one of his
τροποι, i.e.
‛ο
περι τας
περιστασεις;
cf.
P.H. I. 100, also for the treatment
of dreams,
ib. I. 104.
Si modo,
etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it."
Aeque ac vigilanti: =
aeque ac si vigilaret. Dav. missing
the sense, and pointing out that
when awake Ennius did not assent
to his sensations at all, conj.
vigilantis. Two participles used
in very different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv.
Em.
Liv. p. 442.
Ita credit: MSS. have
illa, which Dav.
altered. Halm would prefer
credidit.
Itera dum, etc.: from
the
Iliona of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see
Ad
Att. XIV. 14, and
T.D. II. 44.
§89.
Quisquam: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences
cf. Virg.
Aen. I. 48 with the
FileOutputStreams of Wagner and Conington.
Tam certa putat: so
Sextus
A.M. VII. 61 points out that
Protagoras must in accordance with his doctrine
παντων
μετρον
ανθρωπος hold that
the
μεμηνως is the
κριτηριον
των εν
μανιαι
φαινομενων.
Video, video te: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was
Αιας
μαινομενος,
see Ribbeck
Trag. Lat. rel. p. 205. Cic. in
De Or. III. 162 thus continues the quotation, "
oculis
postremum lumen radiatum rape." So in Soph.
Aiax 100 the hero,
after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in
order to torture him.
Hercules: cf. Eur.
Herc. Fur.
921—1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are
often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g.
A.M. VII. 405
‛ο γουν
‛Ερακλης
μανεις και
λαβων
φαντασιαν
απο των
ιδιων
παιδων ‛ως
Ευρυσθεος,
την
ακολουθον
πραξιν
ταυτηι τη
φαντασιαι
συνηψεν.
ακολουθον
δε ην το τους
του εχθρου
παιδας
ανελειν,
‛οπερ και
εποιησεν. Cf. also
A.M. VII. 249.
Moveretur: imperf.
for plup. as in
90.
Alcmaeo tuus: cf.
52.
Incitato furore: Dav. reads
incitatus. Halm qu. from Wesenberg
Observ. Crit. ad Or. p.
Sestio p. 51 this explanation, "
cum furor eius initio remissior
paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus esset," he also refers to
Wopkens
Lect. Tull. p. 55 ed. Hand.
Incedunt etc.: the MSS.
have
incede, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the verb is
evidently
Furiae.
Adsunt: is only given once by MSS., while
Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.
Caerulea ... angui:
anguis fem is not uncommon in the old
poetry. MSS. here have
igni.
Crinitus:
ακερσεκομης,
"never shorn," as Milton translates it.
Luna innixus: the separate
mention in the next line of
Diana, usually identified with the
moon, has led edd. to emend this line. Some old edd. have
lunat,
while Lamb. reads
genu for
luna, cf. Ov.
Am. I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.)
lunavitque genu sinuosum
fortiter arcum. Wakefield on Lucr.
III. 1013
puts a stop at
auratum, and goes on with
Luna innixans.
Taber strangely explains
luna as =
arcu ipso lunato, Dav.
says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it is the
utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should not
regard
luna and
Diana as distinct.
§90. Illa
falsa: sc.
visa, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
perversely insists on taking
somniantium recordatione ipsorum
closely together.
Non enim id quaeritur: cf.
80 n. Sext. very often uses very similar language,
as in
P.H. I. 22, qu. in n. on
40.
Tum cum movebantur: so Halm for MSS.
tum commovebantur, the em. is supported by
88.
§§91—98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable
knowledge, its processes are not applicable to a large number of
philosophical questions (91). You value the art,
but remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the sorites,
which you say is faulty (92). If it is so, refute
it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will avail you
nothing (93). If you refrain because you
cannot answer, your knowledge fails you, if you can answer
and yet refrain, you are unfair (94). The art you
admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web, witness the
Mentiens, (95). You assent to arguments
which are identical in form with the Mentiens, and yet refuse to
assent to it Why so? (96) You demand that these
sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go
to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would
not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned Dialectic from
Antiochus, the Mentiens and the arguments identical with it in
form must stand or fall together (98).
§91. Inventam
esse: cf.
26,
27.
In
geometriane: with this inquiry into the special function of Dialectic
cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
Gorg. 453 D, 454 C.
Sol
quantus sit: this of course is a problem for
φυσικη, not
for
διαλεκτικη.
Quod sit summum bonum: not
διαλεκτικη
but
ηθικη must decide this.
Quae
coniunctio: etc. so Sext. often opposes
συμπλοκη or
συνημμενον
to
διεζευγμενον,
cf. esp
P.H. II. 201, and Zeller 109 sq.
with footnotes. An instance of a
coniunctio (hypothetical
judgment) is "
si lucet, lucet" below, of a
disiunctio
(disjunctive judgment) "
aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet".
Ambigue dictum:
αμφιβολον,
on which see
P.H. II. 256, Diog
VII. 62.
Quid sequatur:
το
ακολουθον,
cf.
I. 19 n.
Quid
repugnet: cf.
I. 19,
n.
De se ipsa: the
ipsa, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom.
and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an
art is not to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to
solve every problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in
Rep. II.) that the Expert is the man who
knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar
arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp.
P.H. II. 175 and the words
εαυτου
εσται
εκκαλυπτικον.
For the mode in which Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511.
The true ground of attack is that Logic always
assumes the truth
of phenomena, and cannot
prove it. This was clearly seen by
Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the Origin of
Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol
II. of his
Aristotle.
§92. Nata
sit: cf.
28,
59.
Loquendi: the Stoic
λογικη, it must be
remembered, included
‛ρητορικη.
Concludendi:
του
συμπεραινειν
or
συλλογιζεσθαι.
Locum:
τοπον in the philosophical sense.
Vitiosum:
49, n.
Num nostra culpa
est: cf.
32.
Finium: absolute limits;
the fallacy of the
sorites and other such sophisms lies entirely
in the treatment of purely
relative terms as though they were
absolute.
Quatenus: the same ellipse occurs in
Orator 73.
In acervo tritici: this is the false
sorites, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one
grain makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three,
four, etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins
to answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and
no heap. One grain therefore
does make a heap. The true
sorites or chain inference is still treated in books on logic, cf.
Thomson's
Laws of Thought, pp 201—203, ed 8.
Minutatim: cf. Heindorf's note on
κατα
σμικρον in
Sophistes 217 D.
Interrogati: cf.
104. In
94 we have
interroganti, which some edd. read here.
Dives pauper,
etc.: it will be easily seen that the process of questioning above
described can be applied to any relative term such as these are. For the
omission of any connecting particle between the members of each pair, cf.
29,
125,
T.D. I. 64,
V. 73, 114, Zumpt
Gram. 782.
Quanto addito aut dempto: after this there is a
strange ellipse of some such words as
id efficiatur, quod
interrogatur. [
Non]
habemus: I bracket
non in
deference to Halm, Madv. however (
Opusc. I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation
arising from a sort of anacoluthon, comparing
In Vatin. 3,
Ad
Fam. XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit
negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.
§93.
Frangite: in later Gk. generally
απολυειν.
Erunt ... cavetis: this form of the conditional sentence is
illustrated in Madv.
D.F. III. 70,
Em.
Liv. p. 422,
Gram. 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence
Heaut. V. 1, 59
quot incommoda tibi in
hac re capies nisi caves, cf. also
127,
140 of this book. The present is of course required
by the instantaneous nature of the action.
Chrysippo: he spent so
much time in trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his
by Persius
VI. 80.
inventus, Chrysippe, tui
finitor acervi. The titles of numerous distinct works of his on the
Sorites and
Mentiens are given by Diog.
Tria pauca
sint: cf. the instances in Sext.
A.M. VII. 418
τα
πεντηκοντα
ολιγα εστιν,
τα μυρια
ολιγα
εστιν, also Diog.
VII. 82
‛ησυχαζειν
the advice is quoted in Sext.
P.H. II.
253 (
δειν
‛ιστασθαι
και
επεχειν),
A.M.
VII. 416 (
‛ο σοφος
στησεται
και
‛ησυχασει).
The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see Sext.
P.H. II. 244,
III. 66.
Stertas: imitated by Aug.
Contra
Ac. III. 25
ter terna novem esse ... vel
genere humano stertente verum sit, also
ib. III. 22.
Proficit: Dav.
proficis, but
Madv. rightly understands
το
‛ησυχαζειν
(
Em. 184), cf.
N.D. II. 58.
Ultimum ... respondere: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of
defendere with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests
paucorum quid sit.
§94. Ut
agitator: see the amusing letter to Atticus
XIII. 21, in which Cic. discusses different
translations for the word
επεχειν, and quotes a
line of Lucilius
sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator
equosque, adding
semperque Carneades προβολην
pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit εποχη. Aug.
Contra Ac. trans.
εποχη by
refrenatio cf. also
Lael. 63.
Superbus es: I have thus corrected the MSS.
responde superbe; Halm writes
facis superbe, Orelli
superbis, which verb is hardly found in prose. The phrase
superbe resistere in Aug.
Contra Ac. III. 14 may be a reminiscence.
Illustribus:
Bait. with some probability adds
in, comparing
in decimo
below, and
107, cf. however Munro on Lucr.
I. 420.
Irretiat: parallel expressions occur in
T.D. V. 76,
De Or. I. 43,
De Fato 7.
Facere non sinis:
Sext.
P.H. II. 253 points the moral in
the same way.
Augentis nec minuentis: so Halm for MSS.
augendi
nec minuendi, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase
primum augendi to be Latin.
§95. Tollit
... superiora: cf.
Hortensius fragm. 19 (Orelli)
sed ad
extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
dialecticorum ratio.
Vestra an nostra: Bait. after Christ
needlessly writes
nostra an vestra.
αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed
in language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this
subject.
Effatum: Halm gives the spelling
ecfatum. It is
probable that this spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in
connection with religious and legal formulae as in
De Div. I. 81,
De Leg. II. 20,
see Corss.
Ausspr. I. 155 For the word
cf. Sen.
Ep. 117
enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod alii
effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum, in
T.D. I. 14
pronuntiatum is found, in
De Fato
26
pronuntiatio, in Gellius
XVI. 8 (from
Varro)
prologium.
Aut verum esse aut falsum: the constant
Stoic definition of
αξιωμα, see Diog.
VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107.
Mentiris
an verum dicis: the
an was added by Schutz on a comparison of
Gellius
XVIII. 10
cum mentior et mentiri me
dico, mentior an verum dico? The sophism is given in a more formally
complete shape in
De Div. II. 11 where
the following words are added,
dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis,
mentiris igitur. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301,
ed Orelli),
quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum
pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare? Inexplicabilia:
απορα in
the Greek writers.
Odiosius: this adj. has not the strong meaning
of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying."
Non
comprehensa: as in
99, the opposite of
comprehendibilia III. 1, 41. The past
partic. in Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in
-bilis.
