"David Hume - Of the Standard of Taste" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of
its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has
a just taste without a sound understanding.

Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and,
nearly, if not entirely the same in all men; yet few are
qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish
their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. The organs of
internal sensation are seldom so perfect as to allow the
general principles their full play, and produce a feeling
correspondent to those principles. They either labour under
some defect, or are vitiated by some disorder; and by that
means, excite a sentiment, which may be pronounced erroneous.
When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any
distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more
palpable qualities of the object: The finer touches pass
unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice,
his verdict is attended with confusion and hesitation. Where
no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties,
such as rather merit the name of defects., are the object of
his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of
prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where
good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the
beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and
most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections,
the generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in the
finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to
be so fare a character; Strong sense, united to delicate
sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and
cleared of all prejudice, can along entitle critics to this
valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever
they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and
beauty.

But where are such critics to be found? By what marks are they
to be known? How distinguish them from pretenders? These
questions are embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the
same uncertainty, from which, during the course of this essay,
we have endeavoured to extricate ourselves.

But if we consider the matter aright, these are questions of
fact, not of sentiment. Whether any particular person be
endowed with good sense and a delicate imagination, free from
prejudice, may often be the subject of dispute, and be liable
to great discussion and enquiry: but that such a character is
valuable and estimable will be agreed in by all mankind. Where
these doubts occur, men can do no more than in other
disputable questions, which are submitted to the
understanding: They must produce the best arguments, that
their invention suggests to them; they must acknowledge a true