and his congregation in accordance with the doctrines of the church he serves,
for he was employed by it on that condition. But as a scholar, he is completely
free as well as obliged to impart to the public all his carefully considered,
well-intentioned thoughts on the mistaken aspects of those doctrines, and to
offer suggestions for a better arrangement of religious and ecclesiastical
affairs. And there is nothing in this which need trouble the conscience. I;or
what he teaches in pursuit of his duties as an active servant of the church is
presented by him as something which he is not empowered to teach at his own
discretion, but which he is employed to expound in a prescribed manner and in
someone else's name. He will say: Our church teaches this or that, and these are
the arguments it uses. He then extracts as much practical value as possible for
his congregation from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full
conviction, but which he can nevertheless undertake to expound, since it is not
in fact wholly impossible that they may contain truth. At all events, nothing
opposed to the essence of religion is present in such doctrines. For if the
clergyman thought he could find anything of this sort in them, he would not be
able to carry out his official duties in good conscience, and would have to
resign. Thus the use which someone employed as a teacher makes of his reason in
the presence of his congregation is purely private, since a congregation,
however large it is, is never any more than a domestic gathering. In view of
this, he is not and cannot be free as a priest, sinП he is acting on a
commission imposed from outside. Conversely, as a scholar addressing the real
public (i.e. the world at large) through his writings, the clergyman making
public use of his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to
speak in his own person. For to maintain that the guardians of the people in
spiritual matters should themselves be immature, is an absurdity which amounts
to making absurdities permanent.
But should not a society of clergymen, for example an ecclesiastical synod or a
venerable presbytery (as the Dutch call it), be entitled to commit itself by
oath to a certain unalterable set of doctrines, in order to secure for all time
a constant guardianship over each of its members, and through them over the
people ? I reply that this is quite impossible. A contract of this
kind,concluded with a view to preventing all further enlightenment of mankind
for ever, is absolutely null and void, even if it is ratified by the supreme
power, by Imperial Diets and the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot
enter into an alliance on oath to put the next age in a position where it would
be impossible for it to extend and correct its knowledge, particularly on such
important matters, or to make any progress whatsoever in enlightenment. This
would be a crime against human nature, whose original destiny lies precisely in
such progress. Later generations are thus perfectly entitled to dismiss these
agreements as unauthorised and criminal. To test whether any particular measure
can be agreed upon as a law for a people, we need only ask whether a people
could well impose such a law upon itself. This might well be possible for a
specified short period as a means of introducing a certain order, pending, as it
were, a better solution. This would also mean that each citizen, particularly
the clergyman, would be given a free hand as a scholar to comment publicly, i.e.
in his writings, on the inadequacies of current institutions. Meanwhile, the
newly established order would continue to exist, until public insight into the
nature of such matters had progressed and proved itself to the point where, by