Faber points out that in the
Timaeus Cic. translates
αλυτος by
indissolutus
and
indissolubilis indifferently.
Imperceptus, which one
would expect, is found in Ovid.
§96. Si
dicis: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by Manut.
with the exception of
nunc which was added by Dav. The idea of
Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
comic writers is untenable.
In docendo:
docere is not to
expound but to
prove, cf. n. on
121.
Primum ... modum: the word
modus
is technical in this sense cf.
Top. 57. The
προτος
λογος
αναποδεικτος
of the Stoic logic ran thus
ει ‛ημερα
εστι, φως
εστιν ... αλλα
μην ‛ημερα
εστιν φως
αρα εστιν (Sext.
P.H. II. 157, and other passages qu.
Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly
tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges
φως and
‛ημερα into
one word, or that of Zeller (
114, note). These
arguments are called
μονολημματοι
(involving only one premise) in Sext.
P.H. I. 152, 159,
II. 167.
Si
dicis te mentiri, etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does,
that when a man
truly states that he
has told a lie, he
establishes against himself not merely that he
has told a lie, but
also that he
is telling a lie at the moment when he makes the
true statement. The root of the sophism lies in the confusion of
past and present time in the one infinitive
mentiri.
Eiusdem
generis: the phrase
te mentiri had been substituted for
nunc lucere.
Chrysippea: n. on
93.
Conclusioni: on
facere with the dat. see n. on
27.
Cederet: some edd.
crederet, but
the word is a trans. of Gk.
εικειν; n. on
66.
Conexi: =
συνημμενον,
cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment.
Superius: the
συνημμενον
consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the
affirmative—called in Greek
‛ηγουμενον
and
ληγον; if one is admitted the other
follows of course.
§97.
Excipiantur: the legal
formula of the Romans generally
directed the
iudex to condemn the defendant if certain facts were
proved, unless certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went
by the name of
exceptio. See
Dict. Ant.
Tribunum ...
adeant: a retort upon Lucullus; cf.
13. The
MSS. have
videant or
adeant; Halm conj.
adhibeant,
comparing
86 and
Pro Rabirio 20.
Contemnit: the usual trans. "to despise" for
contemnere is
too strong; it means, like
ολιγωρειν,
merely to neglect or pass by.
Effabimur; cf.
effatum above.
Hermarchus: not
Hermachus, as most edd.; see
M.D.F.
II. 96.
Diiunctum:
διεζευγμενον,
for which see Zeller 112.
Necessarium: the reason why Epicurus
refused to admit this is given in
De Fato 21
Epicurus veretur
ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant.
The context of that passage should be carefully read, along with
N.D. I. 69, 70. Aug.
Contra Ac.
III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth
of disjunctive propositions.
Catus: so Lamb. for MSS.
cautus.
Tardum:
De Div. II.
103
Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici; cf. also
ib. II. 116, and the frequent use of
βραδυς in Sext., e.g.
A.M. VII. 325.
Cum hoc igitur: the
word
igitur, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.
Id est: n. on
I. 8.
Evertit: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343.
Zeller 399 sq.,
M.D.F. I. 22.
E
contrariis diiunctio: =
διεζευγμενον
εξ
εναντιων.
§98.
Sequor: as in
95,
96, where the
Dialectici refused to allow the
consequences of their own principles, according to Cic.
Ludere:
this reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for
which see Cope in the old
Journal of Philology. No. 7.
Iudicem
... non iudicem: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by
μεν and
δε, has been a great crux of
edd.; Dav. here wished to insert
cum before
iudicem, but is
conclusively refuted by Madv.
Em. 31. The same construction occurs
in
103.
Esse conexum: with great
probability Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the
copyists.
§§98—105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the
case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two
divisions of visa, one into those capable of being perceived and
those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments
aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the sapiens will
follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly
does (99, 100). Our
sapiens is not made of stone; many things seem to him true; yet he
always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics
themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission
together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible
(101). It is strange that our Probables do
not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He condemns those who say that sensation is
swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its necessary
certainty (103). There are two modes of
withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely
so far as to deny the certainty of phenomena. The latter mode
leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).
98. Tortuosum: similar
expressions are in
T.D. II. 42,
III. 22,
D.F. IV. 7.
Ut Poenus: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf.
D.F. IV. 56,
tuus ille Poenulus, homo
acutus. A different meaning is given by the
ut in passages
like
De Div. II. 30
Democritus non
inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius; "for a
physical philosopher."
§99.
Genera: here = classifications of, modes of dividing
visa.
This way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong
censure of Madv. (Pref. to
D.F. p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted
of ignorance, for representing Carneades as dividing
visa into
those which can be perceived and those which cannot. Is it possible that
any one should read the
Academica up to this point, and still
believe that Cic. is capable of supposing, even for a moment, that
Carneades in any way upheld
καταληψις?
Dicantur: i.e.
ab Academicis.
Si probabile: the
si is not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading
est, probabile nihil esse.
Commemorabas: in
53,
58.
Eversio: cf.
D.F. III. 50 (the same words), Plat.
Gorg. 481 C
‛ημων ‛ο
βιος
ανατετραμμενος
αν ειη, Sext.
A.M. VIII. 157
συγχεομεν
τον βιον.
Et
sensibus: no second
et corresponds to this;
sic below
replaces it. See Madv.
D.F. p. 790, ed. 2.
Quicquam tale
etc.: cf.
40,
41.
Nihil
ab eo differens: n. on
54.
Non
comprehensa: n. on
96.
§100. Si
iam: "if, for example;" so
iam is often used in Lucretius.
Probo ... bono: it would have seemed more natural to transpose
these epithets.
Facilior ... ut probet: the usual construction is
with
ad and the gerund; cf.
De Div. II. 107,
Brut. 180.
Anaxagoras: he made
no
‛ομοιομερειαι
of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is dark in colour.
Concreta: so Manut. for MSS.
congregata. In
121 the MSS. give
concreta without variation,
as in
N.D. II. 101,
De Div. I. 130,
T.D. I. 66,
71.
§101.
Impeditum: cf.
33, n.
Movebitur:
cf.
moveri in
24.
Non enim est: Cic.
in the vast majority of cases writes
est enim, the two words
falling under one accent like
sed enim, et enim (cf. Corss.
Ausspr. II. 851); Beier on
De Off.
I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
est enim, but the MSS. both of the
Lucullus and of Nonius
agree in the other form, which Madv. allows to stand in
D.F. I. 43, and many other places (see his note). Cf.
fragm.
22 of the
Acad. Post.
E robore:
so Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here
ebore.
Dolatus:
an evident imitation of Hom.
Od. T 163
ου γαρ απο
δριος εσσι
παλαιφατου
ουδ' απο
πετρης.
Neque tamen
habere: i.e.
se putat. For the sudden change from
oratio
recta to
obliqua cf.
40 with n.
Percipiendi notam: =
χαρακτηρα
της
συγκταθεσεως
in Sext.
P.H. I. 191. For the use of the
gerund cf. n. on
26, with Madv.
Gram. 418,
Munro on Lucr.
I. 313; for
propriam 34.
Exsistere. cf.
36.
Qui neget: see
79.
Caput: a legal term.
Conclusio
loquitur: cf.
historiae loquantur (
5),
consuetudo loquitur (
D.F. II. 48),
hominis institutio si loqueretur (
ib. IV. 41),
vites si loqui possint (
ib.
V. 39),
patria loquitur (
In Cat.
I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself
in
Orat. 85.
Inquit: "quotha," indefinitely, as in
109,
115; cf. also
dicit in
79.
§102.
Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis: Bait. follows Madv. in
placing a comma after
est, and a full stop at
probabilia.
Tamen ought in that case to follow
dicimus, and it is
noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait.,
and Hahn's ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word
tamen altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice
the omission.
Ista diceret: "stated the opinions you asked for."
Poetam: this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.
§103. For this
section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext.
P.H. I. 227 sq.
Academia ... quibus: a number of
exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on
D.F. V. 16.
Nullum: on the
favourite Ciceronian use of
nullus for
non see
47,
141, and Madv.
Gram. 455, obs. 5.
Illud sit disputatum: for the
construction cf.
98;
autem is omitted with
the same constr. in
D.F. V. 79, 80.
Nusquam alibi: cf.
50.
§104.
Exposuisset adiungit: Madv. on
D.F. III. 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of
tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers,
but no ex. so strong as this is produced.
Ut aut approbet quid aut
improbet: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent editors of
Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by
ut. Halm brackets a similar clause in
20,
and is followed in both instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the
most extensive
bracketer of modern times, rejects very many
clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works. In our passage, the
difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
approbare and
improbare may mean either to render an
absolute approval or
disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on
probability. For example, in
29 the words
have the first meaning, in
66 the second. The same
is the case with
nego and
aio. I trace the whole difficulty
of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the
difference between the two kinds of assent. The general sense will be as
follows. "There are two kinds of
εποχη, one which prevents a man
from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses
above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer
to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval
or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither
absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a
qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of the
clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the
Philologus (vol.
VII.), which I had not
read when this note was first written.
Alterum placere ... alterum
tenere: "the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual
practice." For the force of this see my note on
non probans in
148, which passage is very similar to this.
Neget ... aiat: cf.
97.
Nec ut
placeat: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the wrong sense, for
Clitomachus
did allow such
visa to stand as were sufficient
to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's
neu cui labours under
the same defect. Various emendations are
nam cum (Lamb., accepted
by Zeller 522),
hic ut (Manut.),
et cum (Dav. followed by
Bait.),
sed cum (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me
that of Manut. I should prefer
sic ut, taking
ut in the
sense of "although."
Respondere: "to put in as an answer," as in
93 and often.
Approbari: sc.
putavit. Such changes of construction are common in Cic., and I
cannot follow Halm in altering the reading to
approbavit.
§105. Lucem
eripimus: cf.
30.
§§105—111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this
time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was possible on my
principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If
nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will
be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient
basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us
to assent. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas,
and you yourself refuse assent to the sorites, why then should not
the Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your
other strong point is that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions of the dogmatist
proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the
hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where
probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics
first admit that there are true and false visa and then contradict
themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and
false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference exists; we do
deny that human faculties are capable of perceiving the difference (111).
105. Inducto ... prob.: so Aug.
Cont Ac. II. 12
Soluto, libero:
cf. n. on
8.
Implicato: =
impedito
cf.
101.
Iacere: cf.
79.
Isdem oculis: an answer to the question
nihil cernis? in
102.
Purpureum:
cf. fragm.
7 of the
Acad. Post.
Modo
caeruleum ... sole: Nonius (cf. fragm.
