"Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence (англ) " - читать интересную книгу автора

technically promoted him, appointing his deputy to succeed him, but in fact
this deprived him of direct leadership of the Organs of State because his
title of minister was taken away. Within the framework of the programme for
weakening the Army and the Ministry of State Security, Stalin decided to
remove intelligence from both the Army and State Security. This plan was put
into effect in 1947. The GRU and the organs of political intelligence of the
Ministry of State Security were joined together in one organisation called
the KI: the Committee of Information. The man closest to Stalin was
appointed to lead this organisation, and this was the activist of the
Politburo, Molotov. Thus the Army and Ministry of State Security were
deprived of intelligence. All intelligence work would henceforth be
subordinate to the Party. Such a situation did not suit the Army or the
Ministry of State Security, and they for the first time united against the
Party.
>From its inception the Committee of Information was an utterly
ineffective organisation. The intelligence officers of the Ministry of State
Security and the GRU, who formed the nucleus of the Committee of
Information, strove by all means to return from under the control of the
Party back to their own former organisations. Both sets of officers strove
to sabotage the activities of the Committee of Information. The Ministry of
State Security and the Army, acting in collusion, informed the Central
Committee that they could no longer work effectively since they were
receiving their information at second hand. Then they exerted pressure on
their former officers in order to try to make the Committee of Information
collapse from inside. The Central Committee of the Party made efforts to
improve the effectiveness of the Committee of Information. In less than a
year four chiefs were appointed and dismissed, for the reason that not one
of them was able to counter the unified strength of the Ministry of State
Security and the Army. After long struggles behind the scenes Abakumov, a
pupil and favourite of Beria, became Chief of the Committee of Information.
At a stroke, all the intelligence services passed to the control of the
Ministry of State Security. Stalin immediately saw that a mistake had been
made. In his opinion, the creation of one intelligence service, even if it
was under the leadership of the Party, must sooner or later lead to the
Tchekists seizing power over this organisation, and this would mortally
endanger the Party. There was only one way out of such a situation:
immediately to liquidate the Committee of Information and divide the
intelligence service into two hostile camps - military intelligence to the
Army, and political intelligence to State Security. But the coup was not an
easy one. To get round the problem, the Party naturally found support from
the Army which had not been at all happy with State Security's monopoly of
the intelligence service. On the instructions of Stalin, the first deputy of
the chief of the general staff, General Shtemyenko, made a report to the
Politburo on the subject of the 'blind general staff, after which the GRU
was removed from the control of Abakumov and given to the Army. For his
distinguished services, Stalin immediately appointed General Shtemyenko as
chief of the general staff the senior curator of the GRU. After two years
Shtemyenko and the GRU, seeking to please Stalin, presented documents about
the existence of an agreement among subordinates of Abakumov. Abakumov was
immediately shot, the Committee of Information finally abolished, and the