"SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT" - читать интересную книгу автора (Locke John)

distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family,
and a captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of
making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less
penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in the execution of such
laws, and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign
injury; and all this only for the public good.




C H A P. I I.

Of the State of Nature.

Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it
from its original, we must consider, what state all men are
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another;
there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same
species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages
of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection,
unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on
him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious
Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all
question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to
mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe
one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of
justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know
that it is no less their duty, to love others than
themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must
needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to
receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have
any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be
careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly
in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have
any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must
needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no