23)
quotes
tum caeruleum tum lavum (the MSS. in our passage have
flavum)
videtur, quodque nunc a sole. C.F. Hermann would
place
mane ravum after
quodque and take
quod as a
proper relative pronoun, not as = "because." This transposition certainly
gives increased clearness. Hermann further wishes to remove
a,
quoting exx. of
collucere without the prep., which are not at all
parallel, i.e.
Verr. I. 58,
IV. 71.
Vibrat: with the
ανηριθμον
γελασμα of Aeschylus.
Dissimileque: Halm, followed by Bait., om.
que.
Proximo
et: MSS. have
ei, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g.
De
Fato 44.
Non possis ... defendere: a similar line is taken in
81.
§106.
Memoria: cf.
22.
Polyaenus: named
D.F. I. 20, Diog.
X. 18, as one of the chief friends of Epicurus.
Falsum quod est: Greek and Latin do not distinguish accurately
between the
true and the
existent, the
false and the
non existent, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the confusion
is frequent, notably in the
Sophistes and
Theaetetus.
Si
igitur: "if then recollection is recollection only of things
perceived and known." The dogmatist theory of
μνημη and
νοησις is dealt with in
exactly the same way by Sext.
P.H. II. 5,
10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat
Theaet. 191 sq.
Siron: thus
Madv. on
D.F. II. 119 writes the name,
not
Sciron, as Halm.
Fateare: the em. of Dav. for
facile,
facere,
facias of MSS. Christ defends
facere, thinking that the constr. is varied from the subj. to the
inf. after
oportet, as after
necesse est in
39. For
facere followed by an inf. cf.
M.D.F. IV. 8.
Nulla: for
non, cf.
47,
103.
§107. Fiet
artibus: n. on
27 for the constr., for the
matter see
22.
Lumina: "strong points."
Bentl. boldly read
columina, while Dav. proposed
vimina or
vincula. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
D.F.
II. 70.
negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum
lumen est) N.D. I. 79, and
43 of this book.
Responsa: added by Ernesti.
Faber supplies
haruspicia, Orelli after Ern.
haruspicinam,
but, as Halm says, some noun in the plur. is needed.
Quod is non
potest: this is the MSS. reading, but most edd. read
si is, to
cure a wrong punctuation, by which a colon is placed at
perspicuum
est above, and a full stop at
sustineat. Halm restored the
passage.
Habuerint: the subj. seems due to the attraction
exercised by
sustineat. Bait. after Kayser has
habuerunt.
Positum: "when laid down" or "assumed."
§108.
Alterum est quod: this is substituted for
deinde, which
ought to correspond to
primum above.
Actio ullius rei: n.
on
actio rerum in
62, cf. also
148.
Adsensu comprobet: almost the same
phrase often occurs in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc.
Sit etiam:
the
etiam is a little strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti.
It seems to have the force of Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent
consists."
Sensus ipsos adsensus: so in
I. 41 sensus is defined
to be
id quod est sensu comprehensum, i.e.
καταληψις,
cf. also Stobaeus
I. 41, 25
αισθητικη
γαρ
φαντασια
συγκαταθεσις
εστι.
Appetitio: for all this cf.
30.
Et dicta ... multa: Manut. ejected
these words as a gloss, after
multa the MSS. curiously add
vide
superiora.
Lubricos sustinere: cf.
68
and
94.
Ita scribenti ... exanclatum: for
the om. of
esse cf.
77,
113 with notes.
Herculi: for this form of
the gen. cf. Madv. on
D.F. I. 14, who
doubts whether Cic. ever wrote
-is in the gen. of the Greek names
in
-es. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists
not to change the rarer form into the commoner, also that even
Priscian (see
M.D.F. V. 12) made gross
blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost
irresistible.
Temeritatem:
προπετειαν,
εικαιοτητα.
§109. In
navigando: cf.
100.
In conserendo:
Guretus interprets "
εν τω
φυτυεσθαι
τον αγρον," and is
followed by most commentators, though it seems at least possible that
manum is to be understood. For the suppressed accus.
agrum
cf. n. on
tollendum in
148.
Sequere: the fut. not the pres. ind., cf.
61.
Pressius: cf.
28.
Reprehensum: sc.
narrasti.
Id ipsum: =
nihil
posse comprehendi.
Saltem: so in
29.
Pingue: cf.
Pro Archia 10.
Sibi ipsum: note that
Cic. does not generally make
ipse agree in case with the
reflexive, but writes
se ipse, etc.
Convenienter:
"consistently".
Esse possit: Bait.
posset on the suggestion
of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not throwing it
back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant.
Ut hoc
ipsum: the
ut follows on
illo modo urguendum above.
Decretum quod: Halm followed by Bait. gives
quo, referring
to
altero quo neget in
111, which however
does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have
qui.
Et sine
decretis: Lamb. gave
nec for
et, but Dav. correctly
explains, "
multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed
tantum probabilia."
§110. Ut
illa: i.e. the
decreta implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
have
ille, while Dav. without necessity gives
alia.
Sic
hoc ipsum: Sext. then is wrong is saying (
P.H. I. 226) that the Academics
διαβεβαιουνται
τα πραγματα
ειναι
ακαταληπτα,
i.e. state the doctrine dogmatically, while the sceptics do not.
Cognitionis notam: like
nota percipiendi,
veri et
falsi, etc. which we have already had.
Ne confundere omnia: a
mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf.
58.
Incerta reddere: cf.
54.
Stellarum
numerus: another echo of Lucullus; see
32.
Quem ad modum ... item: see Madv. on
D.F. III. 48, who quotes an exact parallel from
Topica 46, and
sicut ... item from
N.D. I. 3, noting at the same time that in such exx.
neither
ita nor
idem, which MSS. sometimes give for
item, is correct.
§111. Dicere
... perturbatum: for om. of
esse cf.
108, etc.
Antiochus: this Bait. brackets.
Unum ... alterum: cf.
44.
Esse quaedam
in visis: it was not the
esse but the
videri, not the
actual existence of a difference, but the possibility of that difference
being infallibly perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied.
Cernimus: i.e. the
probably true and false.
Probandi
species: a phenomenal appearance which belongs to, or properly leads
to qualified approval.
§§112—115. Summary. If I had to deal with a
Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be
easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise
man sometimes opines (112). The
definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of
Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to
the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate your
assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic system like
yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to
join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who
thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I,
but the sapiens is to adopt (115).
§112. Campis
... exsultare ... oratio: expressions like this are common in Cic.,
e.g.
D.F. I. 54,
De Off. I. 61,
Orat. 26; cf. also Aug.
Cont. Ac.
III. 5
ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret
oratio.
Cum Peripatetico: nothing that Cic. states here is at
discord with what is known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf.
esp. Sext.
A.M. VII. 216—226. All
that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic formula, putting
upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic would have
wondered how a sceptic
could accept his formulae; but the
spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on
18) that we have here a trace of Philo's teaching,
as distinct from that of Carneades. I see absolutely no reason for the
very severe remarks of Madvig on
D.F. V.
76, a passage which very closely resembles ours.
Dumeta: same use
in
N.D. I. 68, Aug.
Cont. Ac.
II. 6; the
spinae of the Stoics are often
mentioned, e.g.
D.F. IV. 6.
E vero ...
a falso: note the change of prep.
Adhiberet: the MSS. are
confused here, and go Halm reads
adderet, and Bait. follows, while
Kayser proposes
adhaereret, which is indeed nearer the MSS.; cf.
however
I. 39
adhiberet.
Accessionem: for this cf.
18 and
77.
Simpliciter:
the opposite of
subtiliter; cf.
simpliciter—subtilitas in
I. 6.
Ne Carneade quidem: cf.
59,
67,
78,
148.
§113. Sed
qui his minor est: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for MSS.
sed mihi minores. Guietus gave
sed his minores, Durand
sed minutior, while Halm suggests
sed minutiores. I conj.
nimio minares, which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr.
I. 734
inferiores partibus egregie multis
multoque minores.
Tale verum:
visum omitted as in
D.F. V. 76.
Incognito: cf.
133.
Amavi hominem: cf. Introd. p.
6.
Ita iudico, politissimum; it is a mistake
to suppose this sentence incomplete, like Halm, who wishes to add
eum
esse, or like Bait., who with Kayser prints
esse after
politissimum. Cf.
108 ita scribenti,
exanclatum, and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on
D.F.
II. 13.
Horum neutrum: cf.
77 nemo.
Utrumque verum: Cic. of course
only accepts the propositions as Arcesilas did; see
77.
§114. Illud
ferre: cf.
136.
Constituas: this verb
is often used in connection with the ethical
finis; cf.
129 and
I. 19.
Idemque etiam: Krebs and Allgayer
(
Antibarbarus, ed. 4) deny that the expression
idem etiam
is Latin. One good MS. here has
atque etiam, which Dav. reads; cf.
however
Orat. 117.
Artificium: =
ars, as in
30.
Nusquam labar: cf.
138 ne labar.
Subadroganter: cf.
126.
§115. Qui
sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse: so Cic. vary often speaks of the
Peripatetics, as in
D.F. IV. 5,
V. 7.
Sustinuero: cf.
70.
Tam bonos: Cic. often speaks of them and
of Epicurus in this patronising way; see e.g.
T.D. II. 44,
III. 50,
D.F.
I. 25,
II. 81. For the
Epicurean friendships cf. esp.
D.F. I.
65.
Diodoto: cf. Introd. p.
2.
Nolumus: Halm and Bait., give
nolimus; so fine a line
divides the subjunctive from the indicative in clauses like these that
the choice often depends on mere individual taste.
De sapiente
loquamur: n. on
66.
§§116—128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy
take Physics first. Would your sapiens swear to the truth of any
geometrical result whatever? (116) Let us see
which one of actual physical systems the sapiens we are seeking
will select (117). He must choose one
teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great
men though they be, he must reject (118).
Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must
believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If
he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus,
must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to
be free, as I am and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles
of the universe! (120) Nothing can exist, say
you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the
deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs
from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato, yet I will not assent
absolutely either to his system or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We
know nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell
strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with
Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless
opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our
sapiens will be unable to decide (124). If
you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among
themselves about physical subjects, why will they not allow me to differ
from them? (126) Not that I deprecate the study
of Physics, for moral good results from it (127).
Our sapiens will be delighted if he attains to anything which
seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness
in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to
asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as
the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all
things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the
sun, I am almost content (128).
§116. Tres
partes: cf.
I. 19.
Et a vobismet: "and especially by you". The threefold division was
peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, cf. Sext.
P.H.
II. 13 (on the same subject)
‛οι
Στωικοι και
αλλοι
τινες. For other modes of dividing
philosophy see Sext.
A.M. VII. 2.
At
illud ante: this is my em. for the MSS.
velut illud ante,
which probably arose from a marginal variant "
vel ut" taking the
place of
at; cf. a similar break in
40
sed prius, also in
128 at paulum
ante. Such breaks often occur in Cic., as in
Orator 87
sed
nunc aliud, also
T.D. IV. 47
repenam fortasse, sed illud ante. For
velut Halm writes
vel (which Bait. takes), Dav.
verum.
Inflatus
tumore: cf.
De Off. I. 91
inflati
opinionibus. Bentl. read
errore.
Cogere: this word like
αναγκαζειν
and
βιαζεσθαι
often means simply to argue irresistibly.
Initia: as in
118, bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable
of proof, so
αρχαι in Gk.
Digitum: cf.
58,
143.
Punctum esse
etc.:
σημειον
εστιν ου
μερος
ουθεν (Sext.
P.H. III. 39),
στιγμη =
το
αμερες (
A.M. IX. 283, 377).
Extremitatem: =
επιφανειαν.
Libramentum: so this word is used by Pliny (see Forc.) for the
slope of a hill.
Nulla crassitudo: in Sext. the
επιφανεια
is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as
μηκος
μετα
πλατους (
P.H.
III. 39),
περας (
extremitas)
σοματος δυο
εχον
διαστασεις,
μηκος και
πλατος (
A.M. III. 77).
Liniamentum ... carentem: a difficult
passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as
μηκος
απλατες. (Sext. as
above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface
negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction
of
longitudinem which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others
propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather
add
et crassitudine before
carentem, comparing
I. 27 sine ulla specie et
carentem omni illa qualitate. I have merely bracketed
carentem, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in
this clause as in the other two, he suggests
quod sit sine.
Hermann takes
esse after
punctum as strongly predicative
("there
is a point," etc.), then adds
similiter after
liniamentum and ejects
sine ulla. Observe the awkwardness
of having the
line treated of after the
superficies, which
has induced some edd. to transpose. For
liniamentum =
lineam cf.
De Or. I. 187.
Si
adigam: the fine em. of Manut. for
si adiiciamus of MSS. The
construction
adigere aliquem ius iurandum will be found in Caes.
Bell. Civ. I. 76,
II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg.
Aen. III. 56
quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra
fames? Sapientem nec prius: this is the "
egregia
lectio" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm
sapientemne was
read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is
not that the
sapiens will swear to the size of the sun
after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations,
but that
the
sapiens, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which
Archimedes uses, will
not swear to the truth of the elaborate
conclusions which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in
128 against the absurdity of attaching one and
the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most complex truths,
and tries to condemn the Stoic
sapiens out of his own mouth, cf.
esp.
nec ille iurare posset in
123.
Multis partibus: for this expression see Munro on Lucr.
I. 734, for the sense cf.
82,
123,
126,
128.
Deum: see
126.
§117.
Vim: =
αναγκην, cf.
cogere in
116.
Ne ille: this
asseverative
ne is thus always closely joined with pronouns in
Cic.
Sententiam eliget et: MSS. have (by
dittographia of
m,
eli) added
melius after
sententiam, and
have also dropped
et. Dav. wished to read
elegerit,
comparing the beginning of
119.
Insipiens
eliget: cf.
115 quale est a non sapiente
explicari sapientiam? and
9 statuere qui sit
sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis.
Infinitae
quaestiones:
θεσεις, general propositions,
opposed to
finitae quaestiones, limited propositions, Gk.
‛υποθεσεις.
Quintal
III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former
An uxor ducenda, of the latter
An Catoni ducenda. These
quaestiones are very often alluded to by Cic. as in
D.F.
I. 12,
IV. 6,
De
Or. I. 138,
II.
65—67,
Topica 79,
Orat. 46, cf. also Quint.
X. 5,
II. E quibus omnia
constant: this sounds like Lucretius,
omnia =
το παν.
§118. For these
physici the student must in general be referred to R. and P.,
Schwegler, and Grote's
Plato Vol.
I. A
more complete enumeration of schools will be found in Sext.
P.H.
III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated by Aug
De
Civ. Dei XVIII. 37.
Concessisse
primas: Cic. always considers Thales to be
sapientissimus e
septem (
De Leg. II. 26). Hence
Markland on Cic.
Ad Brutum II. 15, 3
argued that that letter cannot be genuine, since in it the supremacy
among the seven is assigned to Solon.
Infinitatem naturae:
το
απειρον,
naturae
here =
ουσιας.
Definita: this
is opposed to
infinita in
Topica 79, so
definire is
used for
finire in
Orat. 65, where Jahn qu.
Verr.
IV. 115.
Similis inter se: an attempt to
translate
‛ομοιομερειας.
Eas primum, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog.
II. 6 in R. and P. 29
παντα
χρηματα ην
‛ομου ειτα
νους ελθων
αυτα
διεκοσμησε.
Xenophanes ... deum: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph. mainly
theological.
Neque natum unquam: cf.
neque ortum unquam in
119.
Parmenides ignem: cf. Arist.
Met.
A. 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence
of the phenomenal world, after which he made two
αρχαι,
θερμον και
ψυχρον
τουτων δε το
μεν κατα μεν
το ‛ον
θερμον
ταττει,
θατερον δε
κατα το μη
ον.
Heraclitus: n. on
I. 39.
Melissus: see
Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp.
το εον αιει
αρα ην τε και
εσται.
Plato: n. on
I. 27.
Discedent: a word
often used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 7, 17.
§119. Sic
animo ... sensibus: knowledge according to the Stoics was homogeneous
throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than another.
Nunc lucere: cf.
98, also
128 non enim magis adsentiuntur, etc.
Mundum sapientem: for this Stoic doctrine see
N.D. I. 84,
II. 32, etc.
Fabricata sit: see
87 n.
Solem:
126.
Animalis intellegentia: reason is the
essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138—9, also
28,
29 of Book
I. Permanet: the deity is to the Stoic
πνευμα
ενδιηκον δι
‛ολου του
κοσμου (Plut.
De Plac.
Phil. I. 7 qu. R. and P. 375),
spiritus
per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus. (Seneca,
Consol. ad Helvid. 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147).
Deflagret: the
Stoics considered the
κοσμος
φθαρτος, cf. Diog.
VII. 141, Zeller 156—7.
Fateri: cf.
tam vera quam falsa cernimus in
111.
Flumen aureum: Plut.
Vita Cic. 24 alludes to this (
‛οτι
χρυσιου
ποταμος ειη
ρεοντος). This is the
constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote,
Aristot.
Vol
I. p. 43, quotes
Topica 3,
De
Or. I. 49,
Brut. 121,
N.D.
II. 93,
De Inv. II. 6,
D.F. I. 14,
Ad Att. II. 1, and discusses the
difficulty of applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we
possess.
Nulla vis: cf.
I. 28.
Exsistere: Walker conj.
efficere,
"
recte ut videtur" says Halm. Bait. adopts it.
Ornatus: =
κοσμος.
§120.
Libertas ... non esse: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
liberty see Introd. p.
18.
Quod tibi
est: after these words Halm puts merely a comma, and inserting
respondere makes
cur deus, etc. part of the same sentence.
Bait. follows.
Nostra causa: Cic. always writes
mea, tua,
vestra, nostra causa, not
mei, tui, nostri, vestri, just as he
writes
sua sponte, but not
sponte alicuius. For the Stoic
opinion that men are the chief care of Providence, see
N.D. I. 23,
II. 37,
D.F.
III. 67,
Ac. I.
29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding
the opinion are treated of in Zeller 175,
N.D. II. 91—127. They supply in Sext.
P.H.
I. 32,
III. 9—12
an example of the refutation of
νοουμενα by means
of
νοουμενα.
Tam
multa ac: MSS. om.
ac, which I insert. Lactantius qu. the
passage without
perniciosa.
Myrmecides: an actual Athenian
artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot
which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee
concealed. See Plin.
Nat. Hist. VII. 21,
XXXVI. 5.
§121.
Posse: n. on
I. 29.
Strato: R. and P. 331.
Sed cum:
sed often marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read
et, as Halm.
Asperis ... corporibus: cf. fragm.
28 of the
Ac. Post., also
N.D. I. 66.
Somnia: so
N.D. I. 18
miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
somniantium,
ib. I. 42
non
philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia, also
ib. I. 66
flagitia Democriti.
Docentis:
giving
proof.
Optantis: Guietus humorously conj.
potantis, Durand
oscitantis (cf.
N.D. I. 72), others
opinantis. That the text is
sound however may be seen from
T.D. II.
30
optare hoc quidem est non docere,
De Fato 46,
N.D. I. 19
optata magis quam
inventa,
ib. III. 12
doceas
oportet nec proferas; cf. also
Orat. 59
vocis bonitas
optanda est, non est enim in nobis, i.e. a good voice is a thing to
be prayed for, and not to be got by exertion. There is a similar Greek
proverb,
ευχη μαλλον
η αληθεια, in
Sext.
P.H. VIII. 353.
Magno opere:
Hermann wishes to read
onere. The phrase
magnum onus is
indeed common (cf.
De Or. I. 116), but
magnum opus, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf.
T.D. III. 79, 84,
Orat. 75.
Modo hoc modo illud:
134.
§122. Latent
ista: see n. on fragm.
29 of the
Ac.
Post.; for
latent cf.
I. 45. Aug.
Cont. Ac. II.
12,
III. 1 imitates this passage.
Circumfusa: cf.
I. 44, and
46 of this book.
Medici: cf.
T.D. I. 46
Viderentur: a genuine passive, cf.
25,
39,
81.
Empirici: a
school of physicians so called.
Ut ... mutentur: exactly the same
answer was made recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he
was said to have assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same
properties as the dead.
Media pendeat: cf.
N.D. II. 98,
De Or. III.
178.
§123.
Habitari ait: for this edd. qu. Lactant.
Inst. III. 23, 12.
Portenta: "monstrosities these,"
cf.
D.F. IV. 70.
Iurare: cf.
116.
Neque ego, etc.: see fragm.
30 of
Ac. Post. Αντιποδας:
this doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut.
Plac. Phil. III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75), who give the name of
αντιχθων to the
opposite side of the world. Diog.
VIII. 26 (with
which passage cf. Stob.
Phys. XV. 7)
mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says
that Plato first invented the name. The word
αντιπους seems to
occur first in Plat.
Tim. 63 A. The existence of
αντιποδες;
was of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world
is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the
Tim. and by the Stoics,
see Stob.
Phys. XV. 6, Diog.
VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack
the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug.
De Civ. Dei
XVI. 9.
Hicetas: he was followed by
Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext.
A.M. X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the
mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in
Philolaus, see R. and P. 75.
Theophrastus: who wrote much on the
history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328.
Platonem: the words of
Plato (
Tim. 40 B) are
γην δε
τροφον μεν
‛ημετεραν,
ειλλομενην
δε περι τον
δια παντος
πολον
τεταμενον.
Quid tu, Epicure: the connection is that Cic., having given the
crotchets of other philosophers about
φυσικη, proceeds to give the
peculiar crotchet of Epic.
Putas solem ... tantum: a hard passage.
Egone? ne bis is the em. of Lamb. for MSS.
egone vobis, and
is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (
Em. 185) "
cum
interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82)
solem esse putaret, Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat
quantus videretur vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius
circumscribit, ne bis quidem tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem
et bipedalem". (
D.F. I. 20) This
explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
size, i.e. twice the apparent size.
Ne ... quidem may possibly
appear strange, cf. however
ne maiorem quidem in
82.
Aristo Chius: for this doctrine of his see
R. and P. 358.
§124. Quid
sit animus: an enumeration of the different ancient theories is given
in
T.D. I. 18—22, and by Sext.
A.M. VII. 113, who also speaks in
P.H. II. 31 of the
πολλη
και
ανηνυτος
μαχη concerning the soul. In
P.H.
II. 57 he says
Γοργιας
ουδε
διανοιαν
ειναι φησι.
Dicaearcho:
T.D. I. 21.
Tres
partis: in Plato's
Republic.
Ignis: Zeno's opinion,
T.D. I. 19.
Animam:
ib.
I. 19.
Sanguis: Empodocles, as in
T.D. I. 19 where his famous line
‛αιμα γαρ
ανθρωποις
περικαρδιον
εστι νοημα
is translated, see R. and P. 124.
Ut Xenocrates: some edd. read
Xenocrati, but cf.
I. 44,
D.F. II. 18,
T.D. III. 76.
Numerus: so Bentl.
for
mens of MSS., cf.
I. 39,
T.D. I. 20, 41. An
explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and
P. 244.
Quod intellegi etc.: so in
T.D. I. 41
quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide
dicitur.
Momenta n. on
I. 45.
§125.
Verecundius: cf.
114 subadroganter.
Vincam animum: a common phrase in Cic., cf.
Philipp. XII. 21.
Queru potissimum? quem?: In repeated
questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
quisnam, not
quis, in the second question, as in
Verr. IV. 5. The mutation of Augustine
Contra Ac. III. 33 makes it probable that
quemnam was the original reading here. Zumpt on
Verr. qu.
Quint.
IX. 2, 61, Plin.
Epist. I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud
it for its likeness to impromptu.
Nobilitatis: this is to be
explained by referring to
73—
75 (
imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi
nobilem), where Cic. protests against being compared to a demagogue,
and claims to follow the aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the
commentators to show that Democr. was literally an aristocrat have
failed.
Convicio: cf.
34.
Completa et
conferta: n. on
I. 27.
Quod movebitur ... cedat: this is the
theory of motion disproved by Lucr.
I. 370 sq.,
cf. also
N.D. II. 83. Halm writes
quo
quid for
quod (with Christ), and inserts
corpus before
cedat, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
body is pushed, gives way."
Tam sit mirabilis: n. on
I. 25.
Innumerabilis:
55.
Supra infra: n. on
92.
Ut nos nunc simus, etc.: n. on fragm.
13 of
Ac. Post. Disputantis:
55.
Animo videre: cf.
22.
Imagines:
ειδωλα, which Catius
translated (
Ad Fam. XV. 16) by
spectra, Zeller 432.
Tu vero: etc. this is all part of the
personal
convicium supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by
the Antiocheans, and beginning at
Tune aut inane above.
Commenticiis: a favourite word of Cic., cf.
De Div. II. 113.
§126. Quae
tu: elliptic for
ut comprobem quae tu comprobas cf.
125.
Impudenter:
115.
Atque haud scio:
atque here =
καιτοι, "and
yet," n. on
5 ac vereor.
Invidiam:
cf.
144.
Cum his: i.e.
aliis cum
his.
Summus deus: "the highest form of the deity" who was of
course one in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and
πυρ
τεχνικον is one of
the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf.
I. 29, Zeller 161 sq.
Solem: as of course being
the chief seat of fire.
Solis autem ... nego credere: Faber first
gave
ac monet for MSS.
admonens, which Halm retains, Manut.
then restored to its place
permensi refertis, which MSS. have
after
nego.
Hic, which MSS. have after
decempeda,
Madv. turns into
hunc, while
hoc, which stands immediately
after
nego, he ejects (
Em. 187).
Ergo after
vos is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this
arrangement.
Leniter: Halm and Hermann
leviter; the former
reads
inverecundior after Morgenstern, for what reason it is
difficult to see.
§127.
Pabulum: similar language in
D.F. II. 46.
Consideratio contemplatioque: Cic. is
fond of this combination, as
De Off. I.
153; cf. Wesenberg on
T.D. V. 9, who qu.
similar combinations from
D.F. V. 11, 58.
Elatiores: MSS. mostly have
latiores. Halm with Lamb. reads
altiores, in support of which reading Dav. qu.
D.F. II. 51, Val. Flaccus
Argon. II. 547, add Virg.
Aen. VI. 49, Cic.
Orat. 119.
Exigua et
minima:
σμικρα και
ελαχιστα. Madv. on
D.F. V. 78 notes that except here Cic.
always writes
exigua et paene minima or something of the kind.
Occultissimarum: n. on
I. 15.
Occurit ... completur: MSS. have
occuret mostly, if that is retained
complebitur must be
read. Madv.
Opusc. II. 282 takes
occurit, explaining it as a perfect, and giving numerous exx. of
this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on
T.D. IV. 35.
§128. Agi
secum: cf.
nobiscum ageret in
80.
Simile veri: cf.
66.
Notionem: =
cognitionem,
επιστημην.
At paulum: MSS.
et Halm
sed.; cf.
at illud
ante in
116.
Si quae: Halm and many
edd. have
se, quae. But the
se comes in very awkwardly, and
is not needed before the infinitive. Madv. indeed (
Em. 114), after
producing many exx. of the reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts
about this passage because
considero does not belong to the class
of verbs with which this usage is found, but he produces many instances
with
puto, which surely stands on the same level.
Non
magis: so in
119 nec magis approbabit nunc
lucere, etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely
cognisable phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to
absolute knowledge by refusing
τον ‛ηλιον
‛ομολογειν
ειναι
καταληπτον
(Galen
De Opt. Gen. Dicendi 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.).
Cornix: for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller
349—358.
Signum illud: the
xystus (
9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin.
Nat.
Hist. XXXIV. 8.
Duodeviginti:
82, I just note that
octodecim is not used by
Cic.
Sol quantus sit:
91.
Omnium rerum
... comprehendendi: not a case of a plural noun with a singular
gerund like
spe rerum potiendi, etc., but of two genitives
depending in different ways on the same word (
definitio). M.
Em. 197 qu. Plat.
Leg. 648 E
την παντων
‛ητταν
φοβουμενος
ανθρωπον
τοι
πωματος,
Brut.
163
Scaevolae dicendi elegantia,
De Or. III. 156. Other exx. in
M.D.F. I. 14. For the turn of expression cf.
T.D.
IV. 62
omnium philosophorum una est ratio
medendi,
Lael. 78
omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est,
also
51 of this book.
§§129—141. Summary. What contention is there among
philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems
like that of Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes,
Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho,
Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus,
Carneades (129-131). If I
desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me, while if I
follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must
be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks
virtue gives happiness. "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest
possible." How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those points in which
Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard emotion as harmful,
which the ancients thought natural and useful (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to Carneades "You do not
think me a praetor because I am not a sapiens." "That," said
Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137).
Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be
defended (138). I gravitate then towards one of
them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me
to join pleasure to herself (139). When I hear
the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved
by both, and so I find it impossible to choose (141, 142).
§129. Quod
coeperam: in
128 at
veniamus nunc ad boni
maique notionem.
Constituendi: n. on
114.
Bonorum summa: cf.
D.F. V. 21 and Madv.
Est igitur: so in
De
Div. II. 8,
igitur comes fourth word
in the clause; this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius.
Omitto: MSS.
et omitto, but cf. Madv.
Em. 201
certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro simplici 'omitto,' in
initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae exempla subiciuntur
per figuram omissionis.
Relicta: cf.
130 abiectos. Cic. generally classes Herillus
(or Erillus as Madv. on
D.F. II. 35
spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
systems, cf.
D.F. II. 43,
De Off.
I. 6,
T.D. V.
85.
Ut Herillum. MSS. have either
Erillum or
et
illum, one would expect
ut Herilli.
Cognitione et
scientia: double translation of
επιστημη. For the
finis of Herillus see Madv. on
D.F. II. 43.
Megaricorum:
Xenophanes. Cic
considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to
have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history.
The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic
doctrine. Zeller,
Socrates 211.
Unum et simile: for this
see Zell.
Socr. 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq.
Simile ought perhaps to be
sui simile as in
Tim. c.
7, already quoted on
I. 30, see my note there and cf.
I. 35.
Menedemo: see
Zeller
Socr. 238, R. and P. 182. The
Erctrian school was
closely connected with the Megarian.
Fuit: =
natus est, as
often.
Herilli: so Madv. for
ulli of MSS.
§130.
Aristonem: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines
of Aristo the Chian
ib. 358, Zeller 58 sq.
In mediis: cf.
I. 36,
37.
Momenta =
aestimationes,
αξιαι in
36, where
momenti is used in a different way.
Pyrrho autem: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but in
124 there is just the same change from
Pyrrhoni to
Xenocrates.
Απαθεια: Diog.
IX. 108 affirms this as well as
πραιοτης to be a
name for the sceptic
τελος, but the name scarcely occurs
if at all in Sext. who generally uses
αταραξια, but
occasionally
μετριοπαθεια;
cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338.
Απαθεια was also a
Stoic term.
Diu multumque: n. on
I. 4.
§131. Nec
tamen consentiens: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences between
the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
Callipho: as the genitive is
Calliphontis, Cic. ought
according to rule to write
Calliphon in the nom; for this see
Madv. on
D.F. II. 19, who also gives the
chief authorities concerning this philosopher.
Hieronymus:
mentioned
D.F. II. 19, 35, 41,
V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of him
quem
iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio.
Diodorus: see Madv. on
D.F. II. 19.
Honeste vivere, etc.:
in
D.F. IV. 14 the
finis of Polemo
is stated to be
secundum naturam vivere, and three Stoic
interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
passage—
omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint
fruentem vivere. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him
it is attributed to the
vetus Academia in
I. 22, where the words
aut
omnia aut maxima, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf.
Clemens Alex. qu. by Madv. on
D.F. IV.
15. See n. below on Carneades.
Antiochus probat: the germs of many
Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in Polemo; see
I. 34, n.
Eiusque amici:
Bentl.
aemuli, but Halm refers to
D.F. II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree
Stoicised.
Nunc: Halm
huc after Jo. Scala.
Carneades: this
finis is given in
D.F. II. 35 (
frui principiis naturalibus),
II. 42 (
Carneadeum illud quod is non tam ut
probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat
opponeret),
V. 20 (
fruendi rebus iis,
quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem
auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit),
T.D. V. 84 (
naturae primus aut omnibus aut maximis frui,
ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat). The
finis therefore,
thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is clear that
Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
virtus in it (see
D.F. II. 38, 42,
V. 22) while Polemo did (I.
22). See more on
139.
Zeno: cf.
D.F. IV. 15
Inventor
et princeps: same expression in
T.D. I. 48,
De Or. I. 91,
De Inv. II. 6;
inv. =
οικιστης.
§132.
Quemlibet: cf.
125,
126.
Prope singularem: cf.
T.D. I. 22
Aristoteles longe omnibus—Platonem
semper excipio—praestans; also
D.F. V. 7,
De Leg. I. 15.
Per ipsum Antiochum: a similar line of argument is taken in Sext.
P.H. I. 88,
II.
32, etc.
Terminis ... possessione: there is a similar play on the
legal words
finis terminus possessio in
De Leg. I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage.
Omnis ratio
etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf.
Aug.
De Civ. Dei XIX. 1
neque enim
existimat (Varro)
ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae
non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et
malorum, etc.
Si Polemoneus: i.e.
sapiens fuerit.
Peccat: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see
I. 37.
Academicos et:
MSS. om.
et as in
I. 16, and
que in
52 of
this book.
Dicenda: for the omission of the verb with the
gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic clauses) cf.
I. 7, and Madv. on
D.F.
I. 43, who how ever unduly limits the usage.
Hic igitur ... prudentior: MSS. generally have
assentiens,
but one good one (Halm's E) has
assentientes. I venture to read
adsentietur, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt,
as in
26 (
tenetur) and that then
adsentiet, under the attraction of the
s following, passed
into
adsentiens, as in
147 intellegat
se passed into
intelligentes.
N, I may remark, is
frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
I. 7 appellant,
16
disputant,
24 efficerentur), and all
the changes involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read
sin, inquam (
sc. adsentietur) for
si numquam of MSS.
The question
uter est prudentior is intended to press home the
dilemma in which Cicero has placed the supposed
sapiens. All the
other emendations I have seen are too unsatisfactory to be
enumerated.
§133. Non
posse ... esse: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
non
esse illa probanda sap. after Lamb., who also conj.
non posse illa
probata esse.
Paria:
D.F. III.
48,
Paradoxa 20 sq., Zeller 250.
Praecide:
συντομος or
συνελων
ειπε, cf.
Cat. Mai. 57,
Ad
Att. VIII. 4,
X.
16.
Inquit: n. on
79.
Quid quod
quae: so Guietus with the approval of Madv. (
Em. 203) reads
for MSS.
quid quae or
quid quaeque, Halm and Bait., follow
Moser in writing
Quid? si quae removing the stop at
paria,
and make
in utramque partem follow
dicantur, on Orelli's
suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often
omit one.
Dicebas: in
27.
Incognito:
133.
§134.
Etiam: = "yes," Madv.
Gram. 454.
Non beatissimam:
I. 22, n.
Deus
ille: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's
η θεος η
θηριον), if he can do without
other advantages. For the omission of
est after the emphatic
ille cf.
59, n.
Theophrasto, etc.:
n. on
I. 33,
35.
Dicente: before this Halm after Lamb.,
followed by Bait., inserts
contra, the need for which I fail to
see.
Et hic: i.e. Antiochus.
Ne sibi constet: Cic. argues
in
T.D. V. that there cannot be degrees
in happiness.
Tum hoc ... tum illud: cf.
121.
Iacere:
79.
In
his discrepant:
I. 42
in his constitit.
§135.
Moveri:
κινεισθαι,
29.
Laetitia efferri:
I. 38.
Probabilia: the
removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain.
Sapiensne ... deleta sit: see Madv.
D.F. p. 806, ed. 2, who
is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz),
non
timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit? which
involves the use of
nec for
ne ... quidem. I have followed
the reading of Madv. in his
Em., not the one he gives (after
Davies) in
D.F. ne patria deleatur, which Halm takes, as
does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS.
Decreta: some MSS.
durata; Halm conj.
dictata.
Mediocritates:
μεσοπετες,
as in Aristotle; cf.
T.D. III. 11, 22,
74.
Permotione:
κινεσει.
Naturalem
... modum: so
T.D. III. 74.
Crantoris: sc.
librum, for the omission of which see n. on
I. 13; add Quint.
IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read
in
Herodoti, supplying
libro.
Aureolus ... libellus: it is
not often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is
rather colloquial; cf.
T.D. III. 2,
N.D. III. 43, also for
aureolus 119 flumen aureum.
Panaetius: he had
addressed to Tubero a work
de dolore; see
D.F. IV. 23.
Cotem:
T.D. IV. 43, 48, Seneca
De Ira III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle
(
iram calcar esse virtutis).
Dicebant: for the repetition
of this word cf.
146,
I.
33.
§136. Sunt
enim Socratica: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
affirmed in
Parad. 4,
T.D. III.
10.
Mirabilia: Cic. generally translates
παραδοξα by
admirabilia as in
D.F. IV. 74, or
admiranda, under which title he seems to have published a work
different from the
Paradoxa, which we possess: see Bait., and
Halm's ed. of the Phil. works (1861), p. 994.
Quasi: = almost,
‛ως
επος
ειπειν.
Voltis: cf. the
Antiochean opinion in
I. 18,
22.
Solos reges: for
all this see Zeller 253 sq.
Solos divites:
‛οτι
μονος ‛ο
σοφος
πλουσιος,
Parad. VI. Liberum:
Parad.
V. ‛οτι μονος
‛ο σοφος
ελευθερος
και πας
αφρον
δουλος.
Furiosus:
Parad. IV. ‛οτι πας
αφρον
μαινεται.
§137. Tam
sunt defendenda: cf.
8,
120.
Bono modo: a colloquial and Plautine
expression; see Forc.
Ad senatum starent: "were in waiting on the
senate;" cf. such phrases as
stare ad cyathum, etc.
Carneade: the vocative is
Carneades in
De Div. I. 23.
Huic Stoico: i.e.
Diogeni; cf.
D.F. II. 24. Halm brackets
Stoico,
and after him Bait.
Sequi volebat: "professed to follow;" cf.
D.F. V. 13
Strato physicum se
voluit "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
D.F. II. 102.
Ille noster: Dav.
vester, as in
143 noster Antiochus.
But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf.
113.
Balbutiens: "giving an uncertain sound;"
cf.
De Div. I. 5,
T.D. V. 75.
§138. Mihi
veremini: cf. Caes.
Bell. Gall.
V. 9
veritus navibus. Halm and Bait. follow Christ's conj.
verenti, removing the stop at
voltis.
Opinationem:
the
οιησιν of Sext., e.g.
P.H. III. 280.
Quod minime voltis:
cf.
I. 18.
De
finibus: not "concerning," but "from among" the different
fines; otherwise
fine would have been written. Cf.
I. 4 si qui de nostris.
Circumcidit et amputat: these two verbs often come together, as in
D.F. I. 44; cf. also
D.F. III. 31.
Si vacemus omni molestia: which
Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure.
Cum honestate: Callipho
in
131.
Prima naturae commoda: Cic. here
as in
D.F. IV. 59,
V. 58 confuses the Stoic
πρωτα κατα
φυσιν with
τα του
σωματος
αγαθα και τα
εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which
see
I. 19. More on the
subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the
D.F. Relinquit:
Orelli
relinqui against the MSS.
§139.
Polemonis ... finibus: all these were composite
fines.
Adhuc: I need scarcely point out that this goes with
habeo
and not with
probabilius;
adhuc for
etiam with the
comparative does not occur till the silver writers.
Labor eo: cf.
Horace's
nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, also
D.F. V. 6
rapior illuc: revocat autem
Antiochus.
Reprehendit manu:
M.D.F. II. 3.
Pecudum:
I. 6,
Parad. 14
voluptatem esse summum bonum,
quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum; similar expressions
occur with a reference to Epicurus in
De Off. I. 105,
Lael. 20, 32.
T.D. V. 73,
D.F. II. 18;
cf. also Aristoph.
Plut. 922
προβατιου
βιον
λεγεις and
βοσκηματων
βιος in Aristotle. The meaning of
pecus is well shown in
T.D. I. 69.
Iungit deo: Zeller 176 sq.
Animum solum: the same criticism
is applied to Zeno's
finis in
D.F. IV. 17, 25.
Ut ... sequar: for the repeated
ut see
D.F. V. 10, Madv.
Gram. 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second
ut with Lamb.
Carneades ... defensitabat: this is quite a different view from
that in
131; yet another of Carneades is given in
T.D. V. 83.
Istum finem: MSS.
ipsum; the two words are often confused, as in
I. 2.
Ipsa veritas: MSS.
severitas, a frequent error; cf.
In Verr. Act. I. 3,
III. 162,
De
Leg. I. 4, also Madv. on
D.F. IV. 55.
Obversetur: Halm takes the conj. of
Lamb.,
adversetur. The MSS. reading gives excellent sense; cf.
T.D. II. 52
obversentur honestae
species viro. Bait. follows Halm.
Tu ... copulabis: this is
the feigned expostulation of
veritas (cf.
34 convicio veritatis), for which style see
125.
§140.
Voluptas cum honestate: this whole expression is in apposition to
par, so that
cum must not be taken closely with
depugnet; cf. Hor.
Sat. I. 7, 19
Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius (sc.
par)
cum Bitho Bacchius.
Si sequare, ruunt: for
constr. cf.
I. 7.
Communitas: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297.
Nulla potest
nisi erit: Madv.
D.F. III. 70 "
in
hac coniunctione—hoc fieri non potest nisi—fere semper
coniunctivus subicitur praesentis—futuri et perfecti indicativus
ponitur."
Gratuita: "disinterested."
Ne intellegi
quidem: n. on
I. 7,
cf. also
T.D. V. 73, 119.
Gloriosum in
vulgus: cf.
D.F. II. 44
populus
cum illis facit (i.e.
Epicureis).
Normam ... regulam:
n. on
Ac. Post. fragm.
8.
Praescriptionem:
I. 23, n.
§141.
Adquiescis: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads
adsciscis,
comparing
138. Add
D.F. I. 23 (
sciscat et probet),
III. 17 (
adsciscendas esse),
III. 70 (
adscisci et probari) Bait. follows
Halm.
Ratum ... fixum: cf.
27 and n. on
Ac. Post. fragm.
17.
Falso: like
incognito in
133.
Nullo discrimine:
for this see the explanation of
nihil interesse in
40, n.
Iudicia:
κριτηρια as
usual.
§§142—146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how
Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he
never even follows the vetus Academia, and never stirs a step from
Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements
of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus, do you
rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do
away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I
will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves,
exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being sapiens,
know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno
used to illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any
actual sapiens (145). Now as there is no
knowledge there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this
conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear
testimony.
§142. Venio
iam: Dialectic had been already dealt with in
91—
98 here it is merely
considered with a view to the choice of the supposed
sapiens, as
was Ethical Science in
129—
141 and Physics in
116—
128. With the
enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus
gives in
A.M. VII. 48 sq.
Protagorae: R. and P. 132 sq.
Qui putet: so MSS., Halm and
Bait.
putat after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
Permotiones intimas: cf.
20 tactus
interior, also
76.
Epicuri: nn. on
19,
79,
80.
Iudicium:
κριτηριον
as usual.
Rerum notitiis:
προληψεσι,
Zeller 403 sq.
Constituit: note the constr. with
in, like
ponere in.
Cogitationis: cf.
I. 30. Several MSS. have
cognitionis, the two
words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg
Fm. to
T.D.
III. p. 17, who says,
multo tamen saepius
"cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam contra, also
M.D.F III. 21.
§143. Ne
maiorum quidem suorum: sc.
aliquid probat. For
maiorum
cf.
80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the
so-called
vetus Academia, cf.
I. 33.
Libri: titles of some are preserved in
Diog. Laert.
IV. 11—14.
Nihil
politius: cf.
119, n.
Pedem nusquam:
for the ellipse cf.
58,
116,
Pro Deiot. 42 and
pedem latum in
Plaut.
Abutimur: this verb in the rhetorical writers means to use
words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, see Quint.
X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we
use the name Academic in a non natural fashion?"
Si dies est
lucet: a better trans of
ει φως
εστιν,
‛ημερα
εστιν than was given in
96, where see n.
Aliter Philoni: not Philo of
Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the Megarian,
mentioned also in
75. The dispute between Diodorus
and Philo is mentioned in Sext.
A.M. VIII. 115—117 with the same purpose as here, see
also Zeller 39.
Antipater: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded
Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school.
Archidemus:
several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as
VII. 68, 84.
Opiniosissimi: so the MSS. I
cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn it. Halm is
certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as
ingeniosissimi is necessary. I believe that the word
opiniosissimi (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was
manufactured on the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two
philosophers, who are playfully described as men full of
opinio or
δοξα—just the imputation which, as
Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's
spinosissimi is
ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable
as Halm thinks.
§144. In
contionem vocas: a retort, having reference to
14, cf. also
63,
72. For these
contiones see Lange,
Romische
Alterthumer II. 663, ed 2. They were called
by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of whom had the
right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under fewer
restrictions than the right of the others.
Occludi tabernas in
order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this
see Liv.
III. 27,
IV.
31,
IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O
Israel" in the Bible.
Artificia: n. on
30.
Tolli: n. on
26.
Ut opifices
concitentur: cf.
Pro Flacc. 18
opifices et tabernarios quid
neqoti est concitare? Expromam: Cic. was probably thinking of
the use to which he himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in
Pro
Murena 61, a use of which he half confesses himself ashamed in
D.F. IV. 74.
Exsules etc.:
136.
§145. Scire
negatis: cf. Sext.
A.M. VII. 153, who
says that even
καταληψις
when it arises in the mind of a
φαυλος is mere
δοξα and not
επιστημη; also
P.H. II. 83, where it is said that the
φαυλος is capable of
το
αληθες but not of
αληθεια, which the
σοφος alone has.
Visum ...
adsensus: the Stoics as we saw (II.
38, etc.)
analysed sensations into two parts; with the Academic and other schools
each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable unit, a
ψιλον
παθος. For this symbolic action of
Zeno cf.
D.F. II. 18,
Orat. 113,
Sextus
A.M. II. 7, Quint.
II. 20, 7, Zeller 84.
Contraxerat: so Halm who
qu. Plin.
Nat. Hist. XI. 26, 94
digitum contrahens aut remittens; Orelli
construxerat; MSS.
mostly
contexerat.
Quod ante non fuerat:
καταλαμβανειν
however is frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the
mind."
Adverterat: the best MSS. give merely
adverat, but
on the margin
admoverat which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one
good MS. has
adverterat.
Ne ipsi quidem: even Socrates,
Antisthenes and Diogenes were not
σοφοι according to the Stoics, but
merely were
εν
προκοπηι; see
Diog.
VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut.
Sto.
Rep. 1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli)
εστι δε
ουτος (i.e.
‛ο
σοφος)
ουδαμου γης
ουδε
γεγονε.
Nec tu: sc.
scis; Goer. has a strange note here.
§146.
Illa: cf.
illa invidiosa above (
144).
Dicebas: in
22.
Refero: "retort," as in Ovid.
Metam. I. 758
pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse
et non potuisse referri; cf. also
par pari referre dicto.
Ne nobis quidem: "
nor would they be angry;" cf. n. on.
I. 5.
Arbitrari:
the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
eye-witness," see Corssen
I. 238.
Ea non
ut: MSS. have
ut ea non aut. Halm reads
ut ea non
merely, but I prefer the reading I have given because of Cicero's
fondness for making the
ut follow closely on the negative: for
this see Madv.
Gram. 465
b, obs.
§147.
Obscuritate: cf.
I. 44, n. on
I. 15.
Plus uno:
115.
Iacere: cf.
79.
Plagas: cf. n. on
112.
§148. Ad
patris revolvor sententiam: for this see Introd.
50, and for the expression
18.
Opinaturum: see
59,
67,
78,
112.
Intellegat se: MSS.
intellegentes, cf. n. on
132.
Qua
re: so Manut. for
per of MSS.
Εποχην illam omnium
rerum: an odd expression; cf.
actio rerum in
62.
Non probans: so Madv.
Em. 204 for
MSS.
comprobans. Dav. conj.
improbans and is followed by
Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is wrong. The difficulty is
essentially the same as that involved in
104,
which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a
theoretical dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that
assent
(meaning absolute assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma
Catulus might well describe himself as formally approving
(
comprobans). The
practice is to give assent (meaning
modified assent). There is the same contrast in
104 between
placere and
tenere. I may
note that the word
alteri (cf.
altero in
104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice
are irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably
confirmed edd. in their introduction of the negative.
Nec eam
admodum: cf.
non repugnarem in
112.
Tollendum: many edd. have gone far astray in interpreting this
passage. The word is used with a double reference to
adsensus and
ancora; in the first way we have had
tollere used a score
of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
Bell. Gall. IV. 23,
Bell. Civ.
I. 31, where
tollere is used of weighing
anchor, and Varro
De Re Rust. III. 17, 1,
where it occurs in the sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any
reference to the sea. (The exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe
and this alone is referred to in
Ad Att. XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried
at first to manage a joke by using the word
inhibendum, which had
also a nautical signification, but finding that he had mistaken the
meaning of the word, substituted
tollendum.
[1] De Leg. II. §3.
[2] Cf.
De Or. II. §1
with II. §5.
[3] Ad Fam. XIII. 1,
Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut philosophus
probabatur.
[4] N.D. I. §93,
Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.
[5] Ad Fam. XIII.
1.
[6] Brutus, §309.
[7] Ad Att. II. 20,
§6.
[8] Ad Fam. XIII. 16.
T.D. V. §113.
Acad. II. §
115.
[9] Brutus, §306.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Rep. I. §7.
T.D. V. §5.
De Off. II. §§3,4.
De Fato, §2.
[12] Cf.
Brutus,
§§312, 322.
[13] Cf.
Brutus,
§§312, 314, 316.
[14] Brutus,
§315.
[15] N.D. I. §59.
[16] VII. I. §35.
[17] Cf.
N.D. I. §93
with
Ad Fam. XIII. 1, §1.
[18] Ac. I. §
46.
[19] D.F. V. §3.
[20] D.F. I. §16.
[21] D.F. V. §6,
etc.
[22] D.F. V. §8.
[23] Ac. II. §
4.
[24] Ib. §
69.
[25] Ad Att. XIII.
19, §5.
[26] Ac. II. §
113.
[27] Ac. II. §
113.
De Leg. I. §54.
[28] II. §
12.
[29] Brutus,
§316.
[30] Hortensius,
fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.
[31] T.D. II.
§61.
[32] De Div. I.
§130.
[33] D.F. I. §6.
[34] Ad Att. I. 10
and 11.
[35] Ibid. II. 1, §3.
N.D. I. §6.
[36] Ad Att. II.
2.
[37] Ibid. I. 20. Cf.
II. 1, §12.
[38] II. 6.
[39] Ad Att. II. 7
and 16.
[40] Ibid. II. 6,
§2.
[41] Cf.
Ad Att. IV.
11 with IV. 8 a.
[42] Ibid. IV.
10.
[43] Ibid. IV. 16,
§2.
[44] Ibid. IV. 16 c,
§10, ed. Nobbe.
[45] Ad Qu. Fr. II.
14.
[46] Ad Qu. Fr. III.
5 and 6.
[47] §332.
[48] Ad Fam. XIII. 1.
Ad Att. V. 11, §6.
[49] Ad Att. V. 10,
§5.
[50] De Off. I.
§1.
[51] Tim. c. 1.
[52] Cf.
Tim. c. 1
with
De Div. I. §5.
Brutus, §250.
[53] Ad Att. VI. 1,
§26.
[54] Ibid. VI. 2,
§3.
[55] Ibid. VI. 6,
§2.
[56] Ibid. VI. 7, §2.
Ad Fam. II. 17, §1.
[57] T.D. V. §22.
[58] Ad Att. VII. 1,
§1.
[59] Ibid. VII. 3,
VIII. 11.
[60] Ad Att. X. 8,
§6.
[61] Ibid. VIII. 2,
§4.
[62] περι
‛ομονοιας,
Ad Att. IX. 9, §2, etc.
[63] Ibid. IX. 4, §2;
9, §1.
[64] Ibid. IX. 10,
§2.
[65] Ad Fam. IX.
1.
[66] Ibid. IX. 3.
[67] Ibid. IV. 3 and
4.
[68] De Rep. I. §7.
T.D. V. §5, etc.
[69] Cf.
N.D. I.
§6.
[70] Esp. I. §§
26,
37.
[71] Cf.
Ac. II. §
29.
[72] Ac. II. §
70.
[73] De Div. II. §1.
Ac. I. §
45, etc.
[74] N.D. I. §1.
[75] Cf. esp.
N.D. I.
§5.
T.D. II. §5.
[76] De Div. II. §1.
N.D. I. §7, etc.
[77] T.D. II. §4.
[78] N.D. I. §10.
[79] Cf.
Ac. II. §
8.
N.D. I. §§10, 66.
[80] T.D. II. §9.
[81] N.D. I. §10.
[82] Ibid. I. §17.
Ac. II. §§
120,
137.
[83] T.D. V. §33.
[84] Ac. II. §
121.
[85] T.D. V. §82,
libas ex omnibus.
[86] Ac. II. §
143.
[87] T.D. V. §11.
[88] Ac. II. §
10.
[89] N.D. I. §12.
[90] Parad. §2.
De
Fato, §3.
T.D. I. §7.
De Off. I. §3.
[91] D.F. IV. §5.
[92] Paradoxa,
§2.
[93] T.D. I. §55.
De Div. II. §62.
[94] T.D. V. §11.
D.F. II. §§1 and 2, etc.
[95] §
13.
[96] Cf. esp.
N.D. i.
§6.
Ac. ii. §§
11 and
17.
[97] De Leg. I.
§39.
[98] Ibid. I. §§55,
56.
[99] N.D. I. §4.
[100] T.D. IV.
§53.
[101] Cf.
De Off.
III. §20.
[102] T.D. V.
§§21-31, esp. §23.
[103] Ibid. V.
§75.
[104] De Off. II.
§35.
[105] T.D. V.
§34.
[106] Ac. I. §
16.
[107] Paradoxa, §4.
Ac. II. §§
136,
137.
T.D. III. §10.
[108] Ac. II. §
135.
[109] See esp.
N.D.
I. §§3, 4.
[110] Ibid., also
T.D. V. §83.
[111] Grote's
Aristotle, vol. I. ch. 11.
[112] T.D. IV. §9.
D.F. III. §41.
[113] I. §
6.
[114] T.D. IV.
§7.
[115] Ibid. IV. §7.
Cf.
D.F. II. §44,
populus cum illis facit.
[116] Ac. I. §
6.
T.D. IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33.
D.F.
III. §40.
[117] T.D. IV.
§3.
[118] D.F. I.
§§4-6.
Ac. I. §
10.
D.F. III. §5.
[119] De Div. I.
§§4, 5.
[120] D.F. III. §5.
N.D. I. §8.
T.D. III. §§10, 16.
[121] T.D. I.
§5.
[122] T.D. II.
§5.
[123] De Div. II.
§1.
De Off. II. §4.
[124] De Div. II.
§6.
De Off. II. §2.
[125] See esp.
De
Consolatione, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe.
T.D. V. §5.
Ac. I.
§
11.
[126] N.D. I.
§6.
[127] T.D. II. §§1,
4.
De Off. II. §3.
D.F. I. §1.
[128] T.D. II. §1.
D.F. I. §§1, 3.
[129] D.F. I. §§1,
11.
[130] De Div. II.
§5.
De Off. II. §2.
T.D. IV. §1.
[131] De Div. II.
§4.
[132] N.D. I. §9.
T.D. II. §1.
[133] De Div. II.
§4.
[134] Ad Att. XII.
19, §1.
[135] Ibid. XII.
14, §3.
[136] Ibid. XII.
15, 16.
[137] Ibid. XII.
21, §5.
[138] Ibid. XII.
23, §2.
[139] Ut scias me ita
dolere ut non iaceam.
[140] De Or. III.
§109.
[141] Ad Att. XII.
28, §2.
[142] Cf. esp.
Ad
Att. XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.
[143] Ibid. XII.
40, §2.
[144] Ibid. XII.
40, §5.
[145] Ibid. XIII.
26.
[146] Ibid. XII.
41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.
[147] Ibid. XII.
46.
[148] Ad Att. XII.
45, §1.
[149] Ьber Cicero's
Akademika, p. 4.
[150] Cf.
Ad Att.
XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the first two
books.
[151] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[152] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[153] Ibid. XIII.
21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.
[154] II. §2.
[155] De Fin.
Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.
[156] Ad Att. XIII.
12, §3; 16, §1.
[157] Ibid. XVI. 3,
§1.
[158] Ibid. XVI. 6,
§4.
[159] Ac. II. §
61.
[160] D.F. I.
§2.
[161] T.D. II. §4.
De Div. II. §1.
[162] Cf. Krische, p.
5.
[163] Ac. II. §
61.
[164] Ad Att. XIII.
5, §1.
[165] Ibid. XIII.
32, §3.
[166] Ad Att. XIII.
33, §4.
[167] Ibid. XIII.
II. §1.
[168] Ibid. XII.
42.
[169] Ibid. XIII.
16, §1.
[170] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[171] Ibid. IV.
16a, §2.
[172] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.
[173] Ad Att. XIII.
12, §3.
[174] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[175] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3.
[176] Ibid. XIII.
19, §4.
[177] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.
[178] Ibid. XIII.
19, §3.
[179] Ad Att. XIII.
22, §1.
[180] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[181] Cf.
Ibid.
XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.
[182] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[183] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[184] Ad Att. XIII.
24.
[185] Ibid. XIII.
13, §1; 18.
[186] Ibid. XIII.
13, §1; 18; 19, §4.
[187] Ibid. XIII.
12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates Schьtz assigns to
these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition of the
Academica in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.
[188] Ad Att. XIII.
13, §1.
[189] Ibid. XIII.
19, §5.
[190] Ibid. XIII.
19, §3.
[191] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[192] Ibid. XIII.
25, §3.
[193] Ibid. XIII.
21, §4.
[194] Ibid. XIII.
21, §5.
[195] Ad Att. XIII.
22, §3.
[196] Ibid. XIII.
24.
[197] Ibid. XIII.
35, 36, §2.
[198] Ibid. XIII.
38, §1.
[199] Ibid. XIII.
21, §§3, 4.
[200] T.D. II. §4.
Cf. Quintil.
Inst. Or. III. 6, §64.
[201] Ad Att. XVI.
6, §4.
N.D. I. §11.
De Div. II. §1.
[202] De Off. II.
§8,
Timжus, c. 1.
Ad Att. XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.
[203] Ad Att. XIII.
12; 16; 13; 19.
[204] Ibid. XVI. 6,
§4.
T.D. II. §4.
N.D. I. §11.
De Div. II. §1.
[205] Nat. Hist.
XXXI. c. 2.
[206] Inst. Or.
III. 6, §64.
[207] Plut.
Lucullus, c. 42.
[208] §§
12,
18,
148.
[209] Cf.
Att.
XIII. 19, §4.
[210] Lucullus,
§12.
[211] Ad Att. XIII.
16, §1.
[212] Lactant.
Inst. VI 2.
[213] Cf. esp.
De
Off. I. §133 with
Brutus, §§133, 134.
[214] Esp.
Pro Lege
Manilia, §51.
[215] Brutus,
§222.
[216] In Verrem,
II. 3, §210.
[217] Pro Lege
Manilia, §59.
[218] Pro Sestio,
§122.
[219] Pro Sestio,
§101.
[220] Philipp. II.
§12.
[221] Ad Att. II.
24, §4.
[222] Pis. §6.
Pro Sestio, §121.
Pro Domo, §113.
Post Reditum in
Senatu, §9.
Philipp. II. §12.
[223] Ad Fam. IX.
15, §3.
[224] Cf.
Post Reditum
in Senatu, §9.
Pro Domo, §113.
[225] Pro Archia,
§§6, 28.
[226] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
9 with §
80.
[227] §
62.
[228] Pro Plancio,
§12.
Pro Murena, §36.
Pro Rabirio, §26.
Pro Cornelia
II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.
[229] T.D. V. §56.
Cf.
De Or. III. §9.
N.D. III. §80.
[230] Cf. esp. III.
§173.
[231] Ibid. II.
§28.
[232] Ibid. II.
§§13, 20, 21.
[233] Ibid. II.
§51.
[234] Cf.
ibid. II.
§74 with III. §127.
[235] Cf. II. §152 with
III. §187.
[236] Ibid. II.
§154.
[237] Brutus,
§§132, 133, 134, 259.
De Or. III. §29.
[238] Brutus,
§132.
[239] De Or. II.
§244.
N.D. I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
[240] De Or. II.
§155.
[241] Ibid. III.
§194.
[242] Cf.
De Or.
II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.
[243] De Or. I. §82
sq.; II. §360.
[244] Ibid. I. §45;
II. §365; III. §§68, 75.
[245] §
12,
commemoravit a patre suo dicta
Philoni.
[246] Cf.
De Or.
III. §110.
[247] Ac. II. §
148.
[248] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
11.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid. §§
12,
18, with my notes.
[251] Ac. II. §
12:
ista quae heri defensa sunt compared with
the words
ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
[252] See below.
[253] Ac. II. §§
33—
36 inclusive; §
54.
[254] Ac. II. §
28.
[255] Cf.
Ac. II.
§§
59,
67,
78,
112,
148, with my notes.
[256] Ibid. II. §
10.
[257] Ibid. II. §
28.
[258] Cf. II. §
61 with the fragments of the
Hortensius; also
T.D. II. §4; III. §6;
D.F. I. §2.
[259] Lactant. III.
16.
[260] Cf.
Ac. II.
§
10.
[261] Ib. II. §
61.
[262] §§
44—
46.
[263] §
13.
[264] Cf. II. §
14 with I. §
44, and II. §§
55,
56.
[265] II. §§
17,
18,
22.
[266] Cf. II. §
31 with I. §
45.
[267] II. §§
17,
24,
26,
27,
29,
38,
54,
59.
[268] II. §
79.
[269] Cf. the words
tam
multa in II. §
79.
[270] See II. §
42, where there is a reference to the "
hesternus
sermo."
[271] II. §
10.
[272] Cf. II. §
10:
id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut
tota fere quaestio tractata videatur.
[273] What these were will
appear from my notes on the
Lucullus.
[274] II. §
12.
[275] Ad Fam. IX.
8.
[276] Cf.
Ad Att.
XIII. 25, §3:
Ad Brutum transeamus.
[277] This is not, as
Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death.
That lay at Puteoli: see
Ad Att. VII. 3, §9.
[278] II. §
9.
[279] Cf. II. §6
1.
[280] II. §
80:
O praeclarum prospectum!
[281] Cf. II. §
9 with §
128 (
signum
illud), also §§
80,
81,
100,
105,
125.
[282] II. §
115.
[283] II. §
63.
[284] II. §§
147,
148.
[285] II. §
135.
[286] Cf. II. §§
11, 12 with the words
quae erant contra ακαταληψιαν
praeclare collecta ab Antiocho:
Ad Att. XIII. 19, §3.
[287] Varro,
De Re
Rust. III. 17.
[288] II. §
11.
[289] Paradoxa, §1.
D.F. III. §8.
Brutus, §119.
[290] Ac. I. §
12.
D.F. V. §8.
[291] Cf. II. §
80.
[292] Cf. Aug.
Adv.
Acad. III. §35. Nonius, sub v.
exultare.
[293] Cf. the word
nuper in §
1.
[294] §
11.
[295] §§
3,
18.
[296] Ad Fam. IX.
8, §1.
[297] Ad Att. II.
25, §1.
[298] Ibid. III. 8,
§3.
[299] Ibid. III.
15, §3; 18, §1.
[300] Ad Fam. IX.
1—8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in
our collections.
[301] Above, pp.
xxxvii—xlii.
[302] De Civ. Dei,
XIX. cc. 1—3.
[303] See Madvig,
De
Fin. ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Brьckner,
Leben des
Cicero, I. p. 655, follows Mьller.
[304] Cf. Krische, p.
58.
